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Chapter 1
Epistemic perspectives: Evidentiality,
egophoricity, and engagement
Henrik Bergqvist
Stockholm University
Seppo Kittilä
University of Helsinki
1 Introduction
In the last decade, there has been a surge in output on various forms of epistemic
marking in language, including (epistemic) modality, evidentiality, mirativity,
egophoricity, and engagement.1 Some of these terms are better known than oth-
ers.2 To begin with, epistemic modality has a long research tradition stemming
1Edited volumes that deserve mention are: Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003; 2014) on evidentiality,
modality, and expressions of knowing in grammar more broadly; Gawne & Hill (2017) on evi-
dentiality in Tibetan languages and Floyd et al. (2018) on egophoricity. The list of journal
articles on epistemic marking in grammar is (very) long, but we may note Evans et al. (2017a,
2017b) on engagement, Bergqvist & Knuchel (2017) on egophoricity, and San Roque et al. (2017)
on evidentials and interrogativity.
2By using terms like “evidentiality” and “egophoricity”, we refer to meaning domains that signal
how knowledge about events can be qualified in different ways. Usually, such domain labels
come with a definition that is found in the seminal literature dealing with a given domain (e.g.
Palmer 2001, for modality), but this is not always the case. Definitional criteria for compara-
ble systems and forms are often contested and in a relatively young field such as the present
one, debates concerning what counts as defining (semantic) features of a certain domain, are
especially fierce. In this volume, a term like “evidentiality” is regarded as constituting a lin-
guistic category in some languages, but consequently also refers to an epistemic domain that
expresses different “modes of access” (Plungian 2010) with respect to how knowledge about
events may be acquired.
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from philosophy and qualifies an utterance in terms of possibility and probabil-
ity, ranging from speculation to high certainty. The first monograph-length treat-
ment of epistemic modality from a cross-linguistic perspective is Palmer (1986;
2001). At about the same time, research on the related category, evidentiality, also
began to gain momentum. Evidentiality signals the source of information that a
speaker has for an utterance. It is often sub-divided into direct and indirect ev-
identials where direct evidentials target the (direct) perception of the speaker,
signaling sensory access (visual, auditory) to a discourse object. Indirect eviden-
tials express other types of cognitive access, such as inference, assumption, and
hearsay, and may be differentiated by how directly accessible a given type of evi-
dence is. For example, inference and assumption are both based on the speaker’s
observation of a state-of-affairs that is not directly related to the event his/her
claim is based on (e.g., we may infer that someone has left if that person’s coat
is gone). Inference is usually based on direct sensory perception, while assump-
tion is often based on our general knowledge of the world, thus differing in type
of indirect access (see e.g. Willett 1988). Aikhenvald (2004) is the first typologi-
cal treatment of evidentiality, but it is Chafe & Nichols’ (1986) seminal volume
that is commonly regarded as the first work to investigate evidentiality from a
cross-linguistic perspective.
Mirativity is regarded as separate from evidentiality by some (e.g. DeLancey
1997), but the ultimate definition of this category (and even its existence) is still
under debate.3
Miratives signal new/non-assimilated knowledge and has often been said to
convey the surprise of the speaker (DeLancey 1997; cf. Aikhenvald 2014). Surprise
as a defining semantic component of mirativity has increasingly been rejected,
however, whereas the signaling of new/non-assimilated information appears to
be more widely accepted (but see Hill 2012 for arguments against the category of
mirativity). In some languages (e.g. Turkish and Finnish), mirativity is found in
specific uses of inferential evidential morphemes, while in other languages (such
as Hare), there is a morpheme whose primary, or even only, function, is to signal
mirativity (DeLancey 1997).
Egophoricity signals the epistemic authority of a speaker or addressee (speech-
act participant) subject to his/her involvement in a talked-about event (Bergqvist
2018a; Bergqvist & Kittilä 2017; cf. Hargreaves 2005). This dialogical property of
the egophoric marker has produced a pattern where egophoric markers occur
in statements with first person subjects and in questions with second person
3See e.g. the debate in Linguistic Typology, involving, among others, Hill (2012), DeLancey (2012),
and Hengeveld & Olbertz (2012).
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subjects: I am leaving. [EGO] vs. Are you leaving? [EGO]. This functional overlap
with person marking has led some to regard egophoric marking as a form of
person marking/agreement, but it is clear from diachronic, distributional, and
semantic criteria that egophoric marking is distinct from person marking (see
Bergqvist & Kittilä 2017, for a discussion). Egophoricity, as a term to designate
this kind of epistemic marking, was proposed by Tournadre (1996: 201), but the
forms he discussed using the term had already been described by Austin Hale
(1980) for Kathmandu Newar, then called “conjunct” (contrasted to “disjunct”).
Subsequent research on the phenomenon called into question the usefulness of
the label “conjunct/disjunct” and various proposals were put forth to replace it
(e.g. “assertors involvement”, Creissels 2008; “congruent/non-congruent”, Dick-
inson 2000). Floyd et al. (2018) opts for the term “egophoricity” in providing a
comprehensive overview of the phenomenon.
“Engagement”, finally, is a term that has had some currency in French linguis-
tics (e.g. Desclés 2009; Guentchéva 2011) and in discourse studies (Hyland 2005),
but in the work of Evans et al. (2017a, 2017b) it is used as a label for a kind of epis-
temic marking separate from the categories outlined above. Engagement targets
the epistemic perspectives of the speech-act participants, signaling differences in
the distribution of knowledge and/or attention between the speaker and the ad-
dressee. As such, it specifies whether information is shared, or exclusive to one of
the speech-act participants. This contrast is exemplified with data from Southern
Nambikwara (Kroeker 2001: 63–64 [our adjusted glossing and translation]):
(1) Nambikwara
a. wa3ko3n-a1-Ø-wa2.
work-1-PRS-EXCL-IMPF
‘I am working.’
b. wa3ko3n-a1-ti2.tu3-wa2
work-1-SHRD-IMPF
‘(You and I see that) I am working’
In (1), the semantic contrast between exclusive and shared knowledge is sig-
naled by a zero morpheme and the -ti2.tu3-suffix, respectively.4
While the translation suggests a visual mode of access to go along with such
knowledge asymmetry, this is not encoded in said forms, but signaled by means
of separate evidential morphology (see Kroeker 2001, for details). Engagement
markers are generally underspecified with respect to how knowledge about an
4Kroeker’s label for what we term engagement, is “verification”.
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event is gained, but Evans et al. (2017b) note that engagement markers often
combine with evidentials and modals to signal (a)symmetries in terms of ac-
cessibility to and belief of some event. An issue that relates to the topic of the
present volume in terms of categorical overlap, is whether the assumed distri-
bution of knowledge between the speech-act participants concerns their actual
knowledge/non-knowledge, or their rights/non-rights to knowledge (see Grzech
2020 [this volume]). It is possible that this contrast in terms of knowledge ac-
cess and rights to knowledge is subject to variation across engagement systems.
While engagement has yet to be widely accepted as a grammatical category in
some languages, arguments for making such a claim are put forth in §3.3, below.
The organization of this introductory chapter is as follows: In §2, we will dis-
cuss the functional and semantic overlaps between the discussed categories on a
general level. In §3, we will focus on the relation between the discussed categories
as resources for expressing epistemic authority, and in §4, we will summarize the
main points of the paper and suggest some ideas for future research.
2 Functional and semantic overlap between categories
It is a widely known fact that the abovementioned categories overlap in form,
meaning, and function (see Cornillie 2009; de de Haan 1999; inter alia). This has
been especially noted with respect to modality and evidentiality, where an En-
glish modal verb like must may be treated as a modal, or an evidential depending
on the context of use. Such ambiguity has led some researchers to analyze eviden-
tiality as a subtype of modality (e.g. Palmer 1986; Palmer 2001), whereas others
have argued for a strict separation between the two categories (e.g. Aikhenvald
2004).
A comparable overlap has also been observed for evidentiality, mirativity, and
egophoricity. With respect to evidentiality and mirativity, an inferential (eviden-
tial) form may also serve as a mirative depending on the context of use, as in Turk-
ish (Slobin & Aksu 1982). Evidentiality and egophoricity overlap to the extent
that egophoric markers may be part of evidential paradigms and thus contrast
with evidential forms. Semantically, some have argued that egophoric marking
cannot be regarded as a kind of evidential marking due to the fact that such mark-
ers do not signal a source of information as such (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004). Others
have argued the opposite and regard egophoric markers as the strongest kind of
access that speakers employ to justify a statement (Plungian 2010; San Roque &
Loughnane 2012; cf. Boye 2012, evidentiality as “justification”). Egophoric mark-
ers have sometimes been analyzed as a kind of mirative marker for Tibetan and
4
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Barbacoan languages (DeLancey 1997; Dickinson 2000; but see Curnow 2002, for
a critique). Kittilä (forthcoming), shows that egophoric markers have features in
common with general knowledge/factual evidentials and that claims of factuality
may formally resemble markers of both visual evidence and volitional participa-
tion in an event.
Several papers in this volume discuss categorical overlaps of the kind sketched
above. We will mention a few of them here. Liljegren notes for the Indo-Aryan
language Palula that indirect evidentiality is produced by the contextualized
token-use of perfect forms in addition to employing sentence final particles de-
noting hearsay and inference. The use of aspectual forms and particles to serve
evidential functions are a commonly noted phenomenon, which has also been at-
tested for Turkic (Slobin & Aksu 1982), Caucasian (Tatevosov 2001), and Persian
languages (Lazard 1996).
Grzech accounts for epistemic markers in a variety of Quechua that previ-
ously have been described as evidentials, but which Grzech analyzes as signaling
epistemic authority. Given the defining role of epistemic authority in egophoric
marking, this constitutes a clear case of conceptual overlap between the two cat-
egories where a set of evidential markers (i.e. that are cognate to evidentials in re-
lated languages) have developed egophoric semantics. While assigning epistemic
authority is implied by the use of direct and indirect evidentials (see §3.1, below),
it has become encoded in Tena Kichwa, an Ecuadorian variety of Quechua. Con-
versely, languages with egophoric marking (see e.g. Tournadre 2008) may imply
the cognitive access that a speaker claims for making an assertion, while the
speaker’s epistemic authority is encoded in the form (see §3.2, below).
For Kalapalo, Basso accounts for an enormously rich variety of epistemic mark-
ers with different grammatical status that includes modal and evidential notions,
but which also feature participation and the positioning of knowledge between
the speech-act participants. In a language like Kalapalo, it may not be fruitful to
base categorical distinctions on formal criteria, given their distribution in differ-
ent parts of the grammar. Rather than a small number of forms serving many
functions, Kalapalo has many forms serving overlapping functions, thus consti-
tuting an entirely different kind of categorical overlap than the one that e.g. Lil-
jegren reports for Palula.
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3 The relation between evidentiality, egophoricity, and
engagement
How may we account for the overlaps discussed above? The conceptual overlap
between categories is evident from a functionalist perspective, but how this corre-
sponds to their semanto-pragmatic properties and distinct development requires
further discussion. With respect to the development of markers belonging to the
categories that are the topic of the present volume, it is clear that the presence
of pragmatically contingent components of meaning (e.g. inference as a token-
feature of perfects) makes possible an eventual encoding of this implied feature
to become part of the semantics of a form. This conventionalization of impli-
cature (Levinson 2000) is a driving force in grammaticalization processes more
generally and we may observe this for epistemic marking, as well (see Bergqvist
2018a). The aim of this section is to account for how implied meaning in the use
of certain markers suggests the relation between the investigated categories and
the reason for the frequently attested overlaps between categories.
3.1 Cognitive access vs. (dis)claiming epistemic authority:
Evidentiality
The notion of evidentiality in language has been equated with providing justi-
fication for how information was acquired, i.e. the source of information that a
speaker has for making an assertion about an event. Willett (1988) is still a good
starting point for an illustration of the basic semantic features and divisions rel-
evant to evidentiality in a cross-linguistic sense.
types of evidence
direct
visual
auditory
other sensory
indirect
reported hearsayfolklore
second-hand
third-hand
inferring
results
reasoning
Figure 1.1: Evidential categories (after Willett 1988)
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There is an implicit expectation for the speaker to provide the highest form
of evidence for an assertion, which produces a hierarchical relation in terms of
strength of evidence. Direct evidentials conveying “visual” access (i.e. ‘I know
this from having seen it’) usually constitutes a stronger form of evidence than
other sensory access (i.e. ‘I know this from having heard/felt/smelt it’). It is, how-
ever, important to note that states-of-affairs display variation in this regard. For
example, olfactory evidence is more direct and reliable for a claim like ‘There
must be a gas leak here somewhere’, and tactile evidence outranks visual evi-
dence for claims such as ‘The water is hot’. In general, though, visual evidence
ranks highest, a suggestion that is supported by the use of visual evidential forms
to express participatory/factual evidence in some languages (see §3.2, below). For
indirect evidentials, it is possible to argue that making an inference based on e.g.
visual evidence (i.e. ‘I know this because I know/see what caused it’) is a stronger
form of assertion than one based on report (i.e. ‘I know this because someone
told me about it’). As stated above, inference and assumption are in principle
very similar types of evidence, and both of them are classified as personal and in-
direct evidence by Plungian (2010: 37). However, these two evidence types differ
from each other as regards their directness and reliability; inference is based on
a more reliable (usually directly observable) evidence, while assumption is based
on our general knowledge of the world (see the definitions offered by Plungian
2010: 37). We can also see that the hierarchical relation between direct and in-
direct evidence in terms of strength may not always hold, since e.g. “folklore”,
as a kind of reported evidential (i.e. ‘I know this from (our) oral tradition’), may
be deemed a very reliable source despite the fact that no member of the speech
community has direct access to the events portrayed.
Possibly the most thoroughly investigated aspect of evidentiality is reported
speech,5 which also corresponds to the “simplest” kind of evidential system where
reported speech is the only evidential marker. Estonian exemplifies such a sys-
tem with only a hearsay marker (see Aikhenvald 2004 for details). But despite
this emphasis on reported speech in the literature on evidentiality, a narrow con-
ception of evidentiality as a verbal category tends to emphasize the role of direct
perception (i.e. visual, auditory) in grammaticalized evidentiality systems. In de
Haan’s (2013) survey of evidential systems, however, systems that feature both
direct and indirect evidentials are much less common than systems with only
5This is an impressionistic claim that would be difficult to substantiate statistically given the (by
now) vast literature on evidentiality. Reportive evidentials were, however, discussed as early
as Jakobson (1957) and has continued to occupy research on European languages as well as
more cross-linguistically oriented research (see e.g. Boye 2012).
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indirect evidentials. Evidential systems with only direct evidentials are not at-
tested at all in the survey. From this cross-linguistic patterning, we may gather
that the grammatical expression of evidentiality is primarily a means to signal
indirect access to events, and that this indirect access sometimes is (explicitly)
contrasted to direct access. In the default case (i.e. indirect access to an event),
evidentiality is not so much a strategy to signal ownership of knowledge through
some cognitive channel, but a disclaimer of epistemic authority as a consequence
of restricted (i.e. indirect) sensory access (cf. Mushin 2001).
Signaling indirect access to an event in terms of inference, or assumption, does
not necessarily mean that there is a restriction present on the sensory access that
a speaker has to the talked-about event. In data resulting from the use of an in-
teractive elicitation task developed by Nick Evans and colleagues (described in
San Roque et al. 2012), it is clear that explicit, visual representations of people,
things, and events will prompt the use of inferentials and assumptives even in
cases where such representations appear unambiguous (e.g. Quartararo 2017).
The simple fact that depicted events and people are outside of the speaker’s do-
main of epistemic authority, may be sufficient to warrant a more cautious ap-
proach to asserting such events by using indirect evidentials. The speaker may
mark an event as being inferred from his/her point of view, rather than claiming
direct perceptual access to the contents of the picture, possibly because such con-
tents pertain to previously unknown characters in a fictional universe. Curnow
(2003) discusses the use of non-visual/indirect forms with first person subjects
to produce unintentional/non-volitional readings of utterances (see Example 2b,
below). Such interpretation effects are in line with the hypothesis that indirect
evidentials function as disclaimers of epistemic authority. However, it is also
possible to use evidentials to claim epistemic authority by means of direct evi-
dentials. This may be a less prominent function of evidentials, but one that links
evidentiality to egophoricity (see §3.2, below). Just like indirect evidentials may
be used even in cases where the speaker has direct sensory access to a talked
about event, so are direct evidentials sometimes used to signal other forms of
access than their semantics may suggest (i.e. visual, auditory). One such form of
access that may be signaled by the use of direct evidentials, is “(volitional) partici-
pation”. Participatory meaning in the context of evidentiality may result from the
distribution of direct evidential forms with subject pronouns (i.e. first vs. third
person), or they can constitute distinct forms that are part of paradigms along-
side other direct forms that signal visual access to the referent (see Example 3,
below). Examples of how the distribution of direct evidentials may produce par-
ticipatory meaning according to subject person, is discussed by Curnow (2002:
188–190, citing Ramirez 1997: 133):
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(2) Tucano
a. bapá
plate
bope-ápɨ
break-REC.PAST.NON3.VISUAL
‘I broke the plate (of my own will, e.g., because I was angry).’
b. bapá
plate
bope-ásɨ
break-REC.PAST.NON3.NONVISUAL
‘I broke the plate accidentally (I didn’t see it on the table).’
Curnow discusses the examples from Tucano as an instance of interpretation
effects resulting from the distribution of forms signaling a visual/non-visual con-
trast with first person subjects. Such effects are also reported for other languages
and depending on what evidentials are present in each language, different effects
may arise (see Curnow 2002; 2003 for details).
In Central Pomo, the evidential paradigm contains a form, -la, which denotes
“personal agency” (Mithun 1999: 181):
(3) Central Pomo
da-ché-w=la
pulling-seize-PRF=PERSONAL.AGENCY
‘I caught it.’ (I know because I did it)
It should be noted that performative, or participatory, evidentials assume part
of the function of person agreement, given the implied agency of a first person
subject in such forms. Subject identity is not an encoded feature, however, and
reference to the actions of third person subjects featuring performative/partici-
patory forms may produce a factual reading that corresponds in epistemic sta-
tus to participatory meaning when referring to events and actions involving the
speaker. This means that factual events involving third persons may be marked
in the same way as events involving one of the speech-act participants as a partic-
ipant. Bergqvist & Kittilä (2017; cf. Bergqvist 2015) explores participation/involve-
ment as part of evidential systems in order to place this notion against egophoric
marking, in which volitional participation/involvement has been suggested as a
defining notion (see directly below). One reason to make such a comparison re-
lates to the ongoing debate on whether egophoric marking is a kind of evidential
marker, or if egophoric marking constitutes a separate grammatical expression
altogether. If “source of information” (Aikhenvald 2004) is the preferred defini-
tion, then participation will be difficult to accommodate within such a definition
(but see San Roque & Loughnane 2012 for a discussion). If viewed from the per-
spective of epistemic marking in language, more generally, then cognitive access
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to events must be situated against related means to signal access more broadly,
including access from participation/involvement (see Bergqvist 2017; cf. Boye
2012).
3.2 Involvement and epistemic authority: Egophoricity
Egophoricity is a recently proposed term for a form of epistemic marking that
prototypically occurs with first and second person subjects in declarative and
interrogative clauses, respectively (see Floyd et al. 2018, for a cross-linguistic
overview). Egophoricity is also known as “conjunct/disjunct”-marking in the lit-
erature (e.g. Bickel & Nichols 2007), but competing terms also exist (see §1, above).
Example (4) portrays the two combinations of subject person and sentence type
that trigger egophoric marking in Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980). All other com-
binations of subject person and sentence-type produces non-egophoric marking
(i.e. 1S+interrogative/2S+declarative/3S+any sentence type):
(4) Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980: 95, [our adjusted glossing])
a. ji
1S.ABS
ana
there
wanā
go.EGO
‘I went there.’
b. cha
2S.ABS
ana
there
wanā
go.EGO
lā
INTERR
‘Did you go there?’
In addition to this distributional pattern, there are also restrictions on what
verbs may take the egophoric marker. In Kathmandu Newar, only verbs that fea-
ture (volitional) agents are permitted. The contrast between verbs that denote
volitional actions and ones that do not, is illustrated in (5) (Hargreaves 2005: 12–
13):
(5) Kathmandu Newar
a. jĩ:
1.ERG
jyā
work
yān-ā
do-PST.EGO
‘I did the work.’
b. ji
1.ABS
mhiga
yesterday
then-a
arrive-PFV.ALLO
‘I arrived yesterday.’
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c. jĩ:
1.ERG
thul-a
understand-PFV.ALLO
‘I understood (it).’
Bergqvist & Knuchel (2017) take a broad approach to analyzing egophoric
marking by outlining the boundaries of speech-act participant involvement in
such systems. Although the volitional actions of a speech-act participant pur-
portedly are a defining semantic component of egophoric marking, it has become
increasingly clear that this is not the only kind of involvement that may trigger
the use of an egophoric marker. Involvement as a basis for epistemic authority
may in some instances target the affectedness, or even the attitude of a speak-
er/addressee (Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017: 369). Given that such an encompassing
formulation of involvement is applicable to some egophoric markers, Bergqvist &
Knuchel propose that “epistemic authority” is actually the core semantic notion
that may define egophoric marking against other forms of epistemic marking,
such as evidentials and epistemic modals. Focusing on the notion of epistemic
authority also bridges the gap to seemingly unrelated phenomena such as “eth-
ical datives”, which share formal and functional features with egophoric mark-
ing, as described for a language like Standard Tibetan (see Bergqvist & Knuchel
2017, for details). The involvement of a speech-act participant produces a kind of
epistemic inalienability that permits the speaker to assign epistemic authority to
him/herself, or the addressee without necessarily specifying what this involve-
ment consists of.
The notion of epistemic authority may be conceptualized as a driving force in
verbal interaction more generally and serves to situate information with respect
to the speech-act participants. As such, it goes well beyond the use of egophoric
markers in languages where this is an attested form of epistemic marking. For
English (arguably a language without egophoric marking), the notion of epis-
temic authority may be seen in the correspondence between sentence-type and
communicative function, an issue that has concerned speech-act theory since its
formulation (Searle 1969). Sometimes an assertion may function as a question in
a communicative sense, and vice versa. In fact, the majority of polar questions in
American English have the form of an assertion (Stivers 2010; Stivers & Rossano
2010). In order to explain this apparent discrepancy, Heritage (2012) argues that
the notions, “epistemic status” and “epistemic stance” are key for understanding
discrepancies between grammatical form and (social) action. Epistemic status, as
an index of relative epistemic authority, is formulated with reference to the no-
tion of A and B-events (Labov & Fanshel 1977), where A-events are known only
to the speaker (speaker authority) and B-events are known only to the addressee
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(addressee authority). Typical B-events include the addressee’s opinions, beliefs,
and bodily states, but may also include his/her professional expertise. Heritage
offers the following definition of epistemic status:
(W)e can consider relative epistemic access to a domain as stratified be-
tween actors such that they occupy different positions on an epistemic gra-
dient (more knowledgeable [K+] or less knowledgeable [K−]), which itself
may vary in slope from shallow to deep […]. We will refer to this relative
positioning as epistemic status, in which persons recognize one another to
be more or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowledge (…)
(Heritage 2012: 32)
The speaker’s epistemic stance can be congruent or incongruent with the
speaker’s epistemic status, as seen in the example, you’re married, provided by
Heritage, which may be understood as a request for confirmation despite its as-
sertive formulation, given that it pertains to the addressee’s marital status. A
statement such as, you’re sad, using an assertive form, may be deemed incongru-
ent to the speaker’s epistemic status, given that it must be regarded as K-, given
the addressee’s obvious epistemic authority over his/her own emotional states.
Speakers of any language continuously keep track of what others know and
how their own knowledge can be related to the knowledge of others, and Her-
itage offers us a detailed and empirically grounded picture of how this works
in everyday conversation. Such assumptions most prominently involve the ad-
dressee and explicit formulations of how the addressee’s perspective is attended
to have received some attention in the field of discourse studies, notably in work
by Ken Hyland (e.g. 1999; 2001; 2005). More recently, cross-linguistic research
has led to the formulation of “engagement” as a bona fide epistemic category
in some languages (see Evans et al. 2017a) and the relation between engagement
and epistemic authority deserves to be explored in the definition of both notions.
3.3 Shared vs. non-shared access/rights to knowledge: Engagement
Engagement consists of a contrast between the speaker’s assertion about the ad-
dressee’s knowledge of/attention to an event (e) as either shared or non-shared
with the speaker. I know e and I assume that you know e too, is contrasted with, I
know e and I assume that you do not (Evans et al. 2017a; cf. “complex perspective”,
Evans 2005; cf. “complex epistemic perspective”, Bergqvist 2015; 2016; 2017). This
semantic contrast may in principle concern any aspect of epistemicity, and is as
such relevant for any form of epistemic marking (see below). Engagement tar-
gets “knowing” from a socio-centric perspective, where the speaker’s assertion
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contains an embedded assertion assumed to belong to the addressee. Such as-
sumptions may be implied in the token-use of other forms of epistemic marking,
but in a language with engagement as a category, this implicature has become
encoded in forms to signal asymmetries in the knowledge/attention states of the
speech-act participants.
In Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan; Bergqvist 2016; cf. Ortíz Ricaurte 1994), speakers
can choose one of four auxiliary prefixes that encode engagement.6 These pre-
fixes may be divided into two sets that take the speaker and the addressee as their
respective starting points. A focus on the perspective of the speaker is found with
na-/ni-, where na- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the addressee to
be unaware of e’ (6a), and ni- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the
addressee to know e too’ (6b) (Bergqvist 2016: 2):
(6) Kogi
a. kwisa-té
dance-IMPF
na-nuk-kú
SPKR.ASYM-be.LOC-1S
‘I am/was dancing.’ (informing)
b. kwisa-té
dance-IMPF
ni-nuk-kú
SPKR.SYM-be.LOC-1S
‘I am/was dancing.’ (confirming)
Na-/ni- are in turn contrasted to sha-/shi-, which encode a corresponding dis-
tinction in terms of non-shared/shared knowledge from the addressee’s perspec-
tive. sha- means that ‘the speaker expects the addressee to know e while the
speaker is unaware of e’ (7a), and shi- means that ‘the speaker expects the ad-
dressee to know e, and the speaker knows e too’ (7b) (Bergqvist 2016: 3):
(7) Kogi
a. nas
1SG.IND
hanchibé
good
sha-kwísa=tuk-(k)u
ADR.ASYM-dance=be.LOC-1SG
‘I am dancing well(?)’ (in your opinion)
b. kwisa-té
dance-IMPF
shi-ba-lox
ADR.SYM-2SG-be.LOC
‘You are/were dancing(?)’ (confirming)
6Bergqvist (2015; 2016; 2017) discusses the Kogi system using the term “complex epistemic per-
spective” without arguing for a more general applicability of this term to similar systems and
forms in the literature. Such applicability is, however, considered in Evans et al. (2017a, 2017b)
under the term engagement.
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Shi-/sha- are used to signal the speaker’s acknowledgement of the addressee as
primary knower, but at the same time encodes the speaker’s assertion (without
reduced certainty) of a talked about event.
Engagement in Kogi may appear to be an exotic system in a little-known lan-
guage, but this notion echoes with well-known phenomena like modal particles
in Germanic languages (modal particle). Descriptive accounts of cognates of the
German ja (‘as you know’/‘of course’, Abraham 1991), in Danish (jo, Davidsen-
Nielsen 1996), Norwegian (jo, Andvik 1992) and Swedish (ju, Lindström 2008)
agree that reflexes of this form signals “available knowledge through shared ex-
perience” (Lindström 2008: 74, for Swedish).7 But although modal particles are
relatively frequent in e.g. spoken Swedish (see Bergqvist 2017), they are gener-
ally not viewed as part of core grammar, given their non-obligatoriness, weakly
paradigmatic organization, and function as markers of discourse. Modal particles
have an established (Eurocentric) descriptive tradition, but have recently been
compared to analogous particles in non-European languages such as Chinese
and Japanese (e.g. Abraham & Leiss 2012). A continued exploration of modal par-
ticles by means of cross-linguistic comparison, will surely contribute to a more
developed understanding of engagement as a linguistic category.
From the typological overview presented in Evans et al. (2017b), it is clear that
engagement can combine with modals and evidentials and that the shared/non-
shared contrast may fuse with such forms of epistemic marking. Hintz & Hintz
(2017) account for evidentials in Sihuas Quechua and argue that this language
has developed two distinct sets of evidential markers, which feature an -i/-a al-
teration encoding individual/mutual knowledge, respectively. Papuan languages
like Foe (Rule 1977) and Angal (Sillitoe 2010) also display engagement semantics
fused with evidential forms that produce readings like ‘as I could see, but you
could not’. Schultze-Berndt (2017) reports that markers of epistemic authority
in Jaminjung (Mirndi, Australia) are contrasted according to whether epistemic
authority is considered to be shared, or exclusive to one of the speech-act partic-
ipants.
Ika, a language closely related to Kogi (above), features a version of egophoric
marking that mirrors some of the semantic contrasts found in Kogi, but by way
7For Danish, Davidsen-Nielsen argues that “jo signals that the hearer is assumed to be aware of
and accept the states of affairs described [...]” (Davidsen-Nielsen 1996: 285). He notes that the
notion of something being “familiar to the receiver” is subject to some variation, but that the
semantic component of including the hearer’s perspective remains part of utterences featuring
jo in Danish (Davidsen-Nielsen 1996: 293). For Norwegian, Berthelin et al. (2013) note that
the meaning of jo encodes that “the hearer and speaker both have access to all the evidence
required for entertaining p as true”.
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of a distinct system that signals the involvement of the speech participants in re-
lation to their respective epistemic authorities (Bergqvist 2012; 2018b;2018a). The
epistemic marking systems in Kogi and Ika shows how a functional pressure to
assign epistemic authority to one, or both of the speech-act participants may pro-
duce distinct systems in closely related languages. Drawing on this comparison,
Bergqvist (2018a) argues that any subjective evaluation/positioning may develop
a sensitivity to whether this is shared with the addressee, or not, and that the pos-
sibility of such a development stems from the very nature of indexical reference.
An eventual typology of engagement must answer questions regarding its rel-
evant dimensions of meaning, i.e. whether encoded (a)symmetries of knowing
concern the assimilated knowledge of the addressee, or the speech-act partici-
pant’s respective rights to know in terms of epistemic authority. With respect
to the diachronic development of engagement, this must be accounted for in the
context of engagement being part of related functional categories, but also as a
distinct grammatical expression.
4 Concluding thoughts and a view to the future
From the overview and discussion provided in this introductory chapter, it should
be clear that evidentiality, egophoricity, and engagement are closely related no-
tions that overlap in both form and function. The notion of epistemic authority
is argued to be central to a functional analysis of said categories, either as an un-
derlying (largely implicit) motivation for the use of evidentials, or as a defining
semantic component of egophoric marking. It may also be assigned to one, or
both, of the speech-act participants by forms of engagement. The general role of
epistemic authority as an integral part of the “epistemic engine” that drives ver-
bal communication (Heritage 2012) lends further support to idea that epistemic
authority is a key concern for speakers engaged in conversation.
In order to explore epistemicity in language with this focus, interactive lan-
guage data is required. The dialogic function of language was discussed as a
defining feature of language already by Jespersen (1922), but throughout the 20th
Century this function all but disappeared from linguistic analysis (but see Givón
2001; Halliday 1973). Recently, dialogicity has come back on the agenda in re-
search by Du Bois (2007; 2014) and Evans (2012), among others. A return to the
dialogical features of language use and its consequences for grammar appears
crucial to account for the ongoing exploration of epistemic marking strategies in
languages everywhere.
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Abbreviations
1 first person
1S first person subject
2S second person subject
ABS absolutive
ADR addressee
ALLO allophoric
ASYM asymmetric
EGO egophoric
ERG ergative
EXCL exclusive
IMPF imperfective
IND indicative
INTERR interrogative
LOC locative
NON3 non-third person
NONVISUAL non-visual access
PAST past tense
PERSONAL.AGENCY personal agency
PRF perfect
PRS present
PFV perfective
REC recent
SHRD shared
SPKR speaker
SYM symmetric
VISUAL visual access
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Chapter 2
Epistemic primacy, Common Ground
management, and epistemic perspective
Karolina Grzech
University of Stockholm
In this chapter, I discuss the epistemic discourse clitics attested in Upper Napo
Kichwa, a Quechuan language spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon. I show that con-
trary to how they have been described in other Quechuan dialects, in Upper Napo
Kichwa the enclitic =mi and =cha should not be treated as evidentials, but as mark-
ers related to the (lack of) epistemic authority/primacy, i.e. origo’s relative right to
know a certain piece of information. I also demonstrate that although Quechuan ev-
identials have previously been analysed as focus markers, this analysis, too, cannot
be sustained for Upper Napo Kichwa, where the markers in question are associated
with focal constituents, but cannot be said to “mark” focus.
With examples from a corpus of Upper Napo Kichwa monolingual discourse, I show
that the considerations related to ownership and distribution of knowledge play a
role in the management of Common Ground in interaction. I show that by using
the two enclitics, speakers can indicate whether or not at a given point in interac-
tion the information they convey should be integrated into Common Ground. In
order to generalise this analysis, I propose situating linguistic items dedicated to
Common Ground management, such as =mi and =cha, within the cross-linguistic
functional domain of epistemic perspective.
1 Introduction
This chapter explores the meaning and functions of =mi and =cha in Upper Napo
Kichwa,1 an under-documented Quechuan language spoken in the Ecuadorian
1Upper Napo Kichwa is one of the varieties of Ecuadorian Amazonian Kichwa. In my previous
work (e.g. Grzech 2016a, Grzech 2016b) I have been referring to the same variety with the name
“Tena Kichwa”.
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Amazon. In other Quechuan varieties described to date, these two enclitics have
been analysed as direct and inferential/conjectural evidentials, respectively. As I
show in this chapter, in Upper Napo Kichwa, they are more adequately analysed
as markers of epistemic primacy (=mi) or lack thereof (=cha). That is, they indi-
cate the origo’s (lack of) “relative right to tell, inform, assert or assess” (Stivers
et al. 2011: 13). Moreover, the markers form part of a larger paradigm of free
enclitics loosely associated with focal status of the constituents they attach to.
By way of introduction, I outline the facts underpinning the research presented
here, providing an overview of the research objectives ( 1.1), giving background
information on the language under study and describing the data collection meth-
ods as well as the resulting corpus ( 1.2), and defining the notions used in my
analysis ( 1.3).
In the ensuing sections, I discuss the Upper Napo Kichwa paradigm of dis-
course enclitics (§ 2) and the previous analyses of the markers =mi and =cha (§ 3).
I discuss the markers’ semantics and functions in discourse (§ 4). Subsequently, I
propose a unified analysis of the different aspects of meaning of the two enclitics
(§ 5) and integrate this proposal with a cross-linguistic framework for the descrip-
tion of epistemic marking systems (§ 6). Finally, I provide some conclusions and
suggestions for further research (§ 7).
1.1 Research objectives
The main objective of this chapter is to spell out the analysis of =mi and =cha
in terms of epistemic primacy, and to explain how the markers interact with
focus. Furthermore, I aim to show how through fulfilling both these functions –
marking epistemic primacy, and association with focal status of referents – the
enclitics in question contribute to the management of Common Ground in Upper
Napo Kichwa discourse. I also show the cross-linguistic relevance of this analysis,
discussing the possible place of =mi and =cha within the “domain of epistemic
perspective” (Bergqvist 2017).
1.2 Language and research background
Before I proceed to the description of the enclitics =mi and =cha, it is in order
to provide some background on the language which I analyse here. Upper Napo
Kichwa is a Quechuan language of the QII subgroup, spoken in the province of
Napo, in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The estimated number of speaker varies from
20,000 (Lewis 2016) to ca. 46,000 (INEC 2010).
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Upper Napo Kichwa belongs to the dialectal grouping of Amazonian Kichwa,
and is but one of several Quechuan varieties spoken in Ecuador. Although Qui-
chua2 is recognised by the Ecuadorian constitution as the “official language of
intercultural relations” (ANCE 2008), the legislation and resulting policies on
the national level fail to recognise the existence of multiple Quechuan languages
within Ecuador. Instead, the focus is on Unified Kichwa - an official, “standard”
variety created in the 1980s with the aim of providing a single, official orthog-
raphy for all Quechuan dialects spoken in Ecuador. Unified Kichwa is used in
Spanish-Kichwa bilingual education across the country, and its knowledge is re-
quired of all teachers of Kichwa, even if they are native speakers of other varieties.
It has become the prestige variety of the language, and is adopted by speakers of
other varieties for official purposes, including use in administration and cultural
activities (cf. e.g. Wroblewski 2014). Consequently, its official status contributes
to the weakening rather than strengthening of the regional varieties (cf. Horn-
berger & King 1996; Grzech 2017).
The assessments of the vitality of Upper Napo Kichwa have delivered varying
outcomes. While Lewis (2016) claims the language is “vigorous”, Moseley (2010)
evaluates it as “seriously endangered”. Such discrepancy arises most likely due
to the fact that Lewis (2016) does not take into account the difference between
Unified Kichwa and Upper Napo Kichwa (cf. Grzech 2017). Participant observa-
tion I carried out in 2013 and 2014 suggests that while Upper Napo Kichwa is
not yet seriously endangered, this might be the case within a generation. In the
communities where I conducted fieldwork, the last generation who uses Upper
Napo Kichwa in all social contexts are people around the age of 30. Teenagers
have passive knowledge of the language, but tend to communicate with each
other in Spanish, and small children are generally spoken to in Spanish, and use
the language amongst themselves. Nonetheless, my main field site was relatively
well connected to the provincial capital, and it is likely that the language is faring
better in more secluded settlements (Arthur Cognet, p.c., December 16th, 2016 ).
In terms of its morphosyntactic characteristics, Upper Napo Kichwa exhibits
a number of features typical of the Quechuan language family. It is agglutina-
tive, exclusively suffixing, and the two main word classes are verbs and nom-
inals, characterised by differing patterns of inflection. In Quechuan languages
the dominant word order is generally SOV, but some studies also characterise
them as discourse-configurational (cf. Muysken 1995). A preliminary study of
2In Ecuador, the termQuichua is preferred overQuechua. I use the nameQuichua when referring
to Ecuadorian Quechua in general, but for the name of the language with which this chapter
is concerned, I use the newer orthography, hence writing it Kichwa. This orthography is the
one most widely used by the members of the community I work with.
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the Upper Napo Kichwa word order suggests that in this variety the orders SOV
and SVO are equally permissible (cf. Grzech 2016a: ch.4). Moreover, the language
is characterised by less morphological complexity than most other documented
Quechuan dialects (cf. Adelaar & Muysken 2004); for instance, similarly to other
Ecuadorian varieties, e.g. Imbabura Quichua (Cole 1982), Upper Napo Kichwa
only exhibits residual object agreement marking on the verb.
The data on which this research is based were collected during ten months
of language documentation fieldwork in 2013 and 2014. My main field site was
the village of Nuevo Paraíso, situated on the bank of the Napo River, about fifty
kilometres west from Tena, the capital of the Napo Province. Nuevo Paraíso is ac-
cessible by river and by a dirt road. Buses to and from Tena pass through Nuevo
Paraíso several times a day, and the journey takes about two hours. As of Septem-
ber 2014, 53 associates (Spanish: socios) lived in the village, most of whom were
heads of families. In Kichwa communities, families are formed by parents, un-
married children, and sometimes also widowed grandparents. They range in size
from three to about ten people, the average number of children per family in this
particular community being around five.
The corpus I used for this research comprises two parts: an eleven-hour corpus
of naturalistic Upper Napo Kichwa discourse, and a two-hour corpus of elicited
discourse. Both parts of the corpus were recorded on audio and video, transcribed
in Upper Napo Kichwa and translated into Spanish. In addition, the elicited dis-
course corpus was also parsed and annotated with morpheme-by-morpheme
glosses.
The naturalistic discourse part of the corpus consists of recordings of com-
municative acts characterised by different degrees of spontaneity, ranging from
everyday conversation, through storytelling, to recordings of community events
and political discourse. The elicited discourse corpus includes “staged commu-
nicative events” (Himmelmann 2006): discourse resulting from presenting con-
sultants with video and/or picture stimuli, or asking them to perform specific
tasks. The stimuli I used to collect this part of the corpus included e.g. the “Pear
story” video (Chafe 1980), and the tasks for two consultants from the “Question-
naire on information structure” (Skopeteas et al. 2006). These type of tasks allow
for obtaining naturalistic parallel data (San Roque et al. 2012: 137), and for com-
paring constructions used by various speakers in the same discourse situation.
They also permit the researcher to control what information is, and is not, shared
between discourse participants – a task unattainable in case of naturalistic dis-
course.
The documentation project was carried out in collaboration with a team of
Kichwa researchers: Nilo Licuy, Jacobo Chimbo, Wilma Aguinda and Edwin Shi-
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guango. Sofía Alvarado also contributed to the transcription and translation of
corpus. The members of the research team selected the topics to be documented,
as well as the participants for the interviews. They also worked as camera and
sound operators, interviewers, transcribers and translators (for more details on
collaborative documentation, cf. Grzech 2016a: sec. 1.3.3).
1.3 Definitions
As stated previously, the main objective of this chapter is to explore the mean-
ing and discourse functions of the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics =mi and =cha,
which I analyse as markers of the origo’s epistemic primacy, or lack thereof. To
accomplish this, I first define the basic notions used in the analysis sections of this
chapter. I discuss evidentiality and epistemic primacy, and briefly acquaint the
reader with the domain of epistemic perspective. Subsequently, I focus on the
notions pertinent to information structure that are necessary for the adequate
description of =mi and =cha: focus and Common Ground.
1.3.1 Evidentiality
Although I do not analyse the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics as evidential mark-
ers, the notion of evidentiality is mentioned frequently throughout the chapter,
and therefore needs to be clarified. I understand evidentiality in the “narrow”
sense of the term, as the linguistic coding of the source of information (cf. e.g.
Willett 1988: 54; Nikolaeva 2000; Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 342–343; Aikhen-
vald 2004) or “mode of access” (e.g. González Ruiz et al. 2016). Under this view,
the source of information on which a proposition is based is independent of the
speaker’s beliefs about the veracity of that proposition; evidentiality marks the
source of information on which a proposition is based, while epistemic modality
evaluates the likelihood that this proposition is true (Cornillie 2009). Nonethe-
less, evidential and modal meanings are often hard to separate (Palmer 2001),
and cross-linguistic evidence shows that evidential and epistemic modal mean-
ings can be encoded by the same set of markers (Willett 1988: 55).
Narrowly defined evidentiality and epistemic modality have also been regarded
as two sub-types of the category of EPISTEMICITY (Boye 2012). According to this
approach, both evidentiality and epistemic modality provide JUSTIFICATORY SUP-
PORT for propositions. Evidential expressions provide EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION,
which can be either direct or indirect. Epistemic modal expressions, in turn, pro-
vide EPISTEMIC SUPPORT, which can be full (certainty), partial (probability) or
neutral (lacking epistemic qualification) (cf. Boye 2012: 36). The term EPISTEMIC
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MEANING is used in this chapter in a broader sense than the one adopted by Boye
(2012: sec. 1.5); Following Bergqvist (2017), I see both evidentiality and epistemic
modality as sub-domains within the domain of EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE, which
I discuss in more detail in §1.3.3, after introducing other notions necessary for
understanding it.
1.3.2 Epistemic primacy
Another notion indispensable for the accurate description of the two Upper Napo
Kichwa enclitics discussed here is EPISTEMIC PRIMACY (Stivers et al. 2011). It can
be conceptualised, alongside evidentiality, as related to the dimensions of knowl-
edge in interaction (cf. Stivers et al. 2011: 13), presented in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Dimensions of Knowledge
i. Epistemic access knowing vs. not knowing/types of
evidence/degree of certainty
ii. Epistemic primacy relative right to know/claim, authority of
knowledge
iii. Epistemic responsibility obligations/rights to have information
The three dimensions listed above correspond to the different “levels” on which
knowledge can be grounded in conversation. Evidentiality clearly falls within the
dimension of epistemic access, since it relates to the type of evidence. Epistemic
modality also falls within that domain, as it is related to the degree of certainty.
Epistemic primacy is more subjective than epistemic access;3 while epistemic
access is concerned with the relationship between the proposition and the origo,
epistemic primacy has to do with the distribution of knowledge between par-
ticipants of the speech event. Epistemic primacy is the asymmetry “in the depth,
specificity or completeness of their [speech act participants’] knowledge” (Stivers
et al. 2011: 13). Consequently, the making of epistemic primacy is grounded in
the subjective assessment of the origo’s knowledge state rather than in the re-
lationship of that knowledge to the discourse-external world. In the literature,
3Subjectivity can be defined as “(…) the way in which natural languages, in their structure and
their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself
and his own attitudes and beliefs” (Lyons 1982: 102). Understood in this manner, subjective
expressions index the attitudes or viewpoint of the speaker.
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epistemic primacy is often used interchangeably with EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY (cf.
e.g., Grzech 2016a; García-Ramón 2018). Nonetheless, an important distinction
can be made between those notions: epistemic authority is gradable: one pos-
sesses it if one knows something, although it is possible to know more or less
about the matter at hand. Moreover, epistemic authority can, but does not have
to be relative. One can have epistemic authority on a subject independently of
the knowledge state of other discourse participants. Epistemic primacy, on the
other hand, is relative by default: whether or not one can claim to have epistemic
primacy always depends on the knowledge states of other participants of a given
interaction. It follows that epistemic primacy can only be established in a partic-
ular interactional context.4 The epistemic authority that one might have over a
certain matter only allows one to claim epistemic primacy with respect to inter-
locutors who know less than one does. While epistemic primacy/authority often
arises as a result of having the best possible type of evidence for the information
in question, or being certain that the proposition is true, it need not be grounded
in direct evidence or certainty.
The third domain – EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY – is related to the information
that the speaker has an obligation or a right to know. For instance, it is expected
of everyone to know their own name, etc. On the other hand, there is information
about other people, their internal states and experiences, or private affairs, about
which their interlocutors do not have a responsibility, or even right, to possess
knowledge. I will not devote more attention here to this last domain, (see Grzech
2016a: ch.5 for a more detailed discussion), as it is only relevant to the analysis
presented here inasmuch as the domains of epistemic primacy and epistemic
responsibility correlate with one another. It should be expected that if the origo
has an obligation/right to know a certain piece of information, she is also likely
to have epistemic authority over it.
1.3.3 Epistemic perspective
The dimensions of knowledge discussed above relate mainly to the origo, and
to the extent to which she can know, or claim to know, a piece of information.
The only reference to the interpersonal aspect of communication in Table 2.1 is
the observation that epistemic primacy is “a relative right to know or claim”. The
relative nature of epistemic primacy suggests that the origo’s interlocutor and
4I am grateful to Amparo García-Ramón for the discussion which helped me clarify this dis-
tinction. The authority/primacy distinction is related, but not tantamount to, the epistemic
stance/epistemic status distinction (e.g. Heritage 2012).
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her state of knowledge should also be taken into account by the speaker when
she chooses to use a given marker of epistemic primacy.
In line with this observation, Bergqvist (2017) proposes to analyse evidentiality
and other epistemic marking systems within the functional domain of EPISTEMIC
PERSPECTIVE,5 encompassing not only the relationship of origo to the informa-
tion, but also the distribution of information between the speech act participants.
Proposing the existence of the domain of epistemic perspective is based on two
assumptions: (1) that evidentiality and related systems share a functional space in
the grammar of languages in which they occur; (2) that these epistemic marking
systems allow the speaker to adopt different perspectives with respect to both
information and interlocutors Bergqvist (2017: 11). Consequently, the domain can
be divided into different subdomains of epistemic meaning, stratified according
to the level of (inter)subjectivity they express.6 Figure 2.1 shows this stratifica-
tion:
SCOPE
(wide)
KNOWLEDGE (A)SYMMETRY complex epistemic perspective (CEP)
SPEAKER-HEARER LINKS illocutionary modality
SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT egophoricity
INFORMATION SOURCE evidentiality
POSSIBILITY epistemic modalityNECESSITY
(narrow)
Figure 2.1: Dimensions of the epistemic perspective (after Bergqvist
2017: 12)
As mentioned above, the notion of epistemic perspective points to the fact that
all the categories shown in Figure 2.1 are to some extent concerned with marking
the different dimensions of epistemic access of the discourse participants. From
bottom to top, the different epistemic marking systems shown on the right-hand
5Bergqvist (2017) uses the term FUNCTIONAL DOMAIN coined by Givón (1981); functional domains
are conceptual structures which can overlap with one another and encompass several levels
of meaning (Bergqvist 2017: 11).
6Subjectivity was defined in Footnote 3 above. Intersubjectivity relates to the speakers’ “ac-
knowledgement of and attention to the addressee” (Traugott 2010: 2). Consequently, intersub-
jective expressions take into account the attitudes of, or distribution of knowledge between,
the speaker and the addressee.
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side are organised from the least to the most intersubjective. On the left-hand
side, Figure 2.1 shows the different functional domains corresponding to the epis-
temic marking systems shown on the right. The arrow corresponds to the levels
of meaning, based on the assumptions that the categories at the bottom of the
scale encode more propositional meaning, and hence have narrower scope, and
the categories towards the top encode non-propositional meaning. The marking
of complex epistemic perspective refers to the fully intersubjective systems, in
the encoding of which the perspectives of both interlocutors are equally impor-
tant. The composition of the domain presented in Figure 2.1 is based on a prelim-
inary cross-linguistic survey, including the grammatical categories attested in a
sample of languages which exhibit the exemplified epistemic marking systems
(Bergqvist 2017).
The number of functional sub-domains – and corresponding grammaticalised
marking systems – is bound to increase if other languages are taken into ac-
count. Examples of such systems could include the marking of engagement (cf.
e.g. Landaburu 2007), information status of discourse participants (cf. San Roque
2008), or the marking of epistemic primacy, discussed at length in this chapter.
In Japanese, epistemic primacy is encoded by the dedicated marker yo (Hayano
2011). In the following sections, I show that epistemic primacy is also morpholog-
ically marked in Upper Napo Kichwa, where the distribution of epistemic author-
ity between speaker and hearer is encoded by =mi and =cha. Therefore, at least
for certain languages including Upper Napo Kichwa, epistemic primacy should
be considered one of the functional sub-domains within the overarching domain
of epistemic perspective.
1.3.4 Common Ground and focus
The remaining notions that need to be explained before I proceed to the analysis
of the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics =mi and =cha are Common Ground and focus,
both pertinent to the study of information structure. I define them in turn below.
The readers should keep in mind that the definitions provided here are not meant
to tackle the conceptual complexity of the discussed notions in full detail. Rather,
they are meant to provide basic definitions, so as to allow for a consistent, clear
interpretation of the analysis presented in the following sections.
COMMON GROUND (henceforth CG) consists of information which is mutually
known to be shared by the discourse participants (cf. e.g., Stalnaker 1974; Clark
1996). This information includes discourse referents that the interlocutors are
familiar with, and ‘a set of propositions which the participants in the conversa-
tion mutually agree to treat as true for the purpose of the exchange’ (Stalnaker
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& Cole 1978). CG constantly develops over the course of communication, and
Krifka (2007) points out that there are two aspects of CG relevant to communica-
tion: CG CONTENT, which includes all the truth-conditional information within
the CG, and CG MANAGEMENT, which indicates the way in which CG content
should develop. Both CG content and CG management are shared between dis-
course participants. The aspects of information structure (henceforth IS) that
have truth-conditional impact can be associated with CG content, and those relat-
ing to the pragmatic use of expressions – with CG management (Krifka 2007: 18).
The notion of CG management has been applied in the analysis of e.g. German
modal particles (cf. Repp 2013, Döring 2016). Over the course of this chapter, I
show that Upper Napo Kichwa discourse enclitics contribute to CG management,
rather than to CG content.
As mentioned above, CG develops constantly in the process of communication.
For this to occur, utterances need to contain not only information already known
to both interlocutors, but also information known to the speaker, but new to the
hearer, so that it can be added to CG in the process of communication. However,
there are cognitive constraints on how much new information can be conveyed
at a time. According to the ONE NEW IDEA CONSTRAINT (Chafe 1987; 1994), for
processing reasons, every clause in connected discourse can contain only one
concept which falls under the scope of assertion: the focus of the clause. Clauses
also contain presupposed content, and within it, expressions denoting a referent
the clause is about (cf. Lambrecht 1994: 127). In IS terms, such a referent is the
topic of the clause. Both topic and focus are relational notions. That is, no referent
is inherently focal or topical. Rather, the topic or focus relation arises between
discourse referents and propositions as a result of the speaker’s strategy of CG
management.
2 Upper Napo Kichwa discourse enclitics: the paradigm
In this section I present the morphosyntactic paradigm of Upper Napo Kichwa
discourse enclitics, of which both =mi and =cha form part. As mentioned in § 1.2,
Upper Napo Kichwa is an exclusively suffixing language. Consequently, all the
clitics found in the language are in fact enclitics. Moreover, all the enclitics at-
tested in Upper Napo Kichwa are free, that is, they attach to hosts from any
grammatical category, as long as their hosts function as phrasal heads.7
7In §1.2, I mention that Upper Napo Kichwa has two main grammatical categories, nouns and
verbs. Nonetheless, members of minor word classes, e.g., adverbs, can also function as phrasal
heads/hosts for enclitics.
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The presence of free enclitics is attested in all described Quechuan varieties
(cf. e.g., Parker 1969; Cole 1982; Weber 1986; Cusihuamán 1976), but most authors
do not grant them a comprehensive description, focusing only on a few selected
markers. In the Upper Napo Kichwa data collected to date, as many as fifteen
free enclitics are attested (cf. Grzech 2016a: ch.3). Of those, nine were identified
as DISCOURSE (EN)CLITICS in the sense of Spencer & Luis (2012: 37) as clitics which
express discourse functions, rather than inflectional categories. The occurrence
of discourse enclitics is not conditioned by grammar, and hence no contexts were
identified in which their occurrence would be required for the syntactic well-
formedness of the clause. Rather, they are used to enhance discourse coherence
by encoding “cues for interpretation, (…) emphasis, rhetorical effects, or the atti-
tude of the speaker” (cf. Spencer & Luis 2012: 35). Of the nine discourse enclitics in
Upper Napo Kichwa, one, namely =ga, seems to be associated with presupposed
information (cf. Grzech 2016a: ch.4). The remaining eight markers – among them
the two enclitics described in this chapter – associate with focal referents. These
eight enclitics, along with the analyses proposed for their cognates in different
Quechuan languages, are listed in Table 2.2.
All of the enclitics listed in Table 2.2 occur on focal referents, and attach
to their hosts word-finally, following all the inflectional morphology. However,
apart from being associated with focus, they also play different roles in Upper
Napo Kichwa discourse. For the sake of space, this chapter only concentrates on
two of the markers listed above, =mi and =cha.
As mentioned above, all the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics are syntactically
non-obligatory, and the same applies to the two markers in question. In the
parsed-and-glossed part of the Upper Napo Kichwa corpus, comprising 1537 turns,
=mi occurred in 5.9% of the turns (n=96), and =cha was even less frequent, oc-
curring in 2.15% of turns (n=33). This low frequency suggests that despite their
association with focus, other discourse-related factors are decisive when it comes
to the markers’ use in discourse. In the following sections, I explore these factors,
including their epistemic primacy semantics and their role in CG management.
3 Quechuan evidential enclitics and the Upper Napo
Kichwa “evidential” paradigm
As mentioned in the previous sections, in most other varieties of Quechua de-
scribed to date, =mi and =cha are analysed as evidential markers encoding direct
and conjectural/inferential evidence, respectively. In this section, I present the
Quechuan evidential paradigm (3.1 ) and present the analysis of =mi and =cha in
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Table 2.2: Focus-related discourse enclitics in Upper Napo Kichwa
=mi Validational (e.g., Cole 1982),
Direct evidential (Weber 1986; Floyd 1997),
Direct evidential and best possible ground marker (Faller 2002),
Focus marker (Muysken 1995; Cusihuamán 1976/2001; Sánchez
2010; 2015)
‘Speaking self’ marker (Nuckolls 2012)
=ma Emphatic equivalent of =mi (Cole 1982)
Direct experience marker (Hintz & Hintz 2017)
Marker of surprise (Faller 2002)
Impressive marker (Cusihuamán 1976/2001)
=mari Emphatic equivalent of =mi (e.g., Jake & Chuquín 1979, cited in
Floyd 1997; Faller 2002)
=cha Validational (Adelaar 1977; Cole 1982),
Inferential/conjectural evidential (e.g., Weber 1986; Floyd 1997),
Inferential/conjectural evidential and epistemic modal (e.g., Faller
2002).
=chari Equivalent of =cha (e.g., Cole 1982)
Emphatic equivalent of certainty marker -chaq (Weber 1989)
=chu Negation and polar question marker (e.g., Cole 1982; Weber 1989;
Cusihuamán 1976/2001)
Neutral epistemic support (Boye 2012)
=ta Possible cognate of -taq question marker (cf. Weber 1989)or
contrastive marker (Cusihuamán 1976/2001)
=tá Not attested in other varieties; functionally equivalent to emotive
-ya (e.g., Cusihuamán 1976/2001)
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other Quechuan varieties (3.2), so as to contextualise the analysis of the Upper
Napo Kichwa markers presented in §4 and § 5.
3.1 The Quechuan evidential paradigm
Apart from the two markers described in this chapter, the evidential paradigm
found in most Quechuan varieties also contains a third marker, encoding reporta-
tive evidence. This three-choice system is illustrated in (1) below with data from
Cuzco Quechua, spoken in Peru (adapted from Faller 2002: 122):
(1) Cuzco Quechua8
a. Direct/Best possible ground9 =mi
Parashanmi.
para-sha-n=mi
rain-PROG-3=MI
‘It is raining.’ [speaker sees that it’s raining]
b. Inferential/conjectural =chá
Parashanchá.
para-sha-n=chá.
rain-PROG-3=CHÁ
‘It is raining.’ [speaker conjectures that it’s raining]
c. Reportative =si
Parashansi.
para-sha-n=si.
rain-PROG-3=SI
‘It is raining.’ [speaker was told that it’s raining]
The paradigm shown in (1) is attested in most described Quechuan languages.
However, some varieties diverge from it, offering the speakers more choices.
South Conchucos Quechua (QI) is reported to have five evidential markers (Hintz
2012a; Hintz & Hintz 2017). Six markers have been described for Sihuas Quechua
(QI) (Hintz 2012b; Hintz & Hintz 2017) and Huamalíes Quechua (Howard 2012),
both closely related to South Conchucos. In these varieties, the speaker’s choice
of evidential marker is influenced not only by the type of evidence, but also by
the distribution of knowledge between discourse participants. All these systems
8Language names are only included in examples from languages other than Upper Napo
Kichwa.
9I explain the notion of ‘Best possible ground’ below.
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have the direct, indirect and reportative markers. In addition, South Conchucos
has markers asserting mutual knowledge and indicating shared conjecture (Hintz
& Hintz 2017). Sihuas has a system of three contrastive pairs, indicating the dis-
tinctions between individual and mutual knowledge, individual and shared con-
jecture and individual knowledge from report vs generalised knowledge from
report (Hintz & Hintz 2017). Humalíes has markers indicating speculation, affir-
mation of knowledge co-constructed by the speaker and the hearer, and negation
of such knowledge10 (Howard 2012). In the above systems, the markers do not
correspond strictly to source of information – the use of INDIVIDUAL vs SHARED
KNOWLEDGE MARKERS is also influenced by the speaker’s opinion about whether
she has epistemic authority over the information conveyed (Hintz & Hintz 2017:
96). Epistemic authority in particular is relevant to the description of the ‘eviden-
tial’ markers in Upper Napo Kichwa, as I show in § 4.
In the varieties discussed above, the evidential paradigm consists of three or
more markers. However, in some varieties, including Imbabura Quechua (QII)
(Cole 1982: 164–165), spoken in the Ecuadorian Highlands,11 and Upper Napo
Kichwa, described here, reports are marked periphrastically by means of the verb
ni- (‘say’) rather than by the use of a dedicated marker. Interestingly, the repor-
tative marker is attested in Pastaza Quichua (QII) (Nuckolls 1993; Nuckolls 2012),
which is related to Upper Napo Kichwa more closely than the highland Imbabura
variety.
In Upper Napo Kichwa, the reportative marker seems to have been replaced
by a periphrastic construction, whereby the verb of speech ni- (‘say’) is used in
all hearsay/reportative contexts as a marker of reported speech, and the speech
complements are often marked by the enclitic =mi (see examples (5) in § 3.2 and
(21) in § 6). Given that the reportative enclitic is not attested in the Upper Napo
Kichwa data, I limit the discussion here to the direct and conjectural/inferential
markers.
3.2 Analyses of =mi and =cha in other Quechuan varieties
The analyses of =mi as a direct evidential in different dialects of Quechua point
to the fact that it can mark propositions for which the origo has direct, sensory
10In Howard’s (2012) terms, co-constructed knowledge results from the exchange of information
between the speaker and the addressee. This is different from Hintz & Hintz’s (2017) ‘shared
knowledge’, understood as knowledge shared by participants, acquired either through a lin-
guistic exchange, or through a shared non-linguistic experience. The latter understanding is
more in line with widely accepted definitions of Common Ground.
11Cole (1982: 165) observes that while the marker -shi is attested in Imbabura, it seems to have
undergone semantic shift from marking hearsay to marking speculation.
36
2 Epistemic primacy, Common Ground management & epistemic perspective
evidence. However, a broader definition of the marker’s semantics was proposed
by Faller (2002), in order to reflect the fact that the direct/sensory access analysis
cannot account for all uses of =mi in Cuzco Quechua (QII). Faller (2002) analysed
=mi as the marker of BEST POSSIBLE GROUND (henceforth BPG). BPG corresponds
to direct evidence if the information in question belongs to the speaker’s own
life experience. However, in case of encyclopedic knowledge, which tends to be
learnt from authority rather than through direct experience, the BPG can cor-
respond to reportative evidence. Under Faller’s view, having the best possible
source of information is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for making a
=mi-marked statement. In order to felicitously use =mi, the speaker needs to
have the BPG for making a statement. To have the BPG, apart from having the
best possible source of information, the speaker also needs to have assimilated
the proposition into his network of beliefs (Faller 2002: 140–141).
As for =cha, the marker has previously been analysed as a “conjectural” (We-
ber 1986; Faller 2002), “inferential” (Floyd 1997) or “dubitative” (Muysken 1995)
marker in the different Quechuan varieties. Despite the different labels, in all the
varieties for which it has been described, the marker is reported to cover indirect
evidence based both on reasoning and conjecture. Floyd (1997: ch.5) analyses
the meaning of the Wanka Quechua -chr(a) as prototypically indicating that a
given utterance is an inference. According to Floyd, the prototypical meaning of
the marker is “attenuation in the domain of commitment”, which “equates non-
incorporation into reality (…) and is encoded in terms of likelihood values” (Floyd
1997: 106). He further claims that the non-prototypical uses of =chr(a) have to do
with attenuation in other domains, including e.g., the “psychological distance
between the hearer and the proposition”.
Although Floyd does not explicitly refer to epistemic modality, the fact that he
analyses the marker as encoding commitment to the likelihood of propositions
amounts to an evidential/modal analysis, which is the one that Faller (2002; 2007)
proposes in her work on Cuzco Quechua (QII). According to Faller, the conjec-
tural marker is the only CQ evidential that is both an evidential and an epistemic
modal. The evidential meaning of =chá is to indicate that the speaker “bases his
or her statement on a mental process”, be it inference, conjecture, guesswork or
any other process involving reasoning (Faller 2002: 176). However, if the speaker
bases her statement on partial direct evidence, -chus hina – a marker which oc-
curs in complementary distribution with other evidential enclitics (Faller 2006)
and is glossed below as ‘result’ – is preferred over -chá. Consider the following
example from Cuzco Quechua:
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(2) Cuzco Quechua
a. ?Unqusqachá
unqu-sqa-chá
sick-PRT-CONJ
kashanman.
ka-sha-n-man
be-PROG-3-COND
‘She may be sick.’ [Context: Marya looks very pale.]
b. Unqusqachus
unqu-sqa-chus
sick-PRT-RES
hina
hina
kashanman.
ka-sha-n-man
be-PROG-3-COND
‘She appears to be sick.’ (Faller 2007: 4)
The marker -chus hina/chu shina means roughly ‘I guess’/‘I think’/‘apparently’
(Faller 2006: 3). In Cuzco Quechua, -chá cannot be used if the speaker is certain
that the proposition is true or false, even if she arrived at that conclusion through
reasoning (Faller 2007: 5). This supports the epistemic modal analysis of -chá.
For a -chá-marked proposition to be felicitous, the speaker needs to believe in
the possibility that the proposition expressed is true and needs to have arrived
at that belief by her own reasoning.
The analyses of =mi and =cha presented above cannot be applied to their Up-
per Napo Kichwa cognates. In the case of =mi, neither the ‘direct evidential’ nor
the BPG analysis account for all uses of the marker. The following examples show
that the marker can be used in statements based on different evidence types, in-
cluding direct/visual source of information, as in (3), inference or conjecture, as
in (4) and (5), or reportative evidence, as in (6):
(3) Direct/visual
Tamyawmi.
tamya-w=mi
rain-PROG=MI
‘It is raining’ [uttered while observing the rain]. [el_21092014_01 003]
(4) Inference/conjecture
[Cesar]
[Cesar]
[Cesar]
mingamami
minga-ma=mi
collective.work-DAT=MI
rishka.
ri-shka
go-ANT
‘[Cesar] went to the minga’ [the speaker has just arrived at C’s home. C.
is not there, it’s the day of the minga, and the speaker knows C. always
participates in community events] [el_21092014_01 051]
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(5) Inference/conjecture
Ñuka
ñuka
1SG
yaya
yaya
father
shamuwmi
sham-u=mi
come-PROG=MI
yachin.
yachi-n
seem-3
‘It seems my father is coming.’ [speaker hears footsteps outside, and was
expecting his father to come] [el_21092014_01 035]
(6) Reportative evidence
Rimawanun
rima-wa-nun
say-1OBJ-3PL
Saida
Saida
NAME
ungushkami
ungu-shka=mi
fall.ill-ANT=MI
sirik
siri-k
stay-NMLZ
nisha.
ni-sha
say-COREF
‘They tell me Saida is ill.’ [el_25092014_01 113]
Example (3) can easily be reconciled with both the direct evidential and the
BPG analysis of =mi. Example (6), where =mi is used within a reportative con-
struction, could indicate that in this case =mi can be analysed as a marker of BPG,
as the fact which the speaker reports is not accessible to him directly, and thus
the best possible evidence is that of a verbal report. However, according to the
analyses presented above, examples (4) and (5) could not be marked by =mi in
any of the varieties of Quechua discussed there. Rather, they would be marked
by =cha, as in both cases the speaker arrives at the proposition expressed by the
utterance by reasoning. Moreover, as shown below, the Upper Napo Kichwa =mi
is also felicitously used when the speaker cannot be certain of having the BPG:
(7) Guesswork / Inference based on partial evidence
Lluki
lluki
left
puramami
pura-ma=mi
side-DAT=MI
rin,
ri-n
go-3
llukipurama...
lluki-pura-ma
left-side-DAT
‘[the seed] goes to the left, to the left’ [el_03102014_01 076]
The utterance in (7) comes from an elicitation session during which two par-
ticipants watched recordings of a magician performing six games of a three-shell
game. For each game, they first watched it without the final part in which the
location of the seed was revealed, and were asked to guess where the seed was.
After they took their guesses, the same recording was re-played again, this time
with the finale, so that the participants could confront their guesses with real-
ity.12 The participant who uttered (7) was guessing the location of the seed. He
12This elicitation session is accessible online in the ELAR Upper Napo Kichwa deposit, under
the following link: https://elar.soas.ac.uk/Record/MPI1034554.
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had already made several attempts at guessing where the seeds were located,
but each of them failed. Thus, the use of =mi in (7) cannot be explained by the
speaker’s certainty of having the BPG for the proposition. In §4, I demonstrate
that conversely to the direct evidence/BPG analysis, the epistemic primacy anal-
ysis of =mi can account for all the examples given above.
The Upper Napo Kichwa =cha also does not lend itself well to the analyses
proposed for its cognates. If it was in fact a conjectural/inferential marker, we
would expect to find it in examples such as (4) and (5) above, which are, however,
marked by =mi. Moreover, =cha-marked statements, when presented without
further context, are always interpreted as interrogative, rather than declarative
utterances. Consider:
(8) a. #Tamiashkacha.
tamia-shka=cha
rain-ANT=CHA
Intended meaning: ‘It rained/It must have rained’ [speaker haven’t
seen the rain, but sees the ground is wet] [elicited]
b. Tamiashkacha?
tamia-shka=cha
rain-ANT=CHA
‘Has it rained? / It has rained, hasn’t it?’ [elicited]
The example (8a) was presented to consultants in an elicitation context, but
they rejected it, proposing (8b) instead. If =cha was a conjectural evidential, its
use in a declarative statements would not be problematic, as suggested by evi-
dence from other varieties of Quechua.
Although =cha-marked declaratives are not attested in elicitation, they do oc-
cur in naturalistic discourse, in utterances which can be interpreted as rhetorical
questions, as in (9), or dubitative statements, as in (10):
(9) Rhetorical question
Chiraygucha
chi-raygu=cha
D.DEM-CAUSAL=CHA
kay
kay
P.DEM
islamaga
isla-ma=ga
shore-DAT=TOP
allí…
alli
good
‘That would be why [the soil] is good on this shore’ [in_01082013_02 094]
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(10) Dubitative
Ima
ima
what
shutiracha,
shuti-ta=cha
name-ACC=CHA
Shangricha
Shangri=cha
NAME=CHA
nijkuna
ni-k-kuna
say-NMLZ-PL
akay...
a-ka=y
AUX-PST=EMPH
‘What was his name, I think they called him Shangri…’
[in_26052013_02 132]
Example  (9) is an excerpt from a conversation between two farmers, each of
whom owns a plot of land on the shore of the Napo river, in roughly the same
area. Although the speaker has first-hand knowledge about the quality of the soil
on the shore, he still chooses to use =cha, possibly because the plot of land under
discussion belongs to the other farmer. Example  (10) further shows that Upper
Napo Kichwa =cha does not lend itself to the analyses proposed for its cognates.
In this case, the speaker is an elderly woman trying to remember the name of a
shaman she used to know in her youth. Her interlocutor is a young interviewer,
who could not have possibly known the shaman. Here, =cha is used despite the
fact that the speaker has direct, though partial evidence for the proposition, as
she knew the shaman in person. Thus, as shown in example  (2) above, in Cuzco
Quechua that same example would have been marked by -chus hina, rather than
=cha. As in the case of =mi, the occurrences of =cha in the examples cited in this
section cannot be accounted for by the evidential analysis, but can be explained
if the marker is analysed as related to epistemic primacy. I discuss this analysis
in detail in the following section.
4 Epistemic primacy in Upper Napo Kichwa discourse
In the previous section, I have shown why the evidential analysis does not apply
to the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics =mi and =cha. Here, I spell out their analysis
as markers of epistemic primacy. Firstly, I discuss the semantic contribution that
the two markers make to the clause ( 4.1). Secondly, I explain how their epistemic
primacy semantics can be reconciled with their association with focus (4.2).
4.1 Epistemic primacy semantics of =mi and =cha
As mentioned in § 1.3.2, epistemic primacy can be defined as a “relative right to
know or claim” (Stivers et al. 2011). As such, the notion operates on a different
level of discourse than that of evidence. Evidence or access to information by
default relates to the text-external world. The same does not hold for epistemic
primacy, which is more social or interpersonal. Conviction of having superior
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knowledge or right to claim something can of course also be grounded in the
discourse-external reality, but that need not always be the case. Claims to supe-
rior knowledge can arise on the basis of subjective mental processes unrelated
to external discourse contexts. Consequently, the notion of epistemic primacy
is also broader. All the instances of the speaker having direct, sensory access to
events can be explained as cases of evoking both direct evidence and epistemic
authority/primacy, which arises by virtue of direct access to an event. How-
ever, cases such as the =mi-marked guess in example  (7) can be explained by
the speaker invoking epistemic primacy, but not by the direct evidence or BEST
POSSIBLE GROUND analysis (see §3.2).13
As mentioned in §1.3.2, an important component of the epistemic primacy
meaning is its relative nature; the “relative right to know or claim” certain pieces
of information arises as an interpersonal aspect of the context of the speech sit-
uation. Let us imagine a situation in which I explain the meaning of the Upper
Napo Kichwa word ayllu (‘family’/‘relatives’) to a fellow linguist who works on
another language family. In this encounter, I could safely assume epistemic pri-
macy, since I am more qualified to talk about Quechuan than my colleague. The
knowledge about Quechuan languages falls within my TERRITORY OF INFORMA-
TION (cf. Kamio 1997). However, if I were discussing the meaning of the same
lexeme with any native speaker of Upper Napo Kichwa, it would be them, not
me, who would hold epistemic primacy, by virtue of their native knowledge of
the Kichwa language and culture. It follows that to claim epistemic primacy we
do not need to be extremely highly qualified, or even certain about the veracity
of the proposition; we do need to assume however that we are more qualified to
voice an opinion than our interlocutor is. If we assume that Upper Napo Kichwa
=mi encodes epistemic primacy, examples of its use in utterances  (3) to  (7) as
presented in § 1.3.2 can all be accounted for.
Another aspect of the meaning of =mi which was not mentioned so far is that
it undergoes ORIGO SHIFT. That is, it is anchored to the speaker in declarative
clauses, and to the hearer in interrogative clauses - hence the use of the term origo
rather than speaker in reference to the source of epistemic authority indexed by
=mi. Consider:
13In this particular case, “guesswork” could be regarded as inference based on partial evidence,
rather than no evidence at all – despite the earlier erroneous guesses, the speaker might be
conviced that this time their observation of the seed’s location is correct (I am grateful to
Kasper Boye for pointing this out). This does not invalidate the main point of the argument
– that previous analyses do not hold for Upper Napo Kichwa =mi. As discussed earlier, the
Cuzco Quechua =mi cannot be used in case of only partial direct evidence, where -chus hina
is preferred.
42
2 Epistemic primacy, Common Ground management & epistemic perspective
(11) Ñuka
ñuka
1SG
shuti
shuti
name
anmi
an=mi
be=MI
Karolina.
Karolina
NAME
‘My name is Karolina.’ [elicited]
(12) Ima
ima
what
shutimi?
shuti=mi
name=MI
‘What’s her name?’ [asking about the name of a third person.]
[in_20092013_03 216]
In (11), the speaker introduces herself, and it is clear that the epistemic author-
ity to give this type of information lies exclusively with her. In case of (12), how-
ever, it is not the speaker but the hearer who is the source of epistemic authority.
Origo shift is not a singular feature of the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic mark-
ing - it occurs in a great many evidential/epistemic marking systems described
to date (cf. e.g., Hargreaves 2005).
I turn now to the semantics of the Upper Napo Kichwa =cha. In the previous
section, I have shown that it is not satisfactorily analysed as a conjectural/in-
ferential evidential. Instead, I propose to analyse the marker as indicating the
speaker’s lack of epistemic primacy. This means that by using =cha the speaker
indicates she doesn’t have the “relative right to know or claim”. This analysis is
compatible with the examples  (9) and (10) above, since having no epistemic pri-
macy is compatible with doubt. However, the use of the marker in example  (8),
which demonstrates that in the absence of context, =cha-marked utterances are
interpreted as interrogatives, requires additional explanation, which I provide in
§ 5.
The examples of =cha given so far do not provide sufficient evidence for claim-
ing that the marker indicates lack of epistemic primacy, as they would also be
permissible if the marker simply had a dubitative meaning. What differentiates
the dubitative from the “lack of epistemic primacy” expression is that, by using
the first, the speaker indicates that he considers the proposition in question as a
possibility. In the latter case, the speaker indicates that she is not in a position to
evaluate the probability of the proposition. The Upper Napo Kichwa data suggest
that this in fact the case. In §3.2 I have shown that Upper Napo Kichwa dubita-
tive statements are marked with the epistemic modal yachin ‘seem-3’, potentially
accompanied with =mi, rather than with =cha (see example 5). Consider:
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(13) a. Yaya
yaya
father-3
yachin,
yachi-n,
seem-3
paywa
pay-pa
3SG-GEN
yaya…
yaya
father
‘It seems [he is the] father, his father…’ [el_18092014_02 028]
b. Yaya
yaya
father
yachin,
yachi-n,
seem-3
paywa
pay-pa
3SG-GEN
yayacha…[?]
yaya=cha
father=CHA
‘It seems [he is the] father, isn’t he his father?/is he his father?’ [elicited]
The difference between (13a) and (13b) lies in the fact that in example ( 13a) the
speaker presents his own point of view, supposing that the farmer from the “Pear
story” video (Chafe 1980) is the father of the boy who comes over to steal the
fruit. In (13b), the point of the utterance is different - the speaker first expresses a
supposition that the man in the film is the boy’s father using the epistemic modal,
and then acknowledges the lack of “right to claim”, turning to the addressee for
the evaluation of the proposition. Examples (14) and (15) further support the claim
that =cha encodes lack of epistemic authority, rather than doubt:
(14) Mana
mana
NEG
yachani,
yacha-ni
know-1
imaracha
ima=ta=cha
what=INT=CHA
ranga
ra-nga
do-FUT
rawn…
ra-w-n
AUX-PROG-3
‘I don’t know, what will he do…’ [about the boy in the “Pear story”]
[in_24092014_01 026]
(15) Maymacha
may-ma=cha
where-DAT=CHA
rinun,
ri-nun
go-3PL
payna....
payguna
3PL
Payna
payguna
3PL
wasima
wasi-ma
house-DAT
rinawn
ri-nun
go-3PL
yachin.
yachi-n
seem-3
‘Where are they going. It seems they are going home…’
[el_24092014_02 028]
In (14) and (15) =cha occurs on interrogative pronouns in rhetorical content
questions, rather than marking propositions the veracity of which is not evident
to the speaker, as a dubitative marker would. This is clear in (15), where the
first clause of the utterance is marked with =cha to show the lack of epistemic
authority, and it is only in the second clause that the speaker makes a supposition,
marking it with yachin ‘seem-3’. The above examples support the analysis of the
marker as indicating that by using it the speaker assumes the position of lacking
the knowledge necessary to evaluate its veracity.
There are two other important aspects of the meaning of =cha which should be
mentioned here. Firstly, unlike =mi, Upper Napo Kichwa =cha does not undergo
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origo shift; the “lack of epistemic primacy” is always anchored to the speaker, ir-
respective of whether the utterance is interrogative or declarative. The research
to date does not suffice to explain why this is the case.14 Further research is also
needed to clarify the motivations of speakers when they choose to use =mi and
=cha in questions. It also remains to be established whether such choices are
motivated by the content of the utterance, the epistemic context of discourse, or
considerations related to politeness. Initial observations indicate that speakers
resist using =mi when asking questions concerning the addressee. In second per-
son interrogatives =cha or the negative/interrogative marker =chu are strongly
preferred. When I tried uttering declarative clauses with second person subject,
my interlocutors corrected me, suggesting that what I wanted to say was actually
a =chu or =cha-marked question. As shown in (12) above, the use of =mi is not
an issue in third person questions.
Lastly, it is important to note that the “lack of epistemic primacy” meaning
does not always entail that the speaker’s epistemic access is inferior to that of
the interlocutor. The examples (13) through (15) above suggest that =cha is used
in discourse in such contexts, and this is most often the case. However, this is
not the case in (10), repeated below for the sake of clarity:
(10) Dubitative
Ima
ima
what
shutiracha,
shuti-ta=cha
name-ACC=CHA
Shangricha
Shangri=cha
NAME=CHA
nijkuna
ni-k-kuna
say-NMLZ-PL
akay...
a-ka=y
AUX-PST=EMPH
‘What was his name, I think they called him Shangri…’
[in_26052013_02 132]
As mentioned above, in this case the speaker is trying to remember an event
from her youth, and marks the propositions she is not sure about with =cha. How-
ever, her interlocutor is a young person who could not have known the shaman
whose name the speaker is trying to remember. Therefore, a more plausible anal-
ysis is that the speaker uses =cha to indicate that she does not have epistemic
primacy in this case, although as the narrator and witness of the events she is
recounting, she could be expected by the interlocutors to have it. Although exam-
ples like this one need further analysis, they are still in line with the main point
14The currently available data suggest that unlike =mi, the meaning of =cha does not assign
epistemic primacy to a particular participant of the interaction. Rather, it serves to indicate
that the speaker does not hold it. This aspect of analysis needs to be developed in more detail,
but it would explain why =cha does not partake in origo shift (I am grateful to Henrik Bergqvist
for this observation).
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presented here – that Upper Napo Kichwa =cha can be analysed as a marker of
“lack of epistemic primacy” on the part of the speaker.
In this section, I have shown that the two Upper Napo Kichwa markers de-
scribed in this chapter, namely =mi and =cha, can be analysed as encoding “epis-
temic primacy of the origo” and “lack of epistemic primacy of the speaker”, re-
spectively. In the following section, I discuss the relationship between the mark-
ers’ semantics and their association with focus.
4.2 Epistemic primacy and focus
In Table 2.1 (§2), I show that the cognates of the markers =mi and =cha in other
Quechuan varieties were often analysed as focus marker (cf. e.g., Muysken 1995;
Sánchez 2010; 2015). In the same section, I mention that in Upper Napo Kichwa,
=mi and =cha seem to be associated with focus, but are too infrequent to be
plausibly analysed as focus markers. I have discussed the interaction of focus
with =mi and =cha in detail elsewhere (Grzech 2016a: ch.4). Here, for the sake
of space, I limit the discussion to those aspects of the markers’ association with
focus that are relevant to describing the interdependence between their focus-
related function and their epistemic primacy-related semantics.
The marker =mi can occur in different types of focus structures, but it seems to
only be obligatory for the felicity of utterances which contain contrastive focus.
Consider:
(16) Mana
mana
NEG
ñuka
ñuka
1SG
ushichu,
ushi=chu,
daughter=Q/NEG
ñuka
ñuka
1SG
warmimi
warmi=mi
woman=MI
/
/
/
#warmi
#warmi
#woman
‘[She is] not my daughter, [she is] my wife.’ [elicited]
Contrastive focus, as understood here, exhibits two main properties: (1) having
a set of identifiable alternatives (cf. Kiss 1998; Repp 2010) and (2) implying the
rejection of those alternatives (Repp 2010: 1336). Both apply to (16) above and (17)
below, which the speakers also resisted accepting without =mi:
(17) Mana
mana
NEG
atarikanichu,
atari-ka=chu
get.up-PST=Q/NEG
tianukallami.
tia-nuka=lla=mi
be-3PL.PST=LIM=MI
‘[(S)he] didn’t stand up, they just sat [there]’ [el_24112014_01 041]
The contrastive constructions exemplified in (16) and (17) are also corrective,
that is, the alternatives to the focused constituent are not only identifiable, but
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also overt (cf. Repp 2010). Correction involves rejection of an alternative proposi-
tion that is currently under discussion, or which the hearer assumes to form part
of CG. The =mi-marked constituents are introduced to the CG in the aftermath
of the rejection of the =chu-marked alternatives. Consequently, in both cases,
propositions which one of the speakers considered true before the exchange are
rejected, and replaced with the new, =mi-marked content. The fact that =mi is re-
quired for the felicity of such constructions is fully compatible with the marker’s
‘epistemic primacy’ semantics. By uttering (16) and (17), the speaker contradicts
a proposition the hearer held as true, and introduces a new one, the factuality
of which was outside the interlocutor’s awareness. Hence, in both cases, it is the
speaker who holds the epistemic primacy. This would explain the fact that =mi
is required for the felicity of this type of utterances. The marker can also occur
in information focus structures, but consultants deem those equally permissible
with and without =mi. The non-obligatoriness of the marker in such contexts
plausibly stems from the fact that in the case of information focus it is not al-
ways clear - as it is in cases of corrective, contrastive foci - that the interlocutor
was neither aware of, nor expecting, 15 the focal content of the utterance.
Let us compare the above to the correlation of focus with =cha, which occurs
only in information focus contexts. Consider the following exchanges:
(18) a. Ayajcha
ayaj=cha
bitter=CHA
panga?
panga
leaf
‘[is it a] bitter leaf?’
b. Ayajtá
ayaj=tá
bitter=TÁ
‘[it IS] bitter’ [in_05092014_01 033-34]
(19) a. Shindzi
shindzi
strong
waskachá?
waska=cha
string=CHA
‘[Is] the string strong?’
15Expectation is another factor which seems to be relevant to the occurrence of =mi in Upper
Napo Kichwa. For reasons of space, I do not discuss this in detail here, but a discussion of its
role in the distribution of =mi is provided elsewhere (cf. Grzech 2016a: ch.6).
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b. Shindzimi
shindzi=mi
strong=MI
‘[It is] strong’ [in_20092013_01 186-87]
In the question-answer pairs in (18) and (19), =cha is used to indicate the
focus of the interrogative clauses. In the corresponding answers, the focus is
marked with the verum focus marker =tá and with =mi, respectively. The en-
clitic =cha is not syntactically obligatory in the contexts shown above, but (quasi-
)interrogatives are its most frequent context of use. The fact that it tends to in-
dicate information focus in rhetorical and confirmation questions is compatible
with its “lack of epistemic primacy” semantics; marking the focus of interroga-
tive utterances is tantamount to highlighting the portion of the utterance about
which the speaker does not have sufficient knowledge. Hence, she is requesting
more information from the addressee. Therefore, highlighting focus in dubita-
tive/interrogative contexts and marking the speaker’s “lack of epistemic primacy”
can be regarded as complementary aspects of the discourse function of =cha.
5 Epistemic primacy and Common Ground management
The discussion so far suggests that both =mi and =cha are polyfunctional mark-
ers, encoding meanings related to epistemic primacy and associated with the IS
category of focus. Consequently, a question that emerges is whether these two
aspects of their semantics could be considered jointly, so as to arrive at a uni-
fied analysis of the markers’ function in discourse. In the paragraphs that follow,
I propose that such an analysis is possible if we take the notion of Common
Ground into account.
In § 1.3.4, I defined the notions of COMMON GROUND (CG) and CG MANAGEMENT.
I mentioned that CG develops constantly over the course of communication. Its
content expands as the interlocutors put forward new propositions, which they
mutually agree to treat as true for the purpose of the exchange (cf. e.g., Stalnaker
1974). However, CG consists not only of its truth-conditional content, but also
of CG management, that is, linguistic devices indicating how CG should develop
– what propositions should be added to it, and at which point in the conver-
sation. The discussion in the following paragraphs is underpinned by another
important assumption: that any update in the CG results from solving a qUES-
TION UNDER DISCUSSION (henceforth QUD) (cf. Asher 1993; Matić 2015). QUDs
are introduced into discourse to advance communication, often by means of in-
terrogative clauses which require an answer. QUDs influence the development
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of the CG content by directing the communicative exchange towards saturating
certain propositions, so that they can then be added to CG.
As mentioned above, the development of CG is also informed by expressions
which contribute to CG management, rather than content. These type of expres-
sions are typically non-truth-conditional; they do not add to the proposition ex-
pressed, but rather constitute processing clues for the interlocutors, indicating
whether and how certain propositions could be integrated into the CG content. I
propose that the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics discussed in this chapter belong to
this class of expressions, with the epistemic primacy and information-structural
aspects of their meaning contributing to their overarching function of CG man-
agement.
Although Quechuan epistemic/evidential markers have not been analysed in
this way before, the idea that epistemic meanings and IS meanings are related to
each other is not a new one. Kamio (1997: 3) pointed out a conceptual relation be-
tween the TERRITORIES OF INFORMATION and IS, as both relate to “the character
of information expressed in natural language”. In Quechuan literature, these re-
lations also have not gone without notice. Hintz & Hintz (2017) observe that “the
inter-subjective nature of certain evidential systems” invites discussion of how
evidentiality relates to CG. In her analysis of Cuzco Quechua evidentials, Faller
(2002) also mentions in passing that evidential marking is related to IS. In some
previous studies (e.g., Muysken 1995), the focus-related and evidential functions
of the enclitics were acknowledged, although the relation between the two was
not explained.
Upper Napo Kichwa =mi and =cha can be analysed as markers of CG man-
agement not only because of their meaning, but also because of the type of con-
tribution they make to the proposition expressed. Both markers are non-truth-
conditional, which is confirmed by the fact that their contribution to the propo-
sitions expressed by the utterances in which they occur cannot be negated (for
discussion, see Grzech 2016a: ch.5; 2016b). It follows that they cannot contribute
to the CG content, which is truth-conditional by definition.
Let us discuss the CG management function of =mi on the basis of its occur-
rence in declarative clauses, where the origo is tantamount to the speaker. As
mentioned previously, the speakers use =mi not only to indicate focus, but also to
assert their epistemic primacy. In doing so, they highlight information as congru-
ent with their own world knowledge, but not necessarily with that of the hearer.
Consequently, the use of =mi indicates that the speaker has information that is
sufficient to resolve a certain QUD, and that this information is not shared with
the interlocutor. The association of =mi with contrastive focus is congruent with
this analysis; in examples (16) and (17), the contrastive focus associated with =mi
49
Karolina Grzech
was also corrective. A correction implies that the speaker assumes being the only
participant of the discourse who knows how to answer the current QUD. Conse-
quently, the procedural meaning of =mi, integrating both epistemic primacy and
focus association, is to encourage the hearer to accept the =mi-marked informa-
tion as part of CG, despite the misgivings they might have about it. Consequently,
the marker is a CG-management device, the function of which is to accelerate
the integration of a certain proposition into CG. This is illustrated in (20) with
an exchange that took place between myself (A) and a good friend of mine (B),
when we talked about whether I would be able to prepare chicha, a traditional
drink made from manioc:
(20) a. Mana
mana
NEG
ushani!
usha-ni
can-1
‘I cannot [make chicha]!’
b. Ushanguimi!
usha-ngui=mi
can-2=MI
‘Yes you can’ [attested]
In the example above, my friend corrected me, using a =mi-marked utterance
to dispel my doubts about my capability of preparing the drink. In this specific
context, the use of =mi with second person subject is not aimed to undermine my
authority over my own actions or skills – rather, my friend wanted to emphasise
the fact that she knows I am skilled, and she also knows how to make chicha.
She used the =mi-marked assertion as a form of encouragement, urging me to
re-assess my skills.
The function of =cha as a CG management device is a mirror image of the
function of =mi. As discussed above, Upper Napo Kichwa =cha is associated with
information focus and indicates that the speaker renounces epistemic primacy.
Consequently, in terms of CG development, the use of =cha indicates that the
speaker does not have the information sufficient to answer the current QUD,
and that input is needed from the hearer to integrate the =cha-marked proposi-
tion into CG. This explains why, as shown in example (8), =cha-marked propo-
sitions tend to be interpreted as interrogatives in the absence of further context.
It is also congruent with the association of =cha with information focus, as the
enclitic attaches to that portion of the utterance that requires saturation in subse-
quent discourse. Consequently, the procedural meaning of =cha in terms of CG
management is to indicate that the current QUD is not yet solved, preventing the
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hearer from accepting the proposition as part of CG without further elaboration.
This was shown in examples (18) and (19) above.
In this section, I have shown that the two aspects of the semantics of =mi and
=cha discussed in the previous parts of this chapter can be considered jointly,
if we analyse the enclitics as markers of CG management. This suggests that
rather than referring to them as markers of epistemic primacy associated with
focus, they can be analysed as (part of) a morphosyntactic paradigm the main
function of which is to manage the CG. In the following section, I show how this
proposal can be integrated into a broader, cross-linguistic functional domain of
EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE.
6 Common Ground management and the epistemic
perspective domain
In §1.3.3, I introduced the notion of the domain of EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE (Berg-
qvist 2017), which brings together epistemic marking systems attested in various
languages, proposing that they share a “functional space” in the grammar. The
structure of the domain as proposed by Bergqvist was shown in Figure 2.1 in
§1.3.3 , and is repeated below with minor modifications, incorporating the sub-
domain of CG management:
SCOPE
(wide)
KNOWLEDGE (A)SYMMETRY complex epistemic perspective (CEP)CG management
SPEAKER-HEARER LINKS illocutionary modality
SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT egophoricity
INFORMATION SOURCE evidentiality
POSSIBILITY epistemic modalityNECESSITY
(narrow)
Figure 2.2: Dimensions of the epistemic perspective domain (based on
Bergqvist 2017: 12)
The placement of CG management shown in Figure 2.2 is based on the se-
mantics of the Upper Napo Kichwa CG management markers. As shown in § 4,
the Upper Napo Kichwa CG-managing enclitics indicate knowledge (a)symmetry
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between discourse participants, and hence are related to the category of KNOWL-
EDGE ASYMMETRY.
Bergqvist (2017) based the bottom-to-top ordering of the different sub-domains
of epistemic perspective on the assumption that the more intersubjective mean-
ings correspond to a wider scope of linguistic expressions. This has been con-
firmed in the literature on grammaticalisation (Traugott 1995; 2003; 2010; 2012;
Traugott & Dasher 2002), including grammaticalisation of discourse markers
(Traugott 1995) and deictic elements, such as demonstratives (e.g., Kratochvíl
2011). Traugott (e.g., 2010) observes that subjectified elements tend to appear at
the periphery of the constituent or clause. This observation applies both to Up-
per Napo Kichwa CG management markers and to evidentials in other Quechuan
varieties (e.g., Muysken 1995; Sánchez 2015).
Although I grouped the markers of CG management together with the mark-
ing of COMPLEX EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE (CEP) on the basis of both sub-domains
relating to knowledge (a)symmetries, it remains unclear how CG management
markers relate to CEP. Bergqvist characterises CEP as a subtype of multiple per-
spective (cf. Evans 2005), in which “one perspective [is] embedded in another”
(Bergqvist 2017: 6). In Upper Napo Kichwa, =mi – but not =cha – was attested
to occur in the scope of verbs of speech and thinking, and thus participate in
constructions which could be defined as encoding multiple perspectives. Such
constructions are used to convey reports about other speakers’ utterances, as
well as in self-corrections. Consider:
(21) Muyura
muyu-ta
fruit-ACC
pitiwn…
piti-w-n…
cut-PROG-3
ima…
ima…
what
Coco…
coco...
coconut
Mana,
mana
NEG
cocomi
coco=mi
coconut=MI
[an]
[a-n]
[COP-3]
nini,
ni-ni...
say-1
cocochá…
coco=cha...
coconut=CHA
‘He is cutting [harvesting] fruit….what…[It’s a] coconut…No, I said “co-
conut”… [but is it a] coconut?’ [el_24092014_03 003-5]
In (21), the speaker’s previous opinion about the type of fruit harvested in the
“Pear story” video is embedded in the utterance conveying her current opinion.
As such, the example could be analysed as an instance of CEP. Note that =cha
is also used in (21), but not within the complex perspective construction – the
speaker marks her new opinion with that enclitic, having realised she is not able
to name the fruit she is seeing.
In the light of the above discussion, the tentative positioning of the category
of ‘CG management’ in the vicinity of CEP seems to be accurate. However, it
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requires further research into the scope of the Upper Napo Kichwa CG manage-
ment markers. As mentioned above, the bottom-to-top ordering of the different
sub-domains in Figure 2.2 is based on the assumption that the scope of the lin-
guistic expression of these domains is narrow at the bottom and gets wider to-
wards the top. Consequently, the expressions of CEP are supposed to scope over
all the other types of markers. The scope properties of =mi and =cha need to
be thoroughly investigated before a definite decision on the placement of the
sub-domain of CG management can be made.16
Consequently, the discourse-semantic considerations presented above need to
be investigated in more detail before definite conclusions can be reached about
where CG management fits into the epistemic perspective domain. The relation-
ships between the different sub-domains of epistemic perspective are also likely
to be revised in the light of ongoing documentation of the world’s languages.
In sum, the Upper Napo Kichwa markers of CG management functionally and
semantically fit within the functional domain of epistemic perspective postulated
by Bergqvist (2017). The data from Upper Napo Kichwa also show that the do-
main is not complete in the shape in which it was proposed originally.17 Deter-
mining the place of the sub-domain of CG management within the general do-
main of epistemic perspective, as well as its relationship with other sub-domains,
requires further, cross-linguistic research. In this context, the study of the Upper
Napo Kichwa CG management enclitics brings us one step closer to describing
and analysing the cross-linguistically valid functions and properties of epistemic
marking systems across languages.
7 Summary and conclusions
Over the course of this chapter, the reader has become acquainted with the sys-
tem of marking epistemic primacy in Upper Napo Kichwa, exemplified by the
enclitics =mi and =cha. I have shown that the two Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics
16The scope of the markers is not discussed in this chapter, but I do tackle it to some extent in
my previous work (Grzech 2016a: ch.5). Preliminary investigation shows that =mi can be em-
bedded under verbs of speech and thinking, and under certain modals, but not under negation.
The marker =cha, on the other hand, was not attested in embedded contexts. Both markers are
ungrammatical with overtly marked imperatives.
17In the time between when this paper was first written and its going into print, a category of
‘engagement’ was put forward, which encompasses CEP and a broader range of phenomena
related to epistemicity (Evans et al. 2018). While the analysis presented here does not take that
development into account, it will have to be addressed in future studies of Upper Napo Kichwa
epistemic marking.
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belong to a larger paradigm, and that they can be analysed as marking epistemic
primacy and lack thereof, respectively. I have also shown that although the en-
clitics are associated with focus, they cannot be considered as focus markers.
Subsequently, I have demonstrated that the epistemic primacy semantics of the
markers and their relation to focus can be brought together under one overarch-
ing function: CG management. Finally, I have discussed the place of CG manage-
ment within the cross-linguistically valid epistemic perspective domain.
Numerous aspects of the Upper Napo Kichwa CG management markers re-
main to be investigated. First and foremost, although the considerations pre-
sented in this chapter help account for the occurrence of both enclitics in dis-
course, they are not sufficient to account for their non-occurrence. More factors,
including (counter)expectation (cf. Matić 2015), need to be taken into account
in the future research into determining why the Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics
are only attested in a very small percentage of the utterances in which they
could grammatically occur. As for =cha, it is still unclear what role politeness
plays in motivating its occurrence in discourse. Furthermore, it remains to be
explored how the epistemic markers attested in undescribed languages such as
Upper Napo Kichwa behave in discourse. Data from such languages have yet
to be integrated into the discourse-analytical research concerned with how epis-
temic meaning is expressed through discourse strategies and discourse structure,
which has been on the rise since the publication of the seminal paper of Heritage
& Raymond (2005).
Nonetheless, the analysis of =mi and =cha presented here contributes to our
current knowledge of epistemic marking systems in a variety of ways. The chap-
ter adds to our current knowledge of systems encoding epistemic meanings in
Quechuan languages. As mentioned above, in most described Quechuan vari-
eties, the cognates of the enclitics described in this chapter are analysed as ev-
idential markers. Consequently, the analysis provided here adds to our cross-
linguistic knowledge of evidential and related systems. The chapter also con-
tributes to the description of epistemic primacy as a semantic category. Rela-
tively little work has been done cross-linguistically on morphosyntactic systems
and linguistic expressions encoding epistemic primacy (cf. e.g., Stivers et al. 2011;
Hayano 2011). As a result, the description of the Upper Napo Kichwa system con-
tributes to what we know about the category’s cross-linguistic properties. The
preliminary discussion of the relation of the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic pri-
macy markers to CG management in discourse, and to the epistemic perspective
domain (Bergqvist 2017) make the analysis presented here relevant to the study of
linguistic devices encoding epistemic meaning in a cross-linguistic perspective.
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1OBJ 1st person singular object
ANT anterior
CAUSAL causalis
CONJ conjectural
COREF coreference
D distal
EMPH emphatic
LIM limitative
NAME proper name
P proximal
PRT participle
RES result
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Chapter 3
Egophoricity, engagement, and the
centring of subjectivity
Alan Rumsey
Australian National University
In egophoric systems formal patterns that are associated with first person subjects
in declarative sentences are associated with second person subjects in questions.
This difference in formal patterning is associated with a difference in the centring
of subjectivity, whereby, for example, epistemic authority regarding the state of
affairs that is described in a declarative sentence is vested in the speaker, whereas
in a question it is vested in the addressee. Such egophoric patterning is but one in-
stance of a wide range of phenomena that involve more-or-less regular shifts in the
usual centring of subjectivity as between speaker and addressee. Here I examine
three other such phenomena: 1) interactions between person marking and inten-
tional modality; 2) shifts between speaker-centred and addressee-centred kinship
terms when used in direct address; and 3) the prompting of children with utter-
ances that are voiced as if from the child’s perspective. Evidence is drawn from the
Papuan language Ku Waru and from comparison with other languages. I present
an extended example of “engagement” in Ku Waru and compare it with 1-3. I show
that, while grounded in the same basic aspects of human interaction, it differs from
1-3 in treating the centring of subjectivity as potentially variable, emergent, and dis-
tributed across the interaction rather than as prototypically related to the speech
roles of speaker and addressee and their alternation across speech-act types.
1 Introduction
In egophoric systems1 formal patterns that are associated with first person sub-
jects in declarative sentences are associated with second person subjects in ques-
1In recent literature on egophoricity including the discussions of it in this volume and the de-
tailed cross-linguistic survey in San Roque & Schieffelin (2018) that term is taken to be synony-
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tions. From a functional viewpoint this difference in formal patterning is asso-
ciated with a difference in the centring of subjectivity, whereby, for example,
epistemic authority regarding the state of affairs that is described in a declara-
tive sentence is vested with the speaker, whereas in a question it is vested in the
addressee. Egophoric patterning of this kind is but one instance of a wide range
of phenomena that involve more-or-less regular shifts in the usual centring of
subjectivity as between speaker and addressee. In this chapter, I will examine
three other such phenomena. I will compare and contrast them with egophoric
patterning and ask what, if anything, is special about the latter. Evidence for my
argument will be drawn from the Ku Waru language of Highland Papua New
Guinea — with particular emphasis on interactions between young children and
adults — and from comparison with other languages. The phenomena to be con-
sidered include: 1) interactions between person marking and intentional modal-
ity; 2) shifts between speaker-centred and addressee-centred kinship terms when
used in direct address; and 3) the prompting of children with utterances that are
voiced as if from the child’s perspective. Finally I will present an example of the
nascent grammatical category of “engagement” in Ku Waru and discuss what it
has in common with 1) - 3) and how it differs from them.
2 Egophoricity
As a typical case of egophoricity let us consider that of Northern Akhvakh as de-
scribed by Creissels (2008). Akhvakh is a Nakh-Daghestanian language spoken in
western Dagestan. It has both nominal case marking and gender-number agree-
ment marking on the verb, both of which show ergative-absolutive alignment.
Within the perfect tense/aspect Akhvakh has a formally marked distinction be-
tween the presence vs absence of what Creissels calls “assertor’s involvement”.
He defines the “assertor” as “the speaker in statements and the addressee in ques-
tions” (2). The relevant criterion of “involvement” in Northern Akhvakh is a fully
grammaticalized one: the “involved” participant is the A argument of a transitive
verb or the S argument of a lexically specified subclass of intransitive verbs the
subjects of which are typically volitional. This is illustrated in (1) and (2) by the
distribution of the verb suffixes -ari and -ada for +/- “Assertor’s Involvement”
(ASSINV) (where “non-involvement” is signalled as the residual alternative by the
Perfective suffix (PFV) alone).
mous with what has in the past more often been called ‘conjunct-disjunct patterning’. Here I
follow the above-cited literature in treating the terms as synonyms, and in using ‘egophoricity’
in preference to ‘conjunct-disjunct patterning’, noting, as do San Roque & Schieffelin, that this
is a distinct usage of ‘egophoric’ from that of Hagège (1974) and Dahl (2001; 2008).
62
3 Egophoricity, engagement, and the centring of subjectivity
(1) a. de-de
1SG-ERG
kaʁa
paper
q̵war-ada.
write-PFVASSINV
‘I wrote a letter.’
b. me-de
2SG-ERG
/
/
hu-sw̱-e
DEM-OM-ERG
/
/
hu-λ̱-e
DEM-OF-ERG
kaʁa
paper
q̵war-ari
write-PFV
‘You / he / she wrote a letter.’
c. *de-de kaʁa q̵war-ari.
d. *me-de / *hu-sw̱-e / *hu-λ̱-e kaʁa q̵war-ada.
(Creissels 2008: 1)
(2) a. me-de
2SG-ERG
čũda
when
kaʁa
paper
q̵war-ada?
write-PFVASSINV
‘When did you write a letter?’
b. de-de
1SG-ERG
/
/
hu-sw̱-e
DEM-OM-ERG
/
/
hu-λ̱-e
DEM-OF-ERG
čũda
when
kaʁa
paper
q̵war-ari?
write-PFV
‘When did I / he / she write a letter?’
c. *me-de čũda kaʁa q̵war-ari?
d. *de-de / *hu-sw̱-e / *hu-λ̱-e čũda kaʁa q̵war-ada?
(Creissels 2008: 1)
In a wide-ranging survey of grammatical patterning of this kind San Roque &
Schieffelin (2018: 4) refer to it as egophoric distribution. This is shown in Table 3.1,
which they have adapted from Hale & Watters (1973), who originally interpreted
egophoricity (or what they called conjunct/disjunct marking) as a kind of person
marking.
Table 3.1: Typical distribution of egophoric and non-egophoric markers
with respect to person and sentence type (after San Roque & Schieffelin
2018: 5)
declarative interrogative
1 EGO NON-EGO
2 NON-EGO EGO
3 NON-EGO NON-EGO
A complicating factor in languages that have this kind of system is that in
reported speech, including indirect discourse, the egophoric marker is typically
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used as if grounded in the “reported” speech situation rather than the “reporting”
one. An example from Akhvakh is shown in (3).
(3) a. ha
DEM
ĩgora
bread
de-de
1SG-ERG
magazi-gune
shop-EL
b-eχ-e
N-buy-CVB
j-eq’-ada.
F-come-PFVASSINV
‘I brought this bread from the shop.’
b. ilo-de𝑖
mother𝑜-ERG
eƛ̱’-iri
tell-IRR
waša-su̱-ga,
boy-OM-LAT
ha
DEM
ĩgora
bread
ĩ-λ̱-e𝑖
ANA-OF-ERG
magazi-gune
shop-EL
b-eχ-e
N-buy-CVB
j-eq’-ada.
F-come-PFVASSINV
‘The mother told the boy that she had brought this bread from the
shop.’
(Creissels 2008: 3)
The common denominator between the reported speech cases as in (3b) and
the simpler, non-embedded ones as in (1), (2) and (3a) is that egophoric marking,
or what Creissels calls “assertor’s involvement” marking is associated with the
participant who ostensibly has what Hargreaves (1991) refers to as “epistemic
authority” concerning the event that is being described. In (1), (2) and (3a) that is
the speaker in the primary speech event. In (3b) it is the speaker in the reported
speech event, the mother.
In most languages with egophoric marking its association with epistemic au-
thority is overridden in certain contexts, but languages vary both in the extent
to which this happens and in the contexts where it happens. One such context
for some languages is rhetorical questions. This is illustrated from Akhvakh in
(4),2 where it can be seen that in rhetorical questions the same pattern as in true
questions applies, despite the fact that in the case of the rhetorical questions the
addressee is not really being treated as the epistemic authority.
(4) de-de
1SG-ERG
čũda
when
eƛ̱’-ari
say-PFV
ha-be?
DEM-N
1. ‘When did I say that?’ – I don’t remember, perhaps you do (true
question)
2. ‘When did I say that?’ – You should know that I never did (rhetorical
question) (Creissels 2008: 11)
2In the original source (Creissels 2008: 8) the interlinear gloss of de-de shows 2SG in initial
position rather than 1SG. Creissels (personal communication 6 October 2016) has confirmed
that this is a mistake and has corrected it in an updated version of the original Word doc file
that he has kindly provided me with.
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In other languages with egophoric marking, including Newar (Hale & Watters
1973: 249) and Awa Pit (Curnow 2002: 614–615), questions with first and third per-
son subjects routinely appear with egophoric marking when they are rhetorical
questions and otherwise with non-egophoric marking, which more accurately
tracks the epistemic authority.
Another kind of variation within languages with egophoric marking is in how,
and to what extent, the semantics of volitionality are taken into account as a
potentially overriding factor.
This is illustrated from Newar by (5).
(5) a. *ji
1.ABS
pyān-ā
be.wet-PST.CJ
b. ji
1.ABS
pyāt-a
be.wet-PST.DJ
c. jī:
1.ERG
(tha:-yāta)
(self-DAT)
pyā-k-ā
be.wet-CAUS-PST.CJ
‘I got (myself) wet.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 29)
By contrast, within Northern Akhvakh, for any given verb there is no choice of
marking its subject as either egophoric or non-egophoric in accord with its voli-
tionality or any other contextual factor. As Creissels puts it, “Northern Akhvakh
is a nearly perfect example of a fully syntacticized system of assertor’s involve-
ment marking, in the sense that, when the assertor of a clause in the perfective
positive coincides with the A/S argument of a verb encoding a controllable event,
the omission of assertor’s involvement marking is very exceptional” (Creissels
2008: 12–13).
2.1 Egophoric distribution and evidentiality
As will be evident from the above discussion, the kind of involvement in a predi-
cated event or state of affairs that is deemed to be relevant for egophoric marking
is typically treated as a matter of epistemic authority – the presentation of one-
self as knowing about that event or state of affairs. As was also exemplified above,
a related kind of involvement that also figures in many egophoric systems is voli-
tionality. This pertains to the difference between actions or states of affairs that
have putatively been intentionally performed or brought about by the referent
of the A or S argument and ones that were not under his/her control. But it is im-
portant to note that there are other linguistic phenomena which may not qualify
as egophoricity per se, but which nonetheless show the same kind of alternation
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in the centring of subjectivity as the one between questions and statements that
is shown in Table 3.1. One such area is evidentiality, as demonstrated in detail by
Aikhenvald (2004) and by San Roque et al. (San Roque et al. 2015, San Roque &
Schieffelin 2018), who show how it overlaps and interacts with egophoricity in
that respect. This is exemplified in (6) from Duna, a Trans-New Guinea language
spoken in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea.
(6) a. ka-roko,
be/stand-SW.SIM
e,
hesitation
no
1SG
ame
father
hutia
come.PFV.VIS.P
‘Being there, my father came (according to my visual evidence).’
b. Keni
PSN
hutia=pe?
come.PFV.VIS.P=Q
‘Has Kenny come? (according to your visual evidence?)’
c. Rodni
PSN
kho
3SG
ayu
now/today
hutia
come.PFV.VIS.P
ri-tia
say-PFV.VIS.P
‘[Someone] said Rodney came today (according to their visual
evidence).’
(San Roque & Schieffelin 2018: 56, from San Roque 2008 and field
notes)
As can be readily seen from this example, the patterning of the “previous vi-
sual evidence” (VIS.P) evidential category shows the same shift in the imputed
knower of the evidence across statements, questions and reported speech as did
the Akhvakh egophoric or “asserter’s involvement” marker in examples (1), (2),
and (3) respectively. This correspondence seems expectable (once it has been dis-
covered!) in view of the fact that both evidentiality and egophoricity have to do
with knowledge, and the speech-act participants’ relation to it – evidentiality hav-
ing to do with their sources of knowledge and egophoricity with their presumed
authority over it or lack thereof. But interestingly, the same shift is also found
with respect to other linguistic categories that pertain to another kind of “asser-
tor involvement” besides knowledge, namely intention. In order to illustrate this
I now turn to a discussion of intentional modality, beginning with an example
from Ku Waru.3
3As explained in §2.2, by ‘intentional’ modality I refer to the modal categories that express
an intention or desire on the part of the speaker or other relevant ‘modal subject’ (optative,
imperative, hortative, etc.). I take this to be synonymous with what is sometimes also called
‘volitive’ modality, but not with ‘volitionality’ in the sense that that term is most often used by
linguists, for reasons discussed below.
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2.2 Egophoric distribution and intentional modality
Ku Waru4 has eight TAM categories that are indicated by verb suffixes along
with seven person-number categories. One of the TAM categories is what we
call the “Optative” mood. The suffixes that mark it are shown below with rough
English glosses.
1SG -ab ‘I want to/intend to__’
2SG -an(i) ‘I want you to__’, ‘Go ahead and do__’
3SG -upiyl/ipiyl ‘Let him/her/it do__’
1PL -amiyl ‘Let’s do__’
1DU -abiyl ‘Let’s you and I do__’
2/3PL -ang ‘I want you (pl)/them (pl) to do__’,‘You/they should do__’
2/3DU -angl ‘I want you two/those two to do__’,
‘You/they two should do__’
Some examples of optative 1SG -ab are:
(7) na-nga
1SG-GEN
wanya
hat
ly-ab
get-OPT:1SG
‘I want to get my hat.’
(8) ekepu
now
aku-na
that-LOC
kamukamu
final
nyi-k
say-NF:2/3PL
ti-ng
do-2/3PL:PRF
ul
thing
na
I
pily-ab
hear-OPT:1SG
‘Now I want to hear your (PL) final determination’ [lit: …hear the thing
that you have said finally].
(9) ab
woman
ilyi
this
ly-ab
get-OPT:1SG
‘I want to marry this woman.’
4Ku Waru is spoken in the Western Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea and belongs to a
dialect continuum that includes what Ethnologue classifies as four distinct languages: Melpa,
Mbo-Ung, Imbonggu, and Umbu-Ungu. In those terms, Ku Waru belongs to the Mbo-Ung lan-
guage (ISO code mux). My collaborator Francesca Merlan and I use ‘Ku Waru’ in preference
to ‘Mbo-Ung’ because it has more salience for the local people as a name for a regional speech
variety. Mbo-ung, by contrast, just means ‘Indigenous language’ and does not correspond to a
territorially bounded speech variety at the level of a language.
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When a 1SG optative verb is used in a question, the usual modal origo or rele-
vant centre of intention shifts from speaker to addressee.5 Examples are:
(10) na
I
lku
house
suku
inside
w-ab-i
come-OPT:1SG-Q
‘Can I come into the house?’, ‘Is it o.k. with you for me to come into the
house?’
(11) s-ab
give-OPT:1SG
mola
or
mol
no
‘Shall I give [it to you] or not?’
(12) na-nga
1SG-GEN
mai
ground
aprali
seize
te-k
do-NF:2/3PL
lyi-ng-lum
get-PRF:2/3PL-COND
na
I
tena
where
p-ab
go-OPT:1SG
‘If they take my land, where I am supposed to go? [i.e. where do you
propose that I go?].’
(13) ab
woman
obi-nga
penis-GEN
aki
that
te-pa
do-NF:3SG
suku
inside
pe-lym
be/lie-HAB:3SG
na
I
to-p
hit/do-NF:1SG
pilyi-lyo
know-HAB:1SG
enebu
tiredness
to-kum
hit/be-PPR:3SG
pilyi-kir-ayl
know-PPR:1SG-DEF
mel-ayl
thing-DEF
ti
another
te-ab
do-OPT:1SG
mel
thing
nar
what
‘When a woman has sex with a man that’s how it is, I know; I’m an
expert at it. I know it’s tiring, but what else can I do?’6
5For a similar shift of origo in questions involving 2SG hortatives in another Trans-New Guinea
Papuan language of the Papua New Guinea Highlands, Duna, see San Roque 2008: 448–450.
6This example comes from a paternity dispute, a full transcript and analysis of which is pre-
sented in Merlan & Rumsey (1986). In order to understand the point of this remark, it is im-
portant to know that, at least as of 1983, when the dispute took place, Ku Waru people firmly
believed that is impossible for a woman to become pregnant from having sex with a man only
once, multiple applications of semen being necessary to stem the flow of menstrual blood and
build up the foetus. The woman who was accused of adultery in this case became pregnant at
a time when she was living mainly apart from her husband, during which, as they both agreed,
they had had sex between three and six times. The speaker of (13) is humorously offering him-
self as an expert witness, attesting that in his experience it takes many more acts of intercourse
to impregnate a woman than that – so many that one becomes exhausted. For the full context,
see Merlan & Rumsey (1986: 100).
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(14) ab
woman
ilyi
this
ly-ab-i
get-OPT:1SG-Q
‘Do you want me to marry this woman?’, ‘Are you expecting me to marry
this woman?’
Now let us consider a partly comparable case from Mwotlap, an Oceanic Aus-
tronesian language of Northern Vanuatu. Mwotlap does not mark person, num-
ber or tense on the verb. It has what François (2003, 2004) calls a Prospective
marker so that occurs with a wide range of modal and other meanings. In an
analysis that is consistent with other theorists of modality such as Halliday (1970),
Verstraete (2005) and Lehmann (2012) (but different in its terminology), François
(2003, 2004) distinguishes between the subject of the modus (i.e., of the modal
projection encoded by the Prospective marker) and the subject of the dictum (of
the sentence itself). While the latter is explicitly encoded within the sentence,
the subject of the modus is left unspecified, and must be retrieved from the con-
text. There are certain default patterns to this inference, one of which relates to
the difference between declarative sentences and questions. Let us first consider
a declarative example, as provided to me by François (personal communication
March 12, 2016) based on one of the examples in François (2003: 221).
(15) Nok
1SG
so
PROSP
leg
marry
mi
with
kē.
3SG
‘I <Prosp> marry her.’
Here are possible readings given to me by François for (15) as a statement:
a) I want to marry her
modal subject = Speaker
b) I am being asked to marry her
modal subject = a specific person with the authority to impose my future
wife upon me:  my father, or uncle, etc.)
c) I am supposed to marry her
modal subject = an impersonal custom  (e.g., if marriage rules mean that I
should marry that woman rather than another one)
d) I was supposed to marry her / should have married her
modal subject = an authority, whether specific (father+) or non-specific
(custom…)… but with retrospective reading
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e) I’m going to marry her
non-modal readings e.g. typically in a dependent clause: ‘She will move to
my village, that’s because I’ll be marrying her…’
f) If/When I marry her…
 suspended modal origo (yielding a conditional protasis)
Here are possible readings given by François for that same sentence with ques-
tion intonation:
(16) Nok
1SG
so
PROSP
leg
marry
mi
with
kē?
3SG
‘I <Prosp> marry her?’
a. May I marry her?
modal subject = Addressee (asking for permission, e.g., to own father)
b. Do you think I should marry her?
modal subject = Addressee (asking for advice, e.g., if confiding to my
friend, asking them whether they think this is the right choice for
me)  
c. Am I supposed to marry her?
modal subject = an authority, whether specific (father+) or
non-specific (custom…) François adds:
“For example, if I confide to my uncle who knows well how custom or
kinship systems or marriage rules work, and assuming I want to do
well to please my extended family and marry the ‘righ’ person, then
the modal origo would not be my addressee, but rather, a diluted,
perhaps impersonal subject, whatever we understand as ‘custom’ (as
it is often called in Melanesia) or ‘law’ (as among indigenous
Australians)…” [cf. François 2003: 229]  
d. Am I going to marry her?
non-modal readings (assuming there’s a context where one could ask
this question with no particular feelings or modal contents, as in:
‘What’s the plan exactly? Will I marry her?”)
These uses of Prospective marking in Mwotlap compare interestingly with
those of the optative mood in Ku Waru as discussed above. The main difference
is that the uses of the latter are much more wide-ranging than the former. To
see this, compare Ku Waru example (9) with Mwotlap example (15). As can be
seen, (9) has the same sense as the one given for Mwotlap in (15a). But it cannot
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express non-modal meanings (as in 15e) or any of the other modal ones in (15b)–
(15d), all of which are expressed in other ways in Ku Waru. But notwithstanding
this difference, when Mwotlap so does express a modal meaning, it shows the
same crossover between speaker- and addressee-centred modality in questions
as opposed to statements. This is shown in Table 3.2, which is reproduced from
François (2003) with the title shown in English. (Note that “Cén” in the top row
stands for “centre énonciative”, or “modal subject” as François renders it in the
examples above.)
Table 3.2: The crossover between volitive and deontic values of the
Prospective in Mwotlap (after François 2003: 228)
question assertion/exclamation
Cén=toi Cén=moi
sujet syntaxique
A=moi
‘que je l’épouse ?’
[*je veux …?]
Je dois l’épouser ?
‘que je l’épouse !’
Je veux l’épouser.
~Je dois l’épouser.
sujet syntaxique
A=toi
‘que tu l’épouses ?’
Tu veux l’épouser ?
~Tu dois l’épouser ?
‘que tu l’épouses !’
[*tu veux …]
Tu dois l’épouser.
sujet syntaxique
A=lui
‘qu’il l’épouse ?’
~Il veut l’épouser ?
~Il doit l’épouser ?
‘qu’il l’épouse !’
~Il veut l’épouser.
~Il doit l’épouser.
The correspondence between the crossover in Table 3.2 and that in Table 3.1
is striking, especially in view of the fact that San Roque & Schieffelin’s table is
presented as pertaining to egophoricity and evidentiality with no reference to
modality, and François’ table as pertaining to modality with – so he tells me – no
thought of its possible relevance for any other grammatical domain at the time
when he produced it (personal communication March 25, 2016).
While this kind of crossover has become almost definitional of egophoricity
or “conjunct/disjunct” marking, and also has been recognized with regard to evi-
dentiality as discussed above, it has seldom been noted with respect to modality,
which has generally been treated as if it were exclusively speaker-centred. Be-
sides François (2003, 2004), the main exception that I am aware of is Lehmann
(2012), who develops a systematic typological comparison among six languages
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in this respect, and on that basis argues for an overarching category of “sub-
jective” modality which includes, for all six of the languages, modal categories
within which such interrogative-declarative crossover is found.
I have developed the Ku Waru - Mwotlap comparison in particular here for two
reasons. The first is that, although the examples I presented from those languages
are in full accord with the “egophoric distribution” shown in Table 3.1, they fall
outside the scope of most of the existing literature on egophoric systems, almost
all of which is exclusively concerned with the role in grammar of epistemic au-
thority or involvement. In other words, the “ego” in “egophoric” is taken to be
a knowing ego and the relevant asymmetries among speech act participants are
taken to be ones of knowledge. By contrast, the relevant semantic considerations
here are ones of deontic or intentional modality – what the entailed ego wants,
or what others want of him/her.
The other reason for my comparison between Ku Waru and Mwotlap is that I
think it shows with particular clarity how patterns that are fully grammaticalized
in one language may be evident in the discourse patterning of another. In the fol-
lowing section, I build on that by moving beyond the semantics and pragmatics
of egophoricity, evidentiality and modality to other aspects of language use that
do not show the same pattern of crossover between speaker and addressee, but
which are similar to the above examples insofar as they involve more-or-less reg-
ular shifts in the usual centring of subjectivity as between speaker and addressee.
Arising as they do from my current work on child language socialization, a com-
mon factor among these remaining examples is that they all involve speech that
is addressed to young children.
3 Altercentric kin term usage
There are at least two ways in which Ku Waru adults’ use of kin terms to children
differs from their usage to other adults, and from children’s use of them to any-
body. The first of these is what Merlan (1982) in an Australian context dubbed
“altercentric usage”. To understand what that involves, it is helpful to introduce
the term “anchor” as used by Dahl & Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001). For any given
kin term within a given context, the anchor is the person or persons from whom
the relevant relation is reckoned. So for example the anchors of “Fred’s uncle”,
“our aunt”, and “Daddy”, when used by a child to her father, are “Fred”, 1PL and
1sg respectively. Usually when kin terms are used without explicit reference to
an anchor, the implicit anchor is the speaker as in the “daddy” example above.
But alternatively it may be the addressee, as for example when a mother says
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to a child “Give it to Mommy” or “Where’s Daddy?”. What Merlan (1982) drew
attention to was: 1) that this phenomenon, which she called “altercentric” usage,
is very common around the world; 2) that it is especially common in speech
addressed to young children by adults and older children; and 3) it is typically
non-reciprocal, i.e., it is used when children are being addressed by adults but
not vice versa.7
Altercentric usage of kin terms is common in Ku Waru, and is in accord with
Merlan’s generalizations. Examples are:
(17) ma
mommy
tena
where
pu-m
go-PRF:3SG
‘Where did [your] mommy go?’ (Said by a father to his 2½ year old son)
(18) tata
daddy
uj
wood
me-ba
carry-NF:3SG
o-kum
come-PPR:3SG
‘[Your] daddy is bringing firewood.’ (Said by a mother to her 3-year old
daughter).
(19) ana
same.sex.sibling
apu
carry.on.shoulder
tupily
hit/do:OPT:3SG
‘Let your sister carry you on her shoulder.’ (Said by woman to her 2½
year old niece)
Note that in all these examples (as in the English examples of altercentric us-
age above) there is no explicit indication of the anchor. Just as in the English
examples, it would have been possible to include one, with a possessive pronoun
‘your’ (nunga). But in both cases, as in many other attested ones from around the
world, that indication of the anchor tends to be left out in altercentric kin-term
usage by adults to children.
Another thing to note is that in both the English case and the Ku Waru one
(again, as is common around the world), the kin terms that are used in this way
are ones that in other contexts are characteristically used by children: “daddy”
and “mommy” rather than “(my) father”, “(my) mother”, etc. Likewise in Ku Waru
the terms ma, tata and ana are ones that are in other contexts used more by
children than adults.
I suggest that what is going on here bears a family resemblance to what we
saw above regarding the shift of typical modal origo as between statements and
7For further elaboration of this typology including other kinds of anchor-shift and examples of
them see Agha (2006).
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questions in egophoric, evidential and modal contexts, in two ways. First, in both
cases the shift is between Speaker and Addressee as the relevant implicit ground
in relation to which the meaning is figured. Second, in both cases this happens
within a specific context: questions vs statements in the case of the modal shift
and speech by adults to young children vs other adults and older children in the
case of kin term usage. Another similarity is that the shifts in question are very
widely attested in the languages and speech communities of the world. Below I
will address the question of why this should be the case. First I will introduce
another kind of shift that is widely found in the use of kin terms to children.
4 “Address inversion”
In examining transcripts of interactions involving Ku Waru children one thing I
have been struck by is a regular pattern whereby an adult when speaking to a
child addresses him/her with the kin term that the child uses when addressing
that adult. So for example a man addresses his (“actual” or classificatory) son or
daughter by a term that ordinarily means ‘daddy’, and addresses his nephew or
niece by a term that ordinarily means ‘uncle’.  Examples are:
(20) Man to his “daughter”8 (age 3):
papa=o
daddy=VOC
nu
2SG
ur
sleep
nai-kin
who-COM
pin?
be/lie:PRF:2SG
‘Daddy [i.e., daughter], with whom did you have a sleepover?’
(21) Man to his niece (age 3 ½):
angkol=o
uncle=VOC
nu
2SG
pu-ni
go-FUT:3SG
mola
or
mol
no
‘Uncle [i.e. niece], are you going or not?’
(22) Man to his son (age 4) :
papa
daddy
e
hey
mel
thing
kuduyl
red
ilyi
this
kana-kin-i
see-PPR:2SG-Q
‘Hey Daddy [i.e., son], do you see this red thing?’
8The ‘daughter’ who is being addressed here is in European terms not the speaker’s own daugh-
ter, but the daughter of one of his ‘classificatory’ brothers, which in Ku Waru (as in many
languages) places her in the same kin category as his own daughter (Kroeber 1909). Similar
considerations apply to the kin relations in examples (21)–(23).
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(23) a. John, to his daughter (age 3):
ep
now
na-nga
1SG-GEN
oma
fish
mari
some
tuju-ni?
hit:BEN-FUT:2SG
‘Now will you catch some fish for me?’
b. Saina (the girl’s mother):
toju-ba-yl
hit:BEN-FUT:3SG-DEF
‘Indeed she will.’
c. John:
e?
really?
a
oh
na-nga
1SG-GEN
papa-n…
daddy-ERG
‘Really? Oh, my ‘daddy’ [i.e., daughter] [will catch some]
In all these examples, in place of the junior term within a given dyad (father-
daughter, uncle-niece, father-son) the senior term is used in address and refer-
ence to the junior member of the pair, regardless of his or her gender. Although
such usage may seem unusual from an Anglophone perspective, it is actually
quite widely attested from elsewhere in the world, including Albanian, Arabic,
Bengali, Bulgarian, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Norwegian, Persian, Romanian,
Russian, Tok Pisin, Turkish and many other languages where it has been docu-
mented under the rubrics of allocuzione inversa (Renzi 1968), umgekehrte Anrede
(Beyer & Kostov 1978), and “address inversion” (Braun 1988). This is actually a
misnomer, for two reasons. The one that is especially relevant here is that, as
shown by Braun, in the great majority of attested practices of this kind, there
is actually not a full inversion. That is, while the senior party uses the term
for the junior one that the latter uses for him or her, the junior party does not
change his or her usage in the opposite direction. For example the man’s classi-
ficatory daughter in example (20) does not reciprocate by calling him by a term
for “daughter”. Nor does the man’s son in (22) call his father “son”. Rather the
children continue to call him by a father term.
What are we to make of these usages? As different as they are from the alter-
centric ones discussed above, there are, I suggest, three important similarities:
1. Both are associated with speech by adults to young children.
2. Both involve a shift of perspective that is made by the adult when address-
ing the child, but not by the child in return.
3. In both cases the perspective that is taken is that of the child, or one that
assimilates to it.
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That 3 is true in the case of altercentric kin term usage should be obvious. It is
also true of “address inversion” insofar as the terms that are used, even as their
reference is reversed, are ones that are normally used by children to adults, just
as in the altercentric case. But why the apparent reversal of reference? Friederike
Braun (1988) has suggested that “the senior [kin term] used for inversion could
be regarded as an archilexeme referring to the dyad as a whole, though explic-
itly naming only one of its partners”9 (Braun 1988: 285). I’m not sure how well
that proposal could be supported on formal grounds in the Ku Waru case, but
in functional terms there does seem to me to be something right about the idea
that the “inverse” uses of kin terms highlight the relationship per se. And in Ku
Waru and elsewhere it seems to me no accident that the terms which do that, and
which shift the anchor from speaker to addressee, should be particularly associ-
ated with contexts in which adults are speaking to children. For the highlighting
of relationships is one of the main ways in which children are socialized and
culture is transmitted.
5 Prompting routines
I now turn to a much more general phenomenon involving the same kind of
transposition of perspectives as in the use of altercentric kin terms. This is the
phenomenon of prompting, i.e., of adults presenting utterances to the children for
them to repeat to others.10 An example is shown in (24). This bit of conversation
took place at Kailge, a settlement which lies at the end of a long and winding
unpaved road about one hour’s ride from Mount Hagen, the capital of Western
9In that respect ‘address inversion’ is like ‘dyadic’ kin terms such as discussed by Merlan &
Heath (1982) and Evans (2006). Dyadic kin terms are ones which refer to a pair of people who
stand in a given relationship to each other. They mean things like ‘pair of brothers’, ‘mother
and child’, etc. There is a widespread pattern found among those terms, first pointed out by
Merlan & Heath (1982), such that whenever they are based on the word for one member of an
intergenerational pair such as father-son, uncle-nephew, etc., it is the term for the senior mem-
ber that becomes the basis for the dyadic term. For example in Kayardild, an Australian Abo-
riginal language spoken on the South Wellesley Islands of Northern Queensland, such terms
are formed with a dyadic suffix –ngarrba; the expression for ”mother and child”, ngamathu-
ngarrba, is formed by combining this suffix with the word for ‘mother’, ngamathu. Likewise
in Icelandic the dyadic terms feðgin ”father and daughter” and mæðgin ‘mother and son’ are
derived from the words for ‘father’ and ‘mother’ respectively (Evans 2006).
10For extensive discussion and exemplification of prompting in Kaluli, a Papuan language spoken
in the Bosavi region about 120 km to the southwest of Ku Waru see Schieffelin (1990). For cross-
culturally comparative accounts of this very widespread phenomenon see Demuth (1986) and
Moore (2012).
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Highlands province. The speakers were a man named Taka and his eighteen-
month old daughter Laplin. Both of them were looking at an older boy named
Mawa who was passing by.
(24) a. Father:
mawa
(boy’s name)
wi
call.out.to
to
do:IMP:SG
‘Call out to Mawa.’
b. Daughter [shouts]:
mawai!
‘Hey Mawa!’
c. Father:
kar-na
truck-LOC
p-abiyl
go-OPT:1DU
wa!
come:IMP:SG
kar!
truck
‘Come, let’s you and me go in the car! The car!’
d. Daughter:
wa
come:IMP:SG
‘Come!’
The father’s utterance in line c is a typical instance of prompted speech in
that it is voiced from his daughter’s point of view, for her to repeat. Sometimes
such prompts are explicitly framed with the imperative form of the word for ‘say’
(nya), but more often they are not, as in this case. The daughter nonetheless un-
derstands this as a prompt, and responds appropriately. She is at the one-word
stage of language acquisition, so her father’s utterance with its concatenated
first person dual optative verb and locative-marked accompanying NP is far too
complex for her to understand and repeat in its entirety, but she nonetheless un-
derstands that it is a prompt, picking out its most central element, the imperative
verb wa ‘come’, and repeating it as if from her own viewpoint.
Another, more complex example of prompting is shown in 25. This is from a
conversation between a Ku Waru mother (Wapi) and her two-year-old son (Jesi),
in the presence of his five-year-old brother Alex.11
11For some of the son’s utterances in this transcript there are two parallel lines of Ku Waru.
The first line shows what he actually said and the line below it shows what our Ku Waru-
speaking transcription assistant has offered as an adult equivalent of that utterance. For further
discussion of this interaction see Rumsey (2014).
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(25) a. Mother:
ana
same.sex.sibling
kola
cry
naa
not
ti=o
do:JUS=VOC
nya
say:IMP:SG
‘Tell your brother not to cry [lit: ‘Say “brother, don’t cry”’]’
b. Son:
ana
same.sex.sibling
kola
cry
naa
not
ti=o
do:JUS=VOC
‘Brother don’t cry.’
c. Mother:
kali
kalyke
p-abiyl=o
go-OPT:2DU=VOC
‘Let’s go to Kailge.’
d. Son:
teka
kalyke
Kailge
pabi=o
p-abiyl=o
go-OPT:2DU=VOC
‘Let’s go to Kailge.’
e. Mother:
sispop
cheesepop
ly-abiyl
get-OPT:2DU
p-abiyl=o
go-OPT:2DU=VOC
‘Let’s go get some cheesepops.’
f. Son:
titopa-ti
sispop-ti
cheesepop-IDF
nabi
n-abiyl
eat-OPT:2DU
‘Let’s eat a cheesepop.’
g. Mother:
p-abiyl
go-OPT:2DU
‘Let’s go.’
h. Son:
pebil=o
p-abiyl=o
go-OPT:2DU=VOC
‘Let’s go.’
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i. Mother:
kola
cry
naa
not
ti=o
do:JUS=VOC
‘Don’t cry.’
j. Son:
pike
bighead
naa
not
ti
do:JUS
‘Don’t be a bighead (disobedient).’
All of the mother’s utterances in this example are prompts offered to her son
for him to repeat. Only the first one (25a) is explicitly framed as such by the
imperative verb nya ‘say’. But again the son understands them all as prompts
and responds appropriately. In lines (25b), (25d), (25f) and (25h) he does this by
repeating the utterances he has been prompted to say (sometimes in his own
toddler-talk variants). In line (25j) he responds more creatively by saying some-
thing that does not repeat the prompt verbatim but is fully within the spirit of it,
chastising his brother for being a “bighead”. The framing relationship between
the mother’s prompt in line (25a) and the prompted response that she projects
for her son in it is shown in Figure 3.1. The sons’s response in line (25b) and all
of his subsequent ones are interactionally complex in that they are positioned
both as responses to his mother and as injunctions directed to his brother Alex.
The same is true of the daughter’s responses to her father in 24. In interactional
terms, the utterances by the parents that prompt these responses are similar to
what happens with altercentric kin term usage as exemplified above, in that the
adult speaker is in effect aligning his or her perspective with that of the child,
while at the same time retaining his/her position as the controlling party from
whose perspective the child’s utterance is projected.12 Accordingly, in common
with altercentric kin term usage, the projection of perspectives within prompt-
ing routines is asymmetrical in that it is always done by the adult in relation to
the child, never the other way around.
12A reviewer comments regarding this form of prompting that it ‘seems to be very different
from the perspective shift in altercentric kinship terms. Here the “perspective shift” is a natural
consequence of the fact that the prompt is given verbatim, as direct (pre-)reported discourse,
which is the simplest way to instruct a child what to say.’ I agree that prompting is different in
kind from altercentric kinterm usage in that it is in some instances explicitly marked as what
the referee calls ‘direct (pre-)reported discourse’. But in those many instances where it is not
explicitly framed in that way by a verb of saying, it is more like altercentric kinterm usage in
that the shift of perspective (or, in Bühler’s 1990 terms, transposed origo) must be indirectly
inferred by the addressee, in this case the child. I suggest that the children’s ability to do that
so readily from a very early age results in part from the regularity of the direction in which
that shift takes place, as identified in the following sentence.
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Speaker:
Mother Wapi
Addressee
Son Jesi
Projected Speech situation
Addressee:
Jesi's brother Alex
Speaker:
Jesi
Projected Utterance:
ana, kola naa te
‘Brother, don’t cry’
Figure 3.1: Interactional framing in conversation between Wapi and
Jesi
6 Discussion
In the first part of this chapter I have discussed the regular shifts in the centring of
subjectivity as between speaker and addressee that are entailed in the use of the
grammatical categories of egophoricity, evidentiality and intentional modality. I
then discussed other such shifts that are typically found in the use of kin terms
to young children, and in the prompting of children by adults and older children.
In all of these kinds of shift there was a high degree of regularity but there were
considerable differences between the former, category-based alternations and the
latter, situationally based ones, namely:
1. The category-based shifts are conditioned by speech-act type: statements
on the one hand vs questions or reported speech on the other, whereas
the other shifts are based on aspects of the context of situation: speech to
young children by older people.
2. The category-based alternations are symmetrical, involving reciprocal
transposition of subjective centring as between speaker and addressee,
whereas the situationally based shifts are asymmetrical, involving a shift
of perspective by the adult to that of the child but not vice versa.
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Although these two kinds of shifts may seem very different, in some contexts
there is interaction between the two. This happens on at least two different lev-
els. First, in keeping with what San Roque & Schieffelin (2018: 451) have sug-
gested regarding speech to small children in the Kaluli language (about 200 km
west-southwest of Ku Waru), the practice of “speaking for” the child in prompted
utterances involves at least a partial displacement of epistemic and intentional
authority from the child to the adult, or a virtual merging of the two. For exam-
ple in line (24c), the parent uses an optative form, the general modal meaning
of which involves the attribution of an intention by the speaker to him/herself
– a self-attribution. Here the intention is presented to the addressee as if it were
(also) her own, to be voiced by her in address to a third party, which she then
does. The same is true of line c in example (25).
Additionally there is a shift in what Nuyts (2005, 2006) would call the “con-
trolling participant”, or “first-argument participant” (and Lehmann 2012 the “ex-
ecutor”), i.e., the person who would carry out the intention. That is, it is not the
speaker of the prompting utterance nor her addressee Jesi, but Jesi’s addressee
in the projected utterance that he is prompted with.
In other cases, there is an interesting transposition of perspective within adult
speech to children that is the inverse of the one discussed above regarding modal-
ity. An example is (26), the likes of which I have often heard in adult’s speech to
small children.
(26) lku
house
suku
inside
w-ab-i
come-OPT:1SG-Q
‘Do you want to come into the house?’
Note that this example is the same as the last three words of example (10) above,
the gloss of which was ‘Can I come into the house’. But here the understood
controlling participant (the person whose coming into the house is at issue) is
the addressee rather than the speaker. So here there is a double displacement,
whereby it is not only the modal subject that shifts from speaker to addressee but
also the controlling participant. This is in accord with the fact that such examples
meet both of the contextual criteria for perspective shift that I have discussed
above, namely, occurrence of modal verbs in questions as opposed to declaratives
and occurrence in the speech of adults to children.
The same thing sometimes also happens with the use of the future, which in
Ku Waru, as in most or all other languages, is not a purely temporal category,
but also partly modal in value. An example is (27).
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(27) a. Adult:
nu
2SG
ku
stone/money
mare
some
pe-nsi
be/lie-CAUS
molt-i
be/stay:HAB:2SG-Q
‘Do you have any money?’
b. Child:
al
that:ENDO:DEF
na-n
1SG-ERG
sib-ayl
give:FUT:1SG-DEF
‘I’ll give it [to you].’
c. Adult:
naa
not
lyi-nsi-bu-e
take-BEN-FUT:1SG-Q
‘Oh, so you’re not going to take it [for yourself].’
In line (27c) as in (26) there is a shift of perspective by the adult to that of the
child, both with respect to the modal subject of lyinsibu (the person to whom the
intention as attributed) and the controlling participant. But in (27) there is a fur-
ther complexity in that the utterance in line (27c) as a whole is not voiced entirely
from the projected viewpoint of the child. Rather it is a hybrid or “double per-
spective” construction (Evans 2006) in that the question marker -e is voiced from
the father’s perspective, as the person who is questioning the child’s intention.
Below I will introduce another grammatical category, the nascent one of “en-
gagement”, and discuss its relation to all of the phenomena discussed above. Be-
fore doing so I will first turn to a question pertaining to the three categories that
I have discussed so far. The question arises from the fact that in previous treat-
ments of egophoricity (a.k.a. conjunct-disjunct patterning) it has been so closely
associated with the crossover pattern shown in Table 3.1 as to make that seem al-
most definitional of it. But as has long been appreciated, that pattern is also found
with respect to evidentiality, and as shown above, it is also associated with some
kinds of modality. So the question is, among all the phenomena discussed above,
what if anything is distinctive about egophoricity? If anything, I think it is this:
While all the phenomena discussed above involve shifts in the locus of relevant
subjectivity, egophoric marking is the only one that explicitly tracks that by mak-
ing use of morphemes whose main function is to indicate whether or not a given
argument or other nominal referent is the primary locus of relevant subjectiv-
ity. By contrast in example sentences (8) – (14) from Ku Waru and most of the
readings of (15) and (16) from Mwotlap the main function of the morphemes in
question was to express intentional modality, and the main function of Ku Waru
kin terms in the following examples was to refer to particular people, albeit in
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ways that involve particular shifts of perspective that correspond to the ones
involved in egophoric marking. But I think we must add that the contrast with
egophoric marking is only a partial one, because not all of it does actually indicate
the locus of subjectivity. This is shown to be the case in Akhvakh by example (4),
where it can be seen that the presence or absence of egophoric marking does not
take account of the difference in the centring of subjectivity as between actual
questions and rhetorical ones. Rather, it is determined in a semantically bleached,
fully “syntacticized” way (Creissels 2008: 11) by its occurrence in a question with
a first person subject. Furthermore, as is also clearly brought out by Creissels,
the incidence of egophoric marking is not directly conditioned by the presence
or absence of imputed “assertor involvement” at the level of actual situated ut-
terances, but rather is grammatically and lexically determined. It occurs only in
constructions with perfective verbs. When they are transitive, it is obligatory on
A and when they are intransitive it is obligatory on S for a subclass of intransitive
verbs whose subjects are typically in control of the action, and proscribed in con-
struction with verbs whose subjects are typically not in control. The operative
word here is “typical”: egophoric marking in Northern Akhvakh is not sensitive
to semantically differing uses of a single verb in different contexts, but instead
operates as what Creissels calls:
a particular type of agreement, for which the term assertive agreement can
be proposed. The difference with person agreement is that, in person agree-
ment, verb morphology reflects the coincidence between particular argu-
ment roles and the speech act roles speaker vs. addressee vs. non-SAP, where-
as in assertive agreement, verb morphology (or the morphology of a sub-
class of verbs) reflects the coincidence between a particular argument role
and the speech act role of assertor (Creissels 2008: 11).
While the egophoric system of Northern Akhvakh is perhaps unusual in the
extent to which categorial factors override discourse-contextual ones in this way,
it seems from San Roque & Schieffelin’s (2018) wide-ranging survey of such sys-
tems that all of them show this tendency to a certain extent. In other words, the
marking of what San Roque & Schieffelin call “epistemic authority” (Creissels’
“assertor involvement”) is probably never realized in a completely exceptionless
way by any single formal device. Conversely, many or all of the other formal
categories discussed above probably also serve that function to some extent in
certain discourse contexts. This must be taken as a qualification to the answer I
have offered above to the question of what is distinctive about egophoric mark-
ing. But in my view it still leaves the category of egophoricity intact as a valid
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cross-linguistic one, which is recognizable within particular languages to the ex-
tent that they have markers that signal epistemic authority or assertor involve-
ment as their primary function if not the only one. Having argued as much I now
turn to a consideration of the fledgling linguistic category of “engagement” and
its relation to the other linguistic phenomena discussed above.
7 Engagement
Evans et al. (2018a: 112) characterize engagement as “grammatical means ... for
intersubjective coordination”. Their focus on those means has no doubt been
stimulated in part by the exciting work that has been done in recent years by psy-
chologists, primatologists and cognitive scientists on what is known as “joint at-
tention” (Elian et al. 2005), “shared intentionality” (Tomasello 1999, Tomasello et
al. 2005) or “triangulation” (Hobson 2004), our capacity to focus jointly with oth-
ers on objects of attention and share and exchange intentions and perspectives
with respect to them. It is one of our most distinctively human capacities and
propensities, not shared to any great extent even by our close primate cousins,
but emerging in typically developing humans before speech – from the age of
around nine months. Although in its basic form this capacity does not depend
on language, the evolution of language has almost certainly depended on it, and
in turn has greatly enriched it. Building on the work of Landaburu (2005, 2007)
the recent proposals by Evans et al. (2018b) for a cross-linguistic (meta-)category
of engagement are an attempt to elucidate the grammatical means by which that
capacity is exercised in language use.
Evans et al. note that, although our understanding of “the full panoply” of
those means “remains basic” (2018a: 112), one of them that has been widely stud-
ied at least in western European languages is “the definiteness/indefiniteness
contrasts expressed in article systems” (117). Ku Waru has a somewhat similar
system, but with a wider distributional scope. Rather than articles, it has suf-
fixes, two of which my colleague Francesca Merlan and I (Merlan & Rumsey 1991:
336–337) call “definite” and “indefinite”. The “definite” marker is -ayl/-iyl/-yl. It
means roughly “… which you and I know about”. It contrasts most directly with
the indefinite marker -ti, which means roughly “… which I know about but you
may not”. In some contexts it contrasts with another marker -ja, which means
roughly “perhaps” or “you and I are not sure about this”. All three of these suf-
fixes can occur not only on nouns, but also on inflected verbs, in which case their
scope typically includes the entire clause.
Uses of the latter two markers are illustrated in (28), which is an excerpt from
an audio and video recording of an interaction between a 3 ½ year old Ku Waru
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boy Ken, his father Lep and his uncle, John Onga. A video of this stretch of inter-
action is available online at https://vimeo.com/257625252 Password: Kailge. As
can be seen there, Ken is sitting in his father’s lap, facing away from his father
toward the video camera, which is being operated by John. In the lead-up to this
stretch of interaction, John suggests that he is going to give Ken some money.
Instead of responding directly to John, Ken puts his hand into Lep’s pocket and
starts feeling around for coins there. Instead of money he finds a bit of dried to-
bacco leaf, which he pulls out and hands to Lep. He then puts his hand back into
Lep’s pocket and starts searching for money again. That is the point at which the
video and transcript start, as shown in (28).13
(28) a. Child (Ken)
ti
one
lyi-bu
take-FUT:1SG
‘I’ll take one [coin].’
b. Child (Ken)
ti
one
pe-lym-ja
be/lie-HAB:3SG-MAYBE
‘Maybe one is there.’
c. Child (Ken)
ti
one
pe-lym-jaaaa
be/lie-HAB:3SG-MAYBE
‘Maaaaybe one is there.’
d. Adult (John)
ti
one
pe-lym-ja
be/lie-HAB:3SG-MAYBE
kan-ui
see/look-JUS
‘Maybe one is there. Look.’
e. Child (Ken)
ti
one
pe-lym-iyl
be/lie-HAB:3SG-DEF
‘One is indeed there.’
13The root pe- (in example 28b) is one of five existential verbs in Ku Waru which differentially
characterize their subjects, either with respect to their inherent properties, or with respect to
their state-of-being within particular contexts of discourse (Rumsey 2002). The specific value
of pe- when used in the latter way, as in this case, is to indicate the referent of its S (the coin
that may be in Lep’s pocket) is latent or concealed (loc. cit. pp. 188–197).
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f. Adult (John)
kan-kun-i
see/look-PPR:2SG-Q
‘You see?’
This short stretch of interaction is a classic case of joint attention, in which
the child Ken and his uncle John are focusing on Lep’s pocket and Ken’s attempt
to find money there. The intersubjective coordination within it takes place along
several different dimensions at once. These include at least the following:
1. Gaze direction and facial expressions. After looking in the general direction
of Lep’s pocket during lines (28b)–(28d) , immediately after line (28e) in
which Ken in effect announces that he has found a coin he looks toward
John and smiles.
2. Intonation and prosody. As Ken feels around in Lep’s pocket during lines
(28b) and (28c) he speaks those lines at a relatively high, level pitch, with
elongated final vowel in line (28c), a prosodic feature which in Ku Waru
as in many other languages (Tedlock 1983) is used iconically to signal that
the action or state of affairs being referred to — in this case the state of
uncertainty about whether there is a coin in Lep’s pocket — is prolonged.
In line (28e), after feeling the coin, Ken pronounces the word pelym-iyl ‘it is
there indeed’ with a falling intonation on the final syllable, which is iconic
of the resolution of that uncertainty, which is also explicitly indicated by
the suffix (-iyl) on which the fall pitch in pitch takes place, as discussed in
the Conclusions below.
3. Use of the suffix –ja. Ken’s use of this suffix in lines (28b) and (28c) is inher-
ently intersubjective in that it entails that neither he nor John know yet
whether there is a coin in Lep’s pocket — only that there might be. John af-
firms this entailment on both counts by his repetition of Ken’s ti pelym-ja
in line (28d).
4. Ken’s use of the suffix -iyl. With the switch from -ja in lines (28b)–(28d) to
-iyl in line (28e) Ken indicates that there definitely is a coin in Lep’s pocket
and that this is now a matter of “common ground” (Clark 1996) between
him and John, directly experienced only by Ken, but now shared with John.
5. Parallelism between lines, both across conversational turns and within Ken’s
single turn that extends across lines (28b)–(28c). By “parallelism” here I
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am referring to the meaningful interplay of repetition and variation as the-
orized by Roman Jakobson (1960), Michael Silverstein (2004), James Fox
(2014) and others. A prime example of this in (28) is the relation between
-ja in line lines (28b)–(28d) and -iyl in line e as discussed above.14
8 Conclusions
In this chapter I focused initially on egophoricity and how it has been identified
as a system for indicating “epistemic authority” or “assertor involvement” in re-
lation to predicated actions or states of affairs, with related reversals of marking
as between speaker and addressee in statements vs questions. I have shown that
those reversals, which have been called “egophoric patterning”, are not specific to
egophoricity per se, but (as has long been recognised) are also found with respect
to evidentiality and (as less often recognised) also with respect to some kinds of
modality. In all three cases there are regular shifts in what I call the “centring
of subjectivity” as between speaker and addressee. Drawing from my ongoing
study of Ku Waru children’s language socialization, I then turned to a considera-
tion of shifts which are similar in that respect, but which differ from the former
in being associated with particular contexts of interaction (i.e. speech to young
children by adults and older children) rather than with particular grammatical
categories. I showed that, notwithstanding this difference, there are, in certain
contexts, interactions between the two kinds of shift, resulting in a kind of “dou-
ble displacement” in the centring of subjectivity. Finally, turning to a Ku Waru
example of the nascent category of “engagement” as “grammatical means ... for
intersubjective coordination” (Evans et al. 2018a: 112), I showed how the grammat-
ical dimension of such coordination is thoroughly intertwined both with other
dimensions of language and discourse patterning including intonation, prosody
and parallelism, and with non-linguistic dimensions including gaze direction and
facial expression.
An issue that I left out of that discussion of engagement but will treat here in
order to link it to the rest of the chapter is: what is the status of subjectivity with
respect to examples such as (28)? Here, in relation to “engagement”, the notion
of the “centring of subjectivity” seems to me less straightforwardly applicable
than it was to the other phenomena discussed in the chapter — at least if we take
that expression to refer to a shifting centre of epistemic authority, involvement
14For a more detailed analysis of parallelism in (28) that draws on Du Bois concept of ’dialogic
syntax’ (2014, Du Bois & Giora), and fuller treatment of ’engagement’ in Ku Waru in general,
see Rumsey 2019.
87
Alan Rumsey
or intention that is at any given moment always or mainly located in the individ-
ual mind of one of the interacting parties or another. Rather, the intersubjectivity
that is in play in the processes of engagement as “intersubjective coordination” is
not something that is entirely shaped by the individual, preexisting subjectivities
of the interacting parties, but rather is a process through which those subjectivi-
ties themselves are partly shaped. With respect to (28) for example, consider the
fact that Ken’s utterance in line a is not entirely innovative within this interac-
tion, but partly repeats something his father Lep has said a few turns (14 seconds)
before in the conversation while reaching into his own pocket, namely:
(29) mare
some
pe-lym-ja
be/lie-HAB:3SG-MAYBE
kan-abil
see-OPT:1DU
Maybe some is there; let’s (you and I) see.
Lep in this utterance was in turn responding in part to John’s remark that I
referred to earlier, that he was going to give Ken some money. John’s remark had
provided a context in which it could be taken as a matter of shared understanding
that the referent of Ken’s mare “some” is money, and as a matter of presumed
understanding that if Lep finds money in his pocket he himself will give at least
some of it to Ken (the modal and grammatical subject of his kanabil ‘Let’s see’
being first person dual, referring to Ken and himself). Lep’s utterance in (29) then
provides a context for Ken’s lines (28a) and (28b), in two ways:
1) At the level of linguistic form it provides a model for the form of Ken’s line
(28b), qUANTIFIER pelym-ja, on which Ken innovates by using the quanti-
fier ti ‘one’ in place of Lep’s mare ‘some’. (From what happened later on in
the interaction, as can be seen in the video, it is clear that the understood
referent of Ken’s ti was not just money in general, but a coin, which is the
form in which Ku Waru children are generally given money.)
2) At the level of stated intentions it provides Ken with a warrant for saying
in line (28a) that he will take the coin from Lep’s pocket if he finds one
there.
In line (28d) John picks up on Ken’s use of ti ‘one’ in place of Lep’s mare ‘some’,
and Ken’s repetition of Lep’s pelym-ja ‘maybe is there’. What this amounts to in
terms of “epistemic authority” is that it has in effect been distributed among
three people: Lep, Ken and John. The associated intention – for Ken to get money
– has also been distributed among the three of them, in that it has started out
with John, been taken up in a modified form by Lep (with him as the donor
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rather than John), and then in a further modified form by Ken (with him as the
active taker rather than the passive recipient). During lines (28b)-(28d) there is a
thoroughgoing intersubjective coordination among the three of them in that all
of them are focusing with that shared intention and uncertainty on Ken’s probing
hand in Lep’s pocket, which Ken emphasises with his prosody and intonation in
line (28c), and John with his use of a jussive form of the verb kan- in line (28d).
Then there is coordinated marking of their transition from uncertainty that is
initiated by Ken’s change from -ja in line (28e) to the definite marker -iyl in line
(28e), a suffix that explicitly flags the presence of the coin in Lep’s pocket (and
its being concealed from sight there) as a matter of shared knowledge among
them. This is then further reinforced by John’s switch from jussive marking on
kan- in line (28d) to Present Progressive marking in line (28f) (Present Progressive
being a verbal category which signals indicative mood in addition to its temporal-
aspectual meaning).
In short, in keeping with its definition as an aspect of intersubjective coordi-
nation, engagement shares with egophoricity, evidentiality and some modal cat-
egories its grounding in basic aspects of human interaction, but differs from all
of them in the extent to which it treats the centring of subjectivity as potentially
variable, emergent, and distributed across the interaction rather than as prototyp-
ically related to the speech roles of speaker and addressee and their alternation
across speech-act types. It is important to note that I have expressed this differ-
ence as a matter of degree (“the extent to which…”) rather than as a completely
categorical one. For the complexities of language in use always exceed our ability
to pin them down analytically, and as interestingly exemplified by other chapters
in this volume, the formal devices that we identify as egophoric and evidential
in particular languages may also have “engagement” functions and vice versa.
Abbreviations
ANA anaphor
ASSINV assertor’s involvement
CJ conjunct
CVB general converb
EL elative
ENDO endophor
HAB habitual
IDF indefinite
JUS jussive
LAT lative
NF non-final verb
O oblique stem
OPT optative
PPR present progressive
PROSP prospective
PSN personal name
SIM simultaneous
SW switch
VIS.P previous visual evidence
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Chapter 4
An egophoric analysis of Dhivehi verbal
morphology
Jonathon Lum
University of Melbourne
Egophoricity is a typologically rare category in which first-person statements and
second-person questions share the same marking (“egophoric”), while other con-
texts generally lack this marking. This chapter presents evidence that certain verbal
suffixes in Dhivehi (Indo-Aryan, Maldives) mostly show an egophoric distribution,
contrary to previous analyses of these suffixes as first/second person markers. Dhi-
vehi is thus the first Indo-European language reported to show an egophoric pat-
tern. Aside from the distribution of the relevant suffixes in first-person statements
and second-person questions, further evidence for an egophoric analysis may be
found in contexts where a third-person nominal subject refers to the speaker or
addressee ‒ in these contexts the appearance of the relevant suffixes is more con-
sistent with egophoricity than person marking. However, egophoricity in Dhivehi
is restricted to finite, volitional stems in certain tenses/aspects/moods, and some
relics of an older person-marking system survive. Finally, it is proposed that ego-
phoricity in Dhivehi may have developed from a reanalysis of person markers in
reported speech, in a process similar to that described by Widmer & Zemp (2017)
for certain Tibeto-Burman languages.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and outline
In Dhivehi, the Indo-Aryan language of the Maldives, finite volitional-stem verbs
in some tenses/aspects/moods are seemingly marked for person, though differ-
ent linguists have listed different forms for certain parts of the verbal paradigm.
This is true especially for the second person, which has been grouped both with
Jonathon Lum. 2020. An egophoric analysis of Dhivehi verbal morphology. In Henrik
Bergqvist & Seppo Kittilä (eds.), Evidentiality, egophoricity, and engagement, 95–139.
Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3975801
Jonathon Lum
the first person (Cain & Gair 2000: 23–27) and partly with the third person (Fritz
2002: 166–169). This chapter offers a new analysis of the situation, presenting
data from recent fieldwork as well as from written material to argue that Dhi-
vehi in fact displays an egophoric or “conjunct-disjunct” pattern of verbal mark-
ing. Egophoricity is a typologically rare pattern in which verbs in second-person
questions are marked like verbs in first-person statements, while verbs in second-
person statements are marked like verbs in third-person questions/statements
(e.g., Hale 1980; Creissels 2008; San Roque et al. 2018). The presence of this pat-
tern in Dhivehi may partly explain the inconsistencies between some existing
descriptions of the language, given that verbs with second-person subjects may
resemble verbs with either first- or third-person subjects, depending on the sen-
tence type.
More importantly, the existence of egophoricity in Dhivehi is of considerable
typological significance, as grammatical systems of this kind are highly unusual
cross-linguistically, and have never before been reported for an Indo-European
language. The origins of egophoricity in Dhivehi are therefore of some interest,
especially given the isolation of the Maldives from regions (such as the Tibeto-
Burman area) where egophoricity has previously been reported. The details of
egophoric systems vary greatly (Floyd et al. 2018), and the Dhivehi system shows
some features that have not been (widely) reported on before, and which may
shed light on egophoricity as a cross-linguistic phenomenon. These include the
use of egophoric marking in first-person questions, and an interaction with a
tendency (motivated by politeness) towards third-person nominal reference in
place of first- and second-person pronouns in many contexts.
Like many other languages with egophoricity, Dhivehi also has a reported
speech construction in which egophoric markers may be seen as showing co-
reference between the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the em-
bedded clause, while egophoric marking is absent when these subjects are not
co-referential. And like in many other egophoric systems, Dhivehi egophoric
markers are restricted to volitional contexts, though the existence of separate
“involitive” morphology means that the alternation between egophoric and alter-
phoric marking of the same stem is never deployed to show contrasts in volition,
unlike in some other languages (e.g., the Tibeto-Burman language Newar, Hale
1980).1 It is therefore hoped that this chapter will be of interest both to scholars
of Dhivehi and to scholars working on egophoricity and related areas such as
volitionality, person marking, and reported speech.
1See § 1.3 for definitions of the terms egophoric and alterphoric.
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This chapter is divided into six main sections. The current section introduces
the prospect of an egophoric analysis for Dhivehi and the significance of such
an analysis, provides a brief profile of the language, its speakers and dialects.
The chapter also makes some brief notes on terminology and data collection. § 2
provides a summary of some previous accounts of person marking in Dhivehi,
highlighting their inconsistencies. § 3 introduces some issues with those accounts
and shows how an egophoric analysis is a better fit for the data, presenting ev-
idence from second-person statements as well as from contexts where speakers
use third-person nominal reference in place of first- or second-person pronouns.
Data from reported speech are also shown to be consistent with this analysis.
However, elements of an older person-marking system appear to be present in
the context of first-person questions and in the distribution of the archaic/liter-
ary suffix ‑mu. §4 discusses person marking in some of Dhivehi’s conservative
southern dialects, and suggests a possible way in which egophoricity could have
developed in the northern dialects (including the standard Malé dialect). In par-
ticular, I propose that (northern) Dhivehi may have undergone a similar process
to that described by Widmer & Zemp (2017), in which a person-marking system
is gradually reanalyzed and reshaped into an egophoric system, via a semi-direct
speech construction. Finally, § 5 summarizes the chapter and suggests some areas
for future research.
1.2 Dhivehi
Dhivehi (or “Maldivian”) is an Indo-Aryan language spoken throughout the Mal-
dives, where it is the national language. Dhivehi has more than 340,500 speakers
(Lewis et al. 2014), mostly in the Maldives but also in smaller numbers abroad.
A dialect of the language (sometimes known as Mahl) is spoken on Minicoy, an
island belonging to the Indian union territory of Lakshadweep, to the north of
the Maldives. Despite the increasing encroachment of English, Dhivehi contin-
ues to enjoy a dominant status in the Maldives, where it is the main language of
communication in mass media, government, and home life.
There are two main dialect groups (see Figure 4.1, below): a northern group
spanning from Minicoy all the way to Laamu Atoll, and a southern group com-
prising the dialects of Huvadhu, Fuvahmulah, and Addu. At the heart of the
northern dialect group is the standard dialect based on the language of Malé.
This standard variety is used throughout the country in mass media and in of-
ficial contexts; it is understood all across the archipelago. The atolls nearest to
Malé use this dialect with only some slight variants, while more far-flung islands
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or atolls (such as Minicoy and Laamu) have dialects that are related but more
clearly distinct.2
The dialects in the southern group are the most conservative and show similar-
ities with older varieties of Sinhala, the language to which Dhivehi is most closely
related.3 The Addu and Fuvahmulah dialects are described by Fritz (2002), though
the Huvadhu dialect is practically undocumented (except for a small amount of
information in Maumoon 2002 and Wijesundera et al. 1988). These dialects are
not understood by Malé speakers (though as indicated earlier, southerners can
understand the Malé dialect due to exposure), and are apparently not mutually
intelligible either.
Even the standard/Malé dialect has attracted little scholarly attention, in part
because the Maldives has been relatively inaccessible to outsiders until the late
20𝑡ℎ century, and in part because the language has sometimes been assumed to
be very similar to Sinhala. Thus, although the first word lists date back to the
17𝑡ℎ century (Pyrard 1619) and the first grammatical sketches to the early 20𝑡ℎ
century (Geiger 1919), comprehensive dictionaries and grammatical descriptions
were not made until the last few decades. At present, the best Dhivehi-English
dictionary is Reynolds (2003), and the most detailed grammars are Wijesundera
et al. (1988), Cain (2000) (also re-worked into a sketch grammar, Cain & Gair
2000), Fritz (2002), and especially Gnanadesikan (2017). There are also a number
of Dhivehi-medium works on the language, housed in various educational and
research institutions in the Maldives. Most of these are prescriptive (e.g., Ahmad
1970; Saudiq 2012).
As is the case for Sinhala, there is evidence of substantial historical contact
between Dhivehi and Dravidian languages (Cain 2000); and in later periods Dhi-
vehi has also come into contact with Arabic, Portuguese and English. Typolog-
ically, Dhivehi has much in common with Sinhala (spoken in Sri Lanka) and
other languages of the South Asia region. Dhivehi has a predominant SOV word
order, and noun phrases are consistently head-final. The language makes consid-
erable use of clause chaining, with sentences made up of only one finite clause
2The northern dialect group is probably not as homogeneous as has sometimes been claimed
(e.g., Fritz 2002: 13). According to the consultants from Malé and Laamu with whom I worked
during field trips in 2013‒2015, as well as some expatriates in Australia, Malé speakers can
barely understand the Laamu dialect, if at all. They also report that some northern islands
such as Naifaru (in Lhaviyani Atoll), have very distinct dialects too. More work is needed on
this subject. Nonetheless, it does appear to be true that the northern dialect group is more
homogeneous than the southern dialect group.
3According to Cain (2000), Dhivehi and Sinhala may have begun to diverge as early as the 3𝑟𝑑‒1𝑠𝑡
centuries BCE, but were in contact for many centuries after that.
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Figure 4.1: Dialect Map of Maldives
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preceded by any number of non-finite medial clauses. Pro-drop is typical, es-
pecially in spoken language. Clauses tend to omit as many arguments as are
retrievable from contexts. For reasons that are not entirely clear (but probably
due in part to language contact), Dhivehi has lost much of the morphological
complexity found in Sanskrit and the Prakrits, from which it descends. Gender
is not a category in the standard language (even in pronouns), and number is
not obligatorily marked except on nouns denoting humans. There is no morpho-
logical distinction between the nominative and accusative (both falling under an
unmarked “direct” case), though the standard language does also have separate
dative, locative, genitive, instrumental/ablative, comitative and vocative cases. In
terms of alignment, Dhivehi therefore shows “neutral” alignment in its nominal
and pronominal morphology (i.e., core arguments are never distinguished from
each other morphologically).
Verb paradigms vary according to stem types, with slightly different patterns
for monosyllabic stems (e.g., ka-nī ‘eating’), polysyllabic a-stems (e.g., jaha-nī
‘striking’), polysyllabic nn-stems (e.g., ganna-nī ‘buying’), e-stems including in-
active/intransitive/involitive verbs (e.g., e𝑛ge-nī ‘knowing’), and irregular verbs
(Cain & Gair 2000: 22–25; Gnanadesikan 2017: 136–146). For all stem types, a num-
ber of tenses, aspects and moods may be distinguished morphologically. Verbs
in the present, simple past, simple future, perfect, potential/optative, and irreal-
is/conditional are generally marked for person (e.g., Cain & Gair 2000: 23–27;
Gnanadesikan 2017: Chapter 8), though in this chapter I will argue that this is in
fact egophoric marking. In contrast, verbs with progressive aspect simply take
the suffix ‑(n)ī regardless of person or number. The same suffix also function as
a focus marker, attaching to verbs that appear in non-canonical (i.e., non-final)
position regardless of person, number, or aspect (this “focus marking”, along
with the unusual word order and various prosodic cues, puts pragmatic focus on
whatever constituent follows the verb). Progressive/focus verb forms are very
common in the language and appear in many contexts where English or other
languages would use a conjugated verb.
Like Sinhala, Dhivehi also has an alternation between active, volitional verbal
morphology and inactive/intransitive/involitive morphology (which Cain & Gair
2000 usefully refer to as IN-morphology), with IN-verbs never carrying person
marking. This morphological category interacts with various syntactic construc-
tions and plays an important role in the grammar of the language. IN-verbs are
used in many intransitive clauses, passive (or at least, “inactive”) clauses, as well
as in clauses where the agent acts accidentally or against his own will. In addi-
tion, IN-verbs may be used to show politeness, abilities, or counter-expectations
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of the speaker, among other functions (see Cain 1995; Cain & Gair 2000: 56–60;
Gnanadesikan 2017: 248–257).
Along with progressive/focus verb forms, Dhivehi makes much use of various
other verb forms and verbal nouns that do not show person marking. In par-
ticular, converbs are used in clause chains, and participles in adverbial clauses,
complement clauses, and relative clauses. In fact, as Gnanadesikan (2017: 289)
notes, in general Dhivehi allows at most one finite verb per sentence. It should
also be noted that there are no copular verbs in the language ‒ statements of
equivalence are made by attaching a copular marker directly to the subject noun
phrase (see Gnanadesikan 2017: 236–237). The prevalence of progressive/focus
verb forms, IN-verb forms, converbs and participles (and other non-finite verbs),
in conjunction with the lack of copular verbs, means that there are relatively few
verbs in ordinary Dhivehi discourse that show any kind of person marking, a
point to which I return in §1.4.
1.3 Terminological note
In this chapter I use the terms egophoric and alterphoric, following Post (2013).
The term egophoric (from Tournadre 1992; 1994) has become fairly well estab-
lished in recent years (e.g., Floyd et al. 2018), displacing earlier terms such as
conjunct (Hale 1980). Egophoric markers are used in first-person statements and
second-person questions, though they sometimes appear elsewhere in some lan-
guages. Verbal marking that appears only in other contexts, especially third-
person statements/questions and second-person statements, was originally la-
belled disjunct marking by Hale, though other terms such as non-egophoric have
more recently become popular. Instead of non-egophoric, I use the term alter-
phoric as a convenient way of referring specifically to non-egophoric marking on
finite, volitional-stem verbs in the relevant tenses/aspects/moods, i.e., the same
stems which may carry egophoric marking. The term non-egophoric is less suited
to this purpose because it tends to imply ‘not egophoric’, yet in Dhivehi, non-
finite verbs (including converbs, participles, and infinitives), IN-verbs, and verbs
in the progressive/focus form are unable to carry either egophoric or alterphoric
marking, but in a general sense are non-egophoric (i.e., not egophoric) too. This
will become clearer throughout this chapter. For recent overviews of terminology
used in the egophoricity literature, see San Roque et al. (2018: 6–9) and Widmer
& Zemp (2017: 35).
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1.4 Data sources
The data presented in this chapter mostly come from elicitation sessions con-
ducted with a 34-year-old native Dhivehi speaker in Fonadhoo, Laamu Atoll dur-
ing fieldwork in 2014‒2015. This speaker is fluent in both the Laamu and Malé
dialects, and provided judgements and example sentences for both dialects. These
judgements and sentences were subsequently verified separately with more than
twenty other native speakers in Laamu, Malé, and in Australia (where some na-
tive speakers reside for work or study). To supplement the elicited data, a number
of online searches for written language examples were conducted with the assis-
tance of another native speaker consultant. Literacy rates are extremely high in
the Maldives, and recent years have seen a rapid growth in Dhivehi language
material online, including news, social media, blogs, and collections of short sto-
ries. Much of this material is written in Thaana, a right-to-left script unique to
Dhivehi. Using a search engine, searches were made using combinations of com-
mon subjects (e.g., pronouns and kin terms) with common verbs (e.g., kuranī ‘do-
ing’) in their volitional form and in the appropriate tenses/aspects/moods for the
grammatical contexts at issue. The examples obtained by this process all come
from short stories published online, on various websites and by various authors.
Where necessary, more context is provided with each example.
Finally, a few written language examples from her corpus of Dhivehi online
news stories were kindly shared by Amalia Gnanadesikan (personal communi-
cation), and some other examples are sourced from existing descriptions of the
language such as Cain & Gair (2000) and Gnanadesikan (2017).
The use of these data sources was necessitated by the nature of the research
question, which relates to verbal marking in a range of grammatical contexts.
Some of these contexts, such as second-person statements and first-person ques-
tions, are relatively rare and may not necessarily appear in a corpus of spoken
language texts.4 This problem is common in studies on egophoricity, and unsur-
prisingly much of the literature going back to Hale (1980) relies at least in part
on elicited data. It should also be noted that for Dhivehi in particular, it is not
easy to find in naturally occurring texts the relevant data points to decide be-
tween a person-marking analysis and an egophoric analysis. Aside from the fact
that the right contexts (e.g., second-person statements) are somewhat rare any-
way, egophoric/alterphoric marking (or person marking according to previous
4The corpus of spoken texts I collected during my fieldwork in the Maldives, for example, did
not contain clear examples of finite, volitional-stem verbs in the grammatical contexts at issue.
This corpus, which was compiled for a separate project on spatial language and cognition (see
Lum 2018; Palmer, Gaby, et al. 2017; Palmer, Lum, et al. 2017), mostly included recordings of
speakers engaged in description tasks and instructional texts, with some narratives.
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analyses) in Dhivehi occurs only on finite, volitional-stem verbs that are not in
the progressive/focus form. This means that the appearance of IN-verbs (which
are required in inactive/intransitive/involitive sentences, as mentioned in §1.2)
does not help to decide between analyses, nor does the appearance of non-finite
or progressive/focus forms. As discussed in §1.2, these verb forms are extremely
common in Dhivehi. The use of direct elicitation and the World Wide Web there-
fore facilitated easier access to verb forms and grammatical contexts that are
relatively uncommon in ordinary discourse.
2 Previous accounts of person marking in Dhivehi
Descriptions of person marking in (standard) Dhivehi are provided by Geiger
(1919), Wijesundera et al. (1988), Cain (2000), Fritz (2002), and most recently
Gnanadesikan (2017). A few other works (Cain & Gair 2000; Maumoon 2002)
contain descriptions of person marking based on Cain (2000). In addition, there
are some prescriptive works (in Dhivehi language) that offer guidelines on per-
son marking (e.g., Ahmad 1970; Saudiq 2012). However, many of these various
accounts disagree on aspects of the Dhivehi person-marking system. In particu-
lar, they mostly agree on third-person forms, but not on first- and second-person
forms. Geiger’s (1919) description contains some clues as to how the system
worked in the early 20𝑡ℎ century (see § 4.3), but unfortunately appears to confuse
different tenses and aspects throughout paradigms. Wijesundera et al. (1988) de-
scribe first-person and third-person forms, but not the second person. I will there-
fore concentrate on the more recent descriptions provided by Cain & Gair (2000)
and Fritz (2002), with some mention also of the prescriptive literature. The most
recent description of the language, Gnanadesikan (2017), analyses the relevant
markers as person markers, but like Wijesundera et al., describes them as first-
person and third-person markers. Referencing an earlier version of the current
chapter, Gnanadesikan (2017: 138) acknowledges that second-person forms are
variable, and accepts that at least some speakers show a split, with second-person
subjects in statements triggering the same verbal agreement as third-person sub-
jects, but in questions the same verbal agreement as first-person subjects.
2.1 Fritz’s (2002) account
According to Fritz (2002: 166), “[t]he finite verb is characterized by a three per-
son system distinguishing singular and plural”. For the simple present tense of
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polysyllabic a-stem verbs in the Malé dialect, she gives the paradigm outlined in
Table 4.1 below.5
Table 4.1: Person marking on simple present tense polysyllabic a-stem
verbs according to Fritz (2002: 168–169)
Person/number Suffix Example from balanī ‘looking’ (stem: bala-)
1SG -n bala-n
2SG -V: balā
3SG -V: balā
1PL -mu / -n bala-mu / bala-n
2PL -mu / -V: bala-mu / balā
3PL -V: balā
Fritz thus presents a simple first- versus non-first-person distinction in the
singular, but a more complicated picture in the plural. She states that -mu is used
as a first/second-person plural marker, and lists this in her own tables. However,
she notes in her prose that -n is an alternative to -mu in the first-person plural,
and -V : may be used in the second-person plural, both of which she interprets as
analogical formations based on the equivalent singular forms. The third person
is simply -V : in both singular and plural.
For the simple past (in her terms “finite preterite”), which has a different stem,
Fritz (2002: 174–176) describes the same basic pattern for person agreement: a
first- versus second/third-person dichotomy in the singular, but a first/second-
versus third-person dichotomy in the plural, with the third person having the
same form (-Ø) in both singular and plural. She does not specify whether the
first- and second-person plural also have alternative forms identical to their sin-
gular equivalents as they do in the present tense. Additionally, she regards the
perfect as a compound of the “absolutive” (converb) form of the main verb fol-
lowed by the simple past of the now obsolete verb *fianī ‘put’ (Fritz 2002: 225–
226). Thus, the perfect follows the same person-marking template as the simple
past. However, for the simple future (which also has its own stem), Fritz (2002:
176‒178) presents a first- versus second/third-person distinction that is not sensi-
tive to number. She also gives an alternative, archaic form -ū for the first/second-
person plural, which she reports is mostly confined to literary usage. These var-
ious paradigms are summarized in Table 4.2 below.
5In this table and elsewhere, -V : indicates lengthening of the final vowel in the stem.
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Table 4.2: Person suffixes according to Fritz (2002)
Person/number Simple present Simple past Perfect Simple future
1SG -n -n -fin -an
2SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
3SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
1PL -mu / -n -mu -fimu -an / -ū
2PL -mu / -V: -mu -fimu -e / -ū
3PL -V: -Ø -fi -e
2.2 Cain & Gair’s (2000) account
Cain & Gair (2000: 23–27) present a simpler picture (based on Cain 2000: 54–
63) of person marking in the contemporary standard language of Malé. Accord-
ing to their analysis, many tenses/aspects/moods show a distinction between
an unmarked third-person form on the one hand and a “non-third” (henceforth,
“first/second”) person form on the other, with no distinction between singular
and plural. Tenses/aspects/moods with this marking include the simple present,
simple future, simple past, perfect, irrealis, and optative. According to Cain &
Gair, the third person is unmarked. They report that the first/second-person
marker for the simple present and simple past is -n, but they state that the un-
derlying form is -m/-mu, which appears in certain dialects and sometimes also
in literary Dhivehi. Their paradigms for the simple present, simple past, perfect,
and simple future are shown in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3: Person suffixes according to Cain & Gair (2000)
Person/number Simple present Simple past Perfect Simple future
1SG -n -n -fin -an
2SG -n -n -fin -e
3SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
1PL -n -n -fin -an
2PL -n -n -fin -e
3PL -V: -Ø -fi -e
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2.3 Comparison and discussion
In a review of Fritz (2002), Cain (2004) criticizes Fritz’s account of the person-
marking system, which he argues is based partly on an incorrect phonological
analysis of the nasals n and m. According to Cain, both nasals neutralize to [ŋ]
word-finally (rendered as <n> in writing), and the verbal endings ‑n, -m, and
-mu are simply allomorphs of the same suffix. The first of these appears word-
finally, whereas -m is used before a vowel, such as when followed by the sentence-
final marker ‑eve (Cain 2004: 355). Unfortunately, Cain does not mention what
phonetic environment attracts the -mu form. He does, however, observe that -
mu can be used with singular subjects, which is contrary to Fritz’s account. Cain
also points out that the data in Fritz’s text materials (Fritz 2002: Vol. 2) sometimes
differ significantly from Fritz’s own description, with examples like nikumejjai-
m-eve ‘(I) went out’ (2002: Vol. 2, 136) and ahālaifī-m-eve ‘I asked’ (2002: Vol. 2,
141), in which -m is used for the first-person singular (rather than -n), and also
examples like duśi-n ta? ‘Have (you) seen…?’ (2002: (Vol. 2) 154) in which -n is
used for the second-person singular (rather than -Ø).
Tables 4.4 and 4.56 below summarize the different accounts of person marking
given by Fritz (2002) and Cain & Gair (2000) (whose analysis is also followed
by Maumoon 2002) for four tenses/aspects.7 Suffixes involving -n (or -an in the
future) or ‑mu (a possible allomorph or variant) are in bold.
Table 4.4: Person suffixes according to Fritz (2002)
Person/number Simple present Simple past Perfect Simple future
1SG -n -n -fin -an
2SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
3SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
1PL -mu -n -mu -fimu -an -ū
2PL -mu -V: -mu -fimu -e -ū
3PL -V: -Ø -fi -e
6There are also some small but inconsequential differences according to stem type (e.g., Cain
& Gair 2000: 23‒27). To simplify matters, this table is intended to represent the suffixes for
polysyllabic a-stem verbs in particular, though in most respects it is also accurate for verbs of
other stem types.
7The more marginal irrealis/conditional and potential/optative are not compared here as
Fritz (2002) does not explicitly list their forms according to person and number. No other
tenses/aspects/moods are considered to have person marking.
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Table 4.5: Person suffixes according to Cain & Gair (2000)
Person/number Simple present Simple past Perfect Simple future
1SG -n -n -fin -an
2SG -n -n -fin -an
3SG -V: -Ø -fi -e
1PL -n -n -fin -an
2PL -n -n -fin -an
3PL -V: -Ø -fi -e
If we accept the argument that -mu is an allomorph or variant of -n, then the
two accounts come to look more similar than first meets the eye. This would
basically reconcile the first-person plural (barring the archaic form -ū for the
future) and most of the second-person plural across the two accounts. Both ac-
counts already agree entirely on the first-person singular and third-person sin-
gular and plural. However, the second-person singular and in some tenses the
second-person plural remain problematic. Cain & Gair (2000) consistently group
the second person with the first person. On the other hand, Fritz (2002) groups
the second-person singular with the third person (though as noted earlier, her
data sometimes contradict this), and groups the second-person plural sometimes
with the third person and sometimes with the first person, depending on the
tense/aspect, as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 above. Evidently, the status of the
second person still requires some clarification.
More recently, Gnanadesikan (2017: 138–140) has also analyzed the verbal end-
ings -n [ŋ] and ‑m as allomorphs of the same suffix, which she writes as -m̊ to bet-
ter reflect the underlying form. Based in part on an earlier version of the current
chapter, she describes ‑m̊ as a suffix marking the first person in questions and
statements and the second person in questions only, with second-person state-
ments showing the same verbal agreement as the third person. §3 of the current
chapter will provide evidence for this distribution, though unlike Gnanadesikan,
I argue that the relevant forms are egophoric/alterphoric markers rather than
person markers. As for the form ‑mu, Gnanadesikan (2017: 138–140) describes it
as a “fancy” literary suffix for the first and second person. She notes that the na-
tive grammatical tradition (e.g., Ahmad 1970) prescribes -m ̊ for the first-person
singular and -mu for the second-person singular and the first- and second-person
plural. However, she observes that ‑mu is also attested for the first-person singu-
lar. The suffix ‑mu and its relationship with ‑m̊ will be discussed further in § 3.4
and §4.
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3 Towards an egophoric analysis
Data collected during my own fieldwork in 2014‒2015 as well as from online
sources (see § 1.4) show that several clause types fail to exhibit the person mark-
ers in the expected distribution (according to either of the two main accounts
discussed in the previous section). Although this data does not contain any pre-
viously unattested person markers (with the exception of some distinct future
tense forms in the Laamu dialect, for which see §4.1), it shows a distribution of
these markers that is sensitive to sentence type. Unexpected marking (or lack
of marking) emerges in certain sentences with first-, second-, and even third-
person subjects. In this section I will argue that the data form a pattern that
is mostly consistent with egophoricity rather than person marking, though to
an extent some features of person marking are also present. I first present ev-
idence from the distribution of markers across statements and questions (§ 3.1)
and then from contexts where third-person nominal reference is used in place
of first- or second-person pronouns (§3.2 ). I then show that verbal marking in
reported speech is consistent with egophoricity even if it can be explained in
other ways (§ 3.3). In §3.4 I revisit the archaic/literary person marker -mu (first
described in §2 ) and show how on the available evidence, it appears to be a gen-
uine first/second-person marker rather than an egophoric one. Finally, §3.5 sums
up the section and compares the Dhivehi system to some other egophoric sys-
tems described in the literature, concluding that Dhivehi has elements of both
person marking and egophoricity.
3.1 Statements and questions
According to my data, verbs with second-person subjects may pattern either with
the first person or with the third person, depending on whether the utterance is
a question (first-person pattern is used) or a statement (third-person pattern is
used). There is no singular versus plural distinction. This is shown in the exam-
ples below:8
(1) miadu
today
ma/aharemen̊
1SG/1PL
kai-fim̊=ta?
eat.CNV-PRF.EGO=Q
‘Have I/we eaten today?’ (elicited)
8Glossing abbreviations used in this chapter mostly follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules, and are
listed at the end of this chapter.
In these and subsequent examples, I follow Gnanadesikan (2017) in transcribing /m/ as -m̊
rather than -n word-finally to reflect the underlying form, as described in § 2.3.
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(2) miadu
today
ma/aharemen̊
1SG/1PL
kai-fim̊
eat.CNV-PRF.EGO
‘I/we have eaten today.’ (elicited)
(3) miadu
today
kalē/kalēmen̊
2SG/2PL
kai-fim̊=ta?
eat.CNV-PRF.EGO=Q
‘Have you eaten today?’ (elicited)
(4) miadu
today
kalē/kalēmen̊
2SG/2PL
kai-fi
eat.CNV-PRF.ALTER
‘You have eaten today.’ (elicited)
(5) miadu
today
ēnā/emīhun̊
3SG/3PL
kai-fi=ta?
eat.CNV-PRF.ALTER=Q
‘Has (s)he/have they eaten today?’ (elicited)
(6) miadu
today
ēnā/emīhun̊
3SG/3PL
kai-fi
eat.CNV-PRF.ALTER
‘(S)he has/they have eaten today.’ (elicited)
This distributional pattern suggests that the relevant verbal marking is not
(only) motivated by the grammatical category of person, but by some other orga-
nizing principle. What organizing principle could this be? I propose that instead
of simply marking person agreement, the suffixes in (1)9‒(6) above (and their
equivalents in other tenses/aspects/moods ‒ see §2) behave more like epistemic
markers, except possibly in first-person questions (which I return to in later in
this section). More precisely, they mark whether or not the subject is also the
source of information for the proposition. In most first-person contexts, the sub-
ject (i.e., the speaker) is the source of information, since she has the “epistemic
9A reviewer asks when such a question would ever be uttered, and whether it would include
a pronoun. It is true that some of the elicited examples in (1)‒(6) are somewhat artificial in
certain ways, and that pronouns are typically dropped when the referent is obvious from the
context (though the verb form does not change), as mentioned in §1.2. It is also true that the
necessary contexts for some of the combinations of persons and sentence types are generally
unlikely to arise. However, as I discuss later in this chapter, that is part of the point, and helps to
explain both the inconsistencies in existing descriptions of the language (§2) and the probable
diachronic origins of egophoricity in Dhivehi (§4). Examples (1)‒(6) are simply intended to
show the full range of permutations (of persons and sentence types) using minimal pairs and
with pronouns included for maximal clarity. While some of these sentences are unlikely to be
uttered, some possible contexts are discussed later in §3.1.
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authority” (following Hargreaves 1991; 2005) to report on her own actions, ex-
periences, desires, etc. Second-person questions are similar in that the subject
(i.e., the addressee) again has epistemic authority, the question being about the
addressee’s actions (or experiences, etc.). In second-person statements and third-
person questions/statements, however, there is a mismatch between the subject
and the epistemic source: in second-person statements, the speaker tells the ad-
dressee about the addressee’s actions, and so the speaker is the epistemic source
for a statement about another person’s actions; in third-person sentences, the
epistemic source is the speaker (in statements) or the addressee (in questions),
but in either case the subject of the sentence is a third party. This is what moti-
vates the shared marking of first-person statements and second-person questions
on the one hand, and the shared marking of second-person statements and third-
person statements/questions on the other.
As discussed in §1.3, this type of verbal marking is often referred to as a “con-
junct-disjunct” system (following Hale 1980) or more recently as “egophoricity”
(e.g., Tournadre 1992; 1994; Post 2013; Floyd et al. 2018). In most egophoric sys-
tems, the egophoric (or conjunct) form appears where the subject is the epistemic
source, and the alterphoric (or non-egophoric, disjunct, etc.) form appears else-
where. Egophoricity has been documented in a number of Tibeto-Burman lan-
guages including Newar (Hale 1980), Lhasa Tibetan (DeLancey 1992; 2001) and
Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer 1980; Kelly 2004), other languages of the Himalayas in-
cluding the Mongolic languages Mongghul (Åkerman 2012), Mangghuer (Slater
2003) and Bonan (Fried 2010) and the Sinitic language Wutun (Sandman 2016), as
well as certain languages of the Caucasus (Creissels 2008), South America (Dick-
inson 2000; Curnow 2002; Bergqvist 2012), and New Guinea (Loughnane 2009;
San Roque & Schieffelin 2018). However, as far as I am aware, this type of verbal
marking has not been reported for any other Indo-European languages, nor has
it been documented in any Dravidian or other contact languages through which
the system may have entered into Dhivehi (languages in the region use various
kinds of person agreement systems, or have no person agreement at all ‒ see
Hock 2016 for an overview).
Under this analysis, what has previously been described as first-person or first/
second-person marking in Dhivehi is in fact egophoric marking (and is glossed
as such in examples (1)‒(6)). This includes the suffix -m̊ for the simple present
and simple past, the suffix -fim̊ for the perfect, and the suffix -am̊ for the sim-
ple future.10 These markers generally indicate that the epistemic source is the
10For reasons of space, I only provide examples of the perfect in (1)‒(6) above, though the same
distributional pattern applies in the other tenses/aspects mentioned here. Some examples of
these other tenses/aspects will be provided in the remainder of the chapter.
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subject of the verb. Meanwhile, forms previously described as third person or as
second/third person are in fact alterphoric markers: final vowel lengthening for
the simple present, -Ø for the simple past, ‑fi for the perfect, and -e for the simple
future. These markers are generally used where the epistemic source is not the
subject of the verb.
This explanation may partly account for the different paradigms offered by
Cain & Gair (2000) and Fritz (2002), if we suppose that Cain & Gair based their
analysis of the second person on the interrogative form, while Fritz took the
declarative form to be representative at least in the singular (see §2.3). Both de-
scriptions correctly identify marking that is used in second-person contexts, but
neither description tells the full story. This is perhaps not altogether surpris-
ing, as second-person declaratives are relatively rare in Dhivehi. Of the second-
person statements that do occur, some are nonverbal copular sentences, and
many others involve non-finite verbs, IN-verbs, or verbs with progressive/focus
marking ‒ verbs in these forms do not carry the suffixes at issue, as mentioned in
§1.2. However, example (4) above demonstrates that when the right tense/aspect
coincides with a volitional stem in a second-person statement, the verbal mark-
ing is the same as for the third person, which can be analyzed as alterphoric
marking. Example (7) below (from a website of Dhivehi stories) contains two fur-
ther instances of alterphoric marking in second-person statements, this time in
the future tense:11
(7) kalē
2SG
bēnum̊
want
nu=vi=yas
NEG=be.PST.PTCP=CNCS
kalē-ge
2SG-GEN
zamīru
conscience
kuran̊
do.INF
bēnun̊_ve=gen̊
want_be.CVB=SUCC
kalē
2SG
ti=kam̊
DEM2=action
kurāne.
do.FUT.ALTER
kale=akī
2SG=COP
vakīl-ek̊̊.
lawyer-INDF
ēnā-ge
3SG-GEN
furāna
life
salāmat̊_kuran̊
safety_do.INF
kalē
2SG
masakkat̊
work
kurāne
do.FUT.ALTER
‘Even if you don’t want to, because your conscience wants to do [that],
you will do that. You are a lawyer. You will work to save his life.’ (from
www.esfiya.com/1849/)
While the different verbal marking in second-person statements and questions
points to an egophoric system, a potential problem for this analysis is the be-
11Note that the first clause in (7) has a second-person subject but as a non-finite clause does not
show egophoric/alterphoric marking. Also note that the second sentence in (7) (translating to
‘You are a lawyer’) has a second-person subject, but as a copular sentence in Dhivehi it lacks
a verb.
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haviour of first-person questions. In typical egophoric systems, first-person ques-
tions pattern like second-person statements and third-person statements/ques-
tions, and show different marking to first-person statements and second-person
questions (e.g., Hale 1980). In first-person questions, I ask you about myself, and
the addressee (temporarily) has epistemic authority over the speaker’s actions,
experiences, etc., which are usually in the speaker’s own epistemic territory.
Since the subject (in this case the speaker) is not the epistemic source in first-
person questions, alterphoric rather than egophoric marking is expected in this
context, and indeed has been reported in typical egophoric systems (San Roque et
al. 2018: 4–5). Dhivehi, however, uses egophoric marking (or first/second-person
marking under previous analyses) in first-person questions, as shown in (1) ear-
lier. This situation is summarized in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.6: Typical distribution of egophoric and alterphoric markers in
egophoric systems
Statements Questions
1 EGO ALTER
2 ALTER EGO
3 ALTER ALTER
Table 4.7: Distribution of egophoric and alterphoric markers in Dhivehi
Statements Questions
1 EGO EGO
2 ALTER EGO
3 ALTER ALTER
In Dhivehi, verbal marking in first-person contexts therefore looks like gen-
uine person agreement (despite being glossed here as EGO), while verbal marking
in second-person contexts looks like egophoricity, and verbal marking in third-
person contexts is consistent with both systems. There are at least three ways to
interpret this type of distribution: (i) as a person-marking system with a quirk in
the second person; (ii) as a hybrid of person marking and egophoricity (perhaps
representing a transitional phase in the diachronic development of one system
into the other); or (iii) as an egophoric system with a non-canonical distribution
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of markers. These three analyses lie on a cline ‒ for example, a non-canonical
egophoric system may display elements of person marking, and a hybrid system
may be closer to the egophoric end or to the person-marking end. On the basis of
the evidence introduced thus far, it is somewhat difficult to decide, and a conser-
vative approach would probably be to advocate (i), considering that egophoricity
is rare cross-linguistically (and is in fact unattested in the Indo-European family
and southern South Asia region). However, as I will show, there are good reasons
to think that (ii) and/or (iii) may be correct, and that egophoricity is thus a part
of the Dhivehi verbal system.
Firstly, as others have also noted (e.g., San Roque et al. 2018: 26–27), first-
person questions are usually pragmatically marked, as it is uncommon for the
answer to be genuinely unknown to the speaker. For example, a first-person
question may be posed to test the addressee’s knowledge of the speaker, or it
may be a rhetorical one. Example (8) below contains two first-person questions,
both of which appear to be rhetorical:
(8) ekamaku
but
balā_bala…
look.CVB_IMP
aharen̊
1SG
moya
crazy
kam-ek̊
action-INDF
kura-m̊=ta?
do.PRS-EGO=Q
nūnī
or
duvah-aku=ves
day-UNSP=EMPH
kuri-m̊=ta?
do.PST-EGO=Q
‘But look…do I do anything crazy? Or did [I] ever do [anything crazy]?’
(from www.vaguthu.mv/evaguthu/story/210155/)
Rhetorical questions are problematic because the speaker believes ‒ and in
fact advertises ‒ that she already knows the answer to the question. As such,
rhetorical questions do not truly bestow epistemic authority upon the addressee,
and unsurprisingly in some egophoric systems rhetorical first-person questions
may attract egophoric marking (see Hale & Watters 1973 for Newar). It is difficult
to find first-person questions in Dhivehi that are unambiguously “genuine” as
opposed to rhetorical. The example in (9) below is a good candidate, though the
question has a permission reading and so is not a real request for information:
(9) aharen̊
1SG
ja[𝑚]burōl-ek̊
rose.apple-INDF
naga-m̊=ta?
take.PRS-EGO=Q
‘Can I take a rose apple?’ (from www.dhiggaru.com/946)
Since first-person questions in Dhivehi are rarely genuine requests for infor-
mation, their use of egophoric marking is still in keeping with a system that
is at least partly egophoric in nature. While the use of egophoric marking in
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first-person questions is still unusual cross-linguistically, it is not completely
unattested. The same distributional pattern is found in the future tense of Kaluli
(Trans New Guinea), and has been analyzed as being partly egophoric (San Roque
& Schieffelin 2018). Moreover, the exact distribution of egophoric markers varies
considerably across egophoric systems anyway (see San Roque et al. 2018 for an
overview), and the use of egophoric marking in first-person questions is arguably
only a relatively small departure from the canonical system described earlier.
Secondly, some Dhivehi speakers accept alterphoric marking in at least some
first-person questions. This was the case for one of my consultants (a 34-year-old
man from Fonadhoo, Laamu Atoll), who accepted alterphoric marking in first-
person questions directed at others, but in self-directed first-person questions
only accepted egophoric marking, as shown in (10) vs. (11) below:
(10) miadu
today
ma
1SG
kai-fi=ta?
eat.CVB-PRF.ALTER=Q
‘Have I eaten today?’ (addressee-directed) (elicited)
(11) miadu
today
ma
1SG
kai-fim̊=ta?
eat.CVB-PRF.EGO=Q
‘Have I eaten today?’ (self-directed) (elicited)
According to this consultant, (10) might be used by an old man who has for-
gotten if he has already eaten that day and is asking somebody to remind him,
while (11) might be used by the same old man talking to himself. This distinction
is interesting because it relates to epistemic authority: in self-directed questions,
epistemic authority remains with the speaker, but in (non-rhetorical) addressee-
directed questions, epistemic authority is with the addressee. The use of ego-
phoric marking in (11) and alterphoric marking in (10) is therefore entirely con-
sistent with an egophoric system, but is inconsistent with a person-marking
analysis. However, other consultants in Laamu and Malé rejected such a distinc-
tion, accepting only egophoric marking in both contexts. This may partly reflect
the difficulties of eliciting such an unusual (and pragmatically marked) sentence
type, but probably does nonetheless point to a general preference for egophoric
marking in all first-person questions. Still, this general preference is not absolute,
and it is possible that speakers’ differing intuitions reflect a change in progress
(a point I return to in §4).
3.2 Pronoun avoidance and the use of third-person nominal reference
Aside from the distribution of forms across sentence types, there is another piece
of evidence for egophoricity in Dhivehi: the use of egophoric markers in sen-
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tences where speakers refer to themselves or their addressees with third-person
nominal reference, such as a kin term, name or title. Because such references
are strictly speaking third-person forms, when they are the subject of a verb
they would be expected to trigger third-person agreement if the language uses
a canonical person-marking system. But in Dhivehi, this context triggers ego-
phoric marking (or first/second-person marking under previous analyses). For
example, in (12) below, the speaker asks her mother if she (the mother) has eaten:
(12) mamma
mother
kai-fim̊=ta?
eat.CVB-PRF.EGO=Q
kobā
where
Shihānā=āi
Shihaanaa=CONJ
donta?
sister
emīhun̊
3PL
kai-fi=ta?
eat.CVB-PRF.ALTER=Q
‘Has mother [=addressee] eaten? Where are Shihaanaa and sister? Have
they eaten?’(from http://vnews.mv/517)
In (12), the kin term mamma ‘mother’ is used in lieu of the second-person pro-
noun kalē ‘you’.12 Despite the use of this third-person form as subject, the perfect
egophoric suffix -fim̊ (normally associated with first/second person) is used. This
is very different to the expected marking in a person-agreement system (cf. the
English question Is sir ready to order? which shows third-person agreement ‒
*Are sir ready to order? is ungrammatical). The use of egophoric marking in (12)
therefore appears to be motivated by the fact that the mother is both the subject
and the epistemic source, regardless of whether the speaker refers to her in the
second or third person. Note that although in some egophoric systems egophoric
marking can be triggered when the subject is a close relative of the speaker (San
Roque et al. 2018: 33), the egophoric marking in (12) only relates to the fact that
the subject is the epistemic source, regardless of the relationship with the speaker.
The second question in (12) is about some other close relatives/associates of the
speaker, but uses alterphoric marking because the question is not actually posed
to them. And if the question about the mother were instead directed at somebody
else, the alterphoric perfect suffix -fi would be used, as in (13) below:
(13) mamma
mother
kai-fi=ta?
eat.CVB-PRF.ALTER=Q
‘Has mother eaten?’ (not directed at mother) (elicited)
12That mamma is the subject of the verb kaifim̊ and not a free-standing vocative expression is
supported by the fact that both words would belong to the same intonation unit if the sentence
were used in speech.
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Referring to one’s addressee by a name, kin term or title is extremely com-
mon in Dhivehi, largely because the second-person pronoun kalē ‘you’ is now
generally regarded as impolite (see Gnanadesikan 2017: 70). Somewhat less often,
speakers also refer to themselves in the third person. This occurs especially in
child-directed speech. An example is (14) below, where a mother is telling her
child where she (the mother) went the other day:
(14) kurin̊
earlier
duvah-aku=ves
day-UNSP=EMPH
mamma
mother
e=ge-aṣ̊
DEM3=house-DAT
diya-im̊
go.PST-EGO
‘The other day as well mother [=speaker] went to that house.’
(from www.dhivehivaahaka.com/read/601)
Again, the use of egophoric marking with a formally third-person subject
would be anomalous in a person-marking system (though see (26) in § 3.4), but is
entirely consistent with an egophoric system that is sensitive to epistemic roles.
In this case, the speaker is the epistemic source for the proposition, and so the
use of egophoric marking is well motivated even though she refers to herself in
the third person.
Sentences in which speakers use third-person pronominal reference in place
of first- or second-person pronouns as subjects provide a useful window on the
underlying nature of markers which in many other contexts may look equally
like person markers or epistemic (i.e., egophoric/alterphoric) markers. This gram-
matical context has hardly been explored in the egophoricity literature, though
the general prediction would be for true egophoric markers to follow the pattern
illustrated for Dhivehi in (12) and (14), and for person markers (and perhaps some
“hybrid” markers) to be sensitive to the way in which the subject of the verb is
formally expressed.
3.3 Reported speech
Like many other languages with egophoric systems (e.g., Newar, Hale 1980), Dhi-
vehi makes use of an egophoric/alterphoric opposition in reported speech. Ego-
phoric marking appears where the reported subject (i.e., the subject of the re-
ported speech) is the same as the subject of the matrix clause, and an alterphoric
form appears when there is a mismatch between subjects. This is presumably be-
cause egophoric markers are used when the epistemic source is also the subject
of the clause (cf. §3.1) ‒ in reported speech clauses, the epistemic source is the
person reporting on what was said (i.e., the subject of the matrix clause), and so
egophoric marking appears on the reported verb only when the reported subject
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and matrix subject are co-referential. Thus, where the subject of the matrix clause
is the speaker, egophoric marking appears only if the speaker is the subject of
the embedded clause, such as in (15) as opposed to (16) and (17):13
(15) ma
1SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ma
1SG
Māle
Malé
diya-im=ē
go.PST-EGO=qUOT
‘I said that I went to Malé.’ (elicited)
(16) ma
1SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
kalē
2SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘I said that you went to Malé.’ (elicited)
(17) ma
1SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ēnā
3SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘I said that (s)he went to Malé.’ (elicited)
Where the subject of the matrix clause is the addressee, egophoric marking
appears only if the reported subject is also the addressee:
(18) kalē
2SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ma
1SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘You said that I went to Malé’ (elicited)
(19) kalē
2SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
kalē
2SG
Māle
Malé
diya-im=ē
go.PST-EGO=qUOT
‘You said that you went to Malé.’ (elicited)
(20) kalē
2SG
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ēnā
3SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘You said that (s)he went to Malé.’ (elicited)
And where the subject of the matrix clause is a third party, egophoric marking
appears only if that third party is also the reported subject:
(21) Ali
Ali
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ma
1SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘Ali said that I went to Malé.’ (elicited)
13Note that the egophoric marker (or first/second-person marker under previous analyses) in
these examples is ‑im̊ rather than ‑m̊ (the form presented in §2 for the simple past) because
the verb diya ‘go.PST’ is a monosyllabic-stem verb rather than a polysyllabic a-stem verb (see
Gnanadesikan 2017: 145–146).
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(22) Ali
Ali
bunī
say.PST.FOC
kalē
2SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘Ali said that you went to Malé.’ (elicited)
(23) Ali
Ali
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ēnā
3SG
Māle
Malé
diya-im=ē
go.PST-EGO=qUOT
‘Ali𝑖 said that he𝑖 went to Malé.’ (elicited)
(24) Ali
Ali
bunī
say.PST.FOC
ēnā
3SG
Māle
Malé
diya=yē
go.PST-ALTER=qUOT
‘Ali𝑖 said that (s)he𝑗 went to Malé.’ (elicited)
However, even though the reported speech data is perfectly consistent with
egophoricity, there is another possible explanation. Existing descriptions of Dhi-
vehi analyze the marker =ē (allomorph yē) simply as a marker of direct quota-
tions (Cain & Gair 2000: 47; Gnanadesikan 2017: 302), even if they sometimes
note that the pronoun identity in the original utterance is not always the same
in the quotation (Gnanadesikan 2017: 302–303). In practice, pronouns and other
noun phrases are often omitted when they are obvious from the context, and
so in many cases one cannot tell for sure whether the omitted pronoun would
have been faithful to the original utterance or whether it would have been de-
ployed from the current speaker’s perspective. For example, if ēnā ‘3SG’ in (23)
had been omitted (as is both possible and idiomatic in Dhivehi), the sentence
could perhaps be analyzed as containing a direct quotation with a first-person
subject (i.e., ‘Ali said, “[I] went to Malé”’). However, the examples in (15)‒(24)
show that when a pronoun is included, it is deployed from the perspective of the
current speaker rather than the original speaker. This may be because the inclu-
sion of a pronoun, being unusual, is pragmatically marked, and is more likely to
occur in emphatic contexts where the speaker feels a need to draw attention to
the identity of the reported subject. This is most easily done from the speaker’s
perspective in the current speech context. The data in (15)‒(24) therefore show
elements of both direct and indirect speech: the pronoun in the reported quote
is deployed from the perspective of the current speaker, while the marking on
the reported verb is calculated from the perspective of the original speaker. This
pattern, known as “semi-(in)direct speech” (e.g., Aikhenvald 2008; 2011), “hybrid
reported speech” (Tournadre & Dorje 2003), or “deictically mixed speech” (Wid-
mer & Zemp 2017) among other terms (see Evans 2012), is not inconsistent with
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a person-marking analysis because in semi-direct speech, person marking on the
reported verb does not have to agree with the reported subject.14
Dhivehi also has a logophoric pronoun timannā (plural timannāmen̊) that is
sometimes used in reported speech to refer to an embedded/reported subject that
is co-referential with the matrix subject (see Gnanadesikan 2017: 96–97). This pro-
noun occurs with egophoric (or “first-person”) marking on the verb. An example
is (25) below:
(25) Maumūn̊
Maumoon
amilla-aṣ̊
self-ADVZ
bunī
say.PST.FOC
timannā
LOG
30
30
aharu
year
verikam̊
rulership
koṣ̊-fīm=ē
do.CVB-PRF.EGO=qUOT
‘Maumoon𝑖 himself said that he𝑖 had ruled for 30 years.’ (adapted from
Gnanadesikan 2017: 96)
However, there is no distinct logophoric marking on verbs in Dhivehi; instead,
the same egophoric/alterphoric markers (or first/second-person vs. third-person
markers under previous analyses) are available, as illustrated in (25) and in the
examples earlier in this section. It is therefore not entirely clear how or whether
the logophoric pronoun timannā relates to egophoricity in Dhivehi. It appears to
simply be a special pronoun used in some cases where the reported subject and
matrix subject are co-referential, and has no bearing on the marking of the re-
ported verb (which would still attract egophoric/first-person marking even if the
pronoun were deployed from the perspective of the current speaker or omitted
entirely).
3.4 The suffix -mu
§ 3.1 and § 3.2 presented evidence for egophoricity in Dhivehi, with the caveat that
verbal marking in the unusual context of first-person questions may point to the
Dhivehi system being a hybrid of person-marking and egophoricity. I now turn
to another possible piece of evidence that person-marking is present in Dhivehi:
the distribution of the archaic/literary person marker -mu (first introduced in
§ 2).
14Various kinds of semi-direct reported speech constructions, or fuzzy boundaries between direct
and indirect speech, are attested in South Asia (e.g., Tamil: Lehmann 1989: 373–375; Malayalam:
Asher & Kumari 1997: 2–7). Masica (1991: 403) observes that reported speech constructions in
Sinhala and many other Indo-Aryan languages may be Dravidian calques, and that in some
Indo-Aryan languages there is “no clear distinction between indirect and direct quotation”.
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Recall that Fritz (2002) identifies -mu as a first/second-person plural suffix,
while Cain & Gair (2000) and Gnanadesikan (2017) analyze it as an archaic/liter-
ary suffix for the first and second person (regardless of number), though it was
traditionally prescribed for the second-person singular and first/second-person
plural (e.g., Ahmad 1970). Fritz (2002: 169) and Cain & Gair (2000: 27) assume a
historical connection between -mu and -m̊ in at least some parts of the paradigm.
This raises the question of whether -mu has (or had) much the same distribution
as -m̊, i.e., first-person statements/questions (though possibly restricted to first-
person plural) and second-person questions, but not elsewhere. The evidence ap-
pears to be mixed. On the one hand, -mu is sometimes found in second-person
statements (as well as the expected contexts of first-person statements/questions
and second-person questions).15 On the other hand, speakers tend to reject the
use of -mu in second-person statements, accepting it only in first-person state-
ments/questions and second-person questions. In any case, ‑mu is now seldom
used in spoken language, being mostly restricted to literary contexts.
The example in (26) below shows ‑mu in a statement with a second-person
singular subject:16
(26) manikufānu=eve!
excellency=END
qānūnu_asāsī
law_basis
galu_aḷā=fai_ot̊
stone_put.down.CVB=SUCC_lie.PST.PTCP
duvas_varu
day_amount
manikufānu
excellency
vidāḷu_vī-mu=eve.
say.HHON_be.PST-1/2=END
‘Your excellency! In the days when the [preparation of the] constitution
had stalled [lit. ‘had been hooked on a rock’], your excellency said [it].’
(A. Gnanadesikan, pers. comm.; originally from Haama Daily online
newspaper, 2010)
In (26), -mu cannot straightforwardly be analyzed as an egophoric marker
because the subject of the verb vidāḷu_vī-mu is the addressee rather than the
15Thanks to Amalia Gnanadesikan for bringing this point to my attention.
16The subject of this sentence is the title manikufānu ‘(your) excellency’, which Fritz (2002: 136)
analyzes as a second-person pronoun used in reference to members of the highest level of
society (such as the president), though it could alternatively be regarded as a (formally third-
person) noun ‒ the boundary here is unclear as some other Dhivehi pronouns derive histori-
cally from nouns, such as the deferential first-person pronoun aḷuga𝑛ḍu (lit. ‘slave piece’). If
manikufānu is analyzed as a third-person reference, the use of second-person agreement in
(26) would be odd for a person-marking system, following the discussion in § 3.2. The same
issue applies to tiyabaimīhun̊ (lit. ‘that group of people near you’) which is used in (27) as a
second-person plural pronoun.
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speaker, and the sentence is a statement. It therefore appears to be a second-
person marker in this context. Further, (27) below shows -mu (in the perfect
form ‑fīmu) with a second-person plural subject:
(27) tiyabaimīhun̊
2PL
timannāmen̊-ge
LOG.PL-GEN
gedor-aṣ̊
house-DAT
vade_gane
enter.CVB_take.CVB
h̤amalā_dī
attack_give.CVB
e=tan̊∼tan̊
DEM3=place∼REDUP
halāku
damage
kos-̊fīmu=eve.
do.CVB-PRF.1/2=END
‘You people have come to our homes, attacked, and damaged them.’
(A. Gnanadesikan, pers. comm.; originally from Haama Daily online
newspaper, 2010)
In (27) too, the use of -fīmu cannot be straightforwardly analyzed as egophoric,
because the subject is second person and the sentence is a statement.17 Nonethe-
less, the suffix ‑(fī)mu is accepted by most of my consultants only in second-
person questions as well as first-person contexts, though some who are familiar
with prescriptive grammar books claim that it is also “correct” in second-person
statements, even if they would not personally use it in that context. Additionally,
‑mu can apparently be used in first-person singular contexts, contrary to Fritz
(2002) and the prescriptive guides (e.g., Ahmad 1970) which list it only for the
first-person plural and the second person. This is shown in (28) below:
(28) aharen̊
1SG
e=ge-aṣ̊
DEM3=house-DAT
diyai-mu
go.PST-1/2
‘I went to that house.’ (elicited)
Thus, for many speakers at least, -mu and -m̊ are basically the same, though
‑mu is generally regarded as an archaic, literary, or “fancy” form. Still, because
‑mu does sometimes appear in second-person statements (as shown in (26) and
(27) above), I analyze it conservatively as a first/second-person marker rather
than as an egophoric marker. However, more work needs to be done to explain
the fact that traditional prescription, actual usage, and speaker judgements each
paint somewhat different pictures of ‑mu. The diachronic account that will be
proposed in §4.3 goes some way towards addressing this.
17Note that (27) also includes the (plural) logophoric pronoun timannāmen because it is taken
from a larger quotation in which the speaker is cross-referenced.
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3.5 Discussion
The data in some of the previous sections are problematic for a simple person-
agreement analysis of Dhivehi verbs. Not only does “first/second-person” mark-
ing fail to appear in some second-person contexts (§ 3.1), it actually appears in
some “third-person” contexts (§ 3.2). This data is, however, consistent with ego-
phoricity. On the other hand, the literary ‑mu (§ 3.4) does appear to be a genuine
person marker (though it is falling out of use even in literary contexts, and cur-
rent speaker judgements often do not match traditional prescription with regard
to its distribution), and the marking of verbs in first-person questions (§3.1) could
also be regarded as evidence of a person-agreement system (though as discussed,
the data here are not entirely incompatible with egophoricity either). The data
from reported speech (§ 3.3) are equally consistent with egophoricity and person-
marking, assuming a semi-direct speech construction in the case of the latter. On
the whole, the evidence therefore points to a mixture of egophoricity and person-
marking in Dhivehi, with the language seemingly moving closer to egophoricity
with the decline of the archaic/literary person marker ‑mu (see §4.3 for more on
this).
While egophoricity appears to be a good explanation for (much of) the data,
such a grammatical system is typologically unusual, and Dhivehi would be the
first Indo-European language reported to have such a system. This raises ques-
tions as to whether there might be any other ways to account for the data. Gawne
(2017: 83–84) points out that individual features within egophoric “systems” may
or may not overlap in different languages. According to Gawne, the co-occurrence
of certain constituent features (such as certain evidential markers and a “rule of
anticipation” in which questions pre-empt the person marking of the anticipated
response) may result in an epiphenomenally egophoric pattern.
For Dhivehi, some relevant constituent features are: (i) second-person state-
ments marked like third person, but second-person questions marked like first
person (perhaps under a “rule of anticipation” which also extends to first-person
questions for some speakers); (ii) egophoric markers (or under some previous
analyses, first/second-person markers) used for co-reference in reported speech
(or alternatively, a pattern of semi-direct speech); and (iii) marking on verbs sen-
sitive to the discourse context, rather than the formal expression of the subject
‒ e.g., a speaker using a name or noun phrase to refer to herself uses egophoric
(or first/second-person) marking on the verb, rather than alterphoric (or third-
person) marking. It is possible that these three features are independent phenom-
ena in Dhivehi, and that they just happen to co-occur in such a way that gives the
appearance of an underlying epistemic system. This kind of explanation might
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be advantageous in that it avoids appealing to a typologically rare grammati-
cal “system” that is completely unexpected in the region and language family.
On the other hand, it is obviously more parsimonious to appeal to a single phe-
nomenon that can explain the various constituent features, some of which would
be unusual for the region and language family anyway. Throughout this chap-
ter I adopt the more parsimonious analysis, but it is not possible to completely
discount the notion that egophoricity in Dhivehi may be epiphenomenal. At the
very least though, I hope to have demonstrated that Dhivehi shares a number of
interesting features with other “egophoric” languages in the literature, and that
an egophoric analysis may be just as appropriate for Dhivehi as it is for many of
those languages.
How then does the Dhivehi pattern compare to other examples of egophoricity
in the literature? I have already mentioned that the Dhivehi distribution of ego-
phoric markers resembles the distribution of future tense forms in Kaluli (Trans
New Guinea; San Roque & Schieffelin 2018), which is slightly different to the dis-
tribution found in canonical egophoric systems. I have also discussed similarities
between reported speech in Dhivehi (which involves a particular distribution of
egophoric markers) and reported speech in other egophoric languages. But aside
from the grammatical distribution of egophoric markers, what about possible
connections with systems of evidentiality, mirativity, or volitionality, which of-
ten interact with egophoricity (e.g., Creissels 2008; San Roque et al. 2018)? In
some languages (e.g., Newar: Hale 1980), for example, speakers can use alter-
phoric markers on verbs with first- or second-person subjects to show that the
subject acted without volition, while egophoric marking is restricted to verbs
that describe intentional acts. This is not the case for Dhivehi, in which acciden-
tal or involuntary events are encoded by separate verbal morphology known as
the “inactive/intransitive/involitive” or “IN”-form, introduced in § 1.2.18 IN-verbs
do not take any kind of person marking or egophoric/alterphoric marking, as
shown in (29) below:
(29) aharen̊(‑ge)/ēnā(‑ge)
1SG(-GEN)/3SG(-GEN)
at-un̊
hand-INS
doru
door
leppunu
close.IN.PST
‘I/(s)he closed the door (accidentally).’ (adapted from Cain & Gair 2000:
58)
Dhivehi’s egophoric/alterphoric opposition therefore applies only to volitional-
stem verbs, and alterphoric forms within this opposition are never deployed to
show a lack of volition. For example, (30) below is ungrammatical:
18The IN-form of a typical Dhivehi verb is derived via an umlaut process and/or the addition of
a dedicated suffix, depending on the stem type of the verb (Cain & Gair 2000: 57–61).
123
Jonathon Lum
(30) *aharen̊
1SG
doru
door
leppi
close.PST.ALTER
‘I closed the door (accidentally).’
Hence, although Dhivehi has a regular system for marking volitional vs. non-
volitional distinctions on verbs, it is separate from the egophoric/alterphoric
system which only comes into play for active, volitional verbs (and even then
only for non-progressive aspects). Nonetheless, it is curious that many other lan-
guages with egophoricity also attend to volitionality, and that the egophoric form
in these languages is often restricted to verbs describing intentional, controllable
actions (San Roque et al. 2018: 14–15, 29–30). It therefore seems plausible that
there may be an underlying relationship between the egophoric system and the
volitional system in Dhivehi, though for now the nature of that relationship is
unclear.
Thus far, I have outlined the issues with previous accounts of Dhivehi ver-
bal morphology which revolve around typical notions of person marking, and
have shown that an egophoric analysis appears to be a better fit for the data in
many grammatical contexts. There are of course some limitations and counter-
examples to an egophoric analysis too. However, these are in keeping with the
widespread variation found in egophoric systems, and/or reflect a combination
of egophoricity and person marking in Dhivehi. While it is conceivable that the
Dhivehi data can be explained in terms of the co-occurrence of a number of sepa-
rate, possibly unrelated grammatical and pragmatic phenomena, this is also true
of other egophoric systems reported in the literature. It is therefore valid to dis-
cuss Dhivehi in terms of egophoricity and to consider its potential contribution
to our understanding of egophoricity cross-linguistically.
4 Dialectal variation and historical development
As mentioned in earlier parts of this chapter, egophoric marking has not been
reported for the Indo-European or Dravidian language families nor for any other
languages with which Dhivehi has had historical contact. In order to shed light
on how egophoricity came to emerge in the standard Malé dialect from which
the data in the previous sections were drawn, it may be instructive to consider
the southern dialects of Huvadhu, Fuvahmulah and Addu (briefly introduced in
§1.2), which are in most respects more conservative than Malé Dhivehi (Fritz
2002: 13). In addition, the Laamu and Minicoy dialects are spoken at the extreme
ends of the northern dialect group (see Figure 4.1 in §1.2) and are distinct from the
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Malé dialect in many ways. In the following sections I briefly summarize what is
known about “person marking” in the non-Malé dialects for which information
is available: §4.1 on the Laamu dialect and §4.2 on the dialects of Fuvahmulah and
Addu. In § 4.3 I then propose that the northern dialects may have undergone a
similar process to that outlined in Widmer (2015) and Widmer & Zemp (2017) for
some Tibeto-Burman languages, in which the distribution of person markers in
semi-direct speech fosters a reanalysis of those markers as egophoric/alterphoric
markers.
4.1 Laamu
In the dialect of Laamu Atoll (traditionally known as Haddummatī bas), verbal
marking is mostly identical to that in the standard dialect, according to data
collected during my own recent fieldwork. One salient but inconsequential dif-
ference is that the progressive/focus suffix is ‑(n)ū rather than ‑(n)ī (e.g., danū
‘go.PRS.PROG’). The suffixes for the simple present, perfect, and simple past are
the same as those in Malé. Future-tense forms in Laamu are different, however:
egophoric forms end in ‑m̊ instead of the Malé -nam̊ and alterphoric forms end
in -ḷa instead of the Malé -ne. As with the corresponding Malé forms, the main
evidence that these are egophoric and alterphoric markers respectively is their
distribution in second-person clauses (‑m̊ for questions, ‑ḷa for statements) and in
clauses where a speaker/addressee subject is expressed with third-person nomi-
nal reference (-m̊ used where the subject is the epistemic source, regardless of the
formal expression of the subject). For example, (31) and (32) below demonstrate
that -m̊ behaves as an egophoric marker in second-person clauses while -ḷa acts
as an alterphoric marker:
(31) mirē
tonight
i𝑛ba
2SG
kām̊=te?
eat.FUT.EGO=Q
‘Will you eat tonight?’ (elicited)
(32) mirē
tonight
i𝑛ba
2SG
kāḷa
eat.FUT.ALTER
‘You will eat tonight.’ (elicited)
4.2 Fuvahmulah and Addu
According to Fritz (2002: 164–184), the southern dialects of Fuvahmulah and
Addu have comparatively richer systems of person marking. Fuvahmulah distin-
guishes between all six person and number combinations, like Literary Sinhala.
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Addu distinguishes between first-person singular, second/third-person singular,
first-person plural, and second/third-person plural.19 These patterns are demon-
strated along with the Malé paradigm in Table 4.8 below for the present tense of
the verb balanī ‘looking’.20
Table 4.8: The simple present tense of balanī ‘looking’ in three dialects
(adapted from Fritz 2002: 169)
Fuvahmulah Addu Malé
statements questions
1SG balam̊ balam̊ balam̊ balam̊2SG balayye balai balā3SG balā balā
1PL balamā balamā balam̊ balam̊2PL balāva balatā balā3PL balatta balā
Recall that Fritz’s account of the Malé dialect does not mention the split be-
tween second-person statements and questions, and this raises the question of
whether there might be a similar split in the southern dialects too. However, on
the basis of Fritz’s examples, as well as some reports I have received from native
speakers of the Addu dialect, it appears that Addu does have a genuine person-
agreement system that contrasts first-person with second/third-person and sin-
gular with plural, without any egophoric-like distribution across sentence types.
Fuvahmulah has a fully-fledged person-agreement system according to Fritz’s
description, contrasting first-, second-, and third-person in both the singular
and plural. Thus on the available evidence, these southern dialects use person-
marking systems rather than egophoric ones. It is relevant to note that these
person-marking systems are relatively conservative ‒ the Fuvahmulah system in
particular closely resembles the six-way system in Literary Sinhala (Fritz 2002:
168–175), the language most closely related to Dhivehi.21
19In addition, Addu has some special interrogative forms for certain persons and numbers de-
pending on the stem type and tense, resulting in slightly richer interrogative “paradigms” (Fritz
2002: 244–247). However, as these are not in egophoric distribution and Fritz has a plausible
phonological explanation for them, I will not discuss them further here.
20Note that the forms listed here for Malé are based on the data in §3 rather than Fritz’s descrip-
tion, and that for simplicity I omit forms involving the archaic/literary suffix ‑mu.
21In contrast, Colloquial Sinhala does not have any person or number agreement on verbs (Gair
1990: 15).
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4.3 Possible origins of egophoricity in Dhivehi
The previous sections showed that Dhivehi’s conservative southern dialects re-
tain person-agreement systems, while the northern dialects of Laamu and Malé
instead use egophoric systems with some elements of person agreement. But
how did egophoricity come to exist in northern Dhivehi? Given that the ego-
phoric and alterphoric markers in the northern dialects are highly similar (and
in some cases identical) to the person markers in the southern dialects and in Lit-
erary Sinhala (see Table 4.8 in the previous section as well as Fritz 2002: 168–175),
it is highly likely that egophoricity in northern Dhivehi is a recent development
from a purely person-marking system. This is also supported by a number of
other observations: languages of the region have person agreement rather than
egophoricity (Hock 2016), prescriptive grammar books in Dhivehi list person-
agreement suffixes (e.g., Ahmad 1970), an early description of Dhivehi suggests
a person-marking system (Geiger 1919), and even more recent descriptions also
report person marking, as discussed in § 2. Thus, all indications point to a person-
marking system existing in the language until quite recently, when the person
markers must have changed in their distribution across sentence types, resulting
in the egophoric distribution described in §3. Although the full diachronic devel-
opment is difficult to reconstruct precisely, some aspects are reasonably clear and
others may be inferred. In this section I will first sketch the likely development
of person marking in Dhivehi until it reached the system described by Ahmad
(1970), and then I will address the likely development of that person-marking sys-
tem into the egophoric system used in the modern standard variety (and other
northern dialects).
It is highly probable that Dhivehi once had a six-way distinction along the
lines of Literary Sinhala, but at some point this system began to collapse except
on Fuvahmulah, where the original system survived mostly unchanged (see Ta-
ble 4.8 in the previous section). In Addu the distinction between the old second-
and third-person markers was lost, and it appears that northern Dhivehi also
experienced this change, given that it currently lacks dedicated second-person
markers. The extant forms (in statements) are based on the old third-person ones,
though northern Dhivehi has also lost its third-person plural marker (which was
still attested at the time of Geiger 1919), extending the singular form to the plural
as well.
The suffix ‑mu (§ 3.4) in northern Dhivehi must be related to the Literary Sin-
hala first-person plural suffix of the same form (Fritz 2002: 168), and also to the
first-person plural suffix ‑mā in the southern dialects. However, as discussed in
§3.4, the northern Dhivehi suffix ‑mu is used also for the second person and
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sometimes for the first-person singular. At some point, ‑mu must have spread
to second-person contexts, though the spread to the first-person singular may
be much more recent ‒ according to Geiger (1919) and the native grammatical
tradition (e.g., Ahmad 1970), ‑mu is used only for the first-person plural and sec-
ond person (singular and plural). More recently (i.e., in the later part of the 20𝑡ℎ
century), ‑mu started to fall out of use, and it is possible that those speakers
(or writers) who use it at all in first-person singular contexts have reanalyzed it
simply as a ‘fancy’ equivalent of ‑m̊ (which is also used for the first and second
person).
As for ‑m̊ itself, there is a clear relationship with the Literary Sinhala first-
person singular suffix -m (Fritz 2002: 168) as well as with -m̊ in the southern
dialects, where it also marks the first-person singular. The appearance of -m̊ (in
northern Dhivehi) in second-person questions and in the first-person plural is
difficult to date precisely, though the evidence suggests this unfolded in the late
20𝑡ℎ century. Geiger (1919: 83–88) presents some examples of ‑m in these contexts
(e.g., aharamen̊ kakkāfīm ‘we cooked’),22 probably a reduction of ‑mu, and not
far off the present-day ‑m̊ (pronounced [ŋ] word-finally). Prescriptivists writing
in the second half of the century (e.g., Ahmad 1970) do not comment on ‑m or
‑m̊ in these contexts, however. This suggests at the very least that ‑m̊ in these
contexts was not standard practice in writing by the 1960s, and probably also
indicates that it was not yet widely used in speech or writing (else it would have
been remarked upon, even if only to proscribe its use). However, descriptions of
the language around the turn of the century (Cain & Gair 2000; Fritz 2002) have
reported at least some aspects of the new distribution, as discussed in §2. Quite
possibly, the spread of -m̊ is directly related to the decline of ‑mu, which would
have occurred during much the same period ‒ I return to this point later.
Although ‑mu could have reduced to -m ̊ through loss of the word-final ‑u as
Fritz (2002: 169) suggests, this alone does not explain why -m̊ is not also used
in second-person statements (recall that -mu was formerly used with both first-
and second-person subjects). The correct explanation must account for why -mu
was completely lost in second-person statements and replaced by third-person
forms in that grammatical environment. The diachronic process I wish to pro-
pose here accounts for this: Dhivehi speakers reanalyzed person markers as epis-
temic markers because of their distribution in semi-direct speech, and when this
epistemic reanalysis was overgeneralized to basic clauses, former second-person
marking ‒ now reanalyzed as egophoric marking ‒ disappeared from second-
person statements but not from second-person questions. This process is very
22Transliteration adapted.
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similar to the one recently described by Widmer (2015) and Widmer & Zemp
(2017) for the Tibeto-Burman language Bunan, but with some differences that
will be addressed later in this section.
In Dhivehi, the -u of -mu is deleted before the quotative marker =ē (see §3.3)
in semi-direct speech, resulting in [m]. This [m] could have been reanalyzed as
/m/ underlyingly (and is written in this chapter as m̊ word-finally or m else-
where, following Gnanadesikan 2017). This is also identical to the pre-existing
first-person singular suffix, and so even before any reanalysis took place, [m]
would have been used in all quotations where the original speaker was first or
second person, as semi-direct speech in Dhivehi preserves the person marking
of the original utterance (see §3.3).
But a functional reanalysis of this marker in semi-direct speech must have also
taken place. Semi-direct speech is the only grammatical construction in Dhivehi
that allows a mismatch between a subject pronoun (or noun phrase) and the
marking on a finite verb, the former being calculated from the current speaker’s
perspective and the latter from the original speaker’s perspective. This makes it
the most likely grammatical construction to lend itself to a reanalysis of person
markers (cf. Widmer & Zemp 2017: 54–56). For example, the first-person marking
on the reported verb in a sentence like ‘Ali𝑖 said that he𝑖 went to Malé’ could
be reanalyzed as marking co-reference of the matrix subject with the reported
subject, or even as marking that the reported subject is the epistemic source
(i.e., egophoric marking), especially since the otherwise similar sentence ‘Ali𝑖
said that he𝑗 went to Malé’ displays different marking (third-person) on the verb,
which may naturally be reanalyzed as marking a lack of co-reference or a lack of
epistemic authority on the part of the subject (i.e., alterphoric marking).
An epistemic interpretation in particular (as opposed to a purely syntactic one
to do with co-reference) would have been plausible for speakers because it would
have fit with the way the marker was already being used in most basic clauses,
where co-reference is (probably) not in play.23 The suffix -m̊ was already being
used in first-person clauses, and almost all first-person clauses are statements in
which the first-person subject has full epistemic authority over the proposition.
Further, the phonologically similar suffix ‑mu, which was probably already in the
process of reducing to ‑m̊ in speech, was being used in first-person plural and
second-person contexts, where the subject is also generally the epistemic source
(bearing in mind that first-person questions and second-person statements are
rare compared to first-person statements and second-person questions). Thus,
23Though see Hale (1980) for a co-referential analysis of egophoric/alterphoric markers in basic
clauses, and San Roque et al. (2018: 51–54) for discussion and criticism.
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once an epistemic reanalysis had been made in reported speech, the generaliza-
tion to basic clauses would have been a very natural one.
As this reanalysis is based on verbal marking in reported speech, where both
the (former) first-person singular marker and first-person plural/second-person
marker are realized as [m] (as mentioned earlier), the actual form of the newly re-
analyzed egophoric marker to spread to basic clauses would have been ‑m̊ rather
than ‑mu, though we cannot rule out the possibility that some speakers were al-
ready beginning to reduce ‑mu to -m̊ in basic clauses prior to this point, perhaps
on analogy with the existing first-person singular form. The relative order of
these changes is of little consequence, however. If ‑mu had mostly been replaced
by ‑m̊ in basic clauses already, then the new egophoric reanalysis of ‑m̊ in re-
ported speech would simply have led to a functional reanalysis of ‑m̊ in basic
clauses. If on the other hand ‑mu (or perhaps ‑m with apocope of the final vowel)
was still in popular use, then as the new egophoric system spread from reported
speech ‑m̊ would have begun to displace ‑mu in basic clauses. In either scenario
‑mu would begin to fall out of usage, and an egophoric distribution of ‑m̊ would
start to take shape across basic clauses. This is exactly the situation that (north-
ern) Dhivehi is currently in ‒ the former person-agreement suffix ‑mu is still
known but is now largely restricted to literary contexts, and a mostly egophoric
distribution has taken hold in basic clauses.
The actual shift from person marking to egophoricity in basic clauses would
have been fairly subtle in that most of the pieces were already in the right places.
The ‘new’ egophoric marker ‑m̊ was already being used in first-person state-
ments, and the ‘new’ alterphoric markers (former third-person markers) were
already used in third-person sentences. In the emerging epistemic system, how-
ever, speakers must have started to use alterphoric/third-person marking in sec-
ond-person statements (and as described above, would have increasingly come
to replace ‑mu with the phonologically similar ‑m̊ in first-person contexts and
second-person questions, assuming they had not started this process already).
In addition, names, kin terms, and other formally third-person references would
have started to trigger egophoric marking in the right contexts as the former
person-sensitive system was overridden by an epistemically-sensitive one. How-
ever, the marking of first-person questions survives as a relic of the former person-
agreement system (though as discussed in §3.1, one consultant in Laamu did ac-
cept alterphoric marking in some first-person questions). This might partly be
related to the fact that the first person was already marked with ‑m̊ (at least
in the singular) before the egophoric system emerged, unlike the second per-
son which was marked with the disappearing ‑mu. But it is more likely to be
because first-person questions are unusual and pragmatically marked (see §3.1),
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and because interrogatives in general tend to preserve former person-agreement
markers for longer than declaratives do when a new epistemic system emerges
(Widmer & Zemp 2017). Eventually, however, first-person questions ‒ or at least,
non-rhetorical first-person questions that are not self-directed ‒ might also be
predicted to take alterphoric marking instead of first-person/egophoric mark-
ing, resulting in a fully-fledged egophoric system. The full chain of development
outlined here is represented in Figure 4.2 below (lighter shading indicates di-
achronic changes in the person-marking system up to at least the middle of the
20𝑡ℎ century; darker shading indicates the recent shift from person-marking to
egophoricity):
Six-way person/number agreement
(cf. Literary Sinhala and Fuvahmulah dialect)
Old 2nd person markers lost
(cf. Addu dialect)
Old 3rd person plural marker lost
(replaced by 3rd person singular marker)
1st person plural -mu spreads to 2nd person
~Mid-20th century system (present tense):
1SG: -m̊ 1PL: -mu
2SG: -mu 2PL: -mu
3SG: -V 3PL: -V
Person markers in reported speech
reanalyzed as epistemic markers
1st/2nd person > egophoric
3rd person > alterphoric
Epistemic reanalysis spreads to basic clauses
Former 2nd person marking lost in 2nd person statements
Figure 4.2: Possible development of egophoricity in Dhivehi
Although the transformation of person marking into epistemic marking may
seem an unusual diachronic development, it is not without precedent. Widmer
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& Zemp (2017) propose a similar diachronic process in three Tibeto-Burman lan-
guages: Sunwar, Dolakha Newar, and Bunan (see also Widmer 2015 for Dolakha
Newar and Bunan). According to Widmer & Zemp, these three languages rep-
resent different stages of a process by which person agreement transforms into
epistemic marking. Sunwar is at an early stage in which there is no evidence
of an egophoric/alterphoric opposition in basic clauses, but the language has a
semi-direct reported speech construction with a binary opposition between first-
and third-person marking in reported clauses. Dolakha Newar is at an interme-
diate stage in which person markers in semi-direct speech have been reanalyzed
as epistemic markers, and are occasionally used in declarative clauses to mark
an egophoric opposition. Finally, in Bunan the innovative egophoric system is
widely used in both declarative and interrogative clauses, but some remnants of
the old person-marking system remain, specifically in interrogative contexts.
The diachronic development described by Widmer & Zemp has some differ-
ences to the one outlined for Dhivehi in Figure 4.2 though the basic process is the
same. In Widmer & Zemp’s account of Bunan, second-person endings gradually
become obsolete as first- and third-person markers are reanalyzed as egophoric
and alterphoric markers respectively. With the loss of second-person markers
among younger speakers of the language, Bunan appears to be moving towards
a four-way system that marks egophoric versus alterphoric in both the singu-
lar and plural (though number distinctions are also beginning to disappear in
the Bunan verbal system ‒ see Widmer 2014: 575–576). In contrast, the available
evidence suggests that the person-marking system of (northern) Dhivehi had al-
ready simplified (including the complete loss of dedicated second-person mark-
ers) prior to its reanalysis as an egophoric system, and the new system does not
involve a number distinction at all. Still, both languages developed an egophoric
system through a functional reanalysis of person markers in reported speech.
In both languages, egophoric markers developed from former first-person mark-
ers, and alterphoric markers from former third-person markers. And both lan-
guages also show vestiges of their former person-marking systems, especially in
interrogative contexts (e.g., first-person questions in Dhivehi) and in the dwin-
dling use of certain agreement markers (e.g., ‑mu in Dhivehi) that are outside the
egophoric/alterphoric opposition that is now operational. The similarities with
Bunan add weight to the diachronic development proposed here for Dhivehi, and
suggest that person marking may be a plausible diachronic source of egophoric
marking in other egophoric languages too. Data from other egophoric languages
for which historical records or descriptions are available may shed further light
on the nature of this process.
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5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have presented a new analysis of verbal marking in finite ten-
ses/aspects/moods in Dhivehi. The analysis is that in the simple present, simple
past, perfect and (finite) future tenses/aspects of active, volitional-stem verbs,
Dhivehi employs an egophoric/alterphoric opposition that indexes whether or
not the subject is the epistemic source for the proposition. While this may be a
significant departure from previous accounts of person marking in the language,
it appears to be the best explanation for the data presented in §3. In particular,
the conclusion that Dhivehi has recently developed an egophoric/alterphoric dis-
tinction is able to account for the following:
i. Verbs in second-person questions marked like those in first-person state-
ments;
ii. Verbs in second-person statements marked like those in third-person
clauses;
iii. Verbs with (formally) third-person subjects marked like first/second-
person verbs when the subject refers to the speaker or addressee;
iv. The decline of the first-person plural/second-person suffix ‑mu and the
spread of the suffix -m̊ beyond the first-person singular to certain other
first/second-person contexts.
In addition, this analysis partly explains the differing accounts of second-per
son marking in some existing descriptions of the language (Cain & Gair 2000;
Fritz 2002), since the egophoric/alterphoric distinction splits the second person
by sentence type. However, the analysis presented here stops short of claim-
ing that Dhivehi shows canonical egophoricity, since first-person questions are
marked like first-person statements and second-person questions, instead of be-
ing marked like second-person statements and third-person statements/ques-
tions. Although there are good reasons for thinking that first-person questions
might be aberrant because they represent a pragmatically-marked context (see
§ 3.1), the marking of first-person questions might also suggest that the Dhivehi
system is a hybrid of egophoricity and person agreement. The continued (though
declining) use of the first-person plural/second-person suffix ‑mu is further ev-
idence for a hybrid system, or perhaps more accurately, the (temporary) co-
existence of two systems.
Dhivehi’s egophoric system is typologically unusual, and may even be unique
among Indo-European languages and the languages of the (southern) South Asia
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region. Egophoric marking is found in certain Tibeto-Burman languages as well
as some languages of the Caucasus, South America, and New Guinea, though un-
like in many of these languages, egophoric marking in Dhivehi is not obviously
connected to evidentiality, mirativity, or volitionality. However, the egophoric/al-
terphoric opposition is restricted to volitional-stem verbs, and so we should not
discount a subtler connection of this type, especially given that volitionality is
an important grammatical category in Dhivehi.
An interesting question is how egophoricity emerged in Dhivehi and how it
relates to person marking. The modern system in the northern dialects may well
have developed from an older, six-way person-marking system that simplified
somewhat over time, gradually reducing to a binary distinction as speakers be-
gan to reanalyze person agreement as egophoric/alterphoric marking. This re-
analysis most likely had its genesis in semi-direct speech, the only grammati-
cal construction in the language where ‘mixing’ of subject identities and person
agreement would have been possible.
Further research is required to better understand the historical development of
egophoric marking in Dhivehi, its semantics and grammatical behaviour in the
contemporary language, and its typological significance. Future studies might
look for evidence of egophoricity in the southern dialects (in particular the un-
documented Huvadhu dialect) and in certain northern dialects too, such as the
dialect spoken on the remote island of Minicoy. A study tracing the development
of person/epistemic markers in written Dhivehi would help to pinpoint the tim-
ing of the shift, and may also shed further light on how the shift unfolded. Finally,
the collection of additional data from unusual grammatical contexts such as first-
person questions and second-person statements would help to check the analysis
presented here, and may uncover valuable details concerning the operation of the
egophoric system in the contemporary language.
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Abbreviations
1 first person
2 second person
3 third person
ADVZ adverbializer
ALTER alterphoric
CNCS concessive
CONJ coordinating particle
COP copula
CVB converb
DAT dative case
DEM2 second-person
demonstrative (near
addressee)
DEM3 third-person
demonstrative (not near
speaker or addressee)
EGO egophoric
EMPH emphatic particle
END sentence-final particle
NEG negative particle
FUT future tense
GEN genitive case
HHON high honorific
IMP imperative
INDF indefinite
INF infinitive
LOG logophoric pronoun
PL plural
PRF perfect
PROG  progressive aspect
PRS present tense
PTCP participle
Q question particle
qUOT quotative particle
REDUP reduplicated morpheme
SG singular
SUCC successive particle
UNSP unspecified
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Chapter 5
Emerging epistemic marking in
Indo-Aryan Palula
Henrik Liljegren
University of Stockholm
While evidentiality is neither systematically nor obligatorily signaled in Indo-
Aryan Palula [phl; phal1254] (Pakistan), it can be observed in so-called scattered
coding. It is most obviously reflected in three sub-systems of the language: a) as
a secondary effect of tense—aspect differentiation, mostly clearly seen in the use
of the perfect for indirect evidence vis-à-vis the use of the simple past for direct
evidence; b) by a set of utterance-final mood markers, involving an emerging three-
way paradigmatic contrast: thaní as quotative, maní as hearsay and ɡa as inferred
knowledge; and c) by (at least) one member of a set of second-position discourse
particles, xu, marking surprise. Although evidentiality contrasts akin to the perfect
vs. simple past were indeed part of the ancestral Indo-Aryan tense system, there
are plenty of parallels in adjacent languages to the epistemic contrasts noted for
Palula, suggesting that more recent language contact must have contributed to, or
largely facilitated, the emergence of epistemic marking in the language.
1 Introduction
While evidentiality, mirativity and related notions have been discussed at length
for Sino-Tibetan (DeLancey 1986; 2001) and for Turkic languages (Johanson 2000;
2003), relatively little attention has been given to similar phenomena in the multi-
lingual Hindukush-Karakoram (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir), a mountainous
region home to approximately 50 distinct – mostly Indo-Iranian – languages, ly-
ing at the crossroads of South Asia and the Tibetan and the Turkic worlds. Only
some preliminary suggestions regarding evidentiality and its origin in the region
have been offered, and a few language-specific studies focussing on epistemic
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aspects have been carried out (see §2). While in a few languages, contrasts in
the realm of evidentiality are actually part of verbal morphology, in others it is
mainly indicated with particles, or else such distinctions are present in “scattered
coding”, i.e. not as part of a single sub-system but instead encoded in various
parts of the grammar. In the present study, texts belonging to a corpus result-
ing from recent fieldwork on Indo-Aryan Palula have been analysed, and some
preliminary conclusions as well as open-ended questions are offered regarding
various types of epistemic marking found in the language, their possible seman-
tic scope and their relationship to other language-particular grammatical distinc-
tions. It has been found that epistemic marking is entailed in some tense-aspect
distinctions (§3); in the use of mood-markers (§4); and in the use of discourse
particles (§5). In as much detail as possible, derivational paths will be discussed
(see §6), and also language-contact effects, e.g. the possible influence of gram-
maticalized inferentiality in neighbouring languages or in languages of wider
communication on Palula. The findings of the study are summarized in §7.
2 Background
Palula [iso 639-3: phl; glottocode: phal1254] is an Indo-Aryan language belonging
to the Shina group. It is spoken by approximately 10,000 people in the southern
part of Chitral district in northern Pakistan (35.38, 71.78; see Figure 5.1). Speak-
ers are to a varying degree bilingual in Khowar, another Indo-Aryan language
widely spoken in Chitral, and/or in Pashto, an Iranian language that is one of
the most important lingua francas of northwestern Pakistan. Educated speakers
also know Urdu, the nation-wide lingua franca of Pakistan, and to a lesser extent
English. The author conducted linguistic fieldwork in this language, primarily
in the period 1998 to 2006, with the compilation of a corpus of Palula narratives
and other texts as one of its aims.1 In the present study, that corpus has been
consulted, along with various field notes and other types of language data, e.g.
obtained experimentally or by means of direct elicitation.
The district as well as the surrounding region where Palula is spoken is lin-
guistically highly diverse and multilingual. The mountainous north of Pakistan
counts nearly 30 distinct ethnolinguistic communities, and another 20 or so can
be added if we also include the adjacent, and equally diverse areas of northeast-
ern Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. Those languages represent
1The interested reader is encouraged to consult the following works dedicated to the description
and documentation of Palula: phonetics and phonology (Liljegren & Haider 2009); morphology
and syntax (Liljegren 2010; 2016); vocabulary and semantics (Liljegren & Haider 2011; 2015a);
glossed and translated texts (Liljegren & Haider 2015b).
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six genera: Indo-Aryan2 (to which Palula and above-mentioned Khowar belong),
the dominant one as far as the number of languages is concerned; Iranian (apart
from Pashto and Dari, the Afghan form of Persian, these are relatively small
language communities in remote areas); Nuristani (concentrated in an area of
Afghanistan just across the border from Chitral); Sino-Tibetan (represented by
Balti, spoken in the eastern-most part of this region); Turkic (mainly in the bor-
derlands between Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia);
and the language isolate Burushaski.
Figure 5.1: Chitral district and the surrounding region. Language names
(only those that feature in the article) in italics.
There are only a few studies discussing evidentiality in this region, if we do
not consider the observations made regarding the general pervasiveness of it in
the grammars of Turkic and Sino-Tibetan, two of the genera represented here
– although in a rather peripheral way, as we saw above. In a master’s thesis,
Jones (2009) analyses evidentiality and mirativity in Balti, and concludes that the
language has a grammatical category of mirativity, reflected by present and past
mirative markers, as well as a reportative verb suffix and some newly developed
strategies for marking inference and supposition.
Although evidentiality seems a less pervasive or significant feature in Iranian
languages in general than is the case in Turkic and Sino-Tibetan, there are nev-
ertheless indications that certain verb forms in the Persian varieties spoken in or
2Indo-Aryan, Iranian and Nuristani are usually regarded as subgroups on the same level, sub-
sumed under the Indo-Iranian branch of Indo-European.
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near this region have epistemic uses. While the scope of epistemic uses is limited
to past-time reference in Persian of Iran, Perry (2000) presents evidence of much
wider uses in Dari, i.e. the variety spoken in Afghanistan, encompassing quota-
tive, inference, presumptive and speculative functions, in the present and future
as well as in the past. Bashir also notes the use of a so-called “distant perfect”
in Iranian Wakhi as a marker of inferentiality or mirativity (2006; 2007b: 840)
and a second-position clitic in Pashto carrying out certain evidentiality-related
functions (2006).
Evidentiality distinctions in Indo-Aryan are in general not particularly signif-
icant or easily identifiable (Masica 1991: 279–291; de de Haan 2013), but there are
individual or areally significant exceptions, a fact noted by Bashir (2006). Khowar,
the Indo-Aryan language mentioned above, and its closest relative Kalasha, are
particularly interesting in this regard, as they may be part of an areal configu-
ration, also including non-Indo-Aryan languages in the Hindukush-Karakoram
region, where the semantic parameter of evidentiality to a varying extent has
been grammaticalized (Bashir 1988; 1996; 2013; 2003: 823; 2010). In another de-
gree work, Lubberger (2014) analyses a set of metarepresentation markers in
Indus Kohistani — an Indo-Aryan language spoken in the central parts of the
Hindukush-Karakoram region — of which at least two have a definite bearing on
evidentiality.
Based on previously, but severely limited, published research, Bashir also pre-
sents evidence for what she refers to as “robust inferential/indirective systems”
(2006) in several of the lesser-described Nuristani languages, as well as a special
past-tense form only found in one of the dialects of Burushaski, which imparts
an inferential-mirative meaning (2010: 14).
3 Evidentiality and tense–aspect differentiation
The first evidential sub-system in Palula to be discussed, is that of verbal cate-
gories. Seven main TMA categories can be identified in the language (Liljegren
2016: 247–263): four (Future, Present, Simple Past, Imperative) that are purely
morphological categories, and another three that are periphrastically formed by
the addition of auxiliaries (Past Imperfective, Perfect, Pluperfect). Palula is, like
most other languages of the surrounding region, verb-final, and most frequently
SOV. Verb morphology is suffixal, whether related to tense-aspect or agreement
marking, and auxiliaries occur subsequent to the main verb.
Evidentiality is not a primary category in this system. Instead, the use of Sim-
ple Past vis-à-vis Perfect in Palula narratives often entails a contrast between
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direct and indirect evidence with events in the past. This is for instance reflected
in the choice of verbal category when applying Dahl’s (1985) TMA question-
naire. The event described in ( 1) is the speaker’s eye-witness account, whereas
in  (2), it is what the speaker’s brother experienced and told the speaker prior
to the moment of speaking that is being described. In the first case, the Simple
Past (morphologically expressed with the perfective and ergative person/number
agreement) is used. In the second case, the Perfect category (morphologically ex-
pressed with the perfective and the present tense form of a ‘be’-auxiliary, both
agreeing in person/number with the O or S) is instead applied.
(1) Palula – Simple Past
tíi
3SG.REM.OBL
áa
INDF
báaṭ
stone
ucḥ-i
lift-CVB
ba
TOP
ǰhandra-í
snake-OBL
the
to
uṛíit-u
let.go.PFV-MSG
so
3.SG.REM.NOM
múṛ-u
die.PFV-MSG
[This happened to my brother, I saw it:]‘He took a stone and threw it at
the snake. It died.’ (PHL-TMAQ-NH:174–175)
(2) Palula – Perfect
tíi
3SG.REM.OBL
áa
INDF
báaṭ
stone
ucḥ-í
lift-CVB
ba
TOP
ǰhandra-í
snake-OBL
the
to
uṛíit-u
let.go.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
ta
SUB
so
3SG.REM.NOM
múṛ-u
die.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
[This happened to my brother, and he told me:]‘He took a stone and
threw it at the snake. It died.’ (PHL-TMAQ-NH:179–180)
The example in  (3) is from an interview, where the narrator tells how, a long
time ago, he went to his father-in-law who told him a story. Here, the tense is the
Simple Past. This can be compared with the corresponding Perfect forms used
in the lines of  (4), belonging to a story about a boy named Katamosh who was
told by his mother to go to his grandmother up in the high pastures. The latter is
obviously part of a non-witnessed event with numerous components of fiction,
such as animals acting and talking.
(3) Palula – Simple Past
áa
one
deés
day
táa
there.REM
ɡúum
go.PFV.MSG
ta,
SUB
máathe
1SG.DAT
qisá
story
th-íil-u
do-PFV-MSG
‘One day I went there, and [he] told me a story.’ (PHL-Hunter:009)
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(4) Palula – Perfect
tasíi
3SG.GEN
yéei
mother
taste
3SG.DAT
áak
INDF
ṭíki
bread.cake
th-íil-i
do-PFV-F
hín-i
be.PRS-F
kaṭamúš
Katamosh
ṭíki
bread.cake
ḍóok-a
back-OBL
pharé
along
ɡhaṇḍ-í
tie-CVB
sóon-a
pasture-OBL
dúši
toward
ɡúum
go.PFV.MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
‘His mother made a cake of bread for him. Katamosh tied the bread to his
back and set out to the high pastures.’ (PHL-Katamosh:009-010)
However, it should be noted that this “extended” use of the Perfect is only a
tendency, far from any obligatory marking of indirect evidence. It also seems
that some authors or narrators are more prone than others to use it. In another,
equally fantastic, story, an unnamed person in a distant past goes hunting, and
while sitting down to eat the cooked meat of a markhor, a ṭhaaṭáaku, a hairy and
frightening creature suddenly appears. Here, however, as can be seen in  (5), the
line of the narrative uses the Simple Past.
(5) Palula – Simple Past
anɡóor
fire
ǰeel-í
light-CVB
táa
there.REM
pačaá
cook.CVB
kh-ainií
eat-INF
široó
starting
th-íil-u
do-PFV-MSG
široó
starting
th-íil-u
do-PFV-MSG
ta
SUB
tíi
3SG.REM.OBL
maǰí
in
áa
INDF
ǰhaṭíl-u
hairy-MSG
ṭhaaṭáaku
ogre
yh-óol-u
come-PFV-MSG
‘When he had made a fire, he cooked the meat and started eating.
Meanwhile, a ṭhaaṭáaku suddenly appeared.’ (PHL-Thaataaku:004-005)
An even less predictable contrast is that between Present and Future, as in  (6)
and  (7), respectively. Both can be used with future-time reference. However, the
choice in this case does not necessarily have a bearing on evidentiality per se.
(6) Palula – Future
ma
1SG.NOM
nis
3SG.PROX.ACC
aáǰ
today
kh-úum
eat-1SG
ta
SUB
rhootašíi-a
morning-OBL
ba
TOP
kanáa
what
bh-úum
become-1SG
‘If I eat it today, what should I then do tomorrow?’
(PHL-HunterMonkey:005)
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(7) Palula – Present
uth-í
stand.up-CVB
maníit-u
say.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
ki
COMP
eé
o
lhéṇḍu
bald(M)
ɡóoi
where.from
yh-óol-u
come-PFV-MSG
ma
1SG.NOM
tu
2SG.NOM
kha-áan-u,
eat-PRS-MSG
muṣṭú
first
ma
1SG.NOM
thíi
2SG.GEN
ráat
blood
pil-áan-u
drink-PRS-MSG
théeba
then
ma
1SG.NOM
thíi
2SG.GEN
lhéṇḍ-i
bald-F
kakaríi
scalp
čap-áan-u
gnaw-PRS-MSG
‘I will eat you. First I will drink your blood, and then I will gnaw on your
bald scalp.’ (PHL-Katamosh:030–032)
When on the other hand two present-time referring utterances are being con-
trasted as in  (8) and  (9), there is a clearer correspondence between the use of
Present and direct evidence, on the one hand, and the use of Future and indirect
evidence, on the other.
(8) Palula – Present
faríd
Farid
teeṇíi
REFL
ɡhooṣṭ-á
house-OBL
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
‘Farid is at home [I was there and saw him].’ (PHL-20157027-elic:007)
(9) Palula – Future
faríd
Farid
teeṇíi
REFL
ɡhooṣṭ-á
house-OBL
hóons-a
be-3SG
‘Farid is at home [he is usually at this time].’ (PHL-20157027-elic:008)
4 Evidentiality and utterance-final mood markers
Palula has a closed set of markers that one way or another specify the relation-
ship between an utterance as a whole and the speaker and/or hearer, e.g. signal-
ing a polar question or a request. Almost exclusively, such mood markers occur
utterance-finally, i.e. in most cases following the finite verb. At least three of
those markers have functions related to, or partly related to, evidentiality.
The most frequent (in my corpus) of the three, thaní, is a quotative (Liljegren
2016: 267, 377–387). In Palula narratives, it usually marks — or closes — directly
quoted speech, as in  (10).
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(10) Palula – quotative
so
3MSG.NOM
ba
TOP
maidóon-a=wée
field-OBL=into
be
go.CVB
ba
TOP
áa
one
khur
foot
raál
High
the
do.CVB
ba
TOP
kar
around
kar
around
kar
around
gír-a
turn-3SG
koó
who
hín-ee
be.PRS-MPL.Q
yh-óoi
come-IMP.PL
thaní
qUOT
‘He was spinning around and around in the field, holding up one leg,
[and he was calling out, saying,]“Is there anyone here [brave enough]?
Come on!”’ (PHL-JangibazKhan:037–038)
However, it may occasionally extend into (non-uttered) reported thought, as
shown in  (11), here used along with a preposed ki-complementizer.
(11) Palula – quotative
ɡhrast-á
wolf-OBL
karáaṛ-a
leopard-OBL
asíi
1PL.GEN
xiaál
opinion
ki
COMP
ɡóo
maybe
mheer-íl-u
kill-PFV-MSG
heentá
CONDL
kh-óol-u
eat-PFV-MSG
thaní
qUOT
‘We thought that perhaps a leopard or a wolf had killed and eaten him.’
(PHL-GhaziSamad:011)
If an explicit PCU (perception-cognition-utterance) predicate precedes the com-
plement, the use of the quotative is more variable. In  (12), where the utterance
predicate ṭeekílu ‘called (out)’ is used, there is no closing thaní, while in  (13),
the quotative thaní is co-occurring with the preceding predicate of knowledge
acquisition, búda hína ‘(have) understood’.
(12) Palula – utterance without quotative
áak
INDF
šúma
parrot.OBL
ṭeek-íl-u
call-PFV-MSG
ée
o
kúṛi
woman
thíi
2SG.GEN
míiš-i
man-GEN
paaṇṭí
clothes
ṣ-éel-i
dress-PFV-F
hín-i
be.PRS-F
tu
2SG.NOM
míiš
man
ba
TOP
na
NEG
‘A parrot called out: “O woman, you have dressed like a man, but you are
not a man.’ (PHL-WiseMinister:012-013)
(13) Palula – utterance with PCU predicate and quotative
búd-a
understand.PFV-MPL
hín-a
be.PRS-MPL
ki
COMP
phaí
girl
wíi-a
water-OBL
ɡíi
go.PFV.FSG
thaní
qUOT
‘They understood that the girl must have thrown herself into the water.’
(PHL-ShepherdBoy:060)
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Another, highly grammaticalized, function of thaní is when it occurs post-
posed to a proper noun and carries the meaning ‘called, thus named’, referring
to the immediately preceding noun. An example is provided in  (14).
(14) Palula – ‘name’
miír
Mir
thaní
qUOT
áak
INDF
míiš
man
heens-íl-u
exist-PFV-MSG
de
PST
‘There was a man called Mir.’ (PHL-GhaziSamad:051)
Hearsay can be (but is not necessarily) marked with an utterance-final maní.
The reported content, preceding it, is in such cases often mythical or unexpected,
as in  (15).
(15) Palula – hearsay
dacḥ-áan-u
look-PRS-MSG
ta
SUB
eeteeṇ-ú=ee
such-MSG=CONJ
áak
INDF
šay
thing
yh-óol-u
come-PFV-MSG
maní
HSAY
maaxustán
evening
de
be.PST
maní
HSAY
áa
INDF
šay
thing
yh-óol-u
come-PFV-MSG
babár
furry.thing
búd-u
understand.PFV-MSG
ki
or
na
NEG
‘Then a creature appeared, it is said, in the evening, it is said, a furry one,
you know, don’t you.’ (PHL-AyanMir1:065)
However, the use of maní is not restricted to narrative discourse. It is also
used in everyday conversation, as in  (16), an excerpt from an online chat con-
versation. It should be noted that it is only the first of the two clauses that is
hearsay-marked.
(16) Palula – hearsay
asíi
1PL.GEN
atshareet-á
Ashret-OBL
bíiḍ-u
much-MSG
kir
snow
dít-u
fall.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
maní
HSAY
hiimeel-í
glacier-PL
bi
SEP
whéet-im
come.down.PFV-FPL
hín-i
be.PRS-F
‘[I have been told that] a lot of snow has fallen in our [village] Ashret,
and there have been avalanches as well.’ (PHL-CHN070320)
Finally, a third, and in the present corpus much more infrequently occurring
marker, ɡa, signals inferred, presumed or assumed knowledge, as in  (17).
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(17) Palula – assumption
anú
PROX.NOM.MSG
dhút-a
mouth-OBL
de
give.CVB
baaǰá
harmonium
bhanǰa-áan-a
beat-PRS-MPL
eetáai
from.there
aawaáz
sound
yh-áand-u
come-PRS-MSG
eh
oh
rueeleé
government.official.PL
hín-a
be.PRS-MPL
ɡa
ASS
rueeleé
government.official.PL
ba
TOP
aní
PROX
sarkaarí
official
sipaahi-aán
soldier-PL
hóons-an
exist-3PL
de
PST
‘I heard a sound like a harmonium being played. “Oh,” I thought, “These
must be government officials, such professional soldiers they are.”’
(PHL-Hunter:067-068)
5 Evidentiality and second-position discourse particles
Palula discourse markers are second-position clitics that specify the discourse
role of a preceding unit (often a noun phrase) in relation to adjacent units. A
secondary effect of some discourse markers is that they indicate how larger units
(e.g. clauses) are interrelated, especially when used in pairs, or when the same
marker is used repeatedly in two adjacent clauses. The latter use overlaps with
the function of conjunctions.
The particle xu is such a second-position clitic. It signals surprise, as in  (18), or
emphasis, occurring postposed to the first-position constituent that is thus being
focused. While it is often difficult to find good translation equivalents in English,
it is strikingly similar in meaning to the Swedish modal particles ju or visst.
(18) Palula – assumption
ée
o
míi
1SG.GEN
xudaáyaa
my.God
ni
3PL.PROX.NOM
xu
EMPH
ux-íi
camel-GEN
rhaíi
footprints
hín-i
be.PRS-F
‘O my God, it’s the footprints of a camel.’ (PHL-Hunter:061) [Swedish:
‘Men herregud, det är ju kamelspår!’]
Other members of the set of second-position discourse particles are: bi (sep-
aration marker, see 16 for an example), ba (switch-topic marker), ta (contrast
marker), ee (amplification marker). The extremely frequently occurring switch-
topic marker ba, is for instance used to make a contrast with an immediately
preceding subject explicit, as in  (19), but has a number of other functions, some
of them challenging to define exactly (Liljegren 2016: 419–425). (See 6 for another
example of the contrastive function.)
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(19) Palula – contrast
míi
1SG.GEN
ɡhoóṣṭ
house
lookúṛi
Lokuri [place]
hín-u,
be.PRS-MSG
iskuúl
school
ba
TOP
asíi
1PL.GEN
kaṇeeɡhaá
Kanegha [place]
hín-i
be.PRS-F
‘My house is in Lokuri, while our school is in Kanegha.’ (PHL-Our
school:004)
6 Origins and grammaticalization paths
As for the contrastive use of tense-aspect categories to signal indirect vs. direct
evidence, there is evidence of a similar-functioning differentiation in Old Indo-
Aryan, i.e. in the ancestral language (or a closely related language to that) of
Palula and other modern-day Indo-Aryan languages. In the system described by
the Indian grammarian Pāṇini, there were three categories with past-time ref-
erence: Aorist, Imperfect and Perfect. Of these three, the Perfect was used with
special reference to reported, less recent, events, that is excluding the speaker’s
direct witnessing the event reported, while the Imperfective had the same time
reference as the Perfect but implied that the speaker was indeed a direct witness.
The Aorist, which functioned as a more general past tense, was the only one of
the three that could refer to recent events (Cardona 2002: 235). Deshpande (1981:
62) summarizes, in the same vein, this three-way contrast as: a) [+past +recent
+/-seen] (Aorist), b) [+past -recent +seen] (Imperfective), and c) [+past -recent
-seen] (Perfect), thus making the presence or absence of a [seen] feature the min-
imal contrast between the latter two, a distinction that Bashir (2006) argues has
been passed on to some of the descendant languages, the two Chitral languages
Kalasha and Khowar in particular.
In Khowar, which is locally influential in the district where Palula is spoken,
and also is the second language of many Palula speakers, the distinction between
indirect evidence [+past -seen] and direct evidence [+past +seen] is upheld in the
tense-aspect system (which has retained forms that were lost in most other Indo-
Aryan languages), as can be seen in comparing  (20) with  (21). Here, the [-seen]
value of the Past Inferential is further specified with a birai (a past participle
of ‘become’ whose epistemic function has developed later) which adds a mira-
tive meaning to the reported event. The encoding of such evidentiality-related
differentiation, is non-optional in Khowar (Bashir 2007a: 221–222).
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(20) Khowar – Past Actual
hase
3SG.REM.NOM
boht-o
stone-OBL
ɡan-i
take-CVB
ayi-o
snake-OBL
ṭek-o
TOP-OBL
lak-it-ai
let.go-PST-3SG
hase
3SG.REM.NOM
o-br-it-ai
PST-die-PST-3SG
[This happened to my brother, I saw it:] ‘He took a stone and threw it at
the snake. It died.’ (KHW-TMAQ-AA:174-175)
(21) Khowar – Past Perfective Inferential
hase
3SG.REM.NOM
boht-o
stone-OBL
ɡan-i
take-CVB
ayi-o
snake-OBL
ṭek-o
TOP-OBL
lak-iru
let.go-PPTC
bir-ai
become.PST.INFER-3SG
hase
3SG.REM.NOM
birdu
die.PPTC
bir-ai
become. PST.INFER-3SG
[This happened to my brother, and he told me:] ‘He took a stone and
threw it at the snake. It died.’ (KHW-TMAQ-AA:179-180)
Very similar distinctions are being made in the Kalasha tense-aspect system.
For instance, two distinct past-time referring forms of ‘were’ are used. In  (22),
the past actual asini is used as the speaker points to the domestic animals as
witnessed entities in the real world. In  (23), the past inferential asta instead is
used, as a means for the narrator to portray the participants in the story as the
creations of fiction.
(22) Kalasha – Past Actual
tara
there.REM.SPC
as-ini
be.PST.ACT-3PL
ɡak
cow
tara
there.REM.SPC
ɡordok
donkey
hãš
horse
‘There were cows, donkeys and horses there.’ (Heegård Petersen 2015: 136)
(23) Kalasha – Past Perfective Inferential
ek
one
ɬawak
fox
ek
one
šara
markhor
malɡiri
friend
asta
be.PST.INFER.3
‘Once a fox and a markhor were friends.’ (Heegård Petersen 2015: 182)
Kalasha is not a common second language of Palula speakers. However, con-
siderable interaction apparently took place between the communities in the past,
and there is reason to believe that Kalasha, at least in part of what is now Palula-
speaking territory, is exerting substratal influence, as conversions from the tra-
ditional Kalasha religion often resulted in a gradual language shift from Kalasha
to one of the surrounding languages spoken by a Muslim majority population,
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Palula in those days being one of the main candidates (Cacopardo & Cacopardo
2001: 117–118; Decker 1992: 55–60).
Although the distinction in Palula also could have been inherited, it is equally
probable to have been areally influenced and/or reinforced. Apart from evidential-
ity-related distinctions in the verbal systems of Khowar and Kalasha, a few other
languages in the immediate region reflect similar contrasts in their TMA sys-
tems. There are for instance epistemic verb forms in regionally influential Persian
varieties (Perry 2000; Windfuhr & Perry 2009: 461). Bashir (2010: 14–15; 2007b:
839) also mentions the perfect in the Iranian language Wakhi as well as in Tajik
Persian as specifically correlated to indirect evidence. Another possible paral-
lel is the contrastive use of a proximate vs. a distal perfect in Pashai, another
Indo-Aryan language (or perhaps more correctly, group of related language va-
rieties), spoken across the border in northeastern Afghanistan (Lehr 2014: 295–
297). Perhaps this, in turn, is part of a considerably larger areal configuration in
Western and Central Asia, something that Dahl (1985: 152) is hinting at, when
he describes the extension of perfects into the realm of quotatives as an areal
phenomenon with an approximate geographical correlation with the former Ot-
toman Empire (including e.g. Kurdish and Turkish), but it goes without saying
that the secondary use of perfects for such functions has indeed been verified
cross-linguistically much farther afield (Aikhenvald 2004: 112).
As for the mood markers described in Section  4, they are to a varying extent
grammaticalized in Palula, which is reflected in the textual occurrence of these
markers (Table 5.1). It should be noted, however, that identical forms may occur
in other uses in the material.
Table 5.1: Text occurrences of thaní, maní and ɡa, and of forms related
to them. (In a text corpus consisting of 76 transcribed and annotated
Palula texts, mainly narrative.)
Utterance-final In other uses As other verb forms Total
thaní 117 51 109 277
maní 61 14 351 426
ɡa 20 117 - 137
The quotative marker thaní is the most frequent of the three. The relatively
frequent occurrence of the same form but in other uses is largely accounted for by
its post-nominal “naming” function, as shown in example  (14) above. It is highly
grammaticalized as a quotative, but its co-occurrence with a preposed (and “bor-
rowed”) ki-complementizer, on the one hand, and the alternative construction
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with ki altogether lacking an quote-final thaní, as in  (24), on the other hand,
points to an ongoing competition with the “new” Persian-derived ki-strategy
(further reinforced by the corresponding construction in Urdu), in which the
thaní-less construction most likely is winning out in the long run: …thaní (as
in 10) > ki...thaní (as in 11) > ki... A similar development has been observed in
neighbouring Kalasha with regard to the indigenous utterance-final ɡhõi and the
“imported” utterance-initial ki (Bashir 1988: 266–324).
(24) Palula – quotative
dun-áaṭ-u
think-AG-MSG
bh-íl-u
become-PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
ki
COMP
aní
3FSG.PROX.NOM
ba
TOP
kateeeṇ-í
what.kind-F
ǰuánd
life
‘He started thinking, “What a life!”’(PHL-Katamosh:057)
Formally, thaní is a converb form (or conjunctive participle) of the verb thané-
‘call, say’. In contemporary Palula, few other forms of that verb are in fact in
use, once more confirming the level of grammaticalization that this converb
has reached. Bashir (1996) found in a study of SAY-quotatives, and similarly de-
rived markers, that they are present in many of the region’s languages (and be-
yond), and argues for areal convergence. Examples of such markers include: In-
dus Kohistani (Indo-Aryan) karee (Lubberger 2014: 67–69); Kalasha (Indo-Aryan)
ɡhõi (Heegård Petersen 2015: 67); Khowar (Indo-Aryan) reé (Bashir 1996: 225–
235); Gawri (Indo-Aryan) är(o) (Baart 1999: 147–149); Dameli (Indo-Aryan) ɡani
(Perder 2013: 176–177); Gilgiti Shina (Indo-Aryan) theé (Radloff & Shakil 1998:
28); Balti (Sino-Tibetan) zer/zere (Bashir 1996: 270; Jones 2009: 64); and possibly
Burushaski (isolate) nusé(n) (Bashir 1996: 262), although a pre-posed ke is the
preferred marker of direct speech (Berger 1998: 193). While many of them are in-
deed grammaticalized forms of a verb with the meaning ‘say’, a number of them
are instead ultimately related to a ‘do’-verb; that is likely the case with Palula
thaní (cf. the- ‘do’), the corresponding markers in other Shina varieties, as well
as Indus Kohistani karee (< kar- ‘do’).
Dameli is another geographically close neighbour of Palula, spoken in the next
valley to the south. Here, too, the quotative, which is derived from a converb of
‘say’, is extended to predicates of cognition, as in  (25), and additionally is postpo-
sitioned to a noun phrase with the meaning ‘called, thus named’, as in  (26), just
like in Palula.
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(25) Dameli – quotative
mããtẽẽ
around
dacị-na
see-IPFV.3MSG
mãã-i
1SG.POSS-F
tukuri
basket
kii
who
ɡiɡ-een
take-PFV.3PL
ɡani
qUOT
‘He looks around, thinking, “Who took my basket?”’ (Perder 2013: 176)
(26) Dameli – ‘called’
aats-i
come-CVB
baloo
big
daaš
rock
ɡani
qUOT
ek
one
baaṭ
stone
daro
COP.INAN.IPFV.3
‘Having come there, there is a big stone called the great rock.’ (Perder
2013: 177)
The Palula hearsay marker maní, is of lower frequency in the text corpus, and
is possibly grammaticalized to a lesser extent than thaní. When it is used it is
often in order to emphasize the non-witnessed, and often questionable (in the
mind of the speaker), character of the particular event or situation thus marked,
rather than to signal just any instance of reported speech or hearsay. Note that
maní in  (27) only occurs after the second finite verb of this utterance, not after
the first.
(27) Palula – hearsay
eesé
REM
baačaá-ii
king-GEN
bóoš
twelve
zára
thousand.PL
kuṛíina
women.PL
heens-íl-im
live-PFV-FPL
de
PST
tasíi
3SG.GEN
áaṣṭ
eight
zára
thousand.PL
kuṇaak-á
child-PL
heens-íl-a
live-PFV-MPL
de
PST
maní
HSAY
‘This king had twelve thousand wives, and is said to have had eight
thousand children.’ (PHL-AboutAKing:007-008)
The marker maní is like thaní derived from a converb, in this case of the verb
mané- ‘speak, recite, say’. In the corpus, quite a number of other uses of this
verb occur, including a few instances of it as a non-grammaticalized converb,
entirely homophonous with the hearsay marker. An example of the latter is seen
in  (28), where maní heads a subordinate clause with a subsequence reading, thus
repeating the preceding lexical finite verb ‘said’ in its converb form ‘having said’,
simply corresponding to ‘then’ in English.
(28) Palula – maní as converb
íṇc-̣a
bear-OBL
maníit-u
say.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
ki
COMP
šóo
good.MSG
ba
TOP
tu
2SG.NOM
thulí
fattened
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wháat-u
come.down.PFV-MSG
heentá
CONDL
ma
1SG.NOM
tu
2SG.NOM
kh-úum
eat-1SG
eendáa
like.that
man-í
say-CVB
ba
TOP
iṇc̣
bear
áak
INDF
keeṇ-í
cave-OBL
šíiṭi
inside
the
to
ɡúum
go.PFV.MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
‘The bear said: “Good, if you come down fattened I will eat you.” Then [lit.
Having said that,] the bear went into a cave.’ (PHL-Katamosh:025-026)
Reportative markers with similar functions (and in many cases with a similar
history) have been noted for other languages in the region, e.g. Indus Kohistani
lee (Lubberger 2014: 22–23); Kati (Nuristani) mem (Strand 2016); Waigali (Nuris-
tani) -le (Degener 1998: 173–182); and Balti/Purik (Sino-Tibetan) -lo (Jones 2009:
57–62; Zemp 2013: 776–792).
In the example from Indus Kohistani in  (29), the speaker quotes one of her sons
speaking to her at the time when he had come home after the big earthquake in
2005. The reportative lee cliticizes to the finite verb in each of the two clauses.
(29) Indus Kohistani – reportative
iskul-ãĩ
school-GEN.F
kùṛ-muṛ
wall.FPL-ECHO
bazíthe=lee
go.PRS.PFV.MPL=HSAY
hãã
and
maasmá
child.PL
búṭ
all
báč
saved
hu-úthe=lee
become-PRS.PFV.MPL=HSAY
‘The walls of the school and stuff went down, but the children all
escaped.’ (Lubberger 2014: 26–27)
There are only a few, and in some cases rather dubious, instances of ɡa as an
utterance-final marker of inferentiality in the Palula corpus. It is most likely re-
lated to the homophonous indefinite-interrogative pronoun ɡa ‘what, any, what
kind of, any kind of’. Probably, it was first used in the utterance-final position as
a tag. The assumption here is that it is even less grammaticalized or established
than maní and remains somewhat varying in its application: as a request for con-
firmation, marking suspense or surprise, etc. The particle bo in Kohistani Shina,
see example in  (30), has similar semantics and distribution (Schmidt & Kohistani
2008: 204).
(30) Kohistani Shina – presumption
mi
my
qǽæs
guess
ǰo
some
kudí
where
múṭho
tree
khári
under
níiz-iǰ-aan-o
sleep-ABSP-is-3MSG
bo
ASS
‘I guess he must be asleep under a tree somewhere.’ (Schmidt & Kohistani
2008: 204)
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Careful elicitation (in  31), in which imaginary situations were described, con-
firms the emerging paradigmatic contrast ZERO vs. maní vs. ɡa as corresponding
to a) an event directly observed by the speaker, b) an event heard about but not
seen by the speaker c) an inference/assumption on the part of the speaker.
(31) Palula minimal contrastsː direct (a) vs. hearsay (b) vs. inference/assump-
tion (c)
a. kir
snow
dít-u
put.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
‘It has snowed.’ [directly observed] (PHL-20157027-elic:001)
b. kir
snow
dít-u
put.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
maní
HSAY
‘It has snowed.’ [not seen but heard from sb else]
(PHL-20157027-elic:002)
c. kir
snow
dít-u
put.PFV-MSG
hín-u
be.PRS-MSG
ɡa
INFER
‘It has snowed.’ [not directly observed but inferred from other
evidence, e.g. snow on somebody else’s boots]
(PHL-20157027-elic:003)
Interestingly, the same elicitation task resulted in a two-way differentiation in
neighbouring Khowar  (32).
(32) Khowar minimal contrastː direct (a) vs. hearsay (b)/assumption (c)
a. him
snow
arer
do.PST.3SG
/ him
snow
kor-i
do-CVB
šer
be.INAN.PRS.ACT
‘It has snowed.’ [directly observed] (KHW-20157027-elic:001)
b. him
snow
kardu
do.PPTC
bir-ai
become.PST.INFER-3SG
‘It has snowed.’ [not seen but heard from sb else]
(KHW-20157027-elic:002)
c. him
snow
kardu
do.PPTC
bir-ai
become.PST.INFER-3SG
‘It has snowed.’ [not directly observed but inferred from other
evidence, e.g. snow on somebody else’s boots]
(KHW-20157027-elic:003)
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The discourse particle xu is most likely a loan from Pashto. In Pashto, xo is used
as an emphatic particle (a second position clitic), with the approximate meaning
‘in fact’. In Pashto as well as in Palula xo/xu is homophonous, or alternatively
polysemous, with a clause-initial adversative conjunction ‘but’. The examples
in  (33) and  (34) illustrate the strikingly similar uses and clause positions of the
particle in the two languages.
(33) Palula – use of the particle xu
lo
3MSG.DIST.NOM
tu
2SG.NOM
keé
why
kh-óo
eat-3SG
lo
3MSG.DIST.NOM
xu
EMPH
thíi
2SG.GEN
bhróo
brother
atsharíit-u
Ashreti-MSG
thíi
2SG.GEN
qóom
tribe
‘Why would he eat you? He is your Ashreti brother and of your own
tribe.’ (PHL-GhaziSamad:019-020)
(34) Pashto – use of the particle xo
dā
this.DIR
xo
EMPH
zmā
1SG.GEN
wror
brother
day
be.PRS.3MSG
də
of
bel
other
saṛ-i
man-OBL
wror
brother
na
NEG
‘He is in fact my brother, not some other man’s brother.’ (David 2013: 375)
A parallel pattern of use has also been reported for xu in Dameli, another neigh-
bouring Indo-Aryan language (Perder 2013: 168), and similar sets of particles in
many languages in the region (especially to the west) have been described, for
instance in Nuristani Waigali by Degener (1998: 166–188) and Indo-Aryan Gawri
(Baart 1999: 159–166). Degener describes one of the particles in Waigali, be, as for
instance signalling empathy or some pre-understanding for a particular situation
that has arisen. In the example in  (35), there is also a component of reproach,
again difficult to find a good equivalent for in English but somewhat easier in
German (which like Swedish has its own set of modal particles); be frequently
corresponds to German doch, but in individual examples Degener also offers the
translations bloß, aber, bestimmt, also, nun. Some of those uses seem to overlap
with Palula xu, others with ba.
(35) Waigali – use of the particle be
yi
this
manaṣa
man
be
EMPT
ämeba
1PL.GEN
pũt
way
süräy
blocked
‘This man has apparently blocked our way. [Dieser Mann hat doch
unseren Weg versperrt!]’ (Degener 1998: 167)3
3No morpheme glossing is provided in the source, only a free translation of the sentence as a
whole. The glossing and the English translation are my own.
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There is evidence for a relatively high degree of “borrowability” across lan-
guages (Svärd 2014; Liljegren & Svärd 2017; Perder 2013: 183–184) with these
types of markers, pointing e.g. to a possible diachronic link between Waigali
be and Dameli/Palula ba. Probably, the use of such modal or discourse particles
is a relatively new strategy of signalling evidentiality and inferentiality as far as
Palula is concerned.
7 Summary
Evidential marking and evidentiality-related distinctions in Palula are, like in
many Indo-Aryan languages, observable in so-called scattered coding. It is not
forming an independent system, and it is often optional or comes about as a sec-
ondary effect of the coding of other main functions. It is most obviously reflected
in three separate parts of the language system, namely a) as a component, or
byproduct, of tense—aspect differentiation, b) by a subset of utterance-final mood
markers, and c) by (at least) one member of a set of second-position discourse
particles. In the case of tense—aspect, the choice between a simple past and a
perfect, when referring to a past-time event, is at least partly correlated with di-
rect (witnessed) vs. indirect (non-witnessed) evidence. A less stable correlation
for present-time reference can be observed between the use of present tense and
direct evidence, and between the use of future tense and indirect evidence. Three
mood markers have epistemic functions: thaní is a quotative; maní is a hearsay
(or possibly mirativity) marker; and ɡa indicates inferred or assumed knowledge,
although the latter seems only marginally grammaticalized. The second-position
discourse marker xu signals surprise or emphasis.
As for tense-aspect and its correlation with direct vs indirect evidence, a sim-
ilar contrast was already part of the ancestral Indo-Aryan tense system. There
are also plenty of modern-day parallels in the immediately surrounding region,
in which the use of a perfect serves as a marker of indirect evidence. That has for
instance been noted in regional varieties of Persian as well as in Iranian Wakhi
and Indo-Aryan Pashai. A highly grammaticalized evidentiality differentiation
that is an integral part of the tense-aspect system, has been described for neigh-
bouring Khowar and Kalasha, two languages that even in other respects have
exerted influence over Palula, in the first case mostly as a superstrate, and in the
latter as a substrate.
The mood markers—involving an emerging three-way paradigmatic contrast—
are to varying degree grammaticalized in Palula. Two of them are derived from
converbs meaning ‘to call, to say’ and ‘to speak, to say’, respectively, another
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tendency with numerous parallels in the wider region, and in several other Indo-
Aryan languages. The third, and possibly less grammaticalized, marker is proba-
bly derived from an indefinite-interrogative pronoun ‘what, any’.
The discourse particle xu is most likely a (relatively recent) loan from Pashto,
a language of wider communication, but has become part of a set of discourse
particles that seem to be particularly important and extensive in a subareally de-
fined group of languages in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderland to which Palula
belongs.
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Abbreviations
ABSP ablative-superessive
ACT actual
AG agentive
ASS assumption
CONDL conditional (low)
CONJ conjunction
DIR direct
ECHO echo formation
EMPH emphasis
EMPT emphathy
HSAY hearsay
INAN inanimate
INFER inferential
PPTC past participial
REM remote
SEP separative
SPC specific
SUB subordinator
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Chapter 6
On the existence of egophoricity across
clause types in Totoró Namtrik
Geny Gonzales Castaño
Laboratoire Dynamique du Langage, Université Lumière Lyon
The Barbacoan languages are known for having egophoricity systems (Dickinson
2000, Curnow 2002, Curnow & Liddicoat 1998), which exhibit a verbal marking
pattern in which “speaker subjects in statements are marked the same way as ad-
dressee subjects in questions” (Curnow 2002: 614). Nevertheless, the existence of
such a pattern in Namtrik had not been recognized. A recent paper by Norcliffe
(2018) claims that in the Guambianovariety of Namtrik “the verb marking diverges
from what might be considered canonical egophoricity marking, since it does not
occur when the subject is second person in questions” (Norcliffe 2018). The current
paper presents novel data from the highly endangered variety of Totoró Namtrik
and argues that this variety possesses a set of verbal suffixes exhibiting the cross-
linguistically recurrent pattern of an egophoricity distribution. The goal of this
paper is to show that although Namtrik’s egophoricity system is similar to the sys-
tems in other languages, it was not analyzed as a fully fleged egophoricity system
in the past because the egophoricity suffixes are not always easily recognizable
in interrogative clauses due to morphosyntactic and phonological processes. Ad-
ditionally, this paper shows that Namtrik has an “undergoer” egophoric marker
which exhibits a pattern of egophoricity distribution, shifting from speaker to ad-
dressee perspective in interrogatives.
1 Introduction
Namtrik, also known as Guambiano, is a Barbacoan language (Curnow & Liddi-
coat 1998) spoken in the Colombian Andes. Traditionally, Namtrik speakers live
in four so-called resguardos (settlements recognized by the Colombian State, with
Geny Gonzales Castaño. 2020. On the existence of egophoricity across clause types
in Totoró Namtrik. In Henrik Bergqvist & Seppo Kittilä (eds.), Evidentiality, egophori-
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territorial autonomy and ruled by traditional authorities named Cabildo): Guam-
bia, Ambaló, Quizgó and Totoró. These settlements are situated in two towns,
Silvia and Totoró, located in the department of Cauca, in the Southwest of the
country. Currently most researchers consider Totoró and Guambiano to be two
dialects of the same language (Curnow & Liddicoat 1998), which the speakers
refer to as Namtrik, or Namuy Wam ‘our sound’ (Gonzales Castaño 2013).
This paper will focus on a highly endangered variety of Namtrik, spoken in
the community of Totoró. According to a census conducted by the authorities of
the community in 2013, there are 76 native speakers (approximately 1% of a total
population of 7023 people), who are all over 50 years in age (Gonzales Castaño
2013: 11). In Totoró the use of Spanish has displaced Namtrik in all daily interac-
tions and there are now two generations of monolingual Spanish speakers. There
is no intergenerational transmission of the language. Namtrik in Totoró is clearly
more endangered than the Guambiano dialect in Guambia, which numbers about
8000–9000 speakers (Adelaar 1991: 66).
The data presented in this paper, beside a few examples constructed in elicita-
tion, consists mostly of naturally-occurring examples. This data comes from two
sources. The first is a lexicon collected between 2006 and 2008 within the frame
of workshops on morphosyntax of Namtrik for community teachers and Namtrik
speakers, which were directed by Tulio Rojas Curieux and Beatriz Vasquez. One
of the results of this work was a lexicon (382 words and 448 sentences) edited
and published in 2009 as Léxico de la lengua Namtrik de Totoró (Rojas Curieux
et al. 2009). The other source of this data is a video and audio corpus, consist-
ing of ten hours of natural speech data and additional elicitation data, collected
between 2015 and 2017, in the framework of the project Documentation and De-
scription of Namtrik, an endangered language of the Colombian Andes founded by
HRELP-SOAS.1
The Barbacoan languages are known for their egophoricity systems (Dickin-
son 2000; Curnow 2002; Curnow & Liddicoat 1998; Floyd 2018), which “employ
special verb forms […] where the subject (and/or another privileged argument
role) is first person in declaratives or second person in interrogatives” (San Roque
et al. 2018). Available grammatical sketches based on the Namtrik varieties of
Guambiano and Totoró postulate the existence of a subject agreement marking
system, which distinguishes between first person ‘locutor’ singular and plural
and second and third person ‘non locutor’ (Pabón 1989; Triviño Garzón 1989;
Vásquez de Ruiz 1987; Vásquez de Ruiz 1988).
1The data presented in this paper is available at the Endangered Languages Archive at SOAS
University of London: https://elar.soas.ac.uk/Collection/MPI1012401.
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According to Vásquez de Ruiz (Vásquez de Ruiz 1987; Vásquez de Ruiz 1988) and
Triviño Garzón (1989) the Guambiano variety of Namtrik presents an agreement
verbal marking system distinguishing between a speaker singular subject marker
-(a)r, a speaker plural subject marker -er and a non-speaker marker, singular and
plural -(a)n. In the case of the Totoró variety, besides a different speaker sin-
gular subject marker -(o)r, Pabón (1989) proposes the same forms for the other
egophoricity markers. In these previous descriptions of Namtrik (Pabón 1989;
Triviño Garzón 1989; Vásquez de Ruiz 1987; Vásquez de Ruiz 1988), there is no
information available about the behavior of egophoricity markers in questions;
nevertheless the data presented show clearly that declaratives in Namtrik follow
the expected pattern of an egophoricity system.
The existence of an egophoricity system in Namtrik was not argued for until
a recent paper by Norcliffe (2018), which is based on the Namtrik variety from
Guambia. Norcliffe (2018) notes, however, that while declaratives in Guambiano
present the expected egophoricity pattern, the egophoricity markers do not ap-
pear in interrogatives. Nevertheless “layers of egophoric or egophoric-like mark-
ing are visible in Guambiano’s grammar” (Norcliffe 2018), in Guambiano the verb
marking pattern “does not exhibit the canonic egophoric pattern, since the ego-
phoric markers do not appear in questions” (Norcliffe 2018).
The first goal of this paper is to show that the Totoró variety of Namtrik (TTK)
possesses an egophoricity verbal marking pattern across clause types which “dis-
tinguishes speakers from non-speakers in declaratives, and addressees from non-
addressees in interrogatives” (Creissels 2008: 1); however, some morphophono-
logical processes make it occasionally difficult to recognize this pattern in inter-
rogative clauses. A second goal is to demonstrate that Namtrik in Totoró has an
“experiencer” marker, which exhibits an egophoricity distribution, shifting from
speaker to addressee perspective in interrogatives. Although I will show some
usage patterns of the egophoricity markers, the semantic analysis falls outside
the scope of this paper.
This paper gives a first account of the egophoricity system in TTK, beginning
with a discussion on the morphophonological processes which make it difficult to
recognize egophoricity markers in interrogatives. It then focuses on the descrip-
tion of the general usage pattern of egophoricity markers across clause types.
And it concludes with the description of the use of the experiencer egophoric
marker -t and the distribution of this marker in question predicate constructions.
167
Geny Gonzales Castaño
2 Morphophonological processes affecting egophoricity
markers in Totoró Namtrik
Namtrik has a variety of morphophonological processes that occur at morpheme
boundaries, which have not been fully argued for in previous descriptions. Un-
derstanding these processes is crucial for not only the description of the egopho-
ricity system but also the description of Namtrik’s grammar in general.
In TTK, there are two different morphophonological processes which make
the presence of egophoricity markers in interrogative clauses unrecognizable:
vowel deletion and consonant deletion.
Writing about the egophoricity system in Guambiano, Norcliffe (2018) pro-
poses the existence of a set of verbs that present an alternation correlated with
the existence of a vestigial egophoricity contrast in Guambiano, which show
palatalized consonant forms in ego environments. In this section it will be ar-
gued that this alternation is not directly correlated with Namtrik’s egophoricity
system but with morphophonological processes.
2.1 Vowel deletion
The Totoró variety of Namtrik (TTK) has two egophoric suffixes: singular -or2
and plural -er, and one non-egophoric suffix: -an, as is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Egophoricity markers in Totoró Namtrik
SG PL
EGO -or/-ar -er
NON EGO -an
2The egophoric marker -ar which has been reported in Guambiano Namtrik is also attested in
the Totoró variety in very few examples in the data. This egophoric marker has very restricted
uses, occurring only in constructions with auxiliary verbs in declarative clauses, as is shown
in example (i). The egophoric marker -ar is not attested in interrogative clauses. For these
reasons it falls outside the scope of this paper.
(i) Totoró Namtrik (LEX1/118)
ye
potato
ma-ap
eat-DUR
wa-ar
sit.SG-EGO.SG
‘I’m eating potatoes.’
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Table 6.2: Egophoricity markers on verb stems ending in consonants
VERB V-EGO.SG V-EGO.PL V-NON.EGO
par- ‘cut’ par-or par-er par-an
trup- ‘lose’ trup-or trup-er trup-an
nen- ‘cook’ nen-or nen-er nen-an
kuakl- ‘boil’ kuakl-or kuakl-er kuakl-an
kutr- ‘wake up’ kutr-or kutr-er kutr-an
The egophoricity markers are fully visible when they follow a verb stem end-
ing in a consonant, as shown in the Table 6.2, which presents verb stems ending
in a consonant, hosting the egophoric markers singular -or and plural -er and
the non-egophoric marker -an.
In previous descriptions of Namtrik’s verbal morphology (Pabón 1989; Triviño
Garzón 1989; Vásquez de Ruiz 1987, 1988; Norcliffe 2018), the existence of allo-
morphs of the egophoricity markers has been postulated. The egophoric singular
marker has two realizations -ar and -r (-or and -r in the case of Totoró) and the
non-egophoric marker has the realizations -an and -n. However, the phonolog-
ical context determining these realizations has not been clearly identified, with
the vowel of the suffix described as sometimes being absent “depending on the
value of the final vowel of the verb stem” (Norcliffe 2018).
Table 6.3: Egophoricity markers on verb stems ending in vowels
VERB V-EGO.SG V-EGO.PL V-NON.EGO
ña- ‘spin’ ñar ñer ñan
ña-or ña-er ña-an
spin-EGO.SG spin-EGO.PL spin-NON.EGO
kɨ- ‘be’ kor ker kɨn
kɨ-or kɨ-er kɨ-an
be-EGO.SG be-EGO.PL be-EGO.PL
tso- ‘lie.SG’ tsor – tson
tso-or tso-an
lay-EGO.SG lay-NON.EGO
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Table 6.3 shows examples of the TTK egophoric singular marker -or, the ego-
phoric plural marker -er and the non-egophoric marker -an, following verb stems
ending in vowels. Examples in Table 6.3 show that in all the cases either the fi-
nal vowel of the verb stems or the initial vowel of the egophoricity markers is
absent. The purpose of this section is to clarify the phonological conditioning of
this process of deletion.
Although in TTK it is possible to find sequences of two vowels within lexical
stems or suffixes, the language puts constraints on vowel sequences at morpho-
logical boundaries. When a stem or a suffix ends in a vowel and it is followed by
a suffix beginning in a vowel, one of the two vowels in this sequence is elided.
The identity of the elided vowel does not depend upon the position of the vowels
in the sequence, but on the particular combination of vowels. Table 6.4 shows the
combinations attested in the corpus and the results of vowel elision, as well as
an example for each pattern.
These patterns of vowel elision may be summarized in the rule illustrated in
Figure 1, which also shows that there exists a vowel hierarchy in TTK with re-
spect to this morphophonological process. In this hierarchy the vowels /i/, /e/,
/o/ and/u/ are stronger than the high central vowel, which is stronger than the
vowel /a/.
1. Hierarchy of elision in vowels coalescence
i
e
o > ɨ > a
u
The process of vowel elision was identified in TTK by Pabón (1989). Pabón
proposes that TTK puts constraints on the combination of high vowels and high
or middle high vowels (1989: 16). Nevertheless, the constraints on the vowel se-
quences at morphological boundaries do not concern only these combinations of
vowels, as shown in the Table 6.4. This is a regular and widespread phonological
process in the language and does not solely affect the egophoricity markers.
As noted above, the process of vowel elision is found with other suffixes of the
form -V(C) or -C(V) as well as the egophoric and non-egophoric markers. Every
morpheme ending or beginning with a vowel can lose its last phoneme, as is the
case of the vowel /ɨ/ in the morpheme -mɨ ‘NEG’ in coalition with the morpheme
-elɨ ‘NMZ.PL’ in example (1), or its first phoneme, as example (2) shows in the
case of the vowel /e/ in the morpheme -elɨ ‘NMZ.PL’ affixed to the noun nosrka-
‘brother’.
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Table 6.4: Possible combinations of phonemic vowels
attested combinations outcome example
ɨo o kor
kɨ-or
COP-EGO.SG
oɨ o tson
tso-an
lie.SG-NON.EGO
ao o ñor
ña-or
spin-EGO.SG
oa o pon
po-an
arrive-NON.EGO
ua u atrun
atru-an
come.SG-NON.EGO
ui u llusruk
llusru-ik
spill-NMZ.SG
ɨa ɨ kɨmɨn
kɨ-mɨ-an
COP-NEG-NON.EGO
ia i kip
ki-ap
sleep-DUR
ea e kosrep
kosre-ap
teach-DUR
ɨi i yalik
jalɨ-ik
black-NMZ.SG
ɨe e ker
kɨ-er
COP-EGO.PL
ae a nosrkalɨ
nosrka-elɨ
brother-NMZ.PL
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(1) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_042/227)
mamelɨ
ma-mɨ-elɨ
eat-NEG-NMZ.PL
‘those that have not been eaten’
(2) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_056/58)
nosrkalɨ
nosrka-elɨ
brother-NMZ.PL
‘brothers’
This process makes some morphemes unrecognizable in certain phonological
contexts. This is the case of the imperative second person singular marker -ɨ
which is visible when attached to a verb stem ending in consonant, as shown
in examples (3) and (4), but fully deleted following a vowel ending verb stem as
shown in (5).
(3) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_122/13, elic)
ñi
2
kilka-wan
notebook-DAT
isɨk-ɨ
store-IMP.SG
‘Store your notebook!’
(4) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_036/9)
yusrɨ
yu-srɨ
LOC-DIR
amɨ
amp-ɨ
go.PL-IMP.SG
‘You come here!’
(5) Totoró Namtrik (elic)
kosro
kosro-ɨ
stand.up-IMP.SG
‘Stand up!’
The only sequence which has the vowel /a/ as outcome of the phonological
process of vowel deletion is the sequence /ae/. The vowel /a/ is the “weakest”
one in the hierarchy which determines this process in TTK. This is important to
keep in mind for the description of egophoricity system in TTK; since the non-
egophoric suffix -an begins with /a/ and is often affected by the process of vowel
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elision, which makes it often difficult to recognize, especially in interrogative
clauses. As we will see later, in Namtrik, the egophoricity markers lose their final
consonant in interrogative clauses, so the non-egophoric suffix -an suffers a total
deletion in questions following a vowel-final verb stem. This is similar to the
deletion of the imperative second person singular marker -ɨ in this phonological
context, as shown in example (5).
2.2 Consonant deletion of the egophoricity markers in interrogative
clauses
Questions in TTK are marked by a rising intonation, a high pitch on the last
syllable of the clause and the deletion of the final consonant of the egophoric and
non-egophoric suffixes or, less frequently, the replacement of the final consonant
by a glottal stop /ʔ/. The following set of examples shows two sentences using -an
— one declarative and one interrogative – in similar kinds of predicate structure
and with the same verb stem.
In the second example of each set, it can be seen that the final consonant in
the non-egophoric marker -an, following verb stems ending in consonant — pen-
‘fall’ in (6b) and pasr- ‘stand.SG’ in (7b) — is retained in the surface form of the
interrogative clauses.
(6) a. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_052/325)
/unɨʧik
unɨ-chik
child-DIM
penan/
pen-an
fall-NON.EGO
‘a boy fell’
b. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_483/057)
chu
chu
where
pen-a
pen-an
fall-NON.EGO
‘Where did it fall?’
(7) a. Totoró Namtrik (elic)
/ju
yu
LOC
paʂan/
pasr-an
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘It is here.’
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b. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_058/112)
chine
chi-ne
Q-3
marɨp
ma-rɨp
do-DUR
pasr-a
pasr-an
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘What is she doing?’
Although it is possible to recognize the non-egophoric marker -an in interrog-
ative clauses when it follows a verb ending in a consonant, when it follows a
vowel-final verb it is completely omitted, as is illustrated in the following set of
examples. The examples (8) and (9) (a declarative and an interrogative clause),
show the non-egophoric marker -an hosted by the copula kɨ-. In example (9) the
surface form of the verb seems to have a bare stem form, without any verbal
marker. However, the absence of the non-egophoric marker is explained by the
phonological processes of deletion of vowels in coalescence and the deletion of
the final consonant of the egophoricity markers in interrogative clauses.
(8) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_034/64)
ɨnɨ
ɨ-nɨ
DIST-3
tɨwei
tɨwei
just
kɨn
kɨ-an
COP-NON.EGO
‘It is just that.’
(9) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_058/124)
ɨnɨ
ɨ-nɨ
DIST-3
tɨwei
tɨwei
only
kɨ
kɨ-an
COP-NON.EGO
‘Is it only that?’
2.3 Deletion of the non-egophoricity marker in interrogative clauses
As is claimed by San Roque et al. (2018), writing about interrogativity in eviden-
tial and egophoricity markers, a formal asymmetry with distinct interrogative
morphemes or constructions is attested in several unrelated languages. Similarly
in TTK there are two different question constructions, one for interrogatives in-
volving third person subjects and another for interrogatives involving first and
second person subjects.
Aside from the deletion of the final consonant of the non-egophoric marker
and the rising intonation, the predicate question construction involving third per-
son subjects has the same morphological and syntactic structure as the declar-
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ative predicate construction, as is shown in the following set of examples. Ex-
amples (10) and (11) show an interrogative and a declarative clause with similar
kinds of predicate structure and the same verb stem.3
(10) a. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_059/179)
kuaklap
kuakl-ap
boil-DUR
pasra
pasr-an
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘Is it boiling?’
b. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_083/91, elic)
pi=pe
water=PD
mani
now
[kuakl-ap
boil-DUR
pasr-an]
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘The water is boiling.’
(11) a. Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_059/43)
karopik
governor
kucha
too
atru
come.SG-NON.EGO
‘Is also the governor coming?’
b. Totoró Namtrik (LEX1/104)
wasri
wasri
sparrowhawk
atrun
atru-an
come.SG-NON.EGO
‘The sparrowhawk comes.’
The question predicate construction involving first and second person subjects
is a complex predicate construction consisting of a main verb stem and an oblig-
atory copula auxiliary kɨ-, as is shown in example (12)–(14) (see also 34 and 41).
First and second person questions are marked additionally by the deletion of the
final consonant of the non-egophoric marker and rising intonation (cf. example
14).
(12) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_031/94)
wasrchikyupe
wasr-chik-yu=pe
bag-DIM-LOC=PD
chinɨ
chi-nɨ
Q-3
wai
wai
put
ko
kɨ-or
COP-EGO.SG
‘What did you drop in the bag?’
3In the examples below, square brackets denote a complex predicate construction.
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(13) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_031/110)
chinetɨ
chi-ne-tɨ
Q-3-REST
sro
sro
carry
amtru
amtru
come.PL
ke
kɨ-er
COP-EGO.PL
‘What did they bring?’
(14) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_045/140)
chu
chu
where
pasramkɨ
pasr-am=kɨ-an
stand.SG-IRR=COP-NON.EGO
chi?
chi
Q
‘Where shall I put this?’
In questions involving second person subjects and first person plural subjects,
the egophoric suffixes -or and -er are still recognizable in the surface form of
questions, since the vowels /o/ and /e/ are not affected by the process of vowel
deletion as illustrated in (12) and (13). However the non-egophoric marker -an
is not visible in the surface form of the interrogative clauses involving a first
person singular subject. Nevertheless, as we already mentioned, the omission of
the non-egophoric marker in interrogatives is not related directly to the grammar
of the egophoricity system but to the morphophonological processes of vowel
deletion and the deletion of the final consonant of the egophoricity markers in
interrogative clauses.
3 Verb alternation in verb stems ending in palatal,
alveolar and dental consonants
Before describing the usage pattern of egophoricity markers across clause types
in TTK, there is a final point to explore regarding morphophonological processes
and their relationship with the egophoricity system. In the description of the mor-
phophonology of the Guambiano variety of Namtrik, Vásquez de Ruiz (1987: 58)
claims the existence of a set of verbs which alternate between two verb stem
forms, one ending in a palatal consonant and the other in a dental-alveolar con-
sonant. Recently Norcliffe (2018) proposed that this alternation is correlated with
the existence of a vestigial egophoricity contrast in Guambiano. This set of verbs
would show palatalized consonant forms in ego environments.
Table 6.5 shows examples of verb stems ending in palato-alveolar consonants
hosting suffixes beginning in a vowel: the egophoric markers singular -or and
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plural -er, the non-egophoric marker -an, the durative morpheme (-ip/-ɨp) and
the verb nominalizer -ap.4
Table 6.5: Verb alternant in verb stems ending in palatal and alveolar
consonants
VERB V-EGO.SG V-EGO.PL V-NON.EGO V-DUR V-NMZ
pen- ‘fall’ peñ-or peñ-er pen-an peñ-ɨp
kish- ‘cry’ kish-or kish-er kis-an kish-ɨp
un- ‘walk.SG’ uñ-or — un-an uñ-ɨp
amɨn- ‘walk.PL’ – amɨn-er amɨn-an amɨñ-ɨp-
t- ‘say’ ch-or ch-er t-an ch-ip
muts- ‘drink,
suck, kiss’
muts-or muts-er muts-an muts-ɨp much-ap
kits- ‘grind’ kits-or kits-an kits-an kits-ɨp kich-ap
lall- ‘reap’ lall-or lall-an lall-er lall-ɨp
lusr- ‘build’ lusr-or lus-an lus-er lusr-ɨp
As is shown in the examples in Table 6.5, when the verbs end in /t/, /ɳ/ and
/ʃ/, the final consonant of the verb stem is realized more alveolar: V (C palato-
alveolar or alveolar#) _ a/ +alveolar. If the verb ends in a palato-alveolar affricate
/ʧ/ or an alveolar affricate /ʦ/ the verb alternation is realized only when it is
hosting the nominalizer -ap.
Furthermore, when the verbs are followed by a suffix beginning with a conso-
nant, the alternation is no longer observed, even in ego environments, since it is
caused by the first vowel of the suffix following the verb stem, as is shown in the
following sets of examples. Examples (15a)-(15c) and (16a)-(16c) show the verbs
pen- ‘fall’ and kish- ‘cry’ followed by the negation marker -mɨ and the egophori-
city markers. The above analysis suggests that this alternation is not correlated
with the egophoricity system but with a morphophonological process.
(15) pen- ‘fall’
a. penmor
pen-mɨ-or
fall-NEG-EGO.SG
‘I don’t fall.’
4When the verb stem ends in the consonants, l, ll, n, ñ, ch, and r , the difference between the
durative (-ip/-ɨp) and the verbal nominalizer -ap is neutralized, and the morpheme -ɨp fulfills
both functions.
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b. penmer
pen-mɨ-er
fall-NEG-EGO.PL
‘We don’t fall.’
c. penmɨn
pen-mɨ-an
fall-NEG-NON.EGO.PL
’S/he doesn’t fall.’
(16) kish- ‘cry’
a. kishmor
kish-mɨ-or
cry-NEG-EGO.SG
‘I don’t cry.’
b. kishmer
kish-mɨ-er
cry-NEG-EGO.PL
‘We don’t cry.’
c. kishmɨn
kish-mɨ-an
cry-NEG-NON.EGO.PL
’S/he doesn’t cry.’
4 The general usage pattern of egophoricity markers in
Totoró Namtrik
Up to this point I have discussed the morphosyntactic and phonological pro-
cesses which often make the presence of egophoricity markers in interrogative
Table 6.6: The general usage pattern of egophoricity markers in Awa
Pit (Curnow 2002)
Person Declarative form Interrogative form
1 -s -y
2 -y -s
3 -y -y
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clauses unrecognizable. These processes are mainly of two types: elision of vow-
els through vowel coalescence and consonant deletion in egophoricity suffixes
in interrogative clauses. This section is dedicated to the discussion of the usage
of egophoricity systems across clause types in TTK.
As noted above, egophoricity is canonically defined as a morphological cate-
gory which marks speaker subjects in statements and addressee subjects in ques-
tions in the same way. Awa Pit, another Barbacoan language, shows a prototyp-
ical egophoricity system (Curnow 2002: 613), as is shown in Table 6.6 and in
the following sets of examples of declarative clauses (17a)-(17c) and interrogative
clauses (18a)-(18c).Comparing the two sets of examples, it is observed that the
declarative clause involving a first person subject (17a) is marked in the same
way, with the egophoric marker -s, as the second person subject interrogative
clause (18b). These examples also show that in Awa Pit interrogatives involving
first person subjects (18a), are marked in the same way, with the non-egophoric
marker -y, as the declarative clauses involving second person subjects (17b).
(17) Declaratives in Awa Pit (Curnow 2002: 613)
a. (na=na)
(1S.(NOM)=TOP)
pala
plantain
ku-mtu-s
eat-IMPF-EGO
‘I am eating plantains.’
b. (nu=na)
(2S.(NOM)=TOP)
pala
plantain
ku-mtu-y
eat-IMPF-N.EGO
‘You are eating plantains.’
c. (us=na)
(3S.(NOM)=TOP)
atal
chicken
ayna-mtu-y
cook-IMPF-N.EGO
He/she is cooking chicken.’
(18) Interrogatives in Awa Pit (Curnow 2002: 613, 614)
a. min=ta=ma
who=ACC=INT
ashap-tu-y?
annoy-IMPF-N.EGO
‘Whom am I annoying?’
b. shi=ma
what=INT
ki-mtu-s?
do-IMPF-EGO
‘What are you doing?’
c. min=ta-s
where=LOC-ABL
a-mtu-y?
come-IMPF-N.EGO
’Where is he coming from?’
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Table 6.7 show the general usage pattern of egophoricity markers in TTK. Al-
though it is similar to the Awa Pit system it also presents some differences. The
TTK egophoric system has a contrast in the egophoric suffixes between singular
-or and plural -er which does not exist in the non-egophoric suffix -an and which
is not observed in the other Barbacoan languages.
Furthermore, TTK’s system is not a fully symmetrical egophoricity system,
since, as I already mentioned, there is a formal asymmetry with distinct interrog-
ative constructions. TTK has two different predicate interrogative constructions,
one for first and second person and another one for third person. In interrogatives
involving first and second person subjects there is an obligatory copula auxiliary
kɨ which does not appear in interrogatives involving third person subjects.
Table 6.7: The general usage pattern of egophoricity markers in Totoró
Namtrik
Person & Number Declarative Interrogative
1SG -or kɨ-a(n)
2SG -an kɨ-o(r)
3SG -an -a(n)
1PL -er kɨ-a(n)
2PL -an kɨ-e(r)
3PL -an -a(n)
4.1 Usage pattern of egophoricity markers in declaratives
TTK has two main kinds of predicate constructions: simple and complex predi-
cate constructions. Simple predicate constructions, whose morphological struc-
ture is shown in Figure 2, are formed by a single verbal stem suffixed with the po-
larity marker, egophoricity markers and/or modal epistemic markers, as shown
in examples (19) and (20).
2. Morphological structure of simple predicate constructions
V1(-NEG)(-EGO.EXP)-(EGO/NON.EGO)
(19) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_012/32)
ichente
so
na=pe
1=PD
nam-or
get.angry-EGO.SG
‘Whom am I annoying?’
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(20) Namtrik Totoró (Rojas Curieux et al. 2009: 29)
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
ishukpe
ishuk=pe
women=PD
kumarmɨn
kumar-mɨ-an
sing-NEG-NON.EGO
‘My wife didn’t sing.’
In TTK, simple predicate constructions do not carry aspectual morphology
and the aspectual interpretation depends on the Aktionsart of the verb. While
activities are interpreted as perfective past (21), states are interpreted as simple
present (22).
(21) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_005/545)
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
noshkai
noshkai
son
yautomai
yauto-mai
Popayán-DIR
yan
ya-an
go.SG-NON.EGO
‘My son went to Popayán.’
(22) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_083/10, elic)
an=pe
money=PD
mesa-yu
table-LOC
war-an
lain.down.PL-NON.EGO
‘The money is on the table.’
Namtrik also has a wide range of complex predicate constructions which vary
widely in their morphosyntactic structure and the semantic relationships be-
tween the verbs comprising the complex predicates. Figure 2 shows the minimal
morphological structure of a complex predicate in TTK. Although V2 and V1 can
be inflected with verbal morphology markers in complex predicates, there is a
clear split between the kinds of markers that can be hosted by each one of the
verbs in the complex predicate.
As is shown in the examples (23)–(25), the verb in V1 position can host the
polarity marker, egophoricity markers and/or modal epistemic markers, while
the verb in position V2 presents a non-finite, which can be inflected with the
morpheme of prospective aspect (-tr/-ch/-ntr) PROS, the verbal nominalizers -ik
‘NMZ.SG’ and -elɨ ‘NMZ.PL’, and the morpheme of durative aspect (-ap/-ip/-ɨp).
3. Morphological structure of complex predicates V2V1
V2(-PROS)(-DUR)(-NMZ.SG/-NMZ.PL) V1(-NEG)(EGO EXP)(-EGO.SG/-EGO.PL)
(23) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_036/39)
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
kekpe
kek=pe
husband=PD
[kuallip
kuall-ip
work-DUR
pasran]
pasr-an
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘My husband went to work.’
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(24) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_034/73)
na
na
1
[isupik
isu-ap-ik
think-DUR-NMZ.SG
war]
wa-or
sit.SG-EGO.SG
‘I think.’
(25) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_059/154)
yu
yu
LOC
misak
misak
people
inchape
incha=pe
so
chineken
chineken
nothing
[pailantra
paila-ntr-ap
dance-PROS-DUR
amɨn]
amp-mɨ-an
go.PL-NEG-NON.EGO
‘So, you guys aren’t going to dance.’
Although any verb of the language can fill the position in complex predicates
V2, the position V1 can only be filled by a restricted set of verbs, which are shown
in Table 6.8. In complex predicates the morphological structure of V2 and the kind
of auxiliary determine the modal and aspectual interpretation of the predicates.
The complexity of the predicate constructions in TTK falls out of the scope of
this paper, nevertheless it is important to keep in mind for the description of the
egophoricity system that the verb in position V1 hosts the egophoricity markers
in complex predicates.
Table 6.8: Auxiliary verbs in Totoró Namtrik
SG PL
Posture auxil-
iaries
sit wa- putr-
stand pasr- pɨntr-
hang mekua- mel-
lie tso- war-
Movement
auxiliaries
go ya- amp-
walk uñ-/un- amɨn-/amɨñ-
come atru- amtro-
arrive po-
Others copula kɨ-
The canonical use of the egophoricity markers in declarative clauses is illus-
trated in examples (26)-(33). The canonical use of the egophoric singular marker
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-or in declaratives is illustrated by examples (26) and (27). The canonical use of
the egophoric plural marker -er in declaratives involving first person plural sub-
jects is illustrated by examples (28) and (29).
(26) Totoró Namtrik (Rojas Curieux et al. 2009: 12)
mai-yu
path-LOC
peñ-or
fall-EGO.SG
‘I fell at the path.’
(27) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_012/54)
chente
chente
then
mɨimpe
mɨim=pe
now=PD
nape
na=pe
1=PD
unan
unɨ-wan
child-DAT
payor
pay-or
ask-EGO.SG
‘Then I asked the child.’
(28) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_031/107)
Mɨimpe
mɨim=pe
now=PD
yu
yu
here
wamiap
wam-ia-ap
talk-REC-NFV
pɨntrer
pɨntr-er
stand.PL-EGO.PL
‘Now we are talking here.’
(29) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_037/224)
na-m=pe
1-PL=PD
pueblo-srɨ-mai
town-LOC.DIST-DIR
amp-er
go.PL-EGO.PL
‘We are going to town.’
The canonical use of the non-egophoric -an for second and third person, is
illustrated in examples (30)-(33). The non-egophoric suffix -an is shown in a sen-
tence with a second person singular subject in example (30), in (31) with a second
person plural subject, in (32) with a third personal singular subject, and in (33)
with a third plural person subject.
The TTK egophoricity system has a contrast in the egophoric suffixes between
singular -or and plural -er which does not exist in the non-egophoric suffix –an.
Nevertheless some verbal stems of auxiliary verbs, as is shown in Table 6.8, have
a plural and a singular form, which allows us to identify the grammatical number
of the subject. This is the case of the verbal stems in the examples (32) pasr-an
‘stand.SG-NON.EGO’ and (33) putr-an ‘sit-PL-NON.EGO’.
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(30) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_037/149)
ñipe
ñi=pe
2=PD
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
nimpasrwan
nimpasr-wan
daughter-DAT
nilɨntrapɨk
nilɨ-ntr-ap-ɨk
steal-PROS-NFV-NMZ.SG
kɨn
kɨ-an
COP-NON.EGO
‘You are about to steal my daughter.’
(31) Totoró Namtrik (Rojas Curieux et al. 2009: 20)
nimpe
ñi-m=pe
2=PD
kosrepik
kosre-ap
teach-DUR
kɨn
kɨn
COP-NON.EGO
‘You guys are teaching.’
(32) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_123/24, elic)
nɨ=pe
3=PD
[peñ-ip
fall-DUR
pasr-an]
stand.SG-NON.EGO
‘He  is falling.’
(33) Totoró Namtrik (Rojas Curieux et al. 2009: 41)
tul-io=pe
field-LOC=PD
pɨn
three
wakra
cow
putr-an
sit.PL-NON.EGO
‘The cows are seat in the field.’
4.2 Usage pattern of egophoricity markers in interrogatives
Table 6.9 shows the interrogatives predicate constructions in TTK. As we already
mentioned TTK has two different interrogative constructions: one for first and
second person and one for third person. The main difference between the two
constructions is the obligatory use of a copula auxiliary kɨ- in the interrogative
clauses involving first and second person subjects which is not present in the
interrogative clauses involving third person subjects.
Table 6.9: Interrogative predicate constructions in Totoró Namtrik
1SG (V2) V1-IRR-COP-NON.EGO
2SG (V2) V1-COP-EGO.SG
2PL (V2) V1-COP-EGO.PL
3 (V2) V1-NON.EGO
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The canonical use in interrogative clauses of the egophoricity markers is il-
lustrated in examples (34)-(48). Examples (34) and (35) show the use of the non-
egophoric marker -an in interrogatives involving a first person subject, singular
in (34) and plural in (35). Since asking about one’s self is usually perceived as an
odd situation for Namtrik speakers, data on first person subject interrogatives
is very marginal in the corpus used. (37) is a natural speech example, and (35)
was elicited based on the structure of natural speech examples of first person
questions.
As Floyd (2018: 13–14) notes regarding interrogatives in Chapalaa, first person
interrogatives usually present a special marking which distinguishes them from
second and third person interrogatives. As is shown in Table 6.9 and in the exam-
ples (34) and (35), first person interrogatives additionally have an irrealis marker
-am which is not present in the interrogative clauses involving second and third
person subjects.
Given the small amount of data concerning first person questions, it is not
possible yet to argue if TTK presents a single construction for polar and con-
tent first person questions. However it is possible to recognize the use of the
non-egophoric marker -an in interrogative clauses involving first person sub-
jects, keeping in mind the morphophonological processes affecting this marker
in questions is already described in the first part of this paper.
(34) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_045/140)
chu
chu
where
pasramkɨ
pasr-am=kɨ-an
stand.SG-IRR=COP-NON.EGO
chi
chi
Q
‘Where shall I put this?’
(35) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_078/86, elic)
ñipe
ñi=pe
2=PD
mai
maik
well
kusrenanmɨtan
kusre-nan-mɨ-t-an
learn-CAUS-NEG-EXP-NON.EGO
shente
shente
then
nampe
na-m=pe
1-PL=PD
makatɨ
makatɨ
how
maramkɨ
mar-am-kɨ-an
do-IRR-COP-NON.EGO
‘If you don’t teach well, then what should we do?’
The use of the singular egophoric marker -or in interrogatives involving sec-
ond singular person subjects is illustrated in examples (36)-(39). Examples (36)
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and (37) show the use of the egophoric marker -or in content questions and ex-
amples (38) and (39) in polar questions. TTK has the same predicate construction
for second person content and polar questions.
(36) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_037/80)
chine
chi-ne
Q-3
marɨp
mar-ɨp
do-DUR
unko(.)
un-kɨ-or
walk.SG-COP-EGO.SG
ñipe
ñi=pe
2=PD
ɨsrɨpe
ɨ-srɨ=pe
DIST-DIR=PD
‘What are you doing here?’ (lit. What are you doing walking here?)
(37) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_042/180)
ñipe
ñi=pe
2=PD
chine
chi-ne
Q-3
isu
isu-ap
think-DUR
wako(.)
wa-kɨ-or
sit.SG-COP-EGO.SG
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
Geny
Geny
Geny
‘What are you thinking my Geny?’
(38) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_058/218)
ɨnɨpe
ɨ-nɨ=pe
DIST-3=PD
ñi
ñi
2
wako
wa-kɨ-or
seat.SG-COP-EGO.SG
‘Are you seated in that one (bench)?’
(39) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_058/64)
kishi
kish-ip
cry-DUR
wako
wa-kɨ-or
seat.SG-COP-EGO.SG
‘Are you crying?’
The use of the plural egophoric marker -er in content questions involving
plural second person subjects is illustrated in examples (40) and (41). The use
of the plural egophoric marker in polar questions is shown in examples (42) and
(43)
(40) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_003/28)
chi
chi
Q
pɨrɨ
pɨrɨ
why
kishke
kish-kɨ-er
cry-COP-EGO.PL
‘Why are you (kids) crying?’
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(41) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_031/110)
chinetɨ
chi-nɨ-tɨ
Q-3-REST
warɨke
war-ɨ-kɨ-er
lie.PL-E-COP-EGO.PL
‘What did you bring?’
(42) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_031/154)
takiwan
taki-wan
chagla-DAT
kucha
kucha
too
pasrke
pasr-kɨ-er
stand.SG-COP-EGO.PL
‘Did you leave the chagla sticks there too?’
(43) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_075/87)
uyu
uyu
here
mɨrmɨke
mɨr-mɨ-kɨ-er
listen-NEG-COP-EGO.PL
‘Didn’t you guys listen?’
Regarding interrogatives in the variety of Namtrik spoken in Guambiano, Nor-
cliffe (2018) proposes that “in interrogatives involving second person subjects, the
verb in its bare stem form is obligatorily followed by a particle which takes the
form of either ku/ke or titru. Ku is used for singular second person addressees,
while ke is used for plural second person addressees”, as is shown in examples
(44), (45) and (46).
(44) Guambiano Namtrik (Norcliffe 2018)
chi
Q
mar-ku?
do-KU
‘What are you (SG) doing?’
(45) Guambiano Namtrik (Norcliffe 2018)
chi
Q
mar-ke?
do-KE
‘What are you (PL) doing?’
(46) Guambiano Namtrik (Norcliffe 2018)
ñi
2/3.PROX
mana
when
lanchi-titru?
break-TITRU
‘When did you break it?’
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In the case of TTK, the egophoricity system exhibit a verbal marking pattern,
which is consistent with the description of egophoricity systems in other lan-
guages in which “speaker subjects in statements are marked the same way as
addressee subjects in questions” (Curnow 2002). As is shown in examples (36)-
(43), the forms ko and ke observed in questions involving second person singular
and plural in Guambiano Namtrik, correspond to the copula kɨ- followed by the
egophoric markers -or and -er in Totoró Namtrik.
The canonical use of the non-egophoric marker -an in questions involving a
third person is illustrated in the examples (47) and (48). TTK also has the same
construction for content and polar questions involving third person subjects.
(47) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_057/126)
inɨpe
i-nɨ=pe
PROX-3=PD
tsik
tsik
wood
kɨ
kɨ-an
COP-NO.EGO
chine
chi-ne
Q-3
kalus
kalus
leather
kɨ
kɨ-an
COP-NO.EGO
chi
chi
Q
‘Is this wood or what, leather?’
(48) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_049/14)
unɨ
unɨ
child
mɨkpe
mɨk=pe
man=PD
ciego
ciego
blind
kɨ
kɨ-an
COP-NO.EGO
chi?
chi
Q
‘Is the boy blind, or what?’
5 Egophoricity markers and the category of person
As San Roque and colleagues note regarding egophoricity marking and subject
agreement marking, “under a person-marking account, egophoricity markers
flag the coincidence of the epistemic authority and an argument role” (San Roque
et al. 2018: 33). Since subjects usually “have good grounds to declarative direct
personal knowledge of an event, it naturally follows that declaratives with a first
person subject usually take egophoric marking, as do interrogatives with a sec-
ond person subject” (San Roque et al. 2018: 33).
This approach may describe much of the patterns in TTK, but has trouble ac-
counting for the data which show that under certain semantic and pragmatic
factors, the non-egophoric suffix can be used with first person subjects in declar-
atives as well and that the egophoric plural marker -er can be used in question
clauses with a third person subject.
It was attested in egophoricity marking in different languages (San Roque et al.
2018) that egophoric markers usually do not target non-volitional or non-control
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first person subjects. As is shown in examples (49), (50) and (51), in TTK ego-
phoric marking is not used in declarative clauses which describe a non-volitional
or non-controlled event performed by a first person subject.
Additionally, examples (49) and (50) also show the non-control marker -ra,
which has also been reported in Guambiano by Vásquez de Ruiz (2007: 98–99)
and serves to express the speaker’s lack of control or evidence with respect to
the described event. This marker takes part in a specific complex predicate con-
struction whose structure is shown in Figure 4, and which however is a construc-
tion restricted to first person subjects, and is never marked with the egophoric
singular marker -or but with the non-egophoric marker -an.
4. Non-control event complex predicate construction
V2-DUR-NON.CONTROL-NMZ COP-NON.EGO(-DUB)
(49) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_070/35)
tsap
tsa-ap
end-DUR
kuaprein
kua-ap-ra-in
die-DUR-NON.CONTR-NMZ
kɨntro
kɨ-an-tro
COP-NON.EGO-DUB
pesanai
pesana-ik
faint-NMZ.SG
‘There being sick at night, I fainted.’
(50) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_078/75, elic)
kiprain
ki-ap-ra-in
sleep-DUR-NON.CONTR-NMZ
parin
parin
a.lot
kiprain
ki-ap-ra-in
sleep-NFV-NON.CONTR-NMZ
kɨn
kɨ-an
COP-NON.EGO
nape
na=pe
1=PD
mɨintɨ
mɨin-tɨ
now-REST
kasrar
kasra-or
wake.up-EGO.SG
‘ I was sleeping a lot and I barely woke up.’
(51) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_070/1)
nape
na=pe
1=PD
kuap
kua-ap
die-NFV
sreik
sre-ik
escape-NMZ.SG
kɨpɨk
kɨ-ap-ik
COP-DUR-NMZ.SG
kɨn
kɨ-an
COP-NON.EGO
nape
na=pe
1=PD
srɨ
srɨ
LOC.DIST
kasareik
kasar-ap-ik
get.married-NFV-NMZ.SG
‘I almost died when I was just married.’
Although the general usage pattern of the Namtrik egophoricity system seems
to be very consistent, the system has some flexibility and there are examples
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where the markers are not used according to the expected pattern. In examples
(52)–(53) there is an egophoric plural marker -er in question clauses with a third
person subject. It is not clear what motivates the use of the egophoric plural
marker -er in these sentences.
(52) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_035/15)
gorro=pe
cap=PD
muna
where
un-er
walk.SG-EGO.PL
‘Where is the hat?’ (lit. Where is the hat walking?)
(53) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_078/104)
nai
na-wai
1-GEN
Genype
Geny=pe
Geny=PD
mai
maik
well
munik
mun-ik
wait-NMZ.SG
tsuwer
tsu-wa-er
lie.down-sit.SG-EGO.PL
‘Geny must be waiting for me? (I’m worried about it)’
6 Undergoer and egophoricity
The experiencer egophoric marker -t is involved in different kinds of construc-
tions in TTK. In complex predicate constructions, this marker is always suffixed
to the auxiliary verb. This marker has been reported also in previous descrip-
tions of Guambiano by Vásquez de Ruiz (2007: 101) and Triviño Garzón (1994:
615). Vásquez de Ruiz (2007) described the marker -t as a first person applicative,
which has epistemic-evidential functions, indicating that there is a first person
which is perceiving some information described in the clause (Vásquez de Ruiz
2007: 101). More recently Norcliffe (2018), writing about evidential and egopho-
ricity markers in Guambiano, describes this marker as “a subtype of ego eviden-
tiality ... used in contexts in which the speaker experiences an event as an un-
dergoer, and thus has knowledge of the event as an affected participant” (2018:
25).
In TTK the main function of this marker is similar to the function that has
been described by Vásquez de Ruiz (2007), Triviño Garzón (1994) and Norcliffe
(2018). The main function of the -t morpheme is to mark a speaker which is in
some way affected by the situation described in the clause, as illustrated in the
examples below, which show the undergoer marker -t in intransitive declarative
clauses.
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(54) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_042/240, namtrik_020/5, namtrik_075/11)
a. nakish
nakish
smoke
pesrik
pesrik
angry
kɨtan
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
kashi
kashi
a.bit
‘The smoke is bothering me a bit.’ (lit. The smoke is angry, which
affects me a bit.)
b. kana
kana
one
sruk
sruk
stone
tɨwei
tɨwei
only
wepitan
we-ap-i-t-an
come.out-DUR-NMZ.E-EXP-NON.EGO
‘[My father] just found a stone, (which the duende had hidden to
make my father him sick, my father said).’
c. ashampe
ashan=pe
now=PD
si
si
yes
kek
kek
husband
palɨtan
pal-ɨ-t-an
lack-E-EXP-NON.EGO
‘Now I need a husband.’
The undergoer marker -t may be suffixed to both intransitive verbs and tran-
sitive verbs. In declarative sentences with transitive verbs, the suffix -t marks an
‘affected’ speaker, which in these cases is expressed as an object.
(55) Totoró Namtrik (Rojas Curieux et al. 2009: 16, 25)
a. nai
na-wai
1-GEN
kek
kek
husband
kuakɨtan
kuakɨ-t-an
hit-EXP-NON.EGO
‘ My husband hit me.’
b. nai
na-wai
1-GEN
notsak
notsak
sister
usmai
usmai
head.down
larɨtan
lar-ɨ-t-an
see-NMZ.SG?-EXP-NON.EGO
nan
na-wan
1-DAT
‘My sister looked at me with her head down.’
As is the case in other Barbacoan languages (Floyd 2018: 25), TTK has spe-
cific predicate constructions for experience verbs, including internal states, en-
dophatic states, emotions and desires. In these cases, the non-egophoric suffix -an
is used with first person subjects in combination with the undergoer egophoric
marker -t.
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(56) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_019/6, LEXIN2/62)
a. nante
na-wan-te
1-DAT-REST
kiri
kiri
get.scared
kitan
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
chilliyu
chilli-yu
mud-LOC
puraintrap
pura-i-ntr-ap
go.through-go.SG-PROS-NFV
‘I got scared going through the mud.’ (lit. There was fear in me going
through the mud.)
b. nante
na-wan-te
1-DAT-REST
kitra
kitra
be.cold
kitan
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
‘I am cold.’ (lit. Cold is to me.)
c. nante
na-wan-te
1-DAT-REST
intsa
intsa
laugh
kɨtan
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
‘I laugh.’ (lit. There is laughing for me.)
The data from Totoró Namtrik shows that the undergoer egophoric marker -t
seems to have an egophoricity distribution. That is to say, the suffix -t refers to
the speaker being affected in declarative clauses and to the hearer being affected
in interrogative clauses.
The predicate construction involving the undergoer egophoric marker, which
is shown in Figure 5, consists of a main verb followed by the suffix -t and the non-
egophoric suffix -an. In interrogative clauses, the consonant in the non-egophoric
suffix -an follows the same pattern of consonant deletion found in the predicate
constructions without the suffix -t.
5. Undergoer egophoric marker predicate construction
V-EXP-NON.EGO
The following set of examples shows the pattern of usage of the undergoer
egophoric marker in declarative clauses and interrogative clauses.
(57) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_057/7, LEXIN2_101, namtrik_052/307,
namtrik_059/86)
a. mɨimpe
mɨim=pe
now=PD
kana
kana
one
paso
paso
glass
palɨtan
pal-ɨ-t-an
lack-NMZ.SG?-EXP-NON.EGO
‘Now I need a glass ’ (lit. Now a glass lacks, which affects me.)
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b. ɡuaranɡope
ɡuaranɡo=pe
guarango=PD
trumpik
trumpik
ugly
itrɨtan
itrɨ-t-an
smell-EXP-NON.EGO
‘The guarango wood stinks.’ (lit. Guarango wood smells ugly, which
affects me.)
c. tapɨ
tapɨ
well
kɨtan
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
‘It’s okay for me.’
d. nantɨ
na-wan-tɨ
1-DAT-REST
pailakɨtan
paila-kɨ-t-an
dance-COP-EXP-NON.EGO
‘I want to dance.’ (lit. There is dancing for me.)
(58) Totoró Namtrik (namtrik_059/126, namtrik_058/256, namtrik_057/438,
namtrik_037/144)
a. chillo
chillo
knife
palɨta
pal-ɨ-t-an
lack-NMZ.SG?-EXP-NON.EGO
‘Do you need a knife? (lit. Does it lack a knife for you?)
b. maik
maik
delicious
itrɨta
itrɨ-t-an
smell-EXP-NON.EGO
‘Does it smell delicious (according to you)?’ (lit. Does it smell good to
you?)
c. tapɨ
tapɨ
well
kɨta
kɨ-t-an
COP-EXP-NON.EGO
‘Is it okay for you (according to you)?’
d. mai
maik
well
mutsikɨta
muts-i-kɨ-t-an
drink-NMZ.SG?-COP-EXP-NON.EGO
ñipe
ñi=pe
2=PD
‘Do you want to drink?’
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7 Conclusions
Totoró Namtrik data shows a regular egophoricity pattern, exhibiting a very sim-
ilar distribution as the one found in other Barbacoan languages. However, its
first recognition is obscured by two morphophonological processes: vowel co-
alescence at a morpheme boundary and deletion of the final consonant of the
egophoric and non-egophoric suffixes in questions. The fact that TTK possesses
an egophoricity system is a good argument for claiming that egophoricity is a
genetic feature in Barbacoan languages, as argued by Curnow & Liddicoat (1998).
The system that I illustrate in this paper is very similar to egophoricity systems
in other languages. In declarative clauses the egophoric singular -or and plural
-er are used for first person and the non-egophoric -an for second and third per-
son. In interrogative clauses, the egophoric singular suffix -or is generally used
for singular second person, the egophoric plural suffix -er for plural second per-
son and the non-egophoric -an for first and third person. TTK shows a single
egophoricity system both in declarative and interrogative clauses. In this respect
the TTK data differ from the Guambiano data, as presented by Norcliffe (2018),
which show two separate systems for declarative and interrogative clauses.
Further the TTK data shows an undergoer egophoric suffix -t, which seems to
function as an egophoric undergoer suffix, signifying that the speaker is in some
way affected in declarative sentences. The undergoer egophoric suffix -t appears
to be used in questions to refer to the hearer being affected. This would mean
that this suffix shows an egophoric distribution as well. However, more data is
needed to confirm this.
The Totoró Namtrik egophoricity system does not always behave according
to the general usage pattern. These non-canonical uses of the suffixes in the
egophoricity system will play an important role in the semantic analysis of this
system.
Abbreviations
1 first person
2 second person
3 third person
COP copula
DAT dative
DIST distal
DIR directive
DUB dubitative
DUR durative
E epenthesis
EGO egophoric
EXP experiencer
GEN genitive
LOC locative
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IMP imperative
IRR irrealis
NEG negation
NMZ nominalization
NON.CONTR non-control
NON.EGO non-egophoric
PD discursive particle
PROS prospective
PL plural
Q question
REC reciprocal
REST restrictive
SG singular
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Chapter 7
Interpersonal alignments and epistemic
marking in Kalapalo (Southern Cariban,
Brazil)
Ellen B. Basso
University of Arizona
Kalapalo epistemic features are central to the pragmatic functions of interpersonal
alignments. There is a set of seven hearsay evidentials mainly used in narrative
and in quoted discourse, eight initial position epistemic expressives (EXP), five ev-
idential suffixes (EV) and hearsay quotative evidential strategies (qUOT), together
with a large set of (28) second position epistemic clitics/particles (EM). The latter
confirm that epistemic judgment is essentially a triadic stance procedure involving
the social actors engaged in conversational interaction (an initial speaker, an inter-
locutor or listener-responder) and the epistemic object/proposition. I sort EM into
six sets, two of which (A, B) mark the speaker’s “internal” and “external” degrees
of epistemic judgement. (C) mark the speaker’s contraspective wishing or hoping,
(D )mark the speaker’s re-evaluation, correctives or denial of a proposition with
a focus on new or reconsidered information. The final two sets (E, F) concern the
speaker’s attempts at (or conflicts with) epistemic alignment with a listener or 3rd
person, based on understanding of the epistemic object. While epistemic modality
in the sense of a “scale” or “grade” occurs, in Kalapalo there are other non-modal
meanings including participation (or not) of the speaker and listener and a third
person in an epistemic context, mirativity, incredulity (an extreme skepticism or
unwillingness to believe), and conflict or denial, affinal civility and affection.
1 Introduction
The idea of “interpersonal alignments” is used in this paper to refer to a language-
focused developmental process involving emergent patterns of communication
Ellen B. Basso. 2020. Interpersonal alignments and epistemic marking in Kalapalo
(Southern Cariban, Brazil). In Henrik Bergqvist & Seppo Kittilä (eds.), Evidentiality,
egophoricity, and engagement, 197–237. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI: 10.5281/
zenodo.3975807
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and understanding in the interaction of distinctively different people within a
community. Using this concept (with the words ’interpersonal relations’) the
modernist anthropologist Edward Sapir repeatedly noted in his lectures at Yale
that the interaction of people of different personalities and their influence on the
thought and action of a community has consequences with many historical im-
plications (Sapir 1993: 204). When people respond to one another during conver-
sational interaction as they receive information about the worlds of others, Sapir
noted, they participate in contexts wherein judgments or evaluations of propo-
sitions are being made, often while speakers are trying to make decisions and
plans for future action. More recently, John Du Bois’ technical use of “alignment”
refers to such ongoing activity “in which two participants in dialogical interac-
tion ...converse in varying degrees” in taking a stance (2004: 22–23). Evidential
and epistemic markers contribute to a speaker’s evaluation, self-positioning, and
alignments with other subjects concerning the sharing of knowledge and eval-
uation of the epistemic object or proposition. (Du Bois 2007: 24). Such stance
enactments are central to the pragmatic functioning of sociality and everyday
power (Ameka 2004: 5–6).
In this chapter, I discuss stance enactments as they occur among speakers of
Kalapalo, a Southern Cariban agglutinative language currently spoken by about
630 people in the Alto Xingu region of central Brazil (Guerreiro 2015). In Kalapalo,
a large number of epistemic markers are central to the pragmatic functioning of
social life. My interest in this epistemic marking has grown out of my earlier
anthropological work on Kalapalo narrative discourse (akiñatunda), a dialogical
practice structured in large measure by the interaction between a narrator (akiña
otoi) and a “listener-responder” (etuitsofo) (Basso 1985; 1986; 1987; 1995). Analy-
ses of recorded narrated speech events assisted my understanding of the use of
the epistemic features. In this material, dialogicality exists in the many narrated
quoted conversations in which occur emergent processes of challenge, resistance,
debate, deception, and the negotiation of meaning. Emotional events such as re-
spect and endearment, as well as anger, shame, lust, greed, and envy are impor-
tant for descriptions of protagonists and it is through their quoted speech that we
can see how these emerge from social interaction (Basso 2007). A narrator’s au-
thority to speak of imaginary or historical subjects is an adventure in language, a
kind of critical social commentary that may not be tolerated in other public situa-
tions. Presentation of sociohistorical and mythological realities include fantasies
regarding human bodily processes and tricksters’ appetite for subversion, as well
as historical memories of women who have been abducted and who learned to
live in a different kind of society, and the personal adventures of warriors and
shamans. The materials presented here include quoted conversations (often, in-
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terspersed with narrators’ commentary), as well as from my own conversations
with Kalapalo, and from the ritual speech of hereditary leaders (Basso 2009; see
also Franchetto 1983, 2000).
In Kalapalo there is a set of six hearsay evidential markers (EV) mainly used
in narrative and in quoted discourse (Table 7.1); eight initial position epistemic
expressives (EXP) which directly mark first person judgment and sometimes 1st
person evidence (Table 7.2)1 and the large set of (28) second position epistemic cl-
itics or free particles (EM) that I have ordered into six pragmatic sets; EM numbers
correspond to the full set listed in the Appendix.2
Kalapalo epistemic markers appear at the end of an adverbial phrase, a nomi-
nal phrase or clause, or a converbal or lexical verbal clause. There is rarely any
vowel reduction; except for the morpheme aka, and no epistemic clitics are vowel
initial. The morpheme muk𝑤e may show elision when followed by a vowel initial
phonological word. Nonetheless, most epistemic morphemes function as clitics
insofar as they are phonologically bound through (second syllable) stress pat-
terning to their host constructions, thereby playing a key role in phonological
word construction. Epistemic markers have the ability to be compounded with
one another, and with other types of clitics (Basso 2014), as seen in examples (6),
(33b), (35), (40a), (51), (62c).3
A number of the Kalapalo parameters seem to closely match those specified by
B. J. Hoff (1986) for Surinam Carib (Kari’na) and also Bruna Franchetto’ s (n.d.) dis-
cussion of (so-called modal) “marker’s of true speech” in the closely related Alto
Xingu Kuikuro language. However, with one exception, I use different language
to describe these features in keeping with my emphasis on person-person deixis
and dialogicality in stance processes. What B. J. Hoff calls “grade” (strong-weak-
lacking), “speaker’s attitude”, “appeals on speaker”, “change of grade” and “co-
existence with supporting or conflicting evidence” are clearly semantic parame-
ters found in Kalapalo epistemic marking. Hoff’s specification of an underlying
1Another set of expressives are affective (marking fear, pain, sensory pleasure, disgust, grief,
frustration). Their use by Kalapalo speakers tends to create a synergy of sentiment with listen-
ers. The epistemic expressives are both interpersonal as well as cognitive and introspective in
semantic function as shown in Table 7.2. Both subsets of the expressive word class are in the
main used by speakers to introduce further descriptive commentary.
2Due to the large number of EM markers and complex semantic features, some of which (e.g.,
assertion, inferential, negation) may be repeated in the use of several forms, I have used num-
bers rather than semantically informative glosses. Full descriptions occur in the examples and
the Appendix.
3Similar morphemes have been described in the pioneering work on Northern Cariban lan-
guages by B. J. Hoff (1986), Eithne Carlin (2004); and Sergio Meira (1999). Northern Cariban
epistemic clitics usually appear after the first element in a clause (Wackernagel’s position); the
scope of the clitic including the entire clause (Hoff 1986).
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Table 7.1: Evidential suffixes (EV) and evidential strategies (quotatives)
Meanings Discourse contexts
-tï narrative hearsay narrative line or quotative
-tsï speaker references own speech present or recent
fi appears on a quotative or
demonstrative, marking a
neutral or vague source of
information: (‘something like
what is known’)
can be used as a boundary
marker separating
conversation from
authoritative narrative speech,
can be negated
-kila recent knowledge transmitted
by another speaker
comment on speaker’s own or
3rd person speech act
-kita historical knowledge given to
listener
event description (verbal
clause)
nïgï
i-feke quotative, perfective ‘X said to Y’ (conversational)
ta i-feke quotative, continuative ‘X says to Y’ (response)
contrast in the Surinam Carib particle set between the origins of “extraspective”
and “introspective” evidence is also an evidential feature in Kalapalo, and this
can be understood with reference to Ferdinand de Haan’s (2001) approach that
allows for a pragmatic description subsuming evidential and epistemic features.
de Haan distinguishes between two deictic categories relevant to evidentiality:
in the first, the speaker is separated (or separates themselves) from the action
being described; in the second, the speaker includes themself in the description
of the action. In fact, these make sense for Kalapalo epistemic marking when
the stance object is foregrounded in the discourse segment (particularly in Sets
A and B). However there is also the third person marked both as a logophoric
interlocutor and as an epistemic object. There are four epistemic markers which
can be used to describe logophoricity of several kinds: kafa EM17, weak but posi-
tive; kato EM18, troublesome ; nafa EM20, an animate but non-human response;
kalaka EM23, reflexive desire. Alignment (or “engagement”) is yet another deic-
tic field, involving a speaker referencing another subject’s inclusion in the sphere
of epistemic stance (as in Sets E and F). These involve participant frameworks
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Table 7.2: Epistemic Expressives (EXP)
Epistemic expressives Meanings Translation or other
functions
u:um insight, planning based
on inference
‘I’m thinking’
ah assertive affirmative,
evidential
‘the fact is’
koh unknown ‘I don’t know’.
eh affirmation ‘yes’
eh he acknowledgment of
speech act
‘I hear you’
he acknowledgment
(reduced form)
‘you’re right’
ta: rhetorical negation ‘how/why not’
akah mirative negative,
frustrative
‘oh my’
ekï temporarily forgotten
name
‘um’
u:m ma an attempt to try to
understand
‘I can’t be sure’
ah u:m certainty of imaginative
understanding
‘I’m sure’
relevant to Kalapalo epistemic markers in which the intersubjective relation is
foregrounded and the object-subject relation recedes (though it is not entirely
absent from discursive commentary).
While epistemic modality in the sense of a “scale” or “grade” is a feature of
Kalapalo epistemology, there are important non-modal features that emerge as
speakers evaluate information, including a) participation (or not) of the speaker
and listener and a third person in a cooperative epistemic context; b) changes
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or correctives due to receipt of new information; c) mirativity (due to new and
surprising information) and incredulity (an extreme skepticism or unwillingness
to believe); d) counter-factive or contra-spective wishing or hoping; and e) ac-
ceptance or rejection of a conjoint project. I show in examples how the four
logophoric markers mark responses to different kinds of experiences, speech, or
desires and plans of someone other than the interlocutors: Although I follow ear-
lier writers (Aikhenvald 2004, de Haan 1999, 2001; Nuckolls & Michael 2012), in
making a distinction between evidentiality (EV) and epistemic markers (EM) as
shown in the preceding tables, Kalapalo EV, EXP and EM are often combined in
discourse as many of the examples will show. Additionally some EM also mark
types of evidentiality (first hand experience; inference – or lack of direct speech
evidence – regarding a second or third person’s thoughts and plans). These are
not seen in the EVset. Past tense semantics occurs with the use of wãke EM1 and
nipa EM24, of interest as there is no past tense marking on the verb. In addi-
tion, four EM (kiŋi, plural kiŋi-ni EM11, pile EM15, tiki EM19, tima EM28) have
negation meanings. What follows is a brief listing of the six epistemic sets sorted
according to pragmatic and semantic features. These sets are discussed further
with examples in Sections 2–4, followed by my final observations in section 5.
Names of original narrators and location of my research recordings are given
following the examples.
Outline of Epistemic Sets
• Sets A-D mark a focus upon the speaker’s evaluation of a proposition and
“positioning”.
– Set A: knowledge has been received internally; the speaker is a par-
ticipant in the propositional context.
– Set B: knowledge is received externally; the speaker is not a partici-
pant in the propositional context but must infer or deduce from this
external evidence.
• Sets C and D involve subjective “positioning” used after a speaker has re-
ceived new information.
– Set C: self-correctives.
– Set D: counter-factive or contra-spective acknowledgment, wishing
or hoping’.
• Sets E and F concern the speaker’s marking of epistemic alignment, that is,
participation in a shared or in two cases, disputed propositional context.
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– Set E: shared information; one negative marks refusal to share infor-
mation.
– Set F: speaker’s proposal or rejection of a conjoint project. In this
set there is a marker with negative meaning used when the speaker
refuses to participate or to be blamed in such a context.
2 Internal versus extenal contrasts in Sets A and B
Sets A and B are similar to Berend Hoff’s (1986) specification of an underlying
contrast in the Northern Cariban Kari’na (or Surinam Carib) particle set between
the origins of two types of evidence. The first is “introspective”, “inner world of
the speaker”, evidence in the mind of the speaker and private knowledge. The
second is “extraspective” evidence from the “outside world”, that is, evidence
external to the speaker’s experiences or public knowledge.
2.1 Set A
Knowledge is “internal”, part of the speaker’s experience. There are six members
of this set. These markers seem to reference an interloctor’s thoughts or ideas,
rather than direct speech and thus contrast with the hearsay EVgroup.
2.1.1 wãke EM1
With this frequently used marker, the speaker asserts a (usually distant) past
experience in which knowledge or evidence has been acquired. The strong asser-
tion is often seen in the speaker’s repetition of the marker after each clause. In
the example, upon hearing that his friend is the lone survivor of a massacre, the
speaker declares that was why he didn’t join them earlier, expecting to have to
avenge them all.
(1) ege-tomi=dye-fa
PDEM-PURP=SS-TOP
wãke
EM1
u-te-lï
1-go.away-PNCT
wãke,
EM1
o-pi-ñï-ko-i
2-avenge-AN-PL-COP
u-its-ani,
1-EX-FUT.1
u-ki-lï
1-utter-PNCT
wãke
EM1
‘For this purpose I remember some time ago I said, ‘I will be the one to
go away as your avenger.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1980)
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2.1.2 tifa EM2
This marks the affirmation of the interlocutor’s current understanding of (or
thoughts about) the speaker’s recently spoken ideas. This marker may be based
on the hearsay EVti-. See example (40a) where EM 2 contributes to the interlocu-
tors belief that what he is saying is true. Most examples apear to be referencing
a 2nd or 3rd person’s thoughts rather than speech. The following example marks
an exclusive plural person’s acceptance.
(2) tis-eti-dyi-pïgï-iña=tifa
1+3-come.out-ITR-VPE-BEN=EM2
ti-ŋifa-nïgï.
1+3-teach-PS
‘You are right to think that on behalf of our offspring (i.e., ‘those who
come out of us’), is what we teach.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
Here, the speaker uses both EM2 in the nominalization part of the construction
and taka EM22 agreement with someone else’s description of their experience in
the bracketed adverbial clause; EM22 references his mother’s just-stated dismay
at seeing his reddened eyes. The EM2 tifa references the speaker’s acknowledg-
ment of what she thought of the events being described.
(3) (afïtï=taka
denial=EM22
igei-ufuŋu)
IDEM-unlike
ta-ŋo-fïŋï-tifa...
DIS-NLOC-resemble-EM2
tisuge,
1+3
afïtï
denial
‘No, (=because of what you saw) you must know there’s got to be
another kind of place where we can live, no.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
Here the speaker confirms a nth2 person’s understanding of a past event.wãke
EM1 is used to assert the speaker’s own participation. Because of the group con-
text, I have used a first person plural translation.
(4) ule-tse-ngugi=tifa=wãke,
AFR-be-interrupted=EM2=EM1
ngikogo
fierce people
e-nïgï
come-PERF
wãke.
EM1
aifu-pe-fa.
end-ESS-PTP
‘We saw he was interrupted just as you thought he would be when he
started things, we saw the fierce people come. It was all over for him.’
2.1.3 laka EM3
This marks the speaker’s very weak inference, puzzlement, or a strong inability
to understand the participatory context. This example includes both EM3 and
the EXPuum, referencing thought of an imaginative or inferential nature. In de
Haan’s deictic model (2001), the speaker has put himself into the sphere of action.
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(5) u:um
EXP
aŋi=laka
result=EM3
ukuge
human being
ele-i
DEM-COP
ukuge
human being
‘I suppose that could have been human, a human being.’ (said by Tufule at
Aifa, 1982)
In a trickster story, the speaker is surprised that he has already been told not to
eat some fish parts, although he has already done so. The marker seku following
the verb te-,’ eat’ is the mirativity marker compounded with EM3.
(6) te-ŋe=seku=laka
eat.flesh-TRNS=MIR=EM3
a-nïgï
EQS-PFV
u-feke=lefa
1-ERG=SEQ
‘I don’t think I was already told not to eat flesh!’ (said by Tufule at Aifa,
1982)
2.1.4 ma EM4
Used as a clitic, this dubitative form references the speaker’s uncertainty due
to lack of knowledge. It is used mainly, but not exclusively, with interrogative
forms. It may also serve as an epistemic neutral marker (see also conversational
examples 19–21, 22–24, 44c, 48c, 54c). In the example, a narrator questions how
someone in his story could put a large fish inside a small flute:
(7) ta-me=ma
CONT-FACS=EM4
kuluta
flute
atati
inside
tu-i-ŋalï
REF-put-REV
i-feke
3-ERG
‘How could he have put it back inside something like that flute?’ (said by
Kambe at Aifa, 1979)
2.1.5 maŋa EM5
The speaker, while enunciating a proposition, at the same time denies any pos-
sibility of its occurrence; this form is used to express incredulity, often with the
rhetorical (y/n) question prefix tï (‘I can’t believe you’re asking/saying (X) as
you and I both well know the answer’.)
The envious Trickster declares he will make the same kinds of rare and beau-
tiful things given to his younger brother.
(8) u:um
EXP
tï-kïtsï=maŋa
RQ-ugly=EM5
t-iŋuG-isi
REF-make-ADV
Taugi
NAME
ki-lï
utter-PNCT
‘“Who thinks this is hard for me to make?/ that I can only make it badly?”
(=”This is easy for me to make”), Taugi spoke.’ (said by Tufule at Aifa,
1979)
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A leader’s ritual communication is often filled with this kind of ironic restraint,
a kind of respectful devaluation of the work of his own messengers. There is a
feeling of the speaker’s modesty enacted by his disclaimer.
(9) tï-kaiŋa-fïŋï=maŋa
RQ-DEST-resemble=EM5
Ø-atsa-ki-lï
3-run-TRNS-PNCT
atehe=gele-fa
PER=still-TOP
wãke
EM1
‘Who thinks they still don’t run up to some place as they had done in the
past?’ (Leader’s talk, spoken by Ageu at Aifa, 1998)
2.1.6 kaɳa EM6
The speaker expresses the unlikeliness of an event. Here, an event has taken
place, and the speaker had mistakenly counted on a third person (his father-in-
law) to act in a certain way. Line (10b) has the EM11 from Set C which marks polite
regret to the listener for his agreeing to let his father-in-law do so.
(10) a. ige-tomi=kaŋa-fa
take.away-PURP=EM6-TOP
igei
IDEM
‘Although it was unlikely I would be escorted/led for that,’
b. ukw-oto-feke=kiŋi
dual-relative-ERG=EM11
a-tïfïgï-ko
EQS-IMP-PL
ige-tomi.
take.away-PURP
‘regrettably I let our relative (parent) be our escort/ leader.’ (said by
Kambe at Aifa, 1980)
In example (11), the speaker uses EM6 to taunt an enemy to begin shooting at
him. He asserts that it’s not likely he can rely on the interlocutor to bring him
some arrows. The speaker uses the ki-applicative to change the verb ‘go’ from
an intransitive to a transitive ‘go to do X’ with the complement verb‘ bring’ .
(11) uege=kaŋa
you=EM6
te-ta-tiga
go.to-CONT-HAB
u-fïgi
1-arrow
ï-ki.
bring-INST
‘I can hardly count on you to always go to bring my arrows to me (=i.e.,
‘shoot me’).’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1980)
2.2 Set B
This set includes information marked as “external” to the speaker’s experience
or not foregrounded. There are four members of this set. As with A, there is an
assumption about the interlocutor’s thoughts, wishes, or plans, but not any direct
hearsay evidence.
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2.2.1 nika EM7
The marker is a kind of strong supposition of the speaker’s regarding the in-
terlocutor’s experience or wish. It is often a strong marker of mourning (see
example 16).
A husband is anxiously looking for his wives and comes to a place where he
expects to find them. He politely suggests to some other women that they have
seen his wives there:
(12) aŋi=nika
result=EM7
inde
here
u-oku-ŋi-ta
1-liquid.food-TRNS-CONT
i-ŋi-lï
3-see-PNCT
e-feke-ne
2-ERG-PL
‘You might have seen those who make my food around here.’ (said by
Tufule at Aifa, 1978)
As in examples (13) and (14), there are also compounded clitics.
(13) afïtï=nika=wãke
denial=EM7=EM1
e-ndisï-fuŋu=wãke,
2-daughter-resemble=EM1
ti-ŋiŋi-lï-i
1+3-see-PNCT-COP
wãke.
EM1
‘How could we have known if that was the daughter (about whom you
wished for) we saw before?’ (said by Ugaki at Aifa, 1982)
(14) kuk-iñe-ti-ñï=nika=ale
2-poison-TRNS-AN=EM7=always
igei,
IDEM
nïgï-ti-feke
qUOT–EV-PRSP
tu-fitsu-feke.
REF-wife-PRSP
‘“You seem to think this might always poison us don’t you”, that’s what
he said to his wife’ (said by Ugaki at Aifa, 1979)
(15) kuaku
nightjar
iŋi-tïfïgï=nika-fa
bring-IMP=EM7-TOP
uege,
you
tuwa-kua-ti.
water-into-ADV
‘You’re the person the nightjars wanted to bring into the water, aren’t
you’. (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
(16) ah
EXP
u-muku-gu
my-son-POSS
apuŋu-iŋo-ti=nika
die-FUT.2-DES=EM7
isi
3.mother
ki-ŋalï
utter-INCEP
‘“The fact is my son wants to die later, doesn’t he,” his mother began to
say.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
2.2.2 tata EM8
There is possibility but some uncertainty as the epistemic object involved a 3rd
person, or a distant past source of information, and therefore the speaker could
not know for certain that the event took place. However, some probability from
inferential or customary experience exists.
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(17) igifagafïtï
settlement.name
anetu-gu
leader-POSS
uŋu
house
a-nïgï=tata
EQS-PFVS=EM8
i-feke
1-ERG
‘Possibly the Igifagafiti leader has a house.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
A woman recounts another’s actions based on common female experience, but
since the event took place in the far distant past, the speaker isn’t entirely certain
of the accuracy of what she’s saying.
(18) lepene
then
ø-atu-ndi-lï=tata
3-tap-TRNS-PNCT=EM8
i-feke
3-ERG
‘Then I think she might have tapped on it’ (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
2.2.3 fïna EM9
With this marker the speaker expresses the idea that there is some possibility but
there is no direct evidence. The following is a typical remark after the Trickster
seem to have acted in his usual covert manner.
(19) Taugi=fïna=mbe
Taugi=EM9=SE
‘It might have been Taugi who did that’ (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
Grandmother Quail sees someone who has has pulled up all her peanuts. fïna
appears in this example with the mirative =seku, which in this example has scope
over both utterances. fïna has scope over the line (20b) utterance only.
(20) a. tï-seku=ma
RQ-MIR=EM5
egei
ADEM
u-etigite-gï-ki
1-peanuts-POSS-INST
ga-tiga.
make-HAB
‘What is this here? Someone’s messing with my peanuts.’
b. eŋï
reason
oto-ni
food-non-existent
i-nïgï-ko=fïna=seku-fa.
EX-PFV-PL=EM9=MIR-TOP
‘Could it be that’s because they don’t have any food of their own?’
(said by Kambe at Aifa 1979)
The forest monster is frightened by a man who disguises himself as an adjafi
owl in order to scare him away (this owl is a bad sign to the observer).
(21) adyafi=fïna
owl=EM9
its-a
EX-CONT
‘That could be an adafi I’m seeing.’ (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
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2.2.4 koh EM10
The speaker has no knowledge of what is being described. This morpheme is
most often a particle. and is also used to begin a sentence as an expressive (ex-
ample 23). The scope of koh covers the utterance which it follows.
A husband returns and begins to burn a pile of brush in which, unknowingly,
his wife’s lover is hiding. When the man runs away to escape the fire, the husband
wonders why his wife never told him.
(22) ukuge
person
wende
over.there
e-ki-nu
2-utter-non-existent
koh-i
EM10-COP
u-feke
1-PRSP
‘Why didn’t you tell me there was someone over there?’ (said by Olafu at
Aifa, 1979)
Several brothers, frustrated in not having found their sister in a nearby settle-
ment, say the following to one another:
(23) uwa=ma
what=EM
igei
IDEM
uk𝑤-iŋandsu
dual-sister
i-ñïgï.
EX-TR
‘What could have happened to our sister?’
(24) koh.la=gele-fa
EM.like.that=still-TOP
uk𝑤-iŋandsu
dual-sister
its-ani
EX-FUT.1
‘I don’t know, our sister might be over there somewhere still.’ (said by
Ugaki at Aifa, 1980)
3 Discussion of Sets C (Contraspective), and D
(Counter-expectation)
3.1 Set C
Contraspective: in the sense there is an imaginative wishing or hoping (some-
times, in vain) for a difference in what has been told to, or what is being observed
by, the speaker.
3.1.1 kiŋi; kiŋi-ni (plural) EM11
This is used to mark regret for what has been told to the speaker. This contraspec-
tive marker is a negative nominalization of the verb ki ‘utter’. The following ex-
ample also appears in (10b); the speaker regrets having participated in a joint
venture.
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(25) uk𝑤-oto-feke=kiŋi
dual-relative-ERG=EM
a-tïfïgï-ko
EQS-IMP-PL
ige-tomi.
take.away-PURP
‘I regret I let our relative (parent) be our escort.’ (said by Kambe at Aifa,
1980)
As in this example EM11 often appears hosted by the agreement expression eh
he whereby a speaker acknowledges affirmatively what the interlocutor has said
but is expressing regret (other examples include 49d; 50b; 62b, 63c).
(26) iŋ-ke
see-I
nïgifeke,
qUOT,
ohsi-fa-ta-i
HORT-tell-CONT-COP
ku-mugu
1+2-son
opi-tsomi-feke
avenge-PURP=ERG
figei
IDEM
‘“Look”, he said to him, “be sure to tell the others this (payment) serves to
avenge our son”.’
(27) e-iña
2-DAT
u-e-ta
1-come-CONT
nïgifeke.
qUOT
‘That’s why I’ve come to you.’
(28) eh he
agreement
kiŋi,
EM11
eh he
agreement
‘If only it weren’t so, all right’. (said by Tufule at Aifa 1979)
3.1.2 muk𝑤e EM12
This marks the restrained or suppressed character of the utterance, an indication
of the speaker politely expressing a positive wish or expectation. There can also
be a realization on the speaker’s part that the proposition may be in vain. This
is a frequent marker in narratives; see also the conversational examples (39b),
(47b), (62a), (62c), (69b).
(29) u-ño
1-husband
its-iŋa=muk𝑤e
EX-SN=EM12
ukuge
human
‘If only he were human he might be my husband.’ (said by Ugaki at Aifa,
1979)
This example shows the speaker’s use of muk𝑤e to mark his restraint and
modesty as a son-in-law proposing a work party to help the family (The full
conversational context appears as examples 39–40).
(30) eŋï=muk𝑤e-tsï-fa
do=EM12-EV-TOP
fesoko
fish.name
apuGi-tsofo=muk𝑤e-tsï-fa
flavor-USIN=EM12-EV-TOP
ku-pehe-ne
1+2-ERG-PL
‘This way hopefully we’ll make some flavoring for our fesoko fish.’
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3.2 Set D
Counter-expectation or reevaluation of evidence with regard to the receipt of
new information. The speaker corrects or denies their own proposition. There
are three markers.
3.2.1 maki EM13
The speaker reevaluates what s(he) knows. New (introspective) information re-
sults in reevaluation of speaker’s own earlier proposition. In (31): the adverb ande
is a deictic feature. Knowing there is a prior proposition comes from the context
of the narrative in which the speaker claims to need to travel in another direction
which the interlocutor says won’t take him to the river.
(31) ande=maki
here.now=EM13
fanguiŋga=lefa,
river=SEQ
nïgifeke.
qUOT
‘“Ok, now I see that the river is here after all”, he said (to him).’ (said by
Kambe at Aifa, 1982)
In (32), the speaker, who had thought to be a member of the Trumai group,
now realizes he has been abducted as a child and says:
(32) afïtï=maki
denial=EM13
Tugumai-fuŋu
NAME-resemble
ku-kuge
1+2-people
‘not I realize we people resemble Trumai’, i.e. ‘I realize we people are are
not Trumai.’ (said by Ausuki at Aifa 1982)
3.2.2 makina EM14
New (introspective ) information leads to acceptance of the interlocutor’s earlier
proposition which was rejected:
A man has killed his mother-in-law but has told his wife that the woman has
died from a fish on which she choked to death. The narrator begins this part of
his story with a description of what the wife sees (her first-hand evidence (33a–
33b)), which is followed by the woman’s surprised reaction to this evidence: her
use of the ah expressive to assert her understanding of the truth of the event,
followed by her acceptance of the husband-listener’s deception, using EM17 and
the mirative ki.
(33) a. ege-te=gele
PDEM-DIS=still
is-isi-ŋa=gele
3-throat-inside=still
‘Still there inside her throat’
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b. uluGi
fish.name
akï-tïfïgï
stuck-IMP
i-fu-tsï-tsïgï-fa
3-put.inside-IPE-TOP
i-feke
3-ERG
‘the stuck ulugi fish he had put inside her.’
c. ah,
EXP
aŋ-olo=dye-tsï=makina=ki
EQS-ADV=SS-EV=EM14=MIR
igei
IDEM
‘The fact is I realize now that’s true, I didn’t expect you to tell me that
about her.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa 1979)
A man uses the polite reference to his parent-in-law, uk𝑤-oto-fo-ko.
(34) uk𝑤-oto=fo-ko=makina
dual-parent-PL=EM.28
ege,
he
uk𝑤-oto-fo-ko
dual-parent-PL
‘Now I realize that’s not our parent, our parent.’
A woman tells her brothers her abductor in the past was not one of their kind:
(35) ah,
EXP
ukuge-fïŋï=makina=wãke
1-person-resemble=EM14=EM1
igei=wãke
IDEM=EM1
u-iki-dyu=lefa
1-abduct-PNCT=SEQ
u-feke
1-ERG
tsa=l=ifeke,
tell-always=ERG
i-ño-pe-feke.
3-husband-ESS-ERG
‘“The fact is, the one who abducted me before wasn’t a person like us as I
now realize”, she kept telling them about this other husband of hers.’
(said by Ugaki at Aifa, 1980)
3.2.3 pile EM15
The speaker moves from acceptance to rejection of a proposition.
A young man has agreed throughout the narrative to go to dangerous places to
get things for his brother (whose wife is his lover), but finally realizes the brother
is trying to kill him.
(36) a-faŋa-ŋo-ofo-i
2-ear-NLOC-USIN-COP
wãke
EM1
u-a-nïgï=pile
1-EQS-PFV=EM15
u-ikuki-ne-ta
1-send.away-TRNS-CONT
‘I thought before that because I was your co-spouse I could (safely) be
sent away (but I now understand differently)’ (said by Tufule atAifa
1979)
(37) u-i-gu=pile-fa
1-ornament-POSS=EM15-TOP
ata-ni
EQA-FUT.1
‘I mistakenly thought my pubic ornament would be here.’ (said by
Kambe at Aifa, 1979)
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4 Discussion of Sets E and F
Sets E (five examples) and F (eight examples) concern the speaker’s marking of
epistemic alignment, that is, confirmation of a shared (or in two cases, disputed)
proposition. These sets are probably large because they are used when there is a
speaker’s need to shift between a focus upon the epistemic object, the marking of
a unique or shared perspective, and the marking of the interpersonal alignment,
that is, participation with the interlocutor in an epistemic context involving a
joint venture. As is often the case, such contexts themselves change throughout
a conversation and there is often ‘disclaimed’ responsibility in which EM play a
significant role. My examples include a number of examples of dialogic contexts
that illustrate the co-construction of epistemic and evidential meaning. Examples
of markers from sets A-D appear in these longer examples. Speakers in these
examples discuss issues of responsibility, denial of conjoint participation in a
pragmatic context, and engagement in deception while using the affinal civility
register (Basso 2007).
4.1 Set E
Markers in this set concern shared information and reference the interlocutors
participating in a joint venture; one negative marks refusal to share information.
Conjunct/disjunct contrasts occur and degrees of knowledge are also marked.
4.1.1 tafa EM16
The speaker asserts their own (or a 1st person plural) alignment with the listener.
The example shows both the speaker and interloctor’s use of the “distant future”
FUT.2, as a reciprocal pragmatic politeness marker (see Mendoza 2016 on use of
future as a politeness strategy).
Cuckoo’s mother tells him to come home right away from his uncle’s settle-
ment if the man’s daughter he wishes to marry decides she doesn’t want him
after all. Cuckoo’s answer is in Line (38b).
(38) a. ñafe-tsï-fa
quickly-EV-TOP
iñandsu-feke
sister-ERG
e-tifu-ñe-tote,
2-reject-TRNS-HYP
e-n-ïm-iŋo
2-return-INTR-FUT.2
‘You’ll come back quickly if the sister rejects you, won’t you.’
b. Cuckoo answers his mother:
s-agage-dye=tafa
3-same-SS=EM.16
u-e-n-ïm-iŋo
1-return-INTR-FUR.2
ama
Mother.VOC
‘I will come back, Mother, if she is the same (as you’ve said).’ (said by
Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
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4.1.2 kafa (EM17)
A logophoric marker, kafa indicates the speaker’s presumption of a 3rd person’s
wants, feeling, or experience. In this narrative section from the same story as (34),
four epistemic markers appear. The speaker affirms the 3rd person has accepted
their proposition and asks his wife to accept a trip to get salt, which he apparently
wants to do to benefit the family. The noun ‘our parent’ used for ‘parent-in-law’
and muk𝑤e EM12 are especially typical of the affinal civility register he is using,
and the markers of politeness clearly enable what turns out to be his terribly
deceptive speech.
(39) a. Use of ‘our parent’ as politeness marker:
aŋi=kafa
result=EM17
uk𝑤-oto-i
dual-parent
ŋukugu=mbo-lï
stay.behind=HYP-PNCT
ta
qUOT
i-feke,
3-PRSP
ta-ki
qUOT-MIR
i-feke
3-ERG
‘“This parent of ours could have stayed behind herself after all”, he
said to her, surprising her by saying that.’
b. Use of muk𝑤e to mark a son-in-law’s restraint and modesty:
eŋï=muk𝑤e-tsï-fa
do=EM12-EV-TOP
fesoko
fish.name
apuGi-tsofo=muk𝑤e-tsï-fa
flavor-USIN=EM12-EV-TOP
ku-pehe-ne
1+2-ERG-PL
‘This way hopefully we’ll make some flavoring for our fesoko fish.’
c. eh he
greement
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘“All right” she said.’
In line (40a), the speaker uses compounded markers EM22 taka for suggestion
of a 2nd person prior agreement and nafa logophorically for marking the third
person; the speaker also uses the EM2 tifa to affirm her need or wish. Of interest
is the narrator’s final comment about how even though he is lying to his wife, the
speaker is able to convince her by using these epistemic markers that he should
take his mother-in-law to the salt plants.
(40) a. uge=taka=nafa
me=EM22=EM20
uk𝑤oto–iña=tifa
dual-parent-BEN=EM2
ikï-ponde-fï
drying.rack-arrange-ADV
u-feke
1-ERG
nïgï-fi-feke.
qUOT-EV-ERG
‘“I recall you may have told me (about her) that our parent wanted
me to be responsible for setting up the drying rack for her benefit ”,
he must have said something like that.’
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b. eŋgu-Gi-ta
deceive-TRNS-CONT
i-feke
3-PRSP
‘He was deceiving her.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa 1979)
4.1.3 kato (EM18)
This is another marker with logophoric uses, a strategy for gossipy speech as
the speaker is sharing worrisome information regarding a 3rd person with an
interlocutor, and denies any responsibility for what is being said. The speaker
confirms what the 3rd person has said, but does not always accept it as legitimate.
As the speaker aligns in this manner with the 3rd person outside the present
speech context the shared proposition is puzzling, or even worrisome.
From the Kwambï, a ritual song during which gossip about the singer is “thrown
back” at the original speakers:
(41) kuGife-mbe=kato
witches.dart-SE=EM18
ti-ka-gi-ti
REF-make-TRNS-DES
i-feke
3-ERG
‘I’m worried he wants to make witches’ darts.’ (sung by Kudyu at Aifa,
1967)
People are trying to kill jaguars. They come to a community to see if some
youths can be prepared as warriors. The boys are tested by killing a tapir. In Line
(42a) the speaker uses the third person logophiric kafa because the childen’s ac-
tions confirms their proposal of a joint venture. In Line (42b), there is use of kato.
Here the proposal that the children might be able to kill the jaguars is considered
possible by the speaker but still somewhat weak and worrisome, which is given
further context by the narrator’s explanatory material in Line (42c).
(42) a. agetsi-tsi=mbembege=dya=kafa
one-M=PE=DS=EM17
ule-tsaŋe
AFR-DEO
‘They seem to have wanted to do that together to it (the tapir), what
we had them do.’
b. ata-dye=kato
EQA-SS=EM18
ku-mugu-ko-feke
1+2-son-PL-ERG
ukw-opi-dyï-ko-iŋo
1+2-avenge-PNCT-PL-FUT.2
‘I’m not sure, but since they’ve done it that way, our children must
want to avenge us later.’
c. etsï-ŋi-nda-ko=mbe=dya-fa
fright-INTR-CONT-PL=SE=DS-TOP
‘They were still frightened by what those others (jaguars) kept doing.’
(said by Saŋafa at Aifa)
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4.1.4 tiki EM19
This marks the speaker’s refusal to accept a role in an endeavor described by the
interlocutor or by third persons. tiki is also a mirative form that emphasizes the
speaker’s sudden surprise concerning the contrastive understanding or disagree-
ment. The form may be derived from the negative mirative suffix –ki (see also
example 48f–48g with tifa).
A woman has been abducted by powerful beings and left in her hammock tied
to a tree in the wilderness. When she wakes up, she says:
(43) una=tiki
Q=EM19
egei
ADEM
u-e-tïfïgï
1-come.to-IMP
‘How in the world did I (or ? could I have wanted to’) come here like
this?’ (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
A warrior from a cannibal group cannot understand why his future wife says
others fear he has come to kill them all, because he’s only come to marry her.
(see earlier part of this conversation in (70).
(44) a. una-male
Q-so.many
ago
these.people
te-ta
go.away-CONT
figei
ADEM
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘“Why are so many of these people here going away like this”, he
asked her.’
b. ñ-eŋe-tu-nda-ko
DE-fear-TRNS-CONT-PL
ts-ale
EX-always
igei
many
e-feke
IDEM 2-ERG
‘They’re frightened of what you’re always like.’
c. tuelï-ko
kill-PNCT-PL
faŋa-mi-ta
worry-adversative-CONT
igei
IDEM
efeke.
2-ERG
‘They’re worried that you will kill them all like this.’
d. ta-tiki
RQ-EM19
Ø-ẽ-lï-ko-iña
3-kill-PNCT-PL-DAT
u-e-na-lï
1-come.to-INTR-PNCT
‘Why should anyone say I’ve come here to kill you all?’
e. awu-nda-fïŋï=mbe=dye
like-CONT-resemble=SE=SS
tsa=lefa.
EX=SEQ
‘What they’re saying is like a lie.’
f. e-lï-ko-iña-la
kill-PNCT-PL-DAT-QN
tale
NEG.always
igei
IDEM
u-e-tïfïgï,
1-come-IMP
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘I never came like this to kill you all’
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g. fïgei-pe
arrow=ESS
apokine-nïgï=mbe=dye
put.down-PFV=SE=SS
tsa
EX
i-feke
3-ERG
ule-fa
AFR-TOP
‘He had already put down his arrows because of what she was saying.’
h. iñalï
NEG
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘“Not so”, he said to him.’ (said by Apihũ at Aifa, 1967)
4.1.5 nafa (EM20)
With this marker, a 1st person responds to the interlocutor regarding a 3rd person
animate non-human agent or subject participant. nafa is used in regard to the
speaker assuming the interloctor has customary knowledge of the consequences
of the context.
(45) u-ifi-fo-lu=nafa
1-touch-HYP-PNCT=EM20
e-feke
2-ERG
sike-feke-fa
tocandira.ant-ERG-TOP
e-fife-po-lï
2-bite-HYP-PNCT
‘You must know if you were to touch me the tocandira ant would sting
you.’ (said by Tufule at Aifa, 1979)
While introducing the character Cuckoo, the storyteller confirms that I already
know what he’s talking about, as he was keenly aware I had already worked with
others identifying Kalapalo bird names.
(46) fitsagu,
cuckoo
tu-fu-ti-sï=nafa
REF-know-TRNS-PNCT=EM20
e-feke
2-ERG
‘Cuckoo, you must already know yourself what that is.’ (said by Kudyu at
Aifa, 1982)
The following example describes people escaping a massacre who are giving
out dead hummingbirds as food to their fellow travellers. What occurs as a con-
sequence is a case of oracular interpretation. Responsibility for a problematic
decision is displaced deictically away from the discourse of the 2nd person hu-
man locutors and onto the 3rd person non-human epistemic object. In Line (47b),
there is a use of muk𝑤e (EM12)as ‘hoping in vain’. In Line (47c), there is a use
of maki (EM13) marking change of opinion after receipt of new information (see
also line iv). Line (47d) shows EM13 suffixed by the negator –la (QN) as are final
elements of the other clauses.
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(47) a. lepe,
next
ohsi
HORT
ku-ñi-kondï-ŋi
1+2-DE-give.out.NN
‘Then “let’s see whether or not we can share them (lit., our not
sharing)”.’
b. tï-kon-di
REF-give.out-ADV
Ø-feke-ni,
3-ERG-PL
pok, pok, pok,
(put down sound )
katote
all
itau=muk𝑤e-feke
woman=EM12-ERG
kugiti
everyone
‘They gave them out, the women hoped to give them out to everyone.’
c. he=dye=maki.
yes=SS=EM13
‘Yes, that’s not what I/we expected.’
d. afïtï=dye=maki-la
denial-SS-EM13-QN
aŋikogo-feke
fierce.people-ERG
kukʷ-e-lï-ko-la,
1+2-kill-PNCT-PL-QN
kukʷ-e-lï-ko-iŋo-la,
1+2-kill-PNCT-PL-FUT.2-QN
afïtï
denial
‘Since that wasn’t what I/we expected at all, the fierce people never
kill us all, will never kill us all, not so.’
e. i-ŋa-po-lï=nafa
3-left-over-HYP-PNCT=EM20
its-a-ini
EX-CONT-PL
iñopi-fo-lï-ko=lefa
go.back-HYP-PNCT-KO=SEQ
ule-tseŋugu-i
AFR-interrupt-COP
‘Had they found there was not enough (of them) for everyone, they
would have stopped that (i.e.travelling) and gone back for that
reason.’ (said by Ausuki at Aifa 1982)
In this example, an entire conversation is presented to show how EM19 emerges
at the end of presentation of knowledge by the interlocutors. This is when the
speaker expresses surprise and also questions knowledge. This utterance is cons-
tructed with a rhetorical question that emphasizes the speaker’s sudden and sur-
prising realization of the truth of what is being told him: Note in line (48d). there
is a compounded hearsay EVand EM20.
(48) a. apiči,
Grandfather
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘Grandfather, they said to him.’
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b. tisuge-ake
1+3-COM
egei
ADEM
efigï-ake.
2-grandson+COM
‘Together he and I, we’re your grandsons.”
c. tï-ma=ale-i
RQ-EM4=always-COP
u-figï-i
1-grandson-COP
‘How can it be there have always been grandsons of mine?’
d. tisuge-ti=nafa
1+3-EV-EM20
egei.
ADEM
‘That’s what we know as we’ve been told that about you.’
e. e-figï=nafa
2-grandson=EM20
egei
ADEM
itau-kuegï
woman-AUG
muku-gu-pe,
son-POSS-ESS
‘You now know Monstrous Woman had a son, that’s him over here.’
f. uge=tifa
me=EM2
egei
ADEM
Ñafïgï
NAME
muku-gu-pe.
son-POSS-ESS
‘I, myself, have learned I am one of Ñafïgï’s sons.’
g. eh he!
agreement
nïgifeke
qUOT
ah
EXP
ande-ŋu=tiki
here/now-DIM=EM19
u-fi-dyau
1-grandchild-PL
a-nïgï
EQS-PFV
‘“All right!” he answered. “The fact is, I had no reason to think you
little ones here were my grandchildren!”’ (said by Kambe at Aifa 1980)
4.2 Set F
This set marks differences between the speaker and listener regarding a speaker’s
agreement to participate in the proposal of a shared context for information. The
speaker appeals to a listener with a marked grade of confidence, referencing the
conjoint situation. There is a contrast between these and EM19, which marks the
speaker’s denial of any conjoint agreement.
4.2.1 aka EM21
The speaker substantiates the interlocutor’s proposition. Information is shared
by the speaker with the listener. The speaker declares there is existing, positive
alignment between herself (often as a member of a non-inclusive plural group)
and the listener. In example (49a), the speaker uses nika (EM7 Set B) to align with
the interloctor’s experience. In Line (49d), he uses eh he kiŋi, regretful agreement.
Based on his own experience, Cuckoo judges his wife’s family’s eyes are con-
stantly bothered by the smoke in their house.
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(49) a. ti-fati,
REF-ask-ADV
uma=ale
Q=always
igei
IDEM
igea=nika=ale
manner=EM7=aways
figei
ADEM
e-iñalï-ko
2-MAL-PL
‘Asking, “Aren’t you all always bothered this way like I am?”’
b. eh.
yes
ŋi-ke-fa
see-I-TOP
tisuge...
1+3
‘Yes, look at us.’
c. igei-fuŋu=aka
IDEM-resemble=EM21
tisuge,
1+3
igei-fuŋu
IDEM-resemble
‘As you see this is what we are like, like this’.
d. eh he
assent
kiŋi
EM11
‘Yes, but if only it weren’t so.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1982)
The Dead are invited to return to the living but decline. In Line (50a), the use
of nifa, EM25, marks that the (quoted) speaker shares a conjoint decision with
the listener.
(50) a. tis-ogo-pi-tsa=nifa
1+3-go.back-INTR-CONT=EM25
aña
dead
ki-lï
utter-PNCT
‘“All of us have agreed to go back”, the Dead said.’
b. tits-e-lï=aka
1+3-go-PNCT=EM21
ake-ts-igei=lefa
SD-EX-IDEM=SEQ
‘And so, as you see, we people must take leave of you.’ (said by Tufule
at Aifa, 1979)
4.2.2 taka EM22
This is a weak or uncertain conjunct marker. With this marker, the speaker pro-
poses to the listener (s)he will probably agree with the proposition but speaks
somewhat uncertainly. In my examples, =taka is seen with somewhat hesitant,
rather than assertive speech, as there is no direct evidence the listener can use
to assert knowledge or accept the proposition.
(51) aŋi
exist
muk𝑤e=taka
EM12=EM22
itau=go-pïŋï
woman-PAU-DEF
fogi-tsïgï
find-IPE
u-feke
1-ERG
‘As I hoped there were a few deficient women I found by chance.’ (said by
Kambe at Aifa 1979)
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The following example shows taka hosted by an “I told you so” quotative
(bracketed). The quotation, which precedes the quotative, is included in the scope
of the EM =taka.
(52) uk𝑤-aŋi-fofo
dual-exist-IM
[u-k𝑤 i-ta=taka]
1-utter-CONT=EM22
egei.
IDEM
‘“Let’s wait a while”, I suppose you might remember I said that.’ (said by
Nikumalu at Aifa 1979)
Use of taka with a Q word. The speaker asks a listener to help him remember
someone’s name:
(53) uwa=taka
Q=EM22
i-ñandsu
3-sister
ititï,
name
Kamisu?
NAME
‘What did I say about the sister’s name? Kamisu?’ (said by Ugaki at Aifa,
1979)
What follows is a conversational example regarding responsibility, with ex-
amples of several different logophoric markers. After travelling from place to
place without finding her, the relatives searching for a woman have arrived in
a community where some warriors (during the time of her abduction) had seen
people on the river. They have evidence but never knew how to interpret it until
they are told several years later about this woman who has been abducted. Their
interlocutor uses muk𝑤e as a politeness strategy. In Line (54b), kafa marks the
speaker’s weak presumption of the third person’s experience. In Line (54e), nika
is the second person logophoric marker emphasizing the speech of the visitor and
wãke marks the speaker’s first hand, distant past experience used to assert his
knowledge to the listener. What has happened is the warriors realize they didn’t
have any way of knowing the people they saw on the river were the woman
and her abductor. If so, they might have been able to release her. The narrator
describes the following conversation:
(54) a. tseta-ŋapa-fa
same.place-probably-TOP
i-dye-Gi-nïgï
3-ask.about-CAUS-PFV
i-feke
3-ERG
‘Most likely they asked about her there.’ (narrator’s line)
b. aŋi
result
fogi=kafa
search.for-EM17
inde
here
iñandsu
sister
e-tïfïgï
come-IMP
inde=mukwe
here=EM12
u-limo,
1-children
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘“Is there a chance someone who I’m looking for may be here, I hope
the sister came here my sons ”, he said about her.’
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c. ñalï=ma-e-tsaŋe
NEG-EM4-2-DEO
e-indi-sï
2-daughter-POSS
e-nïmi,
come-CONS
ta
tell
i-feke-ni.
3-ERG-PL
‘“We don’t think what you’re wanting, there’s not any reason your
daughter came here after all”, they answered.’
d. ule-ŋugi=taka=ale
AFR-interrupt=EM22=uninterrupted
egei-i
ADEM-COP
unago-fa,
some.others-TOP
tafaku
bow
oto-mo-fa,
master-PL-TOP
‘Before that (his constant talking about her) was suddenly interrupted
by some others, bow masters’
e. afïtï=nika
contrast=EM7
wãke,
EM1
endisï-fuŋu
daughter-resemble
wãke,
EM1
ti-ŋ-iŋi-lï-i
1+3-DE-see-PNCT-COP
wãke
EM1
‘How could we have known if that was the daughter we saw before
(about whom you spoke) we saw before?’ (said by Ugaki (Aifa, 1982)
4.2.3 kalaka EM23
EM23 marks the speaker’s impressions of a vague 3rd person reflexivity. The im-
pressons are positive although the speaker may have no direct evidence regard-
ing the 3rd person’s thoughts or even the identity of the person. This contrasts
with kato (EM18), which marks worrisome impressions of a hearsay or gossipy
nature on the part of the speaker. Irrealis features in the examples contribute
in several ways to the idea that kalaka marks an uncertainty ( because it intro-
duces the clause marked with koh EM10), and even a polite proposition (because
the clause is used with the -iŋo FUT.2 distant future).
A woman suggests to her sisters that a new fruit might be used as a drink if
the Trickster invents it. The use of the irrealis distant future FUT.2 contributes to
this weak proposition.
(55) aŋi
result
fogi=kalaka
find=EM23
tï-iñambe=nïm-iŋo-koh
REF-drink-INTR-FUT.2=EM10
ta-ti
qUOT-EV
i-feke
3-ERG
‘“He could find in itself a kind of drink for us sometime”, she kept saying
about it, they say.’ (said by Tufule at Aifa 1979)
From a conversation between a Kalapalo speaker and the present author about
usage:
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(56) a. ege
3PDEM
muku-gu
son-POSS
ipo-pïgï=kalaka
pierce-VPE=EM23
egei-i
ADEM-COP
‘She might have wanted someone to pierce her son (i.e. pierce her
son’s ears).’
b. ah-la-tsï,
EXP-like.that-EV
ege
3PDEM
muku-gu
son-POSS
i-po-pïgï
3-pierce-PFV
its-a
EX-CONT
egei.
ADEM
‘The fact is I’ve been telling you her son’s ears have been already
pierced.’
In this example, the speaker suggests his mother-in-law (whom he can’t ad-
dress directly) might have an opinion different from his own. In Line (57b) he
uses aka marking information shared with his wife. Because of affinal avoid-
ance, the speaker has no direct evidence of his mother-in-law’s wishes and so
uses kalaka in (57c).
(57) a. ah
EXP
Ñuku
NAME
nïgifeke
qUOT
ai
EXP
efitsu
wife
ki-lï
utter-PNCT
‘“The fact is Ñuku”, he said to her. “What?”, his wife answered.’
b. ta-iku=nile
RQ-fully=wrong
ukwi-ta-ku=aka
dual-CONT-fully=EM21
igei
IDEM
‘Why do we have to speak so mistakenly to each other about this?’
c. aŋi=kalaka
result=EM23
ukw-oto
dual-parent
iŋu-kugu-mbo-lï
join-fully-INTR-PNCT
‘I’m not sure but maybe our parent has decided to come along by
herself.’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa, 1979)
4.2.4 nipa EM24
The morpheme marks a contradiction involving an interlocutor’s or 3rd person’s
role treated as different from what has been experienced, said, or seen. nipa is
often used in examples that reference the distant past, but where the speaker
has some historical evidence of positive impressions of 3rd persons. For example
in (58) the narrator’s use of nipa references impressions of temporally distant
others, no longer present but mentioned in historical narratives.
(58) teh
nice
ekugu=mbe=nipa
fully=SE=EM24
u-kuge
1-people
‘Except that my (ancestor) was thought very beautiful when that
happened.’ (Kofoño to EB at Aifa, 1979)
223
Ellen B. Basso
Here the complement verb, ‘see, think’ in imperative mood (iŋ-ge), is used with
the main verb for ‘kill’. A warrior is addressing his relative, a person with little
experience:
(59) iŋ-ge
look/think-I
elu=mbe-tsï=nipa
kill=SE-EV=EM24
a-pi-ga
2-club-CONT
i-feke-ne
3-ERG-PL
‘Think carefully, don’t you realize (if you did that) they would club us to
death?’
In the context of a dispute about traveling, foreign visitors keep insisting upon
going in a certain direction, even though others repeatedly show them (using arm
motion) the direction to travel so as to avoid enemies. Possibly nipa is used as
the participants are foreigners with no knowledge of the local geography.
(60) a. la!
distant.place
e-te-ke
2-go-IMP
efu-ta=nipa
canoe-in=EM24
e-ge-tomi
2-travel-PURP
Atatsinu-kai
NAME-by.means.of
‘Except that’s the way you should go, different from how you
want/say, you go by canoe on the Atatsinu.’
b. afïtï,
denial
la
distant.place
u-te-ta-ni
1-go-CONT-FUT.1
‘I won’t, I’m going that (other) way.’
c. i-tagiñu-pe
3-speech-ESS
kugu,
fully
i-tagiñu-pe
3-speech-ESS
male!
too.much
‘So much of their speech, too much of that speech of theirs!’
d. la!
distant.place
e-te-ke,
2-go-I
Atatsinu-kai=nipa
NAME-DEST=EM24
e-te-ke,
2-go-I
la.
distant.place
‘That’s the way you should go, different from what you said, you
should go on the Atatsinu (creek), way over that way (even though
you don’t want to).’ (said by Kambe at Aifa 1982)
4.2.5 nifa EM25
The speaker invites interlocutor into a context to share knowledge, or asserts a
conjoint decision regarding 2nd person or 3rd person (see also example (50a).
(61) ukwatsa-ke-nifa
dual-run-I-EM25
ku-nitsu-na
1+2-grandmother-ALL
‘We really should hurry over to that grandmother of ours.’
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The following example is a discussion of the need for a conjoint decision de-
spite an oracular message to the contrary. In line (62b) the speaker uses kiŋi (con-
traspective negation); and aka (confirmation of a 2nd person). A father is asked
to help prepare his young son to be a warrior who will kill ravaging jaguars. Un-
like the earlier examples (45)–(48) in which the oracular message is accepted, in
this case it is at first rejected but as the need to act is far more important nifa is
used (62c) together with the politeness muk𝑤e ‘hope in vain’ as the speaker, a
leader, is requesting something very special of the interlocutor that will benefit
the community as a whole.
(62) a. taloki=muk𝑤e
useless=EM12
figei
ADEM
eŋï=muk𝑤e-fa
do=EM12-TOP
e-mugu
2-son
tïi-lï
make-PNCT
ku-pehe
1+2-ERG
nïgifeke.
qUOT
‘“It may be useless but even so we should try and make your son”,
they said.’
b. eh he
agree
kiŋ-ale,
EM11-always
afïtï-ku=aka
denial-INT=EM21
u-wituŋu=mbe-su
1-dream=SE-PEJ
ifo-fïŋï
image-resemble
egitse
unable
egei.
PDEM
‘If only it wasn’t so. I want you to know I’ve never had such a dream
image as that, to my detriment.’
c. taloki=muk𝑤e=nifa
useless=EM12=EM25
kuk-opiso-ko-omi-ŋo=muk𝑤e-fa
1+2-avenge-PL-PURP-FUT.2=EM12-TOP
ku-mugu-ko
1+2-son-PL
tu-itu-e.
REF-make-I
‘It may be useless but even so in order to try and have someone
avenge us we need to make our son.’
d. eh he
agree
nïgifeke.
qUOT
‘“All right”, he answered.’ (said by Kambe at Aifa, 1979)
4.3 papa EM26
This marker is used when the speaker agrees the interlocutor should cooperate
by joining in a proposed activity. Use of papa seems also to be a politeness strat-
egy in speech about affinal relatives, as seen in both examples.
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The following conjoint example involves a mother agreeing to participate in
her dauughter’s new relationship of marriage, as seen by the pair’s reciprocal
use of the affinal civility register in which special politeness kin terms (daughter
referring to her husband as ‘your nephew’ and her mother referring to her son-
in-law as ‘your younger brother’ are used.
(63) a. u: um,
EXP
ama
Mother
nïgifeke,
qUOT
ama.
Mother
‘“Mother”, she said, “Mother”’
b. ande
here/now
a-fatuwï.
2-nephew,
ande
here/now
a-fatuwï
2-nephew (=daughter’s husband)
‘I’m thinking your nephew’s here now, I’m thinking your nephew’s
here now.’
c. eh he
agreement
nïgifeke.
qUOT
‘“All right”, she answered.’
d. ah,
EXP
e-fisï-tomi=papa
2-younger.brother-PURP=EM.26
ege-na
3-ALL
e-iña...
2-BEN
‘The fact is, if you want him to come be your younger brother (i.e.
new husband) on your behalf, that’s all right with me...’ (Afanda told
by Ugaki at Aifa 1979)
In an imperative construction, the speaker uses papa to agree with his wife:
(64) ege-ke=papa
2-take.away-IMP=EM26
kuigiku
manioc.soup
nïgïfeke,
qUOT
ukw-oto-iña,
dual-parent-BEN
ukw-oto-iña.
dual-parent-BEN
‘“I agree you should take this soup with you”, he said to her, “for our
parent, for our parent”.’ (said by Ugaki at Aifa 1979)
4.3.1 apa EM27
This EM appears to be informal in comparison with EM26. The speaker wants a
2nd or 3rd person to cooperate as asked. (1 cooperates with 2 as in (65a); 1 asks 2
to cooperate as in (66–67)).
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(65) a. u-limo-wï-tsïpïgï-fa
1-child-father-unending-TOP
fu-mi-kege
send-TRNS-IMP
u-wetiko-gu-ki
1-belt-POSS-INST
e-te-tomi
2-go=PURP
aikaku-na,
NAME-ALL
uguka-ki.
shell.ornaments-INST
‘Send the father never having my children (politeness locution) to get
my belt(s) from the Aikaku, to get shell ornaments (s).’
b. eh he
agreement
nïgifeke
qUOT
‘“All right” she said to him.’
c. u-ki-ta-ni=apa=fofo
I-utter-CONT-FUT.1=EM27=IMM
i-feke
3-ERG
i-fitsu
3-wife
ki-lï
utter-PNCT
‘“I’ll speak to him right away just as you wish”, his wife said.’ (said by
Tufule at Aifa 1979)
(66) a. agetsi-ŋo-i-tsï=apa
one-NLOC-COP-EV=EM27
ku-te-ga-ni-ni,
1+2-go-CONT-PL-FUT.1
‘I want us to all go together soon,’
b. kule-mi-la=ale=keñi
take.care-ADV-QN-always=beware
e-mugu-ko
2-son-PL
undu-pesi-kïgï
attack-ugly-PFV
i-feke-ni
3-ERG-PL
‘as we can never stop watching out in case they make an attack on
your son.’ (said by Madyuta at Tangugu, 1979)
(67) ah,
EXP
e-ŋi-ke=apa
2-see-I=EM27
ande-la-iña
here/now-NEG-DAT
its-apï-gï-ko
3-footprint-POSS-PL
its-a,
EX-CONT
tï-fitseŋe-ki-ñï
REF-stink-INTR-SN
akago
those.people
‘The fact is, you can see their footprints here just as I did, those people
over there are the Stinking People whom I want you to see.’ (said by
Madyuta at Tangugu, 1979)
(68) i-ŋi-gote-fa
3-bring-CONC-TOP
ku-pehe
1+2-ERG
safake-fi-tsïgï-tsï=apa
3-body.trunk-crush-IPE-EV-EM27
e-ta...,
come-CONT
‘If we want to bring (some of it), “come on let’s go get ‘it’s crushed body”
like you did...’ (said by Kudyu at Aifa 1979)
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4.3.2 tima EM28
A contrastive (1≠2)used when the speaker wishes to assert a strong disclaimer of
responsibility, particularly a denial of fault after being blamed by an interlocu-
tor. The rhetorical question prefix tï contributes to the sense of angry negation.
Context: The story concerns a maned wolf father who is looking for his son‘s
poisoner, going from one plant to another:
(69) a. tï-tomi=tima
RQ-PURP=EM28
e-mugu
2-son
igi-fes-iñalï
head-ugly-MAL
u-feke
1-ERG
‘Why should I be blamed for bothering your son?’
b. u-ikeu-te-la=muk𝑤e-ti
1-be.angry-TRNS-QN=EM12-DES
igitse
unable
e-mugu
2-son
ё-ta
come-CONT
u-fanu-tsoke-tiGi
1-?-chew-ADV
‘I never tried to get angry when your son came to chew open my
fruit.’
c. tï-tomi=tima
RQ-PURP=EM28
u-ikeu-ŋalï
1-be.angry-MAL
i=feke
3-ERG
‘Why should I be blamed for getting angry with him?’ (said by
Kudyu at Aifa 1979)
Context: The warrior comes to marry a young woman, but as he is always
clutching his bundle of arrows to his chest, her mother is very frightened.
(70) a. iŋ-ke-fa
look-I-TOP
nïgifeke,
qUOT
ukw-apïŋï
dual-die-PFV
fegei
ADEM
‘“Think of it”, she said, “Someone like that will make us die.”’
b. ah
EXP
tafako
bow
oto
master
ale
CUM
elei,
PDEM
kukw-e-luiŋo
1+2-kill-FUT.2
fegei
ADEM
i-feke.
3-ERG
‘Believe me, they’re all bow masters over there, as someone like that
he’s going to kill us.’
c. eh he
agreement
ta-tima
RQ-EM28
afïtï
contrastive
‘How can I be blamed, that’s wrong.’
d. ta-te-ŋalï-ko
NEG-go-MAL-PL
u-feke,
1-ERG
u.um,
EXP
ta-te-ŋalï-ko
NEG-go-MAL-PNCT-PL
u-feke.
1-ERG
‘Why should I kill them? I’m trying to figure out why they think I
should kill them.’ (said by Apihũ at Aifa 1967)
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5 Final observations
These many examples show how the several rich grammaticalized epistemic
subsystems in the language may only be revealed in full through a discourse-
centered approach that examines the natural contexts in which these occur. A
researcher depending primarily on elicitation or ordinary conversation might
miss many of them altogether, as I discovered over time, particularly as EM so
often occur during socially discordant speech events that speakers are reluctant
to invent for the foreign listener. Narrative and ritual speech frameworks include
marking of changes in the intersubjective relation when new information is re-
ceived, positive acceptance of a conjoint activity is requested by the interlocutor,
and when acceptance or outright rejection of the interlocutor’s proposition oc-
curs. In a conversational context, there are a variety of graded ways these can be
marked, from strong assertion to a weak, inferential marking and denial or dis-
joint marking. Politeness or impoliteness occurs in many examples, particularly
where the epistemic markers are used to mark judgments regarding conjoint ac-
tivities. With regard to a third person, the marker used depends on whether the
speaker is making an inference of the third person’s stance based on common
or historical memory (the logophroic kalaka versus nipa), as well as a stance
marking based on conventional sociocultural knowledge regarding the behavior
of a non-human actor (marked by nafa). Nuckolls & Michael (2012) note the im-
portance of understanding sociocultural factors connected to the emergence of
this complex type of linguistic feature. Kalapalo EM occur in ordinary conversa-
tion, greetings, affinal civility (a register involving constrained speech and gestu-
ral modesty) disagreement and even impolite description of a proposition , and
most notably in quoted conversations that form important segments of extended
narrative discourse. EM contribute pragmatically in these contexts to the “unity
and the experience of stance as it emerges in dialogic interaction” (Du Bois 2007:
35), and there may be more person-to-person temporal and evidential features
involved. EM show types of distribution of responsibility, including requested or
agreed-upon alignment involving participation in an epistemic context, as well
as a speaker’s denial or rejection of co-participation, and denial of alleged re-
sponsibility. Quoted speech in narrative discourse exemplifies a speaker’s need
to shift between a focus on the epistemic object, marking of unique or shared
perspectives, and reference to the interpersonal participation in epistemically
situated discourses (which may also include deliberate impoliteness, involving
the speaker’s refusal to use the civility register as anticipated by interlocutors).
As is often the case, such contexts themselves change throughout a conversa-
tion, and there are a number of EM (especially sets C and D) that mark the nature
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of these person-to-person deictic shifts. This body of Kalapalo data forces us to
look at interpersonal speech practice and experience, which challenges a sim-
ple contrast between private and public, micro- and macro-sociological events.
Memories of such dialogical production of meaning and the effect of these pro-
cesses on social roles and relationships are preserved in the Kalapalo narrative
materials discussed here, an important source for understanding the social and
historical forces that have led to the emergence of this complex set of epistemic
markers.
Phonological symbols
Where my symbols are different from IPA conventions, the latter are placed in
brackets. Alto Xingu conventions are marked (AX). Consonants: voiceless stops:
p: bilabial; t: post-alveolar; k: velar; kʷ : dorso-velar; voiced stops: d: post-alveolar;
g: velar; post-alveolar voiced stop: dy [d𝑦]; prenasal voiced bilabial stop: mb [𝑚b];
voiced uvular flap: ɢ; voiceless fricative: f [ɸ]; voiceless alveolar fricative: s; voice-
less glottal fricative: h; voiced post-alveolar affricate: ts; voiced velar affricate: č;
bilabial nasal: m; velar nasal: n; post-alveolar nasal: ñ [ɲ] nh (AX) ; velar nasal: ŋ
ng (AX);post-alveolar lateral: l; bilabial semivowel: w; velar semivowel: y. Vow-
els: front: medial: e; unrounded: i; Central: medial: ï [ɨ] ü (AX); unrounded: a;
Back: rounded: u; medial: o [ɤ]; stressed vowels show nasalization.
Abbreviations
ADEM adnominal
demonstrative
AFR anaphoric focus referent
AUG augmentative
CONS consequential
CUM cumulative
DE de-ergative
DEO deontic
DES desiderative
DS different subject
EM epistemic clitic or free
particle
EQA active equative
EQS stative equative
ESS essence
EV evidential
EX existential
EXN existential nominalizer
EXP epistemic expressive
FUT.1 anticipated future
FUT.2 potential future
IDEM identificational demonstrative
IMM immediate
IMP imperfective
INT intensive
INST instrumental
IPE end result of involuntary
process
NLOC locative nominalizer
NN negative nominalizer
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PDEM pronominal demonstrative
PE perpetual event
PEJ pejorative
QN quatifier negator
RQ rhetorical question
SD deontic subject
SE same event
SEL selective
SEQ sequential
SS same subject
USIN usuative nominalizer
VPE end result voluntary
event
, short pause
> inverse marking
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Appendix
Table: Kalapalo Epistemic Clitics/Particles (5 pages)
Category Pragmatic roles Other semantic
feature(s)
Translation
A. Focus is on
evaluation of
the epistemic
object; speaker
is inside the
description of
the object or is
foregrounded
(6 markers)
not confirming
speech events
but on thoughts,
wishes, plans,
etc. focus is on
speaker’s
experience or
attitude based on
2nd or 3rd person
ideas or thoughts
degrees of
inference
1. wãke assertion
confirms
speaker’s own
experience
distant past ‘I remember’
2. tifa correction about
what
interlocutor
thinks re
speaker’s
comment about
a 3rd person
recent or current
time
‘you’re incorect
what you think,
or saw’
3. laka weak inference may be negated ‘could be’
4. ma dubitative may be negated ‘don’t know’
5. maŋa incredulity mirative ‘how can it be’
6. kaŋa unlikely event ‘unlikely’,
‘hardly count
on...’
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Category Pragmatic roles Other semantic
feature(s)
Translation
B. Focus is on
evaluation of
the epistemic
object; speaker
is outside the
description of
object or not
foregrounded
(4 markers)
not confirming
speech events;
focus is on
thoughts or
wishes, plans,
etc.
degrees of
inference
7. nika strong
presumptive
regarding
interlocutor’s
wants, thoughts,
etc.
past ‘what you want-
ed/saw/heard’
8. tata possible, some
uncertainty
inference; no
direct evidence;
past
‘possibly’,‘might
have’’
9.fïna weakly possible inference, past ‘could/might
have been’
10. koh unknown ‘I don’t know’
C.
Contra-spective;
focus on
speaker’s
attitude
vis-à-vis
epistemic object
(2 markers)
11. kiŋi; kiŋi-ni
(plural)
regretful confirmation,
polite
‘I regret’
12. mukʷe hopeful polite, restrained
or limited
expectation; in
vain
‘hope/wish in
vain’
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Category Pragmatic roles Other semantic
feature(s)
Translation
D. Counter-
expectation,
re-evaluation or
correctives of
speaker’s or
denial of own
prior
proposition
(3 markers)
13. maki unexpectedly
now accepted
based on new
information
‘I see now’
14. makina speaker now
agrees
prior
information now
accepted
‘Now I agree
with you’
15. pile speaker
rejects’own
proposition,
thoughts
new
introspective
knowledge
‘I was wrong
after all’
E. Focus on
participants in
referenced
contexts;
degrees of
alignment with
another’s
epistemic
judgment
(5 markers)
16. tafa confirmation
(1 →2)
authority of
speaker
‘You were right’
17. kafa Some doubt 3rd
p.
‘They’re right
after all’
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Category Pragmatic roles Other semantic
feature(s)
Translation
18. kato worrisome,
puzzling
proposition
regarding a 3rd
person
may be used in
gossipy songs
‘might be’
19. tiki negation, denial
of responsibility
in experience,
wishing
ki may be a
negated mirative
‘how can I
have...’; ‘why
should you have
said I...’
20 nafa neutral
regarding 3rd
person
animate,
non-human
epistemic object;
can be negated
‘as you know’;
‘had they known,
found...’ ’no
reason to think...’
F.
Intersubjectivity
or contextual
alignment:
speaker appeals
to another with
grade of
confidence or
disputed
conjoint event
(8 markers)
21. aka shared
information
Speaker
substantiates
interlocutor
‘I/we agree’;
‘Don’t/aren’t
you?’’
22. taka confirmed 2nd p
shared weak
information
3rd person
probability;
speaker
moderates
conviction
‘I suppose that’s
so what you
say/think’’
23. kalaka possibity re. 3rd
p. Speaker’s
information may
be incorrect
no direct
evidence
‘I don’t know but
maybe/could be’’
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Category Pragmatic roles Other semantic
feature(s)
Translation
24. nipa contradiction;
negation of
interlocutor’s
presupposition
sometime
indirect
evidence;
sociocultural
understandings
‘Except that’
25. nifa speaker invites
listener into
context to share
knowledge
‘Let’s…’
26. papa speaker agrees
with listener
conformative,
polite
‘ I’ll do as you
wish’
27. apa encouragement
to conform with
speaker
informal
acceptance
‘you do as I have’
28. tima contrastive,
denial regarding
own role
speaker does not
accept blame,
strong negation
‘I can’t be
blamed’; ‘Why
do you say that
I...’
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Chapter 8
Epistemic uses of the pretérito
pluscuamperfecto in La Paz Spanish
Geraldine Quartararo
Department of Romance Studies and Classics, Stockholm University
This paper explores epistemic-evidential uses of the pluperfect, i.e. pretérito plus-
cuamperfecto, in La Paz Spanish. The pretérito pluscuamperfecto displays functions
of a reported evidential form, conforming to results from previous studies on Ar-
gentinian Spanish (Bermúdez 2008; Speranza 2014) and, furthermore, is used ac-
cording to a previously unnoticed inferential evidential function. Using theoretical
frameworks from Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018), this paper describes the
configuration of participant roles and event types implied in the different eviden-
tial functions of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto.
1 Introduction
Romance languages do not possess grammaticalised evidentials and express the
evidential domain through verbal inflection. In peninsular Spanish, for instance,
the evidential domain is expressed by means of the simple future, the past im-
perfect, the present conditional and the past conditional. The simple future and
the present conditional are used to express inference in the present (1) and in the
past (2), respectively.
(1) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added)
Ahora
now
serán
be.FUT.3PL
las
ART.F.PL
cuatro.
four
‘It must be (lit. will be) 4 o’clock.’
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(2) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added, translation modified)
Serían
be.CON.3PL
las
ART.F.PL
ocho
eight
cuando
when
salimos.
go.out-PST.1PL
‘It was (lit. would be) 8 o’clock when we left.’
Whereas the imperfect (3) and the past conditional1 (4) are used to express
reported evidentiality.
(3) Peninsular Spanish (Reyes 1996: 31; gloss added, translation added)
a. ¿Qué tal
how
sigue
follow-textscprs.3sg
Ana?
PN
‘How is Ana doing?’
b. Mejor
better
me
1SG.DAT
parece.
seem-PRS.3SG
No
not
la
3SG.F.ACC
v-i,
see-PST.1SG
porque
because
cuando
when
llegu-é
arrive-PST.1SG
dorm-ía.
sleep-PST.IPFV.3SG
Pero
but
hab-ía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
com-ido
eat-PTCP
algo,
something
y
and
tenía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
menos
less
fiebre.
fever
Esta
this
noche
night
la
3SG.F.ACC
veía
see.PST.IPFV.3SG
el
the
médico
doctor
de nuevo.
again
‘I think she’s better. I did not see her, because when I arrived, she was
sleeping. But she had eaten something and had lower fever. Tonight,
the doctor is supposedly going to see (lit. saw) her again.’
(4) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added, translation modified)
Según
according.to
fuente-s
source-PL
políticas
politic-PL.F
consult-ad-as
consult-PTCP-PL.F
por
by
este
this
periódico,
newspaper
Milosevic
NP
hab-ría
have-COND.3SG
aceptado
accept-PTCP
que
that
la
ART.F.SG
fuerza de interposición
peacekeeping.force
en
in
Kosovo
Kosovo
est-é
be-SUBJ.1SG
compue-sta
form-PTCP.F
por
by
un
ART
30% de
of
efectivo-s
troop-PL
de
of
la
ART.F.SG
OTAN.
NATO
‘According to political sources consulted by this newspaper, Milosevic
accepted (lit. would have accepted) the Kosovo peacekeeping force to be
composed of 30% NATO troops.’
1The evidential use of the past conditional is restricted to journalistic or more formal prose
(Reyes 1996: 33).
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With regard to the pretérito pluscuamperfecto, Spanish grammars (Hernández
Alonso 1986, Cartagena 1999) describe it as the tense that points out the consecutio
temporum ‘sequence of tenses’ between two past actions: the more recent action
is conjugated in imperfect, simple past or present perfect, while the preceding
action is in pretérito pluscuamperfecto.
(5) Peninsular Spanish (10_SP_TASK: 10)
luego
then
mi
my
la
ART.F.SG
mi
my
mujer
woman
fue
go.PST.3SG
a
to
vend-er
sell-INF
lo
3SG.ACC
que
that
hab-ía
have-IPFV.3SG
cosech-ado
harvest-PTCP
y
and
yo
I
me
1.REFL
fui
go.PST.1SG
a
to
sent-ar
sit-INF
‘Then my wife went to sell what she had harvested and I went to sit.’
Moreover, the Nueva Gramática de la Lengua Española (Española 2010: 542)
indicates two other uses of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto, such as the expression
of habitual actions (6) and politeness (7).
(6) Peninsular Spanish (RAE 2010: 452; gloss added, translation added)
A
at
esa
that
hora,
hour
los
the
viernes
friday
Eugenio
NP
hab-ía
have-IPFV.3SG
sal-ido
go.out-PTCP
del
from.ART.SG
trabajo.
work
‘At that time, every Friday, Eugenio went (lit. had gone) out from work.’
(7) Peninsular Spanish (Hernández Alonso 1986: 355; gloss added, translation
added)
Hab-ía
have-IPFV.3SG
pens-ado
go.out-PTCP
yo
I
ped-ir-le.
ask-INF-3SG.DAT
‘I was thinking (lit. had thought) to ask him/her.’
In addition to these normative uses, studies on Latin American Spanish va-
rieties (Laprade 1981; Mendoza 1991; Callisaya Apaza 2012; Adelaar & Muysken
2004; Speranza 2014; Bermúdez 2008) have also attested evidential uses of the
pretérito pluscuamperfecto (8).
(8) La Paz Spanish (Laprade 1981: 224; gloss added, translation modified)
Me
1.REFL
hab-ía
have-IPFV.3SG
tra-ído
bring-PTCP
est-a
this-F
puntabola.
pen
‘I (accidentally) brought (lit. had brought) this pen with me.’
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The specialized literature on the evidential use of the pretérito pluscuamper-
fecto in Argentinian Spanish is limited to two studies, i.e. Bermúdez (2008) and
Speranza (2014). While questioning the temporal function of the pretérito plus-
cuamperfecto, Bermúdez (2008) shows four evidential functions of this tense: an
‘external source’, which expresses the perspective of a third party; ‘shared access
to information’, marking information also known by the addressee; ‘endophoric
source’, marking information that does not come from sensory experience; and
finally, ‘mirative’, which marks information that goes against speaker’s expecta-
tions. Speranza (2014), in turn, proposes a sociolinguistic analysis of the uses
of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto and observes a higher number of epistemic-
evidential uses in the varieties of Argentinian Spanish that are in contact with
languages with grammaticalised evidential-epistemic systems, such as Quechua
and Guaraní (Speranza 2014: 26). With respect to the expression of the commit-
ment to the truth of information provided by the pretérito pluscuamperfecto as
evidential-epistemic form, Bermúdez (2008) and Speranza (2014) arrive at differ-
ent conclusions. Bermúdez (2008: 217) states that the use of an indirect evidential
does not necessarily imply a low commitment to the truth of information:
Assigning information to an external source may mean either a weakening,
or a strengthening of the reliability of the utterance, this depends on the
level of reliability given to the source by the participants involved in the
language exchange.2
Whereas Speranza (2014: 111) states more precisely that the use of the pretérito
pluscuamperfecto implies the speaker’s low degree of commitment to the truth
of the information provided.
The appearance of the PPl (pretérito pluscuamperfecto) is related to utter-
ances where there is the possibility of greater ambiguity in the attribution
of what is mentioned […] the sender, then, expresses a lower degree of reli-
ability by selecting a subordinate tense.3
I am not aware of a separate study focusing on the epistemic-evidential func-
tion of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto in Bolivian and Peruvian Spanish, even
2El asignar una información a una fuente externa puede significar tanto una debilitación como
un fortalecimiento de la credibilidad de la afirmación, lo cual depende del nivel de credibilidad
concedido a la fuente en cuestión por los participantes del intercambio lingüístico.
3La aparición del PPl se vincula a emisiones en las que existe la posibilidad de mayor am-
bigüedad en la atribución de los dichos […] El enunciador, entonces, expresa su menor grado
de confiabilidad a través de la selección del tiempo verbal dependiente.
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though this use has been noted in the literature (Laprade 1981: 222–225; Men-
doza 1991: 196–203; Callisaya Apaza 2012: 306–308; Adelaar & Muysken 2004).
Laprade (1981: 223) notices that in La Paz Spanish the pretérito pluscuamperfecto
can have mirative function or indicate absence of direct knowledge. Along this
line, Mendoza (1991: 199) adds a further observation based on phonology, arguing
that whenever the pretérito pluscuamperfecto has evidential-epistemic function
in La Paz Spanish, the auxiliary verb haber ‘to have’ shows an accent shifting
from había to habiá. Finally, Callisaya Apaza (2012: 307) states that epistemic-
evidential uses of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto are also found in other regions
of Bolivia, although the author does not specify which ones. The contributions of
the present study are three-fold. First, it details the epistemic-evidential uses of
the pretérito pluscuamperfecto in La Paz Spanish. As already mentioned, the use
of the pretérito pluscuamperfecto as an indirect evidential form has been already
described for Argentinian Spanish (Speranza 2014; Bermúdez 2008), but its use in
other varieties of Latin American Spanish and, specifically, in Bolivian Spanish
has not been accounted for. The second contribution consists of further data that
highlights the pragmatic functions of the form in interaction. It is argued that,
in its evidential function, the pretérito pluscuamperfecto signals the distancing of
the speaker from the propositional content of the utterance. Such a distancing,
however, is not necessarily related to a low degree of commitment to the truth
of the information and, in this regard, the evidential uses of this tense, i.e. infer-
ential or reported, display different outcomes. The third contribution is to give
better insights on the configuration of the pragmatic features involved in the use
of pretérito pluscuamperfecto as evidential form. Following the theoretical frame-
work proposed by Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018), the pragmatic features
– such as event types and participant roles – involved in the different evidential
functions of the form as well as their distribution are discussed. The first-hand
data used in the study were collected in La Paz, Bolivia during 2014 and 2015.
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the pretérito pluscuamperfecto by
the acronym PPl (cf. Speranza 2014)4.
2 Evidentials, epistemic modality, participant roles and
event types
Aikhenvald (2004: 3) argues that the core meaning of evidentiality is the expres-
sion of the source of information, but she notes epistemic extensions for both
4This paper is based on chapter 10 of my PhD thesis (Quartararo 2017).
243
Geraldine Quartararo
reported (Aikhenvald 2004: 180) and inferential evidential markers (Aikhenvald
2004: 176). Such extensions are usually related to the expression of the speaker’s
degree of commitment to the truth of the information, i.e. epistemic modality,
and are attested in languages in which the two domains, i.e. evidentiality and
epistemic modality, are expressed by the same forms (Plungian 2001: 354, cf. Ro-
mance languages). The overlap between the two domains is visible in how indi-
rect evidentials may indicate both the speaker’s direct contact with the results of
an event, and the lack of such results. This is the case of inferring evidentiality5
(Willett 1988: 57), as in the use of the Italian future tense in (9), and reported evi-
dentiality (Willett 1988: 57), as in the use of the Italian conditional mood in (10).
In both cases, the speaker may express different degrees of reliability regarding
the verisimilitude of the state of affairs due to the lack of direct evidence.
(9) Italian (Squartini 2008: 923; gloss added, translation modified)
[Suon-ano
ring-PRS.3PL
alla
to.ART.SG
porta].
door
Sarà
be.FUT.3SG
il
the
postino.
postman
‘[The bell rings] It must be (lit. will be) the postman.’
(10) Italian (Squartini 2001: 311; gloss added)
Secondo
according.to
Luca,
PN
ieri
yesterday
il
the
treno
train
sarebbe
be.COND.3SG
part-ito
leave-PTCP
alle
to.ART.PL
5.
5
‘According to Luca the train left (lit. would have left) at 5 yesterday.’
In recent years, some studies on the pragmatic properties of evidentials (Cur-
now 2002, 2003; Clift 2006; Faller 2006; Hengeveld & Hattnher 2015) have signif-
icantly contributed to the description of semantic extensions acquired by eviden-
tials in specific communicative contexts. Such studies have also provided better
insights into the pragmatic features involved in the use of evidentials. Hanks
(2012: 172) summarizes three pragmatic dimensions that affect the use of eviden-
tials: source of knowledge, i.e. the source on which the information rests; source
of statement, i.e. the source of the utterance provided; and expressivity/interac-
tion force, i.e. the “subjective relation between the speaker and some element of
the utterance context” (Hanks 2012: 174). The first and third pragmatic dimen-
sions (i.e. source of knowledge and expressivity) have been detailed in studies
on evidentials, both from a typological perspective (Willett 1988; DeLancey 1997;
5Through the term “inferring” Willett indicates both inference, in Willett’s terms “results”, and
assumption, in Willett’s terms “reasoning”.
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Plungian 2001; Aikhenvald 2004) and in language specific descriptions (Curnow
2002, 2003; Clift 2006; Babel 2009), but the second pragmatic dimension, source of
statement, has received less attention in the literature. According to Hanks (2012:
174), two kinds of possible pragmatic effects belong to the source of statement, i.e.
the discourse modality and the participant roles. Discourse modality refers to the
perspective that speakers adopt in shaping their utterance. In this respect, Nuck-
olls (2012) demonstrates that, in Pastaza Quichua, the use of different evidential
markers in conversational context does not necessarily indicate the access to in-
formation, but it can also specify the perspective adopted by speakers towards
the information.
(11) Pastaza Quichua (Quechua languages, Ecuador y Perú; Nuckolls 2012: 231;
gloss modified)
a. Ñuka-ta
I-ACC
ña
now
kai
this
ruya-ta
tree-ACC
rikwi-i
look-IMP
chi
that
sʰapi-mi
base-EV
siri-u-n.
lie-DUR-3SG
‘Look at me (up in) this tree! It’s lying right at that base!’ (Context:
The speaking self of the narrative event (-mi sⁿ) where Luisa becomes
the voice of Tito talking to his friend)
b. Ni-sha-shi
say-COR-EVD
kapari-ni.
shout-1SG
‘Saying (according to my husband) I shout.’ (Context: The voice of the
other (-shi), where Luisa specifies the perspective of Tito who was
asserting something to her)
In examples (11a) and (11b), the use of two markers, i.e. the direct evidential
-mi and the reported evidential -shi, does not signal a difference in the way Luisa
has gained access to information. Since in both cases Luisa heard Tito’s words,
it rather points out the two different perspectives from which Luisa is providing
the information. In (11a), by using the evidential marker -mi, she provides infor-
mation from Tito’s perspective who de facto pronounced the words that she is
reporting. In (11b), on the other hand, by using the evidential marker -shi, Luisa
maintains her perspective and distances herself from Tito’s words.
The change of perspective implied by the use of different evidentials, as shown
for Pastaza Quichua, is essential to clarify the relevance of the second class
of pragmatic effects established by Hanks (2012), i.e. participant roles. Drawing
on Goffman’s (1981) classification, speakers can be said to occupy three roles,
namely, principal, author and animator. The principal is the one responsible for
the utterance, i.e. the last person who committed to the information provided.
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The author is the person who has chosen the words of the utterance in the nar-
rated world (Goffman 1981), i.e. who has pronounced it for the first time. Finally,
the animator is the person who physically produces the utterance. The three
roles generally overlap within the same speaker, e.g. in the sentence “I am fine”,
the speaker is principal since s/he is taking responsibility for his/her own emo-
tional and health status, as well as author and animator since s/he chooses the
words of the statement and physically utters them.
Further elements of the description of the pragmatic features involved in the
use of evidentials are provided by Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018). Kock-
elman (1957) proposes an implementation of Jakobson’s (1957) classification of
event types by adding a commitment event, and by expanding the narrated speech
event to apply to all evidential notions, calling it source event. The resulting set of
event types is composed by the speech event, the narrated event, the source event
and the commitment event. The speech event corresponds to the world in which
the utterance is made. The source event corresponds to the “spoken-about world
in which speaking occurs” (Kockelman 1957: 128), and may be distinguished ac-
cording to the type of contact that a speaker has with a source (Kockelman 1957:
143). The narrated event indicates the world described in the utterance. Finally,
the commitment event is the world where the speaker commits to the truth of the
proposition expressed (Kockelman 1957: 127). In addition to this proposal, Kock-
elman (1957) also establishes a correlation between Goffman’s (1981) participant
roles, i.e. animator, author and principal, and the new set of event types, i.e. the
speech event, the narrated event and the commitment event. Within this frame-
work, Bergqvist (2018) formulates another relation that connects source event
(Kockelman 1957: 128) with a new participant role defined as cognizer (Bergqvist
2018: 22), i.e. the person who perceives the event. This set of correspondences is
illustrated in 8.1.
Table 8.1: Correspondence between event types and participant roles
Event Type Speaker Role
speech event ⇔ animator
source event ⇔ cognizer
narrated event ⇔ author
commitment event ⇔ principal
If one takes the model of correspondences shown in 8.1, and applies this to
Example (11), above, it becomes possible to provide an analysis of the pragmatic
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features relevant to the use of evidentials. In (11a), Luisa produces the utterance
as if Tito was pronouncing it. This strategy results in two series of consequences
in the configuration of the correlation between event types and participant roles:
first, by reproducing Tito’s voice, Luisa creates an artificial overlap between the
participant roles of the two speakers, playing simultaneously the animator (Luisa
is indeed the last who pronounced the utterance), the author (Tito has chosen the
words of the information), the cognizer (Tito witnessed the event) and the prin-
cipal (Tito committed to the truth of his statement); second, by impersonating
Tito’s voice, Luisa fictitiously matches the world in which she is pronouncing the
utterance with the world in which Tito pronounced the utterance, i.e. the speech
event overlaps with the source event, since they fictitiously occur in the same
world. Given the use of the direct evidential -mi, the commitment event coincides
with the source event. Finally, considering that the narrated event does not make
any reference to the world in which the speech event occurs (e.g. in “I promise”),
it will be kept separate from the others. In (11b), the configuration of event types
and participant roles is different. By using the reported evidential -shi, instead,
Luisa specifies the separation between the speech event and the source event, the
narrated event is kept distinguished from the previous two event types and, fi-
nally, the configuration of the commitment event, as for the correlated participant
role, cannot be established.
3 Material, participants and method
Thirty Spanish-Aymara bilingual speakers participated in the study (17 males
and 13 females, age range: 18–64). All participants first learned Aymara and then
acquired Spanish during their childhood. The L2 proficiency in the standard va-
riety of La Paz Spanish varied among the speakers depending on age and level of
education. About 60% of the speakers had university level education, 26,6% had
secondary education and 13,4% had primary education.
The data was collected mainly in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia). The corpus
consists of fully transcribed recordings lasting 8 hours and 24 minutes in total.
The transcription convention employed (Briz & Universidad de Valencia 2000)
has also been used for the transcription of colloquial Spanish corpora and allows
for a faithful representation of speech.
The corpus is divided into three parts: the first and largest part consists of
the recordings of the “Family Problems Picture Task” (San Roque et al. 2012), the
second part consists of five recordings of the task “The Pear Story” (Chafe 1980),
and the third part consists of four recordings of personal narratives.
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The “Family Problems Picture Task” (FPPT) was created to activate the use of
cognitive categories such as evidentiality and mirativity (San Roque et al. 2012:
140). Its two-fold nature of problem-solving and interactive task allows the acti-
vation of inferential processes and, therefore, supports the analysis of the use of
evidentials in interactive settings. The task consists of 16 pictures in black and
white that follow a defined order. The temporal sequence and content of the pic-
tures are not always clear. Inferential processes are required to understand the
order and development of the story.
The FPPT was developed in five steps: in the first step, speakers were asked to
describe five of the sixteen pictures randomly selected by the fieldworker; in the
second step, speakers ordered all the pictures according to the story that they
believed it was represented; in the third step, one of the two participants in the
first two steps was asked to describe the story built in the first person singular;
in the fourth step, the other participant was asked to tell the story in the third
singular person to a third person who did not participate in the task until then;
finally, during the fifth step, the third participant was asked to tell the story s/he
had been told. In order to facilitate data analysis, the internal organization of the
transcriptions follows the same structure of the FPPT, i.e. each transcription is
divided into five parts.
4 The epistemic-evidential functions of the PPl
The corpus features 78 tokens of the PPl. The analysis reveals that in most of
the cases, 68%, the PPl is used according to its temporal function (see example
5), i.e. it indicates the temporal relation between two past actions; nevertheless,
in a significant number of cases, 32%, the PPl seems to operate as an epistemic-
evidential form, i.e. it specifies the epistemic relation between the speaker and
the event. When the PPl is used as an epistemic-evidential form, it may display
inferential evidence, reported evidence or mirativity. As an inferential evidential,
the PPl signals inference based on observable evidence (13 cases). As a reported
evidential, it signals second-hand report, i.e. the speaker has directly heard the
words of someone else (9 cases). Finally, as mirative form, it indicates surprise (2
cases). Table 8.2 summarizes this.
In the corpus, over 90% of the occurrences of the PPl (72 cases out of 78) comes
from the transcriptions of the FPPT; the remaining cases come from the transcrip-
tions of the personal narratives. By analyzing the distribution of these 72 cases
among the steps of the FPPT, it turns out that the PPl appears 8 times during the
first step, 5 times during the second step, 24 times during the third step, 22 times
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Table 8.2: Function of the PPl in the data
Function № of cases
Temporal function 54
Mirative function 2
Inferring results function 13
Reported second-hand function 9
Total 78
during the fourth step, and 13 times during the fifth step. By further narrowing
down this analysis to the cases in which the PPl seems to operate as an epistemic-
evidential forms, it is notable that all cases of PPl with evidential-epistemic func-
tions occur within the transcriptions of the FPPT. Secondly, no case of inferences
based on observable results occurs in the third (i.e. narrative in the first person)
and the fifth step of the task (i.e. report of the story to a third participant). Lastly,
the largest number of cases of the second-hand reported function appears in the
fifth step. This distribution is presented in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Evidential functions of the PPl (columns) for the steps of the
FPPT (rows)
FPPT Inferring results
evidence
Second-hand
reported evidence
Mirativity Total
Step I 2 1 2 5
Step II 3 - - 3
Step III - 1 - 1
Step IV 8 - - 8
Step V - 7 - 7
Total 13 9 2 24
4.1 Mirative or inferential function?
The debate on the relation between evidentiality and mirativity is still an open
one. On the one hand, some scholars discuss the nature of the relation between
the two domains: DeLancey (1997) and Aikhenvald (2004) consider them as sepa-
rate, while Lazard (1999) and de Haan (2012) consider them to be related. On the
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other hand, recent studies (Hill 2012) entirely reject the description of mirativity
as an independent category, arguing that direct evidence (“sensory evidence” in
Hill’s terms) is an adequate category to account for most of the markers described
as miratives in the literature.
Taking into account cases in which the use of the PPl is related to the expres-
sion of a direct, visual contact with the discourse object, the data shows three
situations: (i) the PPl can simultaneously signal both an inferential and a mira-
tive function (example 12), (ii) the PPl can signal only inference (example 13) and,
(iii) the PPl can signal only mirativity (example 14).
In a few cases, it is not possible to establish a clear distinction, or a hierarchy
between the inferential (Willett 1988) and the mirative function of the PPl; the
two functions, indeed, seem to co-exist and overlap within the same form, i.e. the
PPl [cf. 12].
(12) La Paz Spanish (5_SP_TASK: 6)
a. El
the
mismo
same
es.
be.PRS.3SG
‘It is the same.’
b. El
the
mismo
same
con
with
su
3.POS
mujer.
woman
‘The same with his wife.’
c. ...
......
d. aaaa
INTERJ
hab-ía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
sido
be.PTCP
agricultor
farmer
el
the
cuate
guy
‘Aaaa he is (lit. had been) a farmer, the guy’
e. est-án
be-PRS.3PL
cosech-ando
harvest-GER
no
no
‘They are harvesting, aren’t they?’
f. est-án
be-PRS.3PL
cosech-ando
harvest-GER
sí
yes
el
the
campo
countryside
es
be.PRS.3SG
‘They are harvesting, yes, it is in the countryside’
In (12), the speakers are describing picture (e) in Figure 8.1, which is the fifth
image shown to participants during the first step of the FPPT, showing a man
and a woman that are picking pumpkins in a garden. The remaining four pictures,
previously shown to the participants during this stage of the task, depict the man
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(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 8.1: Pictures used during the first step of FPPT
in a cell (picture 8.1a), drinking alcohol (picture 8.1b), hitting his wife (picture
8.1c), and standing in a courtroom (picture 8.1d).
From observing the first four pictures, speakers are not expected to be able
to guess the man’s profession. Picture 8.1e appears to present new and partly
surprising information, indicated by rising intonation and the interjection “aaaa”
(see Example 12, above). Although a mirative function is implied by this specific
use of the PPl, it is clear that an ongoing inferential process is at the foundation
of the information provided. There is no doubt, that in (12) the sentence where
the PPl occurs is an inference, given the fact that no pictures in the task clearly
show that the man’s profession is farming. A further instance of this evidential
function of the PPl is found in (13).
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(13) La Paz Spanish (3_SP_TASK: 11–12)
a. aquí
here
qué
what
est-á
be-PRS.3SG
hac-iendo
do-GER
este
this
señor
man
ya
already
le
3SG.DAT
empiez-a
start.PRS.3SG
a
to
cont-ar
tell-INF
ha
have.PRS.3SG
deb-ido
must-PTCP
est-ar
be-INF
lejos
far.away
trabaj-ando
work-GER
este
this
señor
man
tal vez
maybe
le
3SG.DAT
empiez-a
start-PRS.3SG
a
to
cont-ar
tell-INF
su
3.POS
señora
wife
a
to
su
3.POS
hijo
son
todo
all
el
the
suceso
happening
como
how
hac-ía
do-PST.IPFV.3SG
como
how
trabaj-aba
work-PST.IPFV.3SG
no
no
‘Here, what is this man doing? Aaa now he starts to tell. He must be
far away, this man, maybe. He starts to tell his wife and his son
everything happened. How he did, how he worked, no?’
b. y
and
su
3.POS
esposa
wife
escuch-a.
listen-PRS.3SG
‘And his wife listens’
c. y
and
acá
here
empiez-a
start-PRS.3SG
a
to
trabaj-ar
work-INF
deb-e
must-PRS.3SG
ser
be.INF
al
to.ART.SG
día
day
siguiente
next
o
or
más
more
tarde
late
no
no
ambos
both
trabaj-aban
work-PST.IPFV.3PL
recog-en
pick-PRS.3PL
su-s
3POS-PL
zapallo-s
pumpkin-PL
‘And here they start to work, it must be the day after or later, no?
both work, they are picking pumpkins’
d. zapallo-s
pumpkin-PL
‘Pumpkins’
e. o sea
that.is.INTERJ
est-as
this-F.PL
persona-s
person-PL
son
be.PRS.3PL
agricultor-es
farmer-PL
‘That is, these people are farmers’
f. aquí
here
est-án
be-PRS.3PL
llev-ando
carry-GER
zapallo-s
pumpkin-PL
‘Here, they are carrying pumpkins’
g. es-os
that-M.PL
zapallo-s
pumpkin-PL
que
that
han
have.3PL
recog-ido
pick-PTCP
llev-an
carry-PRS.3PL
a
to
252
8 Epistemic uses of PPl in La Paz Spanish
vend-er
sell-INF
a
to
la
ART.F.SG
feria
market
allí
there
es
be.PRS.3SG
con
with
su
3.POS
hij-ito
son-DIM
es
be.PRS.3SG
más
more
pequeño
small
‘Those pumpkins that they picked. They are carrying to the market.
There he is with his little son, he is younger’ (glossed)
h. más
more
pequeñ-ito
small-DIM
Yola
Yola.PN
‘Younger Yola’ (glossed)
i. hab-ía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
ten-ido
have-PTCP
dos
two
hijo-s.
child-PL
‘He must have (lit. had had) two children’ (glossed)
j. dos
two
hijo-s
child-PL
aquí
here
est-á
be-PRS.3SG
‘two children? Here it is’ (glossed)
k. ya
INTERJ
aquí
here
‘Yes, here’ (glossed)
Example (13) is an extract from the second stage of the FPPT. Here, the PPl is
the main verb of the utterance había tenido dos hijos ‘s/he must have had two
children’. The speakers placed the pictures of the story in the order shown in
Figure 8.2.
In picture 8.2a, a man sits talking to a woman and a boy. In picture 8.2b, the
same man is picking pumpkins in a garden with a woman. Finally, in picture
8.2c, the man, the woman and a small child are walking together down a road,
carrying two baskets full of pumpkins. After putting in order the three pictures,
the speakers imagine that the actions depicted in them are performed in a few
days, debe ser al día siguiente o más tarde ‘it must be the day after or later’. Fur-
thermore, by comparing picture 8.2a to picture 8.2c, they cannot help but notice
the presence of two children with different ages. This visually available evidence
produces the inference made by B that the couple has two children (había tenido
dos hijos).
If in the previous cases (example 12 and 13) the use of the PPl is related to an
ongoing inferential process, in two cases, the PPl seems to operate exclusively as
a mirative form indicating the surprise of the speaker with respect to something
drawn in the pictures.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 8.2: Pictures used during the second step of FPPT
(14) La Paz Spanish (5_SP_TASK: 5)
uuu
INTERJ
qué
what
pas-a
happen-PRS.3SG
aquí
here
a
to
su
his
mujer
wife
le
3SG.DAT
hab-ía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
peg-ado
hit-PTCP
ese
that
maricón
wimp
‘Uuu, What’s happening here? That wimp has hit (lit. had hit) his wife!’
In Example (14), taken from the first stage of the task, the speaker is describing
what is drawn in picture 8.1c. The use of the PPl, in this case, does not signal an
inference, nor is it possible to consider this use of the form as related to other
documented uses of the PPl in Spanish such as the expression of consecutio tem-
porum, politeness or habitual aspect. Given the linguistic elements that co-occur
with the PPl in Example (14), i.e. the interjection “uuu”, the appellative ese mar-
icón ‘that wimp’, and the exclamatory form of the utterance, the function of the
PPl aligns better with the speaker’s (negative) surprise of the man hitting the
woman in the picture. This use of the PPl could therefore be said to be an in-
stance of the mirative function, also conforming to mirative uses of this tense as
noticed for Argentinian Spanish (Bermúdez 2008).
254
8 Epistemic uses of PPl in La Paz Spanish
4.2 Secondhand reported evidential function
As a reported evidential, the PPl always signals second-hand reports, meaning
that the speaker reports something that s/he has heard directly from the author
of the utterance.
According to Spanish grammars (Maldonado 1999), indirect speech is construc-
ted through a conjugated reporting verb followed by the complementizer que
‘that’ and a subordinate clause, whose verb is conjugated according to specific
tense agreement rules. If the reporting verb is in the present tense, then the verb
of the subordinate clause will also be in the present tense, the simple past/pre-
sent perfect/imperfect, or in the future tense. In the subordinate clause, the use
of one tense rather than another depends on the original tense of the verb of the
reported utterance.
(15) La Paz Spanish (2_SP_TASK: 20), speaker A
uno
one
de
of
su-s
3.POS-PL
familiar-es
relative-PL
lo
3SG.ACC
ha
have-PRS.3SG
llev-ado
take-PTCP
prenda-s
cloth-PL
‘one of his relatives has brought him clothes’
(16) La Paz Spanish (2_SP_TASK: 20), speaker B
dic-e
say-PRS.3SG
que
that
algun-os
some-M.PL
familiar-es
relative-PL
fueron
go.PST.3PL
a
to
dej-ar-le
leave-INF-3SG.DAT
prenda-s
cloth-PL
‘He says that some relatives went to leave him clothes’
Examples (15) and (16) are from the fourth and the fifth stage of the FPPT,
exemplify the change from direct to indirect speech in Spanish. In (16), speaker
A is reporting to the fieldworker what speaker B told him during the previous
stage of the task (15).
The data contains few examples of the PPl as a reported evidential. In such
cases, the reporting verb is in present tense, as in (18).
(17) La Paz Spanish (10_SP_TASK: 10), speaker C
Dos
two
person-as
person-PL
van
go.PRS.3SG
trabaj-ando
work-GER
/ una
a
pareja
couple
‘two people are working, a couple’
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(18) La Paz Spanish (10_SP_TASK: 10), speaker D
ee bien
well
dic-e
say-PRS.3SG
¿no?
no
un
a
día
day
hab-ía
have-PST.IPFV.3SG
hab-ido
have-PTCP
una
a
pareja
couple
‘Well he says, doesn’t he? one day there was (lit. had been) a couple’
Examples (17) and (18) present a similar situation to the one already discussed
for Examples (15) and (16). Example (18) is a reported representation of what said
by the speaker C in (17). However, unlike Example (16), the use of the PPl in Exam-
ple (18) cannot be analyzed in terms of tense agreement, which is clearly violated,
but rather responds to the need of the speaker to distance her/himself from the re-
ported utterance. This distancing is linguistically expressed by a removal in time
of the reported utterance and the greater temporal distance between the verb of
speaking, dice ‘s/he says’, and the verb of subordinate clause, había habido ‘had
had’.
The use of two different tenses in the reported speech of (16) and (18), i.e. the
simple past and the PPl, respectively, depends on the epistemic-evidential func-
tion of the PPl. In both examples, the presence of the reporting verb decir ‘to say’
makes explicit that the information provided comes from another speaker and
that there is a subsequent epistemic distance between the speaker and the source
of information. By using the simple past (16), the speaker B does not add any fur-
ther pragmatic information to the story and presents it as a mere outcome of a
report. In contrast, the PPl in example (18) creates a greater distance between
the speaker and the information provided. This allows speaker D to (i) signal
that the story provided is a report, and (ii) maintain her/his own perspective by
specifying that what s/he is reporting does not represent her/his own words nor
her/his view of the story. In other words, the use of the PPl as the main verb
of the subordinate clause in (18) indicates that the speaker D does not want to
commit to the story told by the speaker in example (17).
4.3 Event types and participant roles in the evidential uses of the PPl
The analysis of the configuration of the pragmatic features involved in the use
of the PPl as an evidential produces two separate outcomes depending on the
evidential function expressed by the PPl.
When the PPl signals inference, as in Example (13), the participant roles of
animator, author and cognizer are placed with the speaker, since s/he (i) pro-
nounces the utterance in the real word, (ii) choses the words of the utterance
and (iii) makes the inference. The role of principal in Example (13), needs some
further discussion, however. Despite what is generally stated in the literature on
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the evidential use of the PPl (Speranza 2014), in the data from La Paz Spanish
there are no clear instances in support of the hypothesis that the inferential use
of the PPl encodes the speaker’s low, or high commitment to the truth of the
information, i.e. there are no instances of additional linguistic elements, e.g. tal
vez “maybe” or ciertamente “certainly”, that indicate the epistemic stance of the
speaker towards the information provided. This observation aligns with what
Cornillie (2009) states with respect to evidentials in Italian (examples 9 and 10)
that the inferring function of the simple future in Italian is not strictly tied to
the expression of commitment to the truth of information. Likewise, the inferen-
tial use of the PPl does not appear to signal degree of commitment, but rather
specifies the presence of an intermediary step, i.e. a cognitive process, in the ac-
quisition of information by the speaker. Consequently, the use of the PPl as an
inferential evidential does not specify the participant role of principal and the
form could thus be considered as epistemically neutral. With respect to the con-
figuration of event types, in Example (13) there is a clear distinction between the
narrated event and the speech event, since the action described in the utterance
refers to a world that is not related to the one in which the speech event took place.
The source event, instead, seems to coincide with the speech event; this overlap
is due to the fact that the process that leads the speakers to state their inference
is simultaneous to the pronunciation of the utterance. Finally, the configuration
of the commitment event – as already mentioned for the related participant role,
i.e. principal – does not seem to be specified in the inferential use of the form.
With regard to the evidential second-hand reported function of the PPl (Exam-
ple 18), as already mentioned, the difference determined by the use of the PPl in
Example (18) and the simple past in Example (16) lies in the different stance from
which the speakers produce their narratives. In (16), by using the simple past, the
speaker reports the story without adding an epistemic qualification. In (18), by
contrast, the speaker adds epistemic information to the utterance by using the
PPl. Such temporal distancing, allows the speaker to reduce her/his commitment
to the truth of the proposition. Regarding the configuration of participant roles, it
is relevant to notice that Examples (16) and (18) show different configurations. In
(16), the role of cognizer coincides with the role of animator, while author remains
separate and principal is unspecified. In (18), on the other hand, the configuration
of the participant roles of animator, cognizer and author is the same as in (16), but
the participant role of principal is present and coincides with that of author. With
respect to the configuration of the event types in Examples (16) and (18), it is im-
portant to note that in reported speech, the speech event and the source event are
always separated. In Examples (16) and (18) the narrated event is also located sep-
arately. The main distinction between the two examples, therefore, relates to the
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specification of the commitment event. While the use of the canonical reported
speech in Example (16) does not imply the speaker’s commitment, the use of the
PPl in Example (18) features a low degree of commitment by the speaker. Table
(8.4) summarizes the configuration of the event types discussed for the evidential
function of the PPl.
Table 8.4: Event types in the evidential functions of the PPl
Event types in inferential PPl Event types in reported PPl
Speech event Speech event
Source event
Commitment event
Source event
Narrated event Narrated event
5 Conclusions
On the basis of first-hand data from La Paz Spanish, this study details the uses of
the PPl and demonstrates that in La Paz Spanish, beyond its normative uses, this
tense is also used to express epistemic-evidential functions. In the existing liter-
ature on the Latin American varieties of Spanish, the PPl has been described as
a tense that can serve as mirative, reported speech, and endophoric evidentials.
The present paper provides new findings and demonstrates that in La Paz Spanish
the PPl is also used accordingly as an inferential evidential that has been previ-
ously unnoticed. The analysis also reveals that the form can convey more than
one epistemic-evidential function simultaneously, meaning that in these cases,
it is actually not possible to establish a sharp distinction between the evidential
function and the mirative function, since both seem to play an important role in
this use of the form. It is important to note, moreover, that in the data both the
mirative and the inferential uses of the PPl are strictly related to visual access of
the source of information. This last statement, to a certain extent, supports Hill’s
(2012) analysis of the mirative forms as markers related to sensory contact with
the source event. However, given the PPl’s attested epistemic-evidential func-
tions, it is not appropriate to consider it as a “sensory evidential” (Hill 2012), but
more like the Turkish -mIş, i.e. an instance of a “mediative” (Lazard 1999) form.
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A further consideration concerns the speaker’s commitment to the truth of
the proposition marked by an evidential. In its inferential use, the PPl does not
signal the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition and in these
cases, it only expresses inference without any further epistemic connotations. By
contrast, its evidential use as a (second-hand) reportative evidential, is related to
the expression of a lower commitment to the truth of the information provided. I
believe that this difference is basically due to the type of contact that the speaker
has with the source. In the first case, the speaker has visual contact with the
source that activates an inferential process based on the speaker’s own logic and
interpretation; in the second case, the contact with source is mediated and the
speaker is aware of telling the story that another individual has formulated and
whose accuracy s/he cannot confirm.
A final consideration is related to the absence of examples of the PPl expressing
other evidential functions, such as inferential reasoning, third-hand report, and
folklore (see Aikhenvald 2004). This absence could depend either on the nature
of the form that does not convey all the indirect evidential functions or on the
nature of the materials used to elicit the evidential forms used in this study. In
relation to this second possibility, I believe that two elements of the FPPT may
have influenced my results: (i) the predominant role played by the visual contact
in the development of the first four stages and (ii) the fifth stage producing mainly
second-hand reported speech. Although these two elements do not preclude the
use of the PPl with other epistemic-evidential functions in the whole corpus, they
certainly favor certain uses rather than others. More studies of first-hand data are
needed in order to improve our understanding of the epistemic-evidential uses
of the PPl in both La Paz Spanish and other varieties of Latin American Spanish.
Abbreviations
1 First Person
2 Second Person
3 Third Person
ACC Accusative
ART Article
CON Conditional
DAT Dative
DIM Diminutive
DUR Durative
EVD Evidential
F Feminine
FPPT Family Problem
Picture Task
FUT Future
GER Gerund
IMP Imperative
INF Infinitive
INTERJ Interjection
IPFV Imperfect
M Masculine
PL Plural
PN Personal Noun
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POS Possessive
PPl Pretérito Pluscuamperfecto
PRS Present
PST Past
PTCP Participle
REFL Reflexive
SG Singular
SUBJ Subjunctive
References
Adelaar, Willem F. H. & Pieter C. Muysken. 2004. The languages of the Andes.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Babel, Anna. 2009. Dizque evidentiality and stance in valley Spanish. Language
in Society 38. 487–511.
Bergqvist, Henrik. 2018. Evidentiality as stance: Event types and speaker roles.
In Ad Foolen, Helen de Hoop & Gijs Mulder (eds.), Evidence for evidentiality,
19–43. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bermúdez, Fernando. 2008. Había sido o no había sido, he ahí la cuestión: Plus-
cuamperfecto y evidencialidad en castellano. Studia Neophilologica 80. 203–
222.
Briz, Antonio & Universidad de Valencia. 2000. ¿Cómo se comenta un texto colo-
quial? Barcelona: Ariel.
Callisaya Apaza, Gregorio. 2012. El español de Bolivia. Contribución a la dialec-
tología y a la lexicografía hispanoamericana. Universidad de Salamanca. (Doc-
toral dissertation).
Cartagena, Nelson. 1999. Los tiempos compuestos. In Ignacio Bosque & Vio-
leta Demonte (eds.), Gramática descriptiva de la lengua española, 2935–2975.
Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.
Chafe, Wallace. 1980. The pear stories: Cognitive, cultural and linguistic aspects of
narrative production. Norwood, N.J: Ablex Publishing Corp.
Clift, Rebecca. 2006. Indexing stance: Reported speech as an interactional eviden-
tial. Journal of Sociolinguistics 10(5). 569–595.
Cornillie, Bert. 2009. Evidentiality and epistemic modality: On the close relation-
ship of two different categories. Functions of Language 16(1). 32–44.
Curnow, Timothy J. 2002. Types of interaction between evidentials and first-
person subjects. Anthropological Linguistics 44(2). 178–96.
Curnow, Timothy J. 2003. Non-volitionality expressed through evidentials. Stud-
ies in Language 27(1). 39–59.
de Haan, Ferdinand. 2012. Evidentiality and mirativity. In Robert I. Binnick (ed.),
Tense and Aspect, 1020–1046. New York: Oxford University Press.
260
8 Epistemic uses of PPl in La Paz Spanish
DeLancey, Scott. 1997. Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected infor-
mation. Linguistic Typology 1. 33–52.
Española, Real Academia. 2010. Nueva gramática de la lengua española. Madrid:
Espasa Calpe.
Faller, Martina T. 2006. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality at the Semantics/
Pragmatics Interface. Fall 2006 Workshop on Philosophy & Linguistics. http:
//web.eecs.umich.edu/~rthomaso/lpw06/fallerpaper.pdf.
Goffman, Ervin. 1981. Forms of talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Hanks, William F. 2012. Evidentiality in social interaction. Pragmatics and Society
3(2). 169–180.
Hengeveld, Kees & Marize Mattos Dall’Aglio Hattnher. 2015. Four types of evi-
dentiality in the native languages of Brazil. Linguistics 53(3). 479–524.
Hernández Alonso, César. 1986. Gramática funcional del español. Madrid: Gredos.
Hill, Nathan W. 2012. Mirativity does not exist: Hdug in Lhasa Tibetan and other
suspects. Linguistic Typology 16(3). 389–433.
Jakobson, Roman. 1957. Shifters and verbal categories. In Linda R. Waugh &
Monique Monville-Burston (eds.), On language, 386–392. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Kockelman, Paul. 1957. Stance and subjectivity. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology
14(2). 127–150.
Laprade, Richard A. 1981. Some cases of aymara influence on La Paz Spanish. In
Martha James (ed.), Aymara language in its social and cultural context, 207–227.
Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
Lazard, Gilbert. 1999. Mirativity, evidentiality, mediativity, or other? Linguistic
Typology 3. 91–109.
Maldonado, Concepción. 1999. Discurso directo y discurso indirecto. In Ignacio
Bosque & Violeta Demonte (eds.), Gramática descriptiva de la lengua española,
3459–3595. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.
Mendoza, José G. 1991. El castellano hablado en La paz: Sintaxis divergente. La Paz:
Univerisidad Mayor de San Andrés, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la
Educación.
Nuckolls, Janis. 2012. From quotative other to quotative self: Evidential usage in
Pastaza Quichua. Pragmatics and Society 3(2). 226–242.
Plungian, Vladimir A. 2001. The place of evidentiality within the universal gram-
matical space. Journal of Pragmatics 33. 349–357.
Quartararo, Geraldine. 2017. Evidencialidad indirecta en Aimara y en el Español de
La Paz: Un studio semántico-pragmático de textos orales. Stockholm University.
(Doctoral dissertation).
261
Geraldine Quartararo
Reyes, Graciela. 1996. Los procedimientos de cita: Citas encubiertas y ecos. Madrid:
Arco Libros.
San Roque, Lila, Lauren Gawne, Darja Hoenigman, Julia C. Miller, Stef Spronck,
Alan Rumsey, Alice Carroll & Nicholas Evans. 2012. Getting the story straight:
Language fieldwork using a narrative problem-solving task. Language Docu-
mentation and Conservation 6. 135–174.
Speranza, Adriana. 2014. Evidencialidad en el español americano: La expre-
sión lingüística de la perspectiva del hablante. Madrid/Frankfurt: Iberoameri-
cana/Vervuert.
Squartini, Mario. 2001. The internal structure of evidentiality. Romance Studies in
Language 25(2). 297–334.
Squartini, Mario. 2008. Lexical vs. Grammatical evidentiality in French and Ital-
ian. Linguistics 46(5). 917–947.
Willett, Thomas. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evi-
dentiality. Studies in Language 12(1). 51–97.
262
Chapter 9
Same same but different: On the
relationship between egophoricity and
evidentiality
Manuel Widmer
University of Zurich
Egophoricity (a.k.a. “conjunct/disjunct”) is a grammatical phenomenon whose
grammatical status generated heated discussions in recent years. While some schol-
ars have analyzed egophoricity as a subcategory of the well-established grammat-
ical category of evidentiality, others have treated egophoricity as an independent
grammatical category. This study aims at assessing the relationship between ego-
phoricity and evidentiality from a functional-typological perspective. The chapter
first discusses the varying structural complexity of egophoric systems against the
backdrop of typological models that treat egophoricity as an evidential subcategory
(e.g. Plungian 2010; San Roque & Loughnane 2012). It is argued that such models
fare well with complex egophoric systems of the Lhasa Tibetan type (see Tour-
nadre & Dorje 2003) but fall short of accommodating binary egophoric systems of
the Kathmandu Newar type (see Hargreaves 2005). In a second step, the chapter
takes a closer look at systems of the Lhasa Tibetan type, arguing that there are
Lhasa Tibetan-type systems in which egophoric and allophoric markers display
a considerable degree of independence, both from a functional and a structural
point of view. These observations provide substantial evidence for the claim that
egophoricity constitutes a functional domain distinct from evidentiality.
1 Introduction
Egophoricity (a.k.a. conjunct/disjunct) is a cross-linguistically rare phenomenon
that has so far only been documented for a comparatively small number of lan-
guages spoken in the Himalayas, the Caucasus, South America and Papua New
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Guinea (cf. Creissels 2008). The grammatical status of egophoricity is a contro-
versial issue that generated much discussion in recent years. While some scholars
have analyzed egophoricity as a subcategory of the well-established grammati-
cal category of evidentiality, which serves the primary function of marking one’s
source of information (Aikhenvald 2004), others have maintained that egophori-
city has a different functional motivation and should be considered as a grammat-
ical category in its own right. This paper contrasts these two approaches, argu-
ing that egophoricity and evidentiality are best conceived of as two independent
grammatical categories but still interact with each other in various ways because
they share a conceptually related functional motivation.
The chapter is structured as follows: §2 discusses some terminological issues
and gives a brief overview of different descriptive approaches towards egophoric
systems. §3 focuses on the distinction between egophoric systems consisting of
two markers and egophoric systems comprising three or more markers. It is ar-
gued that binary systems cannot easily be reconciled with existing typologies
of evidentiality, which suggests that egophoricity may in fact constitute a gram-
matical category distinct from evidentiality. §4 further develops this argument by
demonstrating that there are languages in which egophoricity and evidentiality
manifest themselves as structurally independent subsystems. §5 summarizes the
results of this study and highlights some directions for further research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Terminology
What is referred to as egophoricity in this chapter has been described under dif-
ferent names in the past. Initially, the phenomenon was known under the name
“conjunct/disjunct”, a term that was introduced by Hale & Watters (1973) and sub-
sequently popularized by Hale (1980) and DeLancey (1990). Since the 1990s, vari-
ous scholars have proposed a range of additional terms, either to refer to the phe-
nomenon itself, its subcategories, or both. Table 9.1 below gives an overview of
some terminological proposals (see San Roque et al. 2018 for a detailed overview).
The designation egophoricity, which is derived from Tournadre’s (1991) term
egophoric, has gained considerable acceptance in the course of the past decade
and is now the most widely used term. The term “heterophoric”, which was in-
troduced as an antonym of the term egophoric by Tournadre (1991), never gained
much currency in the literature. This is most probably due to the fact that Tour-
nadre himself abandoned the term “heterophoric” early on when he gave up his
dichotomous analysis of the Lhasa Tibetan egophoric system (cf. Tournadre 2008:
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Table 9.1: Selected terminological approaches to egophoricity
Author Cover term Subcategories
Tournadre (1991) –
“egophoric”
vs.
“heterophoric”
Sun (1993) “person”
“self-person”
vs.
“other-person”
Haller (2000) “volitionality”
“volitional”
vs.
“non-volitional”
Huber (2005) –
“old knowledge”
vs.
“new knowledge”
Creissels (2008) “assertor’s involvement
marking”
“assertor’s
involvement”
301, fn. 48). However, various scholars have subsequently reintroduced antonyms
to describe the antonymic value of egophoric in binary egophoric systems. These
antonyms are “non-egophoric” (San Roque et al. 2018), “alterphoric” (Post 2013),
and “allophoric” (Widmer 2017). In what follows, the terms egophoric and al-
lophoric are used to refer to the two subcategories of egophoricity.1
It is generally assumed that egophoric systems revolve around an epistemic
role that comprises the different speech act roles to which the relevant mark-
ers may relate in different pragmatic contexts (see below for discussion). This
epistemic role has been given a range of different names such as “locutor” (Cur-
now 1997), “epistemic source” (Hargreaves 1991, Hargreaves 2005), “informant”
(Bickel & Nichols 2007), or “assertor” (Creissels 2008). The present chapter fol-
lows Creissels (2008) in using the term assertor.
1Note that the terms egophoricity, egophoric, and allophoric were already used by Dahl (2000),
albeit in a different sense. Dahl does not use the term egophoricity to refer to an epistemic
grammatical phenomenon but to distinguish between two types of reference: egophoric refer-
ence and allophoric reference. The first includes reference to speech-act participants, generic
reference, and logophoric reference, whereas the latter comprises all other types of reference.
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2.2 Approaches to egophoricity
In the course of the past decades, scholars have proposed different analyses of
egophoricity. In early studies (e.g. Hale & Watters 1973; Hale 1980), egophoricity
was analyzed as a peculiar type of person agreement, an approach that has occa-
sionally been invoked by recent typological work (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004; Bickel
& Nichols 2007). Person-based analyses have in common that they focus on the
characteristic distribution of egophoric / allophoric markers in declarative and
interrogative contexts (see Table 9.2 below), which they contrast with the distri-
bution of person endings in ordinary person indexation systems.
Table 9.2: The prototypical distribution of egophoric / allophoric mark-
ers across clause types
DECLARATIVE INTERROGATIVE
SPEAKER EGO ALLO
ADDRESSEE ALLO EGO
OTHER ALLO ALLO
Whether or not it is feasible to treat egophoricity as a manifestation of the
grammatical category of person essentially hinges on how one defines the con-
cept person. A traditional notion of person that is solely based on the roles of
speaker, addressee, and other is not particularly useful for describing the distri-
bution of egophoric and allophoric markers. However, within the framework of
a broader definition that conceives of person as “the grammaticalization of con-
ceptual distinctions between participants involved in speech activities” (Bickel
& Nichols 2007: 220), it is possible to establish a link between person agreement
and egophoricity. Under such an approach, egophoric systems can be analyzed as
person agreement systems that make a binary distinction between the assertor,
viz. the speech act participant against whose knowledge a proposition is profiled,
and everybody else (see Bickel 2008; Bickel & Nichols 2007: 223; Creissels 2008).
However, this comes at the cost of blurring the fundamental distinction between
syntactic agreement (determined by syntactic roles of arguments) and pragmatic
agreement (determined by the identity of speech act participants and the type of
speech act).
Person-based approaches towards egophoricity offer valuable insights into
the different ways in which the participants of speech acts may be conceptu-
alized across languages. At the same time, scholars working in such frameworks
have often interpreted the assertor-based conceptualization of speech acts as the
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core function of egophoric systems. In other words, they have taken agreement
with the assertor as the primary function of egophoricity (see Bickel & Nichols
2007; Creissels 2008). This generalization is problematic for two reasons. First,
a person-based analysis may work well for languages that have highly syntacti-
cized egophoric systems, but it runs into difficulties when dealing with languages
that have egophoric systems that are based on pragmatic rather than syntactic
principles (cf. San Roque et al. 2018). Second, there is some evidence that ego-
phoric markers may not be invariably tied to the role of the assertor. One piece
of evidence for this claim comes from the Chibchan languages Ika and Kogi. For
both languages, Bergqvist (2012, 2016) has described verbal affixes that are func-
tionally reminiscent of egophoric / allophoric markers but appear to be sensitive
to the speech act roles of speaker and addressee rather than the epistemic role
of assertor. Another piece of evidence comes from the Tibeto-Burman language
Bunan. Bunan possesses the volitive suffixes -te (SG) / -𝑡ℎ𝑒 (PL), which indicate
one’s intention to perform an action (Widmer 2017: 555–556). These suffixes are
clearly modal in nature and accordingly have a different functional motivation
than egophoric markers (see below for a discussion of this aspect). However,
they still revolve around the epistemic role of the assertor (Widmer 2017: 453–
459). These facts suggest that the epistemic role of the assertor is not a part of the
functional definition of egophoricity but rather represents a distinct grammatical
phenomenon that can occur independently of egophoric systems.
In sum, person-based analyses of egophoric systems are rarely propagated in
the literature nowadays, most probably due to the analytical challenges outlined
above. In contemporary studies, egophoricity is commonly analyzed as an epis-
temic phenomenon, that is to say, a grammatical means to relate the knowledge
that is conveyed in a given speech act to speech act participants. These epistemic
approaches can be broadly classified into two types: (i) those that conceive of ego-
phoricity as a subcategory of evidentiality in the sense of Aikhenvald (2004), i.e.
as having “source of information” as their primary meaning, and (ii) those that
treat egophoricity as an epistemic category with a different functional motiva-
tion.
Approaches that treat egophoricity as a subcategory of evidentiality in a more
or less explicit manner are encountered both in cross-linguistic and language-
specific studies. Typological studies that are relevant here are Plungian (2010)
and San Roque & Loughnane (2012). Plungian (2010: 34) postulates an eviden-
tial subcategory “participatory evidence”, which indicates that a speaker knows
about an event because she / he was directly involved in it.2 Although this defini-
tion is reminiscent of the functional properties of egophoric markers, Plungian
2Note that Plungian (2010) adopts the term participatory evidence from Oswalt (1986).
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does not identify participatory evidence with egophoricity (which he refers to as
“conjunct/disjunct”). Rather, he states that egophoric systems are “not so much
related to the grammatical expression of evidentiality but to the expression of
person (i.e. that of the speaker)” (2010: 43), thus suggesting that evidentiality
and egophoricity are distinct categories. At the same time, he notes that the
Trans-New Guinea language Oksapmin possesses participatory evidentials (2010:
34). Indeed, Loughnane (2009) describes a “participatory-factual” or “personal-
factual” evidential category for this language. However, Loughnane (2009: 253)
also explicitly compares this evidential subcategory to egophoric marking, stat-
ing that “[t]he conjunct [i.e. egophoric] term in conjunct/disjunct systems [i.e.
egophoric systems] appears, at least in some languages, to be a personal eviden-
tial.” Accordingly, there is a link between Plungian’s (2010) notion of “participa-
tory evidence” on the one hand and egophoric marking on the other, even though
Plungian does not make this explicit.
In their survey of evidential systems in languages of the New Guinea High-
lands, San Roque & Loughnane (2012) follow Plungian (2010) in postulating an
evidential subcategory “participatory evidence”, which is used to mark events
that the speaker performed herself / himself or which are generally known to
her / him. Unlike Plungian (2010), San Roque & Loughnane explicitly link this
category to egophoricity (which they call “conjunct/disjunct”), stating that the
languages of the New Guinea Highlands “highlight the relevance of participatory
and visual-sensory evidentials to conjunct/disjunct systems, and suggest that in
certain cases “conjunct” and “disjunct” terms can be analyzed as participatory
and visual(-sensory) evidentials, respectively” (2012: 158).
Like Plungian (2010) and San Roque & Loughnane (2012), the recent typolog-
ically oriented study by Tournadre & LaPolla (2014) treats egophoricity as an
evidential subcategory, which they refer to as “egophoric” or “personal”. How-
ever, unlike the above cited authors, Tournadre & LaPolla (2014) additionally
extend Aikhenvald’s (2004) original definition of evidentiality from simply mark-
ing one’s “source of information” to marking both one’s “source and access to
information”.
Some recent language-specific studies that analyze egophoricity as an eviden-
tial subcategory are Loughnane (2009), whose work has already been mentioned
above, as well as Norcliffe (2018) and Floyd (2018), who describe egophoric mark-
ers as a part of complex evidential systems of the Barbacoan languages Namtrik/
Guambiano and Cha’palaa, respectively.
Approaches that treat egophoricity as an epistemic category with a functional
motivation different from “source of knowledge” have so far predominantly been
268
9 Relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality
applied in the description of individual languages, in particular languages spo-
ken in the Greater Himalayan region. Table 9.3 gives an overview of these ap-
proaches.3
As the table illustrates, most of the above cited approaches characterize the
functional motivation of egophoricity in terms of a binary contrast between two
different types of knowledge, viz. privileged / personal / old / internal knowledge
vs. non-privileged / objective / new / external knowledge. While individual ap-
proaches focus on different functional aspects of this dichotomy, it is clear that
they essentially all describe the same phenomenon, viz. an epistemic grammat-
ical category that is conceptually related yet functionally distinct from eviden-
tiality (in the sense of Aikhenvald 2004) and distinguishes between two types of
perspectives on knowledge: an epistemically privileged and epistemically non-
privileged perspective.
3 Different manifestations of egophoricity
In the languages of the world, we encounter two different structural manifesta-
tions of egophoric systems. First, there are binary egophoric systems, which in-
stantiate a dichotomic contrast between an egophoric and an allophoric marker.
Such a system can be found in Kathmandu Newar (Tibeto-Burman, Nepal). The
endings of the Kathmandu Newar egophoric system are illustrated in Table 9.4
below.
Second, there are egophoric systems in which egophoric markers directly con-
trast with two or more evidential markers. Such a system has been described
for Lhasa Tibetan, whose imperfective and perfective endings are illustrated in
Table 9.5 below.4
It is this variability in the structural organisation of egophoric systems that has
given rise to controversies about the grammatical status of egophoricity and its
relationship to evidentiality (cf. Gawne & Hill 2017: 295–296). The interpretation
3It is important to note that these descriptive models differ strongly from each other in terms
of terminology and the grammatical status that is assigned to egophoricity. Accordingly, it
would be misleading to think of these different models as a unified approach. However, it is
still justified to group them together since they all define egophoricity in a way that is not
compatible with Aikhenvald’s (2004) definition of evidentiality.
4The egophoric markers -pa yin and -byung are tied to different participant roles. The first
expresses an epistemically privileged perspective in combination with agents, while the latter
expresses an epistemic privileged perspective in combination with undergoers (Widmer &
Zúñiga 2017). The relevance of participant roles for egophoricity is not discussed in the detail
in the present chapter but briefly touched upon in § 6.
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Table 9.3: Non-evidential epistemic approaches towards egophoricity
Language Functional motivation
Kathmandu Newar
(Hargreaves 1991: 188,
2005: 31)
Bunan (Widmer 2017:
459)
privileged access to mental states /
knowledge
vs.
non-privileged access to mental states /
knowledge
Dzongkha (van Driem
1992: 112)
assimilated / personal knowledge vs.
acquired / objective knowledge
Shigatse Tibetan
(Haller 2000: 88)
Themchen Tibetan
(Haller 2004: 136)
Kaike
(Watters 2006: 304)
volitional acting
vs.
non-volitional acting
Mangghuer (Slater
2003: 194)
high degree of speaker involvement
vs.
low degree of speaker involvement
Kyirong Tibetan
(Huber 2005: 98)
old knowledge
vs.
new knowledge
Galo (Post 2013: 123)
internal knowledge
vs.
external knowledge
Tsafiki (Dickinson
2016)
knowledge inside one’s territory of
information
vs.
knowledge outside one’s territory of
information
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Table 9.4: The Kathmandu Newar system (Hargreaves 2005)
EGO ALLO
NPST -e -i
PST -ā -a
Table 9.5: The Lhasa Tibetan system (DeLancey 1990)
EGO DIRECT INDIRECT
IPFV -gyi yod -gyis -gyi yod-pa red
PFV -pa yin / -byung -song -pa red
of egophoric markers as evidentials is sensible and practical from the perspec-
tive of ternary systems of the Lhasa Tibetan type, in which an egophoric marker
like the imperfective ending -gyi yod directly contrasts with the direct evidential
ending -gyis and the indirect evidential ending -gyi yod-pa red. However, such
an evidential analysis is more difficult to uphold for a binary system of the Kath-
mandu Newar type, where one only encounters a binary contrast between the
egophoric markers -e (NPST) / -ā (PST) and the allophoric markers -i (NPST) / -a
(PST). Consider the following sentences from Kathmandu Newar below.
(1) Kathmandu Newar, Tibeto-Burman
a. Ji
1SG
wan-ā.
go-PST.EGO
‘I went.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 12)
b. Ji
1SG
mhiga
yesterday
then-a.
arrive-PST.ALLO
‘I arrived yesterday.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 13)
c. Cha
2SG
wan-a.
go-PST.ALLO
‘You went.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 12)
d. Wa
3SG
wan-a.
go-PST.ALLO
‘S/he went.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 12)
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As the examples illustrate, the egophoric ending -ā is used whenever the as-
sertor describes an event that she / he intentionally and consciously performed
herself / himself, while the allophoric form -a is used whenever the assertor de-
scribes an event that she did not instigate intentionally and / or consciously or
that was performed by some other person. Hargreaves (1991, 2005) has argued
that egophoric and allophoric endings in Kathmandu Newar essentially encode
an opposition of “privileged access” vs. “non-privileged access” to the mental
state that is associated with intentional actions. Egophoric markers indicate that
the assertor willfully instigated the event in question, while allophoric markers
indicate that this is not the case.
Hargreaves’ analysis can be contrasted with the evidential approaches men-
tioned in § 2.2, which analyze egophoricity as an evidential subcategory usually
referred to as “participatory evidence” (Plungian 2010; San Roque & Loughnane
2012). If one were to apply such a descriptive approach to the Kathmandu Newar
system, egophoric markers would have to be analyzed as evidential markers that
mark a proposition as being based on knowledge that was acquired through per-
sonal participation in the relevant event.
As far as egophoric markers are concerned, such a model can be implemented
without difficulties, as it provides an adequate functional characterization of ego-
phoric marking. However, matters become more complex once we turn to al-
lophoric markers. If we consider the Kathmandu Newar egophoric system pre-
sented in Table 9.4 as an evidential system and analyze the endings -e ‘NPST.EGO’
and -ā ‘PST.EGO’ as expressing “participatory evidence”, we also have to come
up with an adequate functional characterization of the contrasting endings -i
‘NPST.ALLO’ and -a ‘PST.ALLO’. Egophoric and allophoric endings stand in a salient
functional opposition and constitute a functionally self-contained system within
the verbal domain. If the egophoric endings are analyzed as evidential markers,
it appears conclusive that the corresponding allophoric endings should also be
assigned an evidential function. However, such an analysis poses difficulties, as
it is hard to assign clear evidential semantics to these markers. It is misleading to
characterize allophoric endings as direct evidentials, as they can be used in con-
texts in which the assertor did not directly witness an event. At the same time,
it is problematic to describe allophoric endings as indirect evidentials, since they
can occur in contexts in which the assertor directly observed an event.
Current typological models of evidentiality are not helpful in resolving this
issue. Consider the following table, which gives an overview of the typological
models proposed by Aikhenvald (2004), Plungian (2010), San Roque & Lough-
nane (2012), and Hengeveld & Hattnher (2015).
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Table 9.6: Selected typological models of evidentiality
Aikhenvald
(2004)
Plungian
(2010)
San Roque &
Loughnane (2012)
Hengeveld &
Hattnher (2015)
– Participatory Participatory –
Visual Visual Visual Event perception
Sensory Non-visual Non-visual Event perception
Inference Inferential Results Deduction
Assumption Presumptive Reasoning Inference
Hearsay Reported Reported Reportativity
Quotative Reported Reported Reportativity
None of the models listed above postulates an evidential subcategory that ac-
curately characterizes the function of allophoric forms in Kathmandu Newar or
other languages with binary egophoric systems. Most notably, Plungian (2010)
and San Roque & Loughnane (2012), which postulate participatory evidence as
an evidential subcategory and apply this notion to markers that have been de-
scribed as egophoric elsewhere in the literature, do not postulate another ev-
idential subcategory that would correspond to the allophoric forms in binary
egophoric systems. To be sure, San Roque & Loughnane (2012: 158) argue that
allophoric endings appear to be functionally equivalent to “visual(-sensory)” evi-
dentials in certain languages. However, as noted above, the allophoric endings of
Kathmandu Newar cannot be described as direct evidentials. One might maintain
an evidential analysis by augmenting Plungian (2010) and San Roque & Lough-
nane’s (2012) models with an additional allophoric / “non-participatory” eviden-
tial subcategory. However, as discussed earlier, this subcategory would be diffi-
cult to define with respect to its evidential value. These considerations illustrate
that it is difficult to maintain an evidential analysis of allophoric endings and,
more generally, of a binary egophoricity contrast of the Kathmandu Newar type.
Proponents of an evidential approach towards egophoricity might argue that
allophoric markers could be analyzed as “non-evidential” forms that do not ex-
press any epistemic semantics. Such an analysis, however, is at odds with the
fact that allophoric markers serve an epistemic function in the sense that they
express the assertor’s non-privileged epistemic perspective with regard to an
event. One might further argue that the epistemic construal of allophoric forms
only arises as a consequence of a generalized conversational implicature (see
Levinson 2000), that is to say, because they stand in direct contrast with ego-
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phoric forms. However, such a pragmatic explanation would presuppose that
allophoric forms are semantically less marked than egophoric forms. This asym-
metric relationship would be expected to consistently manifest itself in terms of
both form (the allophoric category should be morphologically less marked than
egophoric category) and / or function (the egophoricity distinction should be
neutralized in favor of the allophoric form in certain contexts) across languages.
However, there is no compelling cross-linguistic evidence for a privative seman-
tic markedness relationship between the domains of egophoric and allophoric
marking.
In sum, binary egophoric systems pose a challenge to evidential approaches.
If one analyzes egophoric markers as expressing “participatory evidence”, one
is confronted with the difficulty that allophoric markers, which constitute an
integral part of binary egophoric systems, cannot be adequately described un-
der such an analysis. This observation suggests that egophoricity may not be
an evidential category in the sense of Aikhenvald (2004) but rather represents a
functionally independent epistemic “package” that can be combined with an evi-
dential system, as the example of Lhasa Tibetan demonstrates. If this assumption
were correct, however, we would expect this functional independence to corre-
late with a certain degree of structural independence in ternary systems of the
Lhasa Tibetan type. This hypothesis is further explored in §4 below.
4 Structural evidence for an independent status of
egophoricity
4.1 Egophoricity as an independent functional domain
There are languages with ternary egophoric systems of the Lhasa Tibetan type in
which egophoricity and evidentiality manifest themselves as independent func-
tional domains. Such a system is attested in Bunan, a Tibeto-Burman language
of North India. The language possesses a simple egophoric system in the present
tense, in which there is a binary contrast between an egophoric and an allophoric
form, and a more complex ternary system in the past tense, in which the ego-
phoric form is part of paradigm that also comprises evidential markers. Table 9.7
and the example sentences in (2) illustrate the present tense endings.
(2) Bunan, Tibeto-Burman
a. gi
1SG
dzamen
food
noj
much
dza-k-ek.
eat-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG
‘I am eating a lot.’ (Widmer fieldnotes)
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Table 9.7: The present tense egophoric system of Bunan (Widmer 2017)
EGO ALLO
PRS SG -ek -arePL -ʰek -ʰak
b. han
2[SG]
/
/
tal
3[SG]
dzamen
food
noj
much
dza-k-are.
eat-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG
‘You are eating a lot.’ / ‘She / he is eating a lot.’ (Widmer fieldnotes)
Table 9.8 and the example sentences in (3) illustrate the past tense endings.5
Table 9.8: The past tense egophoric system of Bunan (Widmer 2017)
EGO ALLO
DIR INFER
PST SG -et ∼-men -dza -dʑi ∼-taPL -tsʰa -tɕʰok
(3) Bunan, Tibeto-Burman
a. Gi
1SG
dzamen
food
noj
much
dza-et.
eat-PST.EGO
‘I ate a lot.’ (Widmer fieldnotes)
b. Han
2[SG]
/
/
tal
3[SG]
dzamen
food
noj
much
dza-dza.
eat-PST.ALLO.DIR.SG
‘You / she / he ate a lot.’ (The speaker witnessed the relevant event.)
(Widmer fieldnotes)
c. Han
2[SG]
/
/
tal
3[SG]
dzamen
food
noj
much
dza-dʑi.
eat-PST.ALLO.INFER.SG
‘You / she / he has eaten a lot.’ (The speaker infers that the relevant
event must have taken place.) (Widmer fieldnotes)
5The egophoric past tense marker has the allomorphs -et ~ -men, whereas the allophoric infer-
ential past tense marker has the allomorphs -dʑi (SG) / -tɕʰok (PL) ~ -ta. The allomorphs are
lexically conditioned and depend on the transitivity class of the relevant predicate. Verbs be-
longing to the intransitive and middle class take the allomorphs -et and -dʑi (SG) / -tɕʰok (PL),
while verbs belonging to the transitive class take the allomorphs -men and -ta.
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As Table 9.9 illustrates, Widmer (2017) proposes a layered analysis of the past
tense system, with an evidentiality distinction being nested inside an egophori-
city distinction. This is not the only possible analysis of this past tense paradigm,
however. Non-nested approaches towards structurally similar systems have been
proposed in the literature as well (cf. Tournadre & Dorje 2003, 2008; San Roque
& Loughnane 2012; inter alia). Under a non-layered approach, the egophoric
form directly contrasts with a direct evidential and an inferential form. The non-
layered analysis of the Bunan past tense system is illustrated in Table 9.9.
Table 9.9: A non-layered analysis of the Bunan past tense system
EGO DIR INFER
PRS SG -et ∼-men -dza -dʑi ∼-taPL -tsʰa -tɕʰok
At first, a non-layered analysis of the Bunan system seems more parsimonious,
as it allows one (i) to reduce the number of epistemic subcategories in the past
tense from four to three and (ii) to reduce the number of epistemic categories
from two to one. However, on closer examination it becomes clear that this anal-
ysis poses a number of difficulties in the case of Bunan.
If one adopts a non-layered approach and postulates egophoric (EGO), direct
(DIR), and inferential (INFER) as directly contrasting values, it becomes impos-
sible to relate the past tense system to the present tense system, which merely
distinguishes the values egophoric (EGO) and allophoric (ALLO). In particular, such
an approach fails to explain how the value allophoric relates to the values direct
and inferential. Since a non-layered analysis presupposes that all of the aforemen-
tioned markers stand in a direct functional contrast, it entails that the values ego-
phoric, allophoric, direct, and inferential all belong to the same functional domain.
However, this analysis is at odds with the structural organization of the system,
in which the values allophoric and direct / inferential are in complementary distri-
bution. In order to maintain a non-layered analysis, one would have to argue that
the egophoric markers are “semantically hybrid” in the sense that they can both
contrast with evidential markers, which specify one’s source of knowledge, as
well as with allophoric markers, which express one’s epistemic outside perspec-
tive with regard to a certain event. However, this entails that egophoricity has
to be defined as a “fuzzy” semantic concept, as its subcategory of egophoric can
serve two different functions, depending on the grammatical context in which
it occurs. A non-layered approach towards egophoricity in Bunan thus raises a
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number of difficulties that can be avoided if one considers egophoricity and evi-
dentiality as two distinct categories that are independent of each other but stand
in a layered relationship.
It is important to note that the paradigm described in Table 9.8 is not the only
paradigm in which egophoricity and evidentiality manifest themselves as two
distinct functional domains. A structurally similar system is attested in the as-
sumptive present tense, which occurs in propositions that are based on one’s
overall knowledge of the world. In the assumptive present tense, the egopho-
ricity distinction is nested inside of the evidential subcategory rather than the
other way around. This is illustrated by the following table.
Table 9.10: The assumptive present tense endings
ASSUM
EGO ALLO
PRS SG -men -mendʑiPL -mentɕʰok
The following sentences illustrate the use of the assumptive present tense.
(4) Bunan, Tibeto-Burman
a. Gun
winter
eraŋ=maŋ
1PL.INCL=ALL
mu
snow
noj
much
ra-men.
come-ASSUM.EGO
‘In winter, there is a lot of snow in Lahaul.’ (Widmer 2017: 477)
b. Gun
winter
eraŋ=maŋ
1PL.INCL=ALL
mu
snow
noj
much
ra-mendʑi.
come-ASSUM.ALLO.SG
‘In winter, there is a lot of snow in Lahaul.’ (Widmer 2017: 477)
The difference between the egophoric ending -men and the allophoric ending
-mendʑi is so subtle that it is difficult to capture in the English translation. The use
of the egophoric ending indicates that the speaker makes this statement on the
basis of knowledge that she / he considers to be personal and intimate. The use
of the allophoric ending, in turn, indicates that the speaker makes this statement
on the basis of knowledge that she / he considers to be equally accessible to other
persons.
The assumptive present tense historically derives from a periphrastic construc-
tion consisting of the infinitive -men and an inflected form of the equative cop-
ula jen-. The originally periphrastic nature of the construction can still be seen
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in negated contexts. When the assumptive evidential present tense is negated,
the equative copula occurs as a separate phonological word and expresses the
negation.6 Consider the following example.
(5) Bunan, Tibeto-Burman
Khjak
here
ra-men
come-INF
men
NEG.EQ.EGO
manɖi=astok
Mandi=TERM
ra-men.
come-ASSUM.EGO
‘(These trees) do not grow here (in Kullu), they can be found up to Mandi.’
(Widmer 2017: 223)
Accordingly, one might argue that assumptive evidentiality in Bunan cannot
be considered as an evidential subcategory in its own right, as the relevant con-
struction is still partly periphrastic in negative contexts. However, in affirmative
contexts the nonfinite verb form and the copula have phonologically fused to the
extent that native speakers are no longer aware that the form originally consisted
of two independent syntactic constituents. From a strictly synchronic point of
view, it is thus legitimate to analyze the endings -men, -mendʑi, and -mentɕʰok
as nonsegmentable morphemes.
One might further argue that the notion of layeredness in itself is not a suffi-
cient criterion to distinguish between the functional domains of egophoricity and
evidentiality, as evidential subcategories can themselves display a layered struc-
ture. The Tibetan variety spoken in Spiti, North India, for example, displays a set
of perfect markers that combine the semantics of direct perception evidentials
with the semantics of inferential evidentials. Consider the following examples:
(6) Spiti Tibetan, Tibeto-Burman
a. khō
3SG
ārāk
liquor
tʰūŋ-wanuk
drink-PERF.INFER.VIS
‘He must have had liquor.’ (I can see it) (Hein 2001: 46)
b. khō
3SG
pētɕā
book
sīl-anak
read-PERF.INFER.NONVIS
‘He must have read the book.’ (I can hear it) (Hein 2001: 46)
However, it appears that layered constructions like the one illustrated in (6), in
which one grammatical form simultaneously expresses two different evidential
subcategories, are rare and combinatorial possibilities of such constructions are
6In Bunan, verbal negation is commonly expressed by the prefix ma-, which attaches to the
verb root (Widmer 2017: 429–432). In the case of the equative copula jen-, the negative prefix
has phonologically fused with the copula, yielding the negative copula stem men-.
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highly restricted. These restrictions appear to be a consequence of the fact that
two evidential subcategories have to relate to conceptually compatible informa-
tion sources in order to complement each other. For example, it is difficult to
imagine how a direct evidential contrast of visual vs. non-visual evidence could
be nested inside of an assumptive evidential construction, because the two sub-
categories presuppose conceptually distinct information sources, viz. one’s sen-
sory perception and one’s overall knowledge of the world. One’s overall knowl-
edge of the world cannot be accessed through any of one’s five senses. Accord-
ingly, there is no cognitive basis for implementing a direct evidential contrast
inside of an assumptive evidential construction.
Egophoricity, in turn, does not appear to be restricted in the same way and
can be combined with evidential subcategories that presuppose different types
of information sources. As has been demonstrated above, egophoricity opposi-
tions can host evidential contrasts that presuppose the direct perception of an
event (i.e. direct evidence) or the resultant state of an event (i.e. inferential evi-
dence) and they can also be nested inside of evidential subcategories that presup-
pose world knowledge about an event. One could of course argue that egopho-
ricity is combinable with so many different evidential subcategories because it
presupposes an unspecific type of information source. However, given the fact
that there is independent evidence that egophoricity constitutes an autonomous
functional domain that is distinct from evidentiality, it is much more sensible to
assume that egophoricity is so versatile because it does not indicate the source
of one’s knowledge but rather specifies the quality of one’s knowledge in terms
of a binary distinction between an epistemically privileged and an epistemically
non-privileged perspective.
4.2 Egophoricity as an independent morphological category
In the languages of the world, we also encounter epistemic systems in which ego-
phoricity and evidentiality manifest themselves as morphologically independent
subsystems. Such a system has been reported for the Barbacoan language Tsafiki,
which displays two different sets of morphemes to encode egophoricity and evi-
dentiality. As a consequence, the Tsafiki systems looks like a ternary system of
the Lhasa Tibetan type from a functional perspective, but differs from the latter
in so far as egophoricity and evidentiality are realized as distinct morphological
categories. This is illustrated in (7a)–(7c) below. In these examples, the markers
-yo ‘EGO’ and -i ‘ALLO’ occur in the morphological slot after the verb root, while
the inferential evidential marker -nu ‘INFER’ occurs in the morphological slot
following them.
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(7) Tsafiki, Barbacoan
a. La
1MASC
kuchi=ka
pig=ACC
tote-yo-e.
kill-EGO-DECL
‘I killed the pig.’ (Dickinson 2000: 412)
b. La
1MASC
kuchi=ka
pig=ACC
tote-i-e.
kill-ALLO-DECL
‘I killed the pig (unintentionally).’ (Dickinson 2000: 412)
c. La
1MASC
kuchi=ka
pig=ACC
tote-i-nu-e.
kill-ALLO-INFER-DECL
‘I must have killed the pig (unintentionally).’ (Dickinson 2000: 412)
In these examples, the egophoric marker -yo ‘EGO’ expresses that the assertor
intentionally and consciously killed the pig, whereas the use of the allophoric
marker -i indicates that the assertor caused the animal’s death by accident. Within
the domain of allophoric marking, there is an additional distinction between di-
rect and inferential evidence. The presence of the inferential marker -nu in (7b)
suggests that the assertor did not directly witness the pig’s death but only infers
what has happened upon finding the animal’s dead body, while the absence of
the inferential marker in (7c) indicates that the assertor observed the animal’s
death (cf. Dickinson 2000: 412). The combination of the egophoric marker -yo
‘EGO’ and the inferential marker -nu is not allowed (Dickinson 2000: 410–413).
This restriction does not come as a surprise, however. If a predicate takes an ego-
phoric marker, this presupposes that the speaker directly witnessed the respec-
tive events. In other words, the privileged epistemic perspective that is implied
by egophoric marking entails direct perception of the relevant facts.
One might argue that syntagmaticity is not a valid argument to distinguish the
two categories because syntagmatic relationships may also hold between eviden-
tial markers (cf. Aikhenvald 2004; Hengeveld & Hattnher 2015) and egophoric
markers (cf. Widmer 2017; Floyd 2018). However, the claim being made here is
not that markers belonging to the same epistemic category should not be able
to stand in a syntagmatic relationship with each other. Rather, the point is that
one would expect to find systems in which egophoricity and evidentiality are en-
coded separately if the two categories are conceptually independent grammatical
phenomena, and this is exactly what one encounters in Tsafiki.
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5 Discussion
The preceding sections have discussed the relationship between egophoricity
and evidentiality from a structural perspective and argued that there is substan-
tial evidence for the claim that egophoricity constitutes a grammatical category
in its own right. The arguments that have been brought forward in favor of
this position focus on different aspects of egophoric systems. §3 explores the
functional motivation of egophoricity by contrasting Hargreaves’ (2005) analy-
sis of the Kathmandu Newar egophoric system with an alternative “evidential ap-
proach”. The section argues that such systems cannot be adequately described in
terms of an evidential framework and makes a case for Hargreaves’ (2005) analy-
sis, under which egophoricity can be conceived of as a distinct epistemic category
with a different functional motivation. §4.1 discusses the structural organization
of complex epistemic systems that combine egophoric / allophoric and eviden-
tial markers. It is demonstrated that egophoricity and evidentiality constitute
two functional layers in Bunan. These layers closely interact but are ultimately
independent of each other. §4.2 adduces further evidence for this claim by dis-
cussing the case of Tsafiki, a language in which egophoricity and evidentiality
stand in a syntagmatic relationship, constituting two independent morphological
subsystems.
When considered in isolation, each of the three aspects discussed above may
not provide sufficient evidence to warrant the analysis of egophoricity as a gram-
matical category different from evidentiality. However, when taken altogether,
they make a compelling case for treating egophoricity as a grammatical cate-
gory in its own right. After all, egophoricity meets the minimal requirements to
be considered as an autonomous grammatical category. First, egophoricity man-
ifests itself as a functionally and formally self-contained grammatical subsystem
in languages with binary egophoric systems (e.g. Kathmandu Newar). Second,
egophoricity may manifest itself as a self-contained grammatical subsystem in
languages with complex epistemic systems. This may either be in the form of an
autonomous functional domain (as in Bunan) or in the form of an autonomous
morphological system (as in Tsafiki).
One could make an even stronger case for treating egophoricity as an au-
tonomous grammatical category if one could demonstrate that egophoricity and
evidentiality categories combine into paradigms in which they constitute two
orthogonal grammatical categories whose subcategories can be freely combined.
Such a hypothetical paradigm is given in Table 9.11 below.
However, evidence from natural languages suggests that egophoricity and evi-
dentiality do not combine into paradigms in which they stand in an orthogonal
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Table 9.11: A paradigm with egophoricity and evidentiality as orthogo-
nal categories
Evidentiality
DIR INFER ASSUM
Egophoricity
EGO … … …
ALLO … … …
relationship. Rather, it appears that egophoricity and evidentiality represent two
distinct yet closely related functional domains that can combine into a number
of different hierarchical relationships with each other. Evidence for this claim
comes from the epistemic systems of Bunan and Tsafiki, which have been de-
scribed in §4.1 and §4.2. In both languages, we encounter an egophoric system
in which the allophoric domain hosts an additional evidential contrast between
direct vs. inferential. This is illustrated in Figure 9.1 below.
EGO ALLO
DIR INFER
Figure 9.1: An egophoric system hosting an evidentiality distinction
In Bunan, we additionally encounter an evidential subcategory hosting an ego-
phoric system. This is illustrated in Figure 9.2 below.
ASSUM
EGO ALLO
Figure 9.2: An evidential subcategory hosting an egophoric system
The fact that egophoricity and evidentiality fail to combine into paradigms
in which they represent orthogonal categories is a consequence of their closely
related semantics. Both categories essentially serve the primary function of re-
lating the knowledge that is conveyed in propositions to specific speech act par-
ticipants. However, they diverge with regard to which aspect of this knowledge
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relation they profile. Egophoricity specifies the quality of one’s knowledge in
terms of a dichotomic opposition that distinguishes between an epistemically
privileged and an epistemically non-privileged perspective, while evidentiality
specifies the source of one’s knowledge.
The relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality is thus comparable to
the relationship between the well-established grammatical categories tense and
aspect (Gawne & Hill 2017: 299). In some of the world’s languages, temporal and
aspectual distinctions are intertwined in such complex ways that it is difficult to
tease them apart. At the same time, there is compelling cross-linguistic evidence
that tense and aspect are two distinct grammatical phenomena, even though they
may not be recognizable as such in all languages of the world. Accordingly, few
scholars would argue that one should abandon the distinction between tense
and aspect and, for example, treat aspect as a subcategory of tense or vice versa.
In my view, the relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality should be
conceptualized in the same manner. In some languages, egophoricity and eviden-
tiality may be formally and functionally integrated in one single system to the
extent that there is no reason to analyze them as separate phenomena. When de-
scribing such languages, it may be feasible and justified to describe egophoricity
and evidentiality as exponents of one unified grammatical subsystem. However,
when treating such languages from a cross-linguistic perspective, it is necessary
to make a clear distinction between egophoricity and evidentiality, as there is
compelling cross-linguistic evidence that they constitute two distinct grammati-
cal phenomena. That is not to say that egophoricity and evidentiality should only
be investigated in isolation of each other. After all, the two categories are closely
related from a functional point of view. However, the two categories should then
not be treated as one unified grammatical category but as two autonomous epis-
temic categories.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the relationship between egophoricity and eviden-
tiality and argued that there is substantial evidence for the claim that egophori-
city constitutes a grammatical category in its own right. The arguments brought
forward in favor of this claim are based on both functional and structural ev-
idence. First, it was demonstrated that binary egophoric systems are difficult
to describe in the framework of an evidential approach, both from a language-
specific as well as from a typological perspective. Second, it was demonstrated
that there are complex epistemic systems in which egophoricity manifests itself
as an independent functional layer or as an autonomous morphological system.
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Several issues could not be addressed in this paper for lack of space. For exam-
ple, the study has not addressed the frequently observed sensitivity of egophoric
markers to participant roles (see Bickel 2008; Post 2013; inter alia). In many lan-
guages with egophoric systems, egophoric markers can only be used in contexts
in which the assertor assumes a specific participant role, most often the role of
an agent (cf. Widmer & Zemp 2017; Widmer & Zúñiga 2017). While such “epis-
temic argument marking” (Bickel 2008) also appears to be relevant for evidential
markers to some extent, it is clear that the phenomenon plays a much more im-
portant role in the case of egophoricity. This suggests that the strong tendency
of egophoric markers to be tied to certain participant roles is a further character-
istic that sets them apart from evidential markers. However, further research is
needed to explore this topic.
Another aspect that could only be touched upon briefly in this chapter is the
status of the epistemic role of assertor in egophoric systems. As noted in §2.1,
there is reason to believe that the assertor is a grammatical phenomenon that is
independent of egophoric systems and, accordingly, is not part of the functional
definition of the category. At the same time, it is a fact that the vast majority of
the egophoric systems that have been described so far revolve around this notion.
This suggests that the two phenomena are strongly connected. The nature of this
connection will have to be clarified by future research.
Finally, this paper has primarily focused on the relationship between egopho-
ricity and evidentiality, thereby neglecting potential relationships to other epis-
temic categories such as mood, mirativity, etc. Evidence from the languages of
the world suggests that egophoricity may closely interact with these categories
as well. Future research into these aspects will further enhance our understand-
ing of egophoricity and related grammatical phenomena, thus contributing to-
wards an ever more fine-grained picture of epistemic categories and their mutual
interaction.
Abbreviations
1 1st person
2 2nd person
3 3rd person
ACC accusative
ALL allative
ALLO allophoric
ASSUM assumptive
COND conditional
DAT dative
DECL declarative
DIR direct
EGO egophoric
EQ equative copula
ERG ergative
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INCL inclusive
INF infinitive
INFER inferential
INTR intransitive
IPFV imperfective
MASC masculine
NEG negative
NMLZ nominalizer
PERF perfect
PFV perfective
PL plural
PST past
SG singular
TERM terminative
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Evidentiality, egophoricity, and
engagement
The expression of knowledge in language (i.e. epistemicity) consists of a number of dis-
tinct notions and proposed categories that are only partly related to a well explored
forms like epistemic modals. The aim of the volume is therefore to contribute to the on-
going exploration of epistemic marking systems in lesser-documented languages from
the Americas, Papua New Guinea, and Central Asia from the perspective of language
description and cross-linguistic comparison. As the title of the volume suggests, part of
this exploration consists of situating already established notions (such as evidentiality)
with the diversity of systems found in individual languages. Epistemic forms that feature
in the present volume include ones that singal how speakers claim knowledge based on
perceptual-cognitive access (evidentials); the speaker’s involvement as a basis for claim-
ing epistemic authority (egophorics); the distribution of knowledge between the speech-
participants where the speaker signals assumptions about the addressee’s knowledge of
an event as either shared, or non-shared with the speaker (engagement marking).
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